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Globalization is on the rise across the globe. In many instances, nationalism 
appears to be, too, as evidenced by the anti-immigrant and “nation first” rhetoric and 
success of presidential candidates, such as Donald Trump in the United States and 
Sebastian Pinera in Chile. However, the author questioned whether nationalistic attitudes 
are truly on the rise across the globe and what conditions cause some countries to shift 
toward nationalistic attitudes in the face of rising globalization, while others to shift away 
from it. She utilizes descriptive statistics, case studies, and fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis to analyze the conditions that influence how a country responds to 
globalization. The conditions under investigation include socioeconomic status, equality, 
immigration, cultural globalization, cultural emancipative values, and fear politics. She 
found that the combination of slow improvements in socioeconomic status coupled with 
the usage of fear politics leads to an increase in nationalistic attitudes. Conversely, strong 
improvements in socioeconomic status coupled with significant rises in globalization 
(without bringing about rapid cultural change) and leaders who do not use migration to 
instill fear lead to a decline in nationalistic attitudes. As globalization expands, it brings 
both problems (e.g., global pandemics) and solutions (e.g., Paris Climate Accord). People 
can respond in different ways – embracing globalization or resisting it. As nationalism 
often leads to violent and repressive acts against certain groups of people, it is important 
to encourage responses to globalization that are inclusive of all people across the globe. 
Encouraging strong socioeconomic improvements and working against the use of fear 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
Several years ago, while in Buea, Cameroon, I was sitting with a colleague from 
the local university. As we watched the cascade of people, cars, motorbikes, and carts, 
moving past us, he pointed to one particular man and called him a name that was clearly 
derogatory. I gave a puzzled look and he went on to explain that the person was adopting 
(what he perceives to be) the negative aspects of Western culture; in this case, that meant 
long dread locks, a t-shirt, and baggy shorts that were hanging well below his waist line. 
My colleague expressed serious concerns about how the West was influencing his culture 
(even though he also expressed a clear desire to visit the United States). He largely 
blamed the cultural shifts on the prevalence of Western television shows and movies. 
What he viewed as the most troubling aspect of Western culture to “invade” Africa was 
homosexuality. Homosexuality represented a much deeper layer of culture and was more 
threatening to him then surface level changes, such as clothing and hair styles. He viewed 
homosexuality as an entirely invented concept that originated in the West, but was 
influencing his culture through films, shows, and music. He saw this as a significant 
threat to his culture and a negative outcome of globalization. He blamed globalization for 
undermining African culture.  
 Globalization is indeed on the rise in Cameroon. From 2000 to 2014 (when this 
conversation occurred), overall globalization had increased 19% (KOF 2019). There is 
nuance within that figure though. Interestingly, interpersonal globalization, which 
includes international voice traffic, international tourism, international students, 
migration, telephone subscriptions, freedom to visit (number of countries for which 
Cameroon requires a visa), and international airports, increased 70% over this same 
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period, while de facto cultural globalization, which includes trade in cultural goods, trade 
in personal services, international trademarks, number of McDonald’s restaurants, and 
number of Ikea stores, increased by 106%. With these significant increases in 
interpersonal and de facto globalization, it is not surprising that someone would attribute 
perceived cultural shifts to globalization. However, according to the KOF index, de jure 
cultural globalization only increased by 17%, a much slower pace than interpersonal and 
de facto globalization. De jure cultural globalization measures gender parity, human 
capital, and civil liberties (including personal autonomy and individual rights). With a 
much slower increase in these measures compared to the actual cultural interactions, it 
would appear that the increase in global interactions was not causing substantial shifts in 
the actual culture. When people fear their culture is leaving them behind, it is not 
surprising that they would attribute it to globalization because of the surface level 
changes that they do see taking place.  
 Some may question how globalization – connections of people, ideas, products, 
and economies around the world – could be blamed for the erosion of local cultures, but 
it is a complicated phenomenon that is at times praised for bringing people together and 
providing access to goods and ideas from around the world, and at other times faulted for 
destroying national cultures and exacerbating inequalities. In the face of extensive and 
rapid globalization, a potential response is to revert to a more nationalist orientation that 
puts one’s own country and people first, in order to protect one’s own well-being, 
security, and sense of belonging. However, another potential response is to embrace the 
abundance of ideas and develop a more global world view that incorporates multiple 
cultural perspectives and perceives an equal moral responsibility to all human beings.  
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This dissertation seeks to develop a clearer and deeper understanding of the 
reasons why some societies shift toward nationalist attitudes and others shift away from 
them. The objective is to explore the conditions or combination of conditions that are 
present when a society shifts away from a nationalistic orientation, with the hope of 
better understanding whether interventions can be made to guide other societies towards 
that same outcome. The research question and hypotheses are laid out below, followed by 
an overview of the topic, a brief discussion of methodology, and details regarding the 
structure of the dissertation.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The various responses that a society can have to globalization serve as a necessary 
foundation for the specification, presentation and assessment of the following research 
question and hypotheses: 
Research Question: Under what conditions does a country shift toward a more 
nationalistic orientation in the face of increasing globalization? 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of decreasing socio-economic status, increasing 
income inequality, increased immigration from outside culturally similar regions, 
rapid globalization, and rapid changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a 
shift toward a nationalist political perspective within a population. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of rising socio-economic status, decreasing income 
inequality, falling or steady immigration (or from culturally similar regions), 
steady globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative 




Through the exploration of this question, the researcher determined whether each 
condition is necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant in leading to an increased proclivity 
toward nationalism (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). A very likely possibility through the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology employed in this dissertation 
(which will be discussed in further detail) is that a combination of conditions (or a few 
combinations) could lead to the same outcome, even if no condition in isolation 
consistently leads to such an outcome. Ultimately, people are seeking stability, security, 
and a benefit to themselves, so their response to an increase in globalization is most 
significantly driven by the conditions that affect their well-being and sense of security.  
Overview of the Topic 
Globalization 
Globalization is a frequently used term, but not always understood. Globalization 
describes the way countries and people from around the world interact and integrate. The 
history of globalization and how extensive the current epoch is compared to previous 
waves are often debated. While some scholars, such as Hopper (2007), contend that the 
world is in an unprecedented era of globalization in terms of the intensity, extensity, and 
velocity of the exchange of products, ideas, and money, others argue that previous eras 
were much more globalized than our current one. For example, Pieterse (2009) sees 
globalization as a long-term historical process because of human interaction that dates 
back centuries, while Giddens (1990) considers globalization as a consequence of 
modernity, which is far more contemporary. The researcher follows Pieterse’s argument 
that globalization has existed for many centuries. However, she contends that this era of 
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globalization is unique in terms of the depth of its reach to those beyond the elite strata of 
society.  
Globalization is sometimes understood to simply mean the increased 
interconnectedness of the global community. Arjun Appadurai (1996), one of the leading 
scholars on the topic, explains globalization as a series of processes that revolve around 
the movement of people, media images, technologies, money, political ideologies, 
religious ideas, and academic theories. However, simply having interactions across 
national boundaries does not equate to globalization. Those relationships must crystallize 
into structures and institutions in order to denote true globalization (Osterhammel and 
Petersson 2005). Some argue that the United Nations is an example of an institution that 
has crystallized as part of our globalized world, but others argue that the primary actors in 
the United Nations are still individual nation states, which supports the idea that 
globalization has not entirely transformed our world. The extent to which these 
relationships have led to globalized structures is a point of debate that will discussed 
further in Chapter 2.  
There are multiple dimensions of globalization – economic, environmental, 
political, cultural – that can all be examined and assessed independently, but ultimately 
are so intricately interconnected that all forms of globalization must be taken into 
consideration if any one element is under consideration. Economic globalization 
describes the development of a global economy and international trade. As a global 
economy, what happens in one country can impact all other countries. For example, in 
2008, when the housing bubble burst in the United States, it caused a recession that was 
felt around the world. Political globalization is best encapsulated by the United Nations, a 
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global institution that influences the world through rules and standards. Finally, cultural 
globalization refers to cultural elements and products being available outside their place 
of origin, such as Spanish soap operas playing on televisions in Cameroon with voice-
overs in English or French, depending on the region. Some refer to the possibility of a 
global culture, as cultures shift towards mimicking the dominant culture of the West, as 
result of influences through interactions and media (namely, television, films, and music).  
 As noted, though, each dimension of globalization does not stand in isolation; 
they are interconnected. For example, people may immigrate to another country, thus 
increasing their interactions with people from another culture. However, they may also 
send remittances back to their home country, which has economic consequences. 
American television shows often air around the world, which is a form of cultural 
globalization, but those are also the shows airing because of America’s economic power. 
Global institutions, such as the World Bank, collect, distribute, and control money around 
the world, while other global bodies are formed to discuss global solutions to world-wide 
issues, such as climate change. Even the proliferation of extremist groups who recruit 
members from around the world is a form of globalization, as cultural shifts can inspire 
extremism and advances in technology allow for connections to occur seamlessly.  
As one can see from the various examples noted thus far, people view 
globalization through very different lenses. Some perceive it to be a force that is 
elevating all people through increased wealth and access to a diversity of products and 
ideas. Others perceive it to be a negative process that is undermining local cultures and 
allowing only the rich to benefit from the global economy. Certain world events, such as 
the global recession of 2008, Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 
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September 2001, the increase of Islamist extremist jihadist inspired terrorism, and what 
some consider development of a McWorld (Barber 1996) have contributed to an adverse 
reaction to globalization in countries across the developed and developing worlds.  
A McWorld is dominated by global consumer capitalism, with comodified 
cultural products – McDonald’s, Apple, Hollywood – connecting us. McWorld refers to 
the ways in which these connections have led to a homogenized world through 
modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization. The ability to 
distribute cultural products around the world and enter extensive trade agreements and 
engage in global governance has led to what Barber coined a “McWorld.” This approach 
to understanding globalization has led some scholars to perceive that a globalist culture 
(or a single, monoculture) is taking over the world through the distribution of mass 
media, proliferation of the English language, and secularization. Hebron and Stack (2001) 
describe this negative view as follows:  
This foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with its 
materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and fraternizing of 
nationalities is a prescription of cultural genocide because of the process' potential 
to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human civilizations (as cited in 
Lieber and Weisberg 2002, p. 281).  
 
Some will point to female genital mutilation (FGM) being outlawed in certain countries 
as a response to pressures from Western culture as an example of cultural genocide. 
Others may point to the prominence of English language books, movies, and music in the 
French-speaking province of Quebec as evidence of an invasion and cosmopolitan 
consumerism. Regardless of the examples that one selects, it is unquestionable that 
feeling as though one’s culture is at risk of disappearing can lead to strong visceral 
reactions.   
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Despite the dire view of globalization that some hold, proponents of globalization 
point to the increased diversity of products available to people, the benefits of global 
trade, and greater potential for peace caused by increased personal interactions. 
Globalization allows for the creation of geographically dispersed communities, which 
may include religious and political extremists on the one hand or family members and 
support groups on the other hand. For example, family members who move to another 
location can still “see” their loved ones via video platforms right on their phone. People 
have even “live streamed” their wedding to allow friends and family from afar to feel as 
though they are there.  
With these various perspectives in mind, it is no wonder that Dani Rodrik referred 
to globalization as a “paradox.” Globalization has provided access to a range of cultural 
products to people around the world, but the economic benefits have largely coalesced 
around the wealthiest members of the richest states. For example, at the start of the 
Industrial Revolution (in the late 18th century), the economic gap between the richest and 
poorest regions of the world was 2 to 1. By the early 21st century, it had grown to 20 to 1. 
From the middle of the 20th century to the present, the world has seen tremendous 
economic growth, but that development has coalesced around a small group of wealthy 
countries. Most poor countries have been unable to close the gap. However, there are 
exceptions, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and China. All three of these countries were 
able to embrace globalization in a way that took into account their own culture, beliefs, 
and strategies. In Taiwan and South Korea, they limited import competition in order to 
allow their domestic industries to grow, meanwhile setting themselves up to be export 
power houses. In China, because their Communist Party did not support private property 
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or ownership, they created township and village enterprises (TVEs), which were owned 
by local governments, rather than the central government or private entities. TVEs 
produced a wide-range or products. Thus, while globalization has largely benefited the 
wealthiest countries, there are exceptions where countries adeptly utilized globalization 
to their benefit. As Rodrik explained, “Globalization is a tremendously positive force, but 
only if you are able to domesticate it to work for you rather than against you” (2011, p. 
146). 
Globalization is not inherently good or bad and its effects are felt and perceived 
differently depending on a person’s positionality, which is how their personal values, as 
well as location in time and space affect their understanding of and experiences in the 
world. For example, Derne (2015) found that most of the new, higher-paying jobs that 
were created in India as a result of globalization were only open to well-educated Indians, 
leading less educated Indians to feel “left behind” by globalization. A well-educated 
Indian who can take advantage of the economic benefits of globalization may be more 
inclined to view it as a positive force, whereas a person who does not have access to the 
new jobs may understand globalization as a force that is changing his or her society 
without any benefits. Needless to say, globalization is not a monolithic force with 
universal outcomes, so it not surprising that people respond to it in a spectrum of ways. 
Nationalism 
While many scholars have focused on the global economy and the economic 
impact of globalization, others have been more concerned about the cultural implications 
of globalization and the response to those effects. Recent political rhetoric and election 
results in countries such as Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the United States, and 
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Brazil appear to indicate a shift toward increased nationalism, possibly as a response to 
the perceived dangers of globalization, as noted above. National identity is a visible and 
strongly felt sense of belonging to a certain group (Hofstede 2010). That sense of identity 
involves a combination of citizens’ own image of their nation (Selbstbild) coupled with 
their perception or actual image in the eyes of the world (Fremdbild) (Rusciano 2003). 
Thus, as people interact more with an ‘other’, as a result of extensive globalization, their 
sense of national identity can be heightened and even redefined.   
When people feel their national identity is threatened, then they exert it more 
prominently and passionately. An example of this is the 2016 vote in the United 
Kingdom to leave the European Union, also known as Brexit. While there were many 
factors that influenced voters, one notable factor was an increase in immigration from 
cultural regions that are quite different from Britain. Some people perceived that their 
country was being taken over by people who were very different, and they began to feel 
out of place in their own country. Leaving the European Union was viewed as a viable 
option for gaining control over immigration levels and, thus, as a way of protecting their 
current way of life and culture. Being faced with “outsiders” in their own country caused 
some British to respond by exerting their own culture and voting in a way that would 
allow for further exertion of that culture.  
Many would dub those that voted to leave the EU as nationalist. Those who do 
“identify strongly with their nation-state” can be defined as nationalists (Norris 2000, p. 
159). In addition, nationalists “have little confidence in multilateral and international 
institutions, and . . . favor policies of national economic protectionism over the free trade 
of goods and services” (p. 159). This clearly describes many of the arguments that 
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“Brexiteers” made as they expressed a lack of confidence in the EU to benefit UK 
interests and the desire to make economic decisions that favored the UK, rather than 
Europe as a whole.  
It is important to note, however, that Nationalist and Patriot are not synonymous, 
as the later represents pride in one’s country and nationalist represents favoring one’s 
own country’s needs over all others. Nationalists are positioned in opposition to 
globalization and its domestic effects within a given country. Patriotism, or pride in one’s 
country, can morph into nationalism if people feel that their way of life is being 
threatened. For example, a patriotic American might cheer enthusiastically for the USA 
in the Olympics and even keep a medal count tally on their office door, while still 
identifying as a global citizen who speaks Spanish, enjoys music from West Africa, and 
wants her government to make decisions that benefit all people in the world. A patriotic 
America might embrace immigrants and see the value that they bring to her country, 
through their diverse perspectives, skills, and even positive impact on the economy. A 
nationalist, in contrast, might view immigrants as a threat to their culture and their 
country’s economic interests. While they will likely cheer for Americans during the 
Olympics, they may also view the Olympics as an unnecessary global institution that 
allows for excessive interaction between people from different cultures, thus negatively 
influencing one’s own culture. 
Research to date has analyzed the effects of nationalism on the perceptions of 
globalization, in terms of nationalism leading to heightened cultural protectionism 
policies, which restrict globalization in some ways (Bekhuis et al. 2013). Other research 
has examined shifts in people’s cosmopolitan outlooks in the face of globalization (Norris 
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2001; 2009).  However, more research is needed to determine how globalization affects 
nationalism and, more specifically, which factors within a country influence how its 
residents respond to increasing globalization. Are there certain factors, such as those 
related to socioeconomic status, income inequality, level of education, rate of 
immigration, level of cultural globalization, and cultural emancipative values, that make a 
society more likely to adopt a nationalist perspective in the face of rising globalization? 
On the other hand, is there a combination of factors that set the stage for a society to 
move away from nationalism? 
Methodology 
With the goal of filling gaps in the current literature, the researcher explored the 
following research question: Under what conditions does a country shift toward a more 
nationalistic orientation in the face of increasing globalization? The hypotheses are as 
follows: 
1). The presence of decreasing socio-economic status, increasing income 
inequality, increased immigration from outside similar cultural regions, rapid 
globalization, and rapid changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a shift 
toward a nationalist perspective and  
2). The presence of rising socio-economic status, decreasing income inequality, 
falling or steady immigration (or from similar cultural regions), steady 
globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative values lead 
to a shift away from a nationalist perspective. 
The researcher explored overall trends through quantitative data that compares the level 
of and changes in globalization with the level of and changes in nationalism, as well as 
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with the potential factors noted in the hypotheses (socioeconomic status, income 
inequality, level of education, rate of immigration, level of cultural globalization, and 
cultural emancipative values). The heart of the methodology though lies in 11 case 
studies, which will be analyzed through a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA) approach, which is described briefly below.  
 Before delving into the methodological approaches, it may be useful to describe 
some of the key data sources that the researcher utilized. The author will rely heavily 
upon data from the World Values Survey (WVS), which represents 90% of the world’s 
population and provides invaluable data on people’s attitudes towards various topics. The 
researcher utilized key questions from the WVS to determine nationalistic attitudes 
within particular countries. Another key data source will be the KOF Index, which will 
provide data on the level of globalization. The research will focus on a 20-year period 
(1997-2017), as it allows for the inclusion of a time period pre-9/11, which many view as 
a turning point for globalization and the world’s reaction to it.   
 To explore overall trends, the researcher conducted an analysis of WVS Wave 3 
(1995-98) and Wave 6 (2010-14). To determine the level of nationalism, she will utilize 
key questions from the WVS, some of which were selected based on past research by 
Norris (2000; 2009) and others that were selected based on the researcher’s assessment of 
their representation of nationalist attitudes. Additionally, she will use evidence on 
campaign rhetoric related to immigration, as well as election results. She will pull the 
level of globalization from the KOF for the same year that the WVS survey was 
conducted in each country for Wave 3 and Wave 6. Finally, she will use various sources, 
such as the World Bank, United Nations, Gini Index, and Welzel’s (2013) emancipative 
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values, to assess the various potential factors. The researcher used simple statistics to 
compare the various data points to determine the relationship between globalization and 
nationalism, as well as between nationalism and the factors under consideration. A likely 
outcome is that none of the factors independently correlates to an increase or decrease in 
nationalism. However, the second methodological approach, the fsQCA, will allow the 
researcher to explore if combinations of conditions impact the level of nationalism.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a methodology that allows the 
researcher to retain nuanced understanding derived from case studies, while still 
performing a systematic cross-case analysis that employees tools from quantitative 
research. The cases that the author will examine include two from each of the world’s 
most significant regions, with three from the West (characterized as Europe and northern 
North America), due to its vast geographic and historical diversity. The cases are as 
follows: Chile and Mexico in Latin America; China and South Korea in Asia; Turkey and 
Jordan in the Middle East; South Africa and Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 
Germany, Romania, and the United States in the West. An in-depth case study of each 
country will provide detailed context around their experience with globalization, as well 
as their response to it. The WVS data, along with campaign rhetoric and election results, 
will be utilized to determine the level of nationalism. Various sources will be utilized to 
delve into the conditions that the researcher has hypothesized may impact whether a 
country shifts towards or away from a nationalist perspective.  
The quantitative aspect of QCA takes shape through the quantifying of outcomes 
and conditions. The original QCA approach, called crisp set, forced researchers to 
identify each condition or outcome as a 1 or 0 (fully in the group or fully out of the 
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group). For example, if an outcome was the wealth of a country, researchers could only 
identify them as “rich” or “poor.” However, this study will utilize a fuzzy set approach, 
which allows for calibrating conditions and outcomes along a pre-determined spectrum. 
For example, the spectrum might include definitely rich, more rich than poor, neither rich 
nor poor, more poor than rich, and definitely poor.  Although this approach creates a 
more complex analysis, it also allows the researcher to retain more of the nuance that is 
derived from the case studies. The researcher will delve into each case for an in-depth 
understanding and will make comparisons across cases to determine whether each 
condition is necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant in leading to increased nationalism 
(Rihoux and Ragin 2009). A very likely possibility through the QCA employed in this 
dissertation is that a combination of conditions (or a few combinations) could lead to the 
same outcome, even if no condition in isolation consistently leads to the same outcome.  
Structure of Dissertation 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will review the relevant literature related to 
globalization, culture, and nationalism. Chapter 3 will detail the methodological approach 
(descriptive statistics and fsQCA), including the selection of cases and conditions. 
Chapter 4 will review the descriptive statistics and provide a base understanding of some 
overall trends. Chapters 5 through 9 will present the cases, grouped by region, with some 
initial observations made about each region. Chapter 10 will be devoted to a comparative 
analysis of the case studies through an fsQCA truth table, while Chapter 11 will draw 




CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nationalists tend to exhibit low levels of confidence in the ability of international 
institutions or international collaboration in solving pressing world issues. Many of our 
major global programs, from climate change to immigration, cannot be adequately 
addressed through a unilateral approach. Global solutions are necessary. One 
interpretation of nationalism is that it involves putting one’s own country’s needs ahead 
of all else, which can sometimes be at odds with global solutions that may be viewed as a 
short-term loss for one’s country, even if the long-term global gains are tremendous. 
In its rarest form, nationalism can also lead to damaging extremist behavior, 
including terrorism. In July 2011, Norway experienced a horrific mass killing. Anders 
Breivik killed nearly 80 people, most of them teenagers at a summer camp for young 
members of the social democratic Labor Party. His goal was to murder a guest speaker at 
the camp that day - Gro Harlem Brundtland, the first female Prime Minister of Norway 
and a strong supporter of feminism and multiculturalism. She had already left for the day, 
but Breivik still shot dozens of teenagers, often at point blank range. Earlier in the day, he 
had set off a bomb outside of the offices of the Prime Minister, who was a member of the 
Labour Party. He killed 8 people with that blast, although not the Prime Minister. From 
Breivik’s manifesto, we know that he was motivated by a desire to rid Norway of 
foreigners. He discussed his hatred of Muslims, as well as the “radical feminist agenda.” 
He held politicians responsible for what he termed “cultural genocide against the 
indigenous peoples of Europe.” After spending vast amounts of time online, he became a 
leader of the Knights Templar, a militant Christian group that had a goal of destroying 
every mosque in Europe and eliminating every Muslim (Schlosser 2015). He decided to 
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begin his “mission” by ridding Norway of those current and future politicians who he 
viewed as supporters of immigration and diversity. More recent attacks have made links 
back to the inspiration that Breivik has provided.  
Even world leaders are espousing fears about the potential loss of a nation’s 
identity and culture. In a February 2018 speech, Hungarian leader Viktor Orban said, “If 
things continue like this, our culture, our identity, and our nation as we know it will cease 
to exist” (Smith and Banic 2019). This type of rhetoric creates a “culture of fear” in 
which politicians find a way to profit from misinformation or myths about potential risks 
to a population (Glassner 1999). Both of these examples, however, that of Orban’s 
rhetoric and of Breivik’s attacks, are extreme forms of nationalism. It can also come to 
materialize in the form of voting against international treaties, renegotiating trade deals, 
or imposing policies that limit migrants’ rights. Not all nations, of course, have 
politicians who try to capitalize on the espoused threats of globalization and not all 
populations will succumb to this tactic. Some even become more open in the face of 
rising globalization. This leads to the question of interest regarding which conditions may 
be present when a country shifts towards or away from nationalism.  
 Before delving into research on the conditions that lead to a shift toward or away 
from nationalism, it is important to first explore the existing relevant theories and 
research that relate to said objective. Overall, this chapter develops and presents working 
definitions of key terms, then explores some of the relevant research in order to identify 
existing gaps in the literature. Globalization, Culture, Nation, Nationalism – these are all 
terms that lack a single, clear definition. However, for the purposes of this research, the 
author has adopted definitions of each of these concepts to allow for an explanation of 
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how they are connected. The goal of this study is to determine the conditions (or 
combination of conditions) that lead to a shift away from nationalism, as well as those 
conditions that might lead to an increase in nationalism in the face of rising globalization. 
This chapter sets the proverbial stage for this study by discussing the existing relevant 
literature.  
The research question for this dissertation involves an array of concepts; thus, the 
following literature review is broken into six sections: Globalization; Culture and 
Cultural Globalization; National Identity and Nationalism; Globalization and 
Nationalism; Cultural Change; and Contributions of Dissertation to Existing Literature. 
The first three sections strive to develop working definitions of key terms. To ensure a 
clear understanding of globalization, the researcher draws on a number of sources 
(Osterhammel and Petersson 2005; Appadurai 1996; Pieterse 2004; Hopper 2007) that 
explore globalization’s history, as well as theories that seek to explain the phenomenon 
(most notably globalists, skeptics, and transformationalists). Globalization extends 
beyond relationships and requires the crystallization of institutions that support those 
interactions between people. Ultimately, all forms of globalization will be considered, but 
cultural globalization is given special attention because it has the most visible effects on 
the behavior of human beings.   
In the second section, the author explores culture and cultural globalization. In 
defining and explaining culture, the researcher draws on the works of many scholars, but 
adopts Schweder’s definition of culture as “community-specific ideas about what is true, 
good, beautiful, and efficient” (2000, p. 163). Changes in these “community-specific 
ideas” can illicit strong reactions, which is partly why this research focuses on cultural 
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globalization, the dimension of globalization that is the furthest reaching in terms of its 
effects on the human experience (Rosendorf 2000). This section discusses three periods 
of cultural globalization: Pre-modern, Modern, and Contemporary. The Contemporary 
period in particular is defined by the intensity, extensity, and velocity of globalization, 
which has reached all levels of society for the first time (Hopper 2007). Finally, this 
section examines the theories of how globalization impacts culture: homogenization, 
diversification, and hybridization. 
The third section discusses the terms nation, national identity, and nationalism, as 
well as the processes associated with those terms, along with their implications. As 
leading scholars on the topic acknowledge, nation and nationalism are challenging 
concepts to define (Anderson 2006; Seton Watson 1977). A nation, for example, is an 
imagined community that allows people to feel connected to one another despite never 
meeting all members of that community (Anderson 2006). National identity is based on 
both a nation’s image of itself and its image in the opinion of the world; consequently, it 
can be shaped heavily by globalization and encounters with an “other” (Rusciano 2003). 
Nationalism refers to a strong identification with the nation, one that drives nationalists to 
put the interests of their own nation ahead of all else. This third section will explore the 
paradoxes of and approaches to nationalism, as well as its relationship with authoritarian 
populism.   
 This research aligns with the skeptical scholars who contend that, without 
globalized structures that eliminate or reduce the need for organization based on nation 
states, one cannot sustain a truly global culture; thus, there are still national cultures to 
defend. Although Hirst and Thompson (1996, 2000) acknowledge that there is vast 
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economic internationalization, the world does not yet have fully developed globalization, 
in which organizational structures move beyond membership by distinct states, there is a 
single world currency, and a universal language that all world citizens learn. More 
specifically, the fourth section on Globalization and Nationalism relies heavily on the 
contention that a common response to globalization is to assert one’s own national and 
cultural identities (Mann 1997; Tomlinson 2003). Barber (1996) notes that the 
homogenization (globalization) of the world in the areas of business and economics has 
led to jihad (or the resistance to homogenization through asserting one’s own national 
identity). In this instance, jihad is not used in the context of an Islamic concept, whether 
striving to lead a pious life (as most Muslims believe) or prosecuting holy war (as 
extremists view it), given that any state may experience it. This section also draws 
heavily upon research by Norris (2000, 2009), which is widely referenced, and Bekhuis, 
Meuleman, and Lubbers (2013), which is less well known, but directly relates to the 
questions posed in this project.  
 The final section on cultural change outlines some relevant theories on how and 
why cultures shift (Wilson 1997, Clifford 1992, Ervin 2015), as well as the impact of 
globalization on cultural change. This research draws upon reception theory, which 
contends that individuals interpret foreign products in ways that suit their own national 
culture (Kuppens 2013) and those foreign products often reinforce established values 
(Read 1979, Derne 2005). An important theory of cultural change explored in this section 
is Welzel’s “emancipative theory,” which outlines the role that receding existential 
pressures play in people’s shift toward prioritizing freedom, autonomy, and diversity over 
security, authority, and uniformity (2013). Once threats and challenges to survival recede 
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and people are secure in their ability to meet basic needs, it becomes more advantageous 
to shift towards emancipative values. The section concludes with a discussion of the 
varying ways that people respond to this type of cultural change (Norris and Inglehart 
2019).   
 The final section explores the contributions that this dissertation will make to 
existing literature on the topics of nationalism and globalization. There is some existing 
literature on the connection between globalization and nationalism, but it either needs to 
be updated or expanded upon. The goal of this research is to identify specific conditions 
or combinations of conditions that lead to an increase or a decrease in nationalism 
through the exploration of eleven cases. 
Globalization 
Simply stated, globalization refers to “multiple forms of global 
interconnectedness” (Hopper 2007, p. 10). More specifically, cultural globalization can 
be defined as the “increased flows of people, images, sounds and symbols” (Hopper 
2007, p. 3). However, it is also critical to note that multiple characteristics of 
globalization are intertwined: cultural, economic, political, and environmental, for 
example. One characteristic cannot be studied without understanding the processes 
behind the others. In exploring shifts in nationalist identities in light of globalization, the 
researcher considered globalization as the broader umbrella that includes all forms of 
such phenomena. However, when conducting the case studies to determine which factors 
within a country contribute to a shift away from nationalism, the forms of globalization 
will be examined individually.  Special emphasis will be given to cultural globalization, 
as recent research has connected a rise in populism (and with it nationalism) to fears of 
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cultural change (Norris 2016; Florida 2017) and cultural globalization has the most 
significant effects on the human experience. The connection between populism and 
nationalism will be further explored in the section on nationalism.  
Although much attention has been devoted to globalization in recent years, it is 
not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, the history of globalization is not universally 
accepted. While Pieterse (2009) sees globalization as a long-term historical process 
because of human interaction that dates back centuries, Giddens (1990) views 
globalization as a much more recent consequence of modernity. The researcher follows 
Pieterse’s argument that globalization has existed for many centuries. The question begs, 
however, “what is globalization?” 
As Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) explain, “‘Globalization’ implies more 
than just the existence of relations between distant places on earth . . . Relations have to 
crystallize into institutions in order to gain permanence” (p. viii). Rothschild (1999) also 
supports the idea that globalization is not a simple concept, noting that globalization 
moves beyond the exchange of goods or a comparative history. Globalization is a history 
of relations between individuals who belong to different cultures or who move between 
different identities, languages, countries of residence, or nationalities.   
 As Arjun Appadurai (1996) describes, globalization is as a series of processes that 
are all about movement, whether of people, media images, technologies, money, political 
ideologies, religious ideas, and academic theories. Appadurai (1996) suggests a 
framework of five types of global flows that may or may not be interrelated:  






(The first three are not all coordinated and can happen independently of one another). 
4. Mediascapes. 
5. Ideoscapes (e.g., Democracy, human rights, free trade, all of which may be 
adapted to the local). 
 
An example of the way in which these ‘scapes’ can interconnect is deterritorialization.  
Lower class workers migrate to wealthier countries where they face alienation and 
exclusion. They become discontent and critique host country ideologies. This diaspora 
borrows the response of their home country (ideoscapes). The diaspora connects with the 
home country financially by sending remittances (financescapes). Mediascapes then help 
to reinforce the ideoscapes, such as establishing a new nation state or a cultural, religious, 
and ethnically pure version of the current nation state.  
People can connect in many ways, on many fronts, through various ‘scapes’. One 
example in the West is Muslim diasporas in Europe – Muslims who moved to Western 
European countries from predominantly Muslim countries in the developing world, 
largely as a result of post-World War II guest worker programs in places such as France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. This also includes the subsequent generations of 
Muslims who were born and raised in Western European countries. If such Muslim 
communities are not integrated effectively into their host community and thus are 
marginalized, they may become discontent (Pauly 2004). This phenomenon of 
marginalization has been more prominent among Muslim youth than their parents’ and 
grandparents’ generations. Even though many members of the younger Muslim 
communities in Western Europe were born and raised there, some continue to be 
ostracized in their societies; with globalization, remaining connected to their country of 
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ancestral roots through media and money is simple. Ultimately, the combination of the 
absence of a sense of belonging where they physically live and the ease of connecting to 
where they feel a cultural affiliation can lead to strong resentment towards their perceived 
“host” country. Globalization allows for these physical, monetary, and idea connections 
to remain entrenched. 
 While examples of these types of connections are plentiful, there are various 
theories about the effects they have on the world. Within the globalization literature, 
there are three primary approaches: globalists (first wave theorists); skeptics (second 
wave theorists); and transformationalists (third wave theorists). Key globalist scholars 
include Ohmae (1990), Giddens (1990), Greider (1997), Held et al. (1999), and 
Guehenno (1995). The globalists believe globalization has reached an unprecedented 
stage in history that is changing the world order by diminishing the role and importance 
of the nation state (Giddens 1990). Ohmae views globalization as a force that is 
integrating global markets, increasing global governance structures, and expanding 
Western consumerism (1990). As Hopper (2007) explains, this restricts the autonomy of 
national governments in terms of the management and regulation of economic, political, 
and even cultural issues. Some states cannot prevent the influence of global culture and 
information flows into their territories. Globalists point to the European Union as a prime 
example of the challenge to sovereignty and autonomy that nation states are facing (Held 
et al. 1999). For example, the implementation of the Schengen zone in 1995, which 
includes many of the European Union members, allows people (both residents of one of 
those nations, as well as visitors) to cross borders freely throughout the zone. In addition, 
member states are held to regulations that the European Union establishes, such as certain 
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policies around immigration. However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
globalization has transformed people’s identities as global citizens (Norris 2009) and it 
can, in fact, solidify their sense of national identity. The skeptics are highly critical of the 
globalist position and they contend that the nation state is still the primary actor on the 
world stage, despite an increase in regional blocs (Smith 1995).  
Skeptics note the myths of globalization that portray a global economy. Scholars 
such as Hirst and Thompson (1996, 2000) note that global trade and finance is evident 
only in a triad of North America, Japan, and Europe, and is thus far from ‘global.’ 
However, one could also argue that the vast number of regional trade agreements, as well 
as the increased prominence of China and South Korea in the global market have 
expanded the number of countries involved in global trade and finance. Skeptics see an 
economic internationalization, acknowledging the current flows of money and people, but 
refute the idea of fully developed globalization. They go as far as to suggest that the 
period of 1870 to 1914 was more globalized in terms of the economy than the current 
epoch (Hopper 2007). Mann even suggests that a resistance to globalization has actually 
fostered stronger national identities (1997).  
The skeptics’ perspective raises “doubts about the extent of contemporary cultural 
change” (Hopper 2007, p. 7). Without truly globalized infrastructures, nothing can 
sustain global cultural formations. As Pager notes, only four countries have fully 
liberalized audiovisual services; all others reserve the right to engage in unrestricted 
protectionism, thus hindering the development of a global culture (2011). Even when 
people are exposed to elements of cultures beyond their own, reception theory suggests 
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that this does not result in movement toward a monoculture, as people perceive the 
cultural product through their own lens (Kuppens 2013).  
In contrast, transformationalists view this era of globalization as unprecedented in 
terms of the level of global interconnectedness and the extent of economic, political, and 
cultural flows (Giddens 1990; Rosenau 1997). According to Hopper (2007), 
“Globalization is seen as a powerful, complex and essentially indeterminate and open-
ended transformative force or process responsible for massive change within societies 
and world order” (p. 8). However, debates within the transformationalist community have 
festered regarding the relationship between modernity and globalization. Some view 
globalization as an outcome of modernity, with globalization bringing new forms of 
global interdependence (Giddens 1990), while others view globalization as pre-dating 
modernity, notwithstanding the fact that modernization has helped to accelerate 
globalization (Robertson 1992). Tomlinson summarizes the relationship between 
modernity and globalization by introducing the term “global modernity” (1999). More 
pointedly, the advances that modernization brought have allowed globalization to 
accelerate and reach a broader audience. 
Globalization has a vast history encompassing all forms of interconnectedness – 
most notably economic, political, cultural, and environmental. While all forms are related 
to one another, cultural globalization is of special significance in this research due to the 
strong feelings that it evokes and how those feelings relate to nationalism. When 
considering cultural globalization, it is important to consider and determine the nature 
and extent of cultural transformations.  Globalization is more than just relations or even 
the availability of cultural products; those connections must crystallize into institutions in 
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order to create lasting change. Scholars do not agree on the extent to which the current 
epoch of globalization has changed the world order. In fact, Hay and Marsh (2001) 
suggest that globalization cannot have causal effects; globalization is, in fact, the 
phenomenon that needs to be explained. 
Culture and Cultural Globalization 
Culture is a concept with many definitions. Gregory et al. (2009), in the 
Dictionary of Human Geography, define “culture” as a process of intellectual and 
spiritual development; a ‘way of life’; or work of intellectual and artistic activity. They 
note that, particularly in the West, it is viewed as a refinement of the mind. However, 
most social scientists see culture as something other than a “refinement of the mind.” 
Hofstede et al. (2010) define culture as the mental programming that individuals collect 
throughout life, including all of their patterns of thinking and feeling. They describe it as 
a collective phenomenon that informs human beings’ every interaction. It is learned, 
rather than genetic, and manifests itself through societal symbols, heroes, rituals, and 
values. Pierre Bourdieu (1993) developed a conception of ‘habitus’ to describe culture as 
a system in which people and groups develop shared cultural attitudes, but exhibit them 
in unique ways based on their distinctive situations. This definition takes into account 
that even within a particular culture, there are different ways of expressing and 
interpreting that culture. Culture is not monolithic in the way it is practiced.  
Because culture is such a broad, encompassing term, scholars will often focus on 
particular aspects of culture in defining the term based on their particular study or 
inquiry. For example, Harrison and Huntington (2000) define culture “in purely 
subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions 
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prevalent among people in a society” (p. xv). They chose this definition because their 
work focused on how culture affects societal development.  Schweder (2000), in his 
contribution to Harrison and Huntington’s Culture Matters, defines culture as 
“community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient. To be 
‘cultural’, those ideas about truth, goodness, beauty, and efficiency must be socially 
inherited and customary; and they must actually be constitutive of different ways of life” 
(p. 163). More pointedly, culture refers to goals, values, and pictures of the world that 
manifest themselves in speech, laws, and routine practices. 
Generally speaking, scholars and policymakers accept that culture is pervasive 
and important and is something that affects many aspects of the world and individual 
lives. Nevertheless, there is not a clear, concise consensus on what culture truly is. At its 
core, though, culture is an individual’s way of being. It is something learned, and 
something that can evolve and change over time. David Landes (2000), in his chapter in 
Culture Matters, describes culture as the inner values and attitudes that guide a 
population. Culture affects both one’s inward attitudes and outward practices. 
For the purposes of this research, the author adopts Schweder’s (2000) definition 
of culture (above) as “community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and 
efficient.”  The term “community specific” is especially important in this research, as the 
author delves into the concept of national culture and the fear of losing it. The researcher 
additionally understands culture as something that is not static or immune to outside 
influences. Cultures are constantly evolving, both naturally and as a result of global 
interactions.  As Hopper notes, “we often only become aware of our cultures when we 
encounter otherness or difference” (2007, p. 42). 
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Culture is especially important to this research, as the author contends that culture 
is the very thing that people are afraid of losing – more so than economic status and 
stability – which ultimately leads to a rise in nationalism. In addition, a more nationalistic 
orientation in and of itself can be viewed as a cultural characteristic. Naturally, an 
increase in cultural globalization as a specific form of globalization plays an 
indispensable role in this research. It will be examined alongside the other forms of 
globalization (political, economic, environmental), but, as Rosendorf explains, “Social 
and cultural globalization is arguably the broadest, farthest-reaching dimension of the 
phenomenon, if we limit our examination of globalization to the human experience” 
(2000, p. 109).   It is the dimension of globalization that can elicit the strongest reaction. 
The history of cultural globalization can be outlined in three phases: Pre-modern 
(prior to 1500); Modern (1500-1945); and Contemporary (1945 onwards) (Held et al. 
1999). The Pre-modern phase consisted of early human migration, the emergence of 
world religions, early imperial systems, and the development of transregional trade 
networks. The Modern period included European imperialism, an emerging international 
economy, international migration, development outside the West, the spread of 
modernity, the rise of the nation-state, and industrialization. The nation state paved the 
way for imperial expansion (globalization), but it also led to 
greater emphasis upon maintaining national borders, a development that inhibited 
freedom of movement and cultural diffusion . . . the consolidation of national 
cultures frequently entailed excluding those who were perceived as not belonging 
and the dismissal of other cultures as inferior. Thus the modern era witnessed the 
construction of ideologies of exclusion . . . other ideologies emerged opposing all 
forms of cultural mixing and miscegenation, . . . , which paved the way for 




It is sensible for one to question if the world is returning to a resurgence of the emphasis 
on national cultures and the exclusion of others and, if so, which conditions are most 
conducive to this resurgence. The Modern period can also be characterized by the 
technological advances of the late 18th century that allowed for “simultaneity,” a term 
coined by Stephen Kern. This meant that people around the world could experience the 
same thing at the same time (Rosendorf 2000).  
The Contemporary period has been “marked not only by the greater intensity and 
extensity of cultural flows, in the form of the movement of peoples, ideas, goods, 
symbols and images, but also by the greater velocity with which they travel from place to 
place, and is in turn serving to deepen forms of global cultural interconnectedness” 
(Hopper 2007, p. 29). For example, by the 20th century, people around the world were 
grieving the Titanic disaster by the next day; today, however, events can be live streamed 
with people around the world viewing one another’s experiences and others’ responses to 
those experiences in real time. Prior phases were limited primarily to interactions among 
elites. This phase is at the popular level; it is reaching the masses (Rosendorf 2000; Held 
et al 1999).  A valid argument can be made, though, that not all people are engaged in 
this “globalized world” in the same way.   
Some people (whether that is entire nations or certain populations within a nation) 
are actively involved in global networks, while others remain relatively excluded from 
the processes of globalization. For example, there are parts of the world that do not have 
access to media and rarely, if ever, encounter anyone from outside of their ethnic group. 
The most abundant examples come from isolated communities (rather than entire states), 
such as the Sentinelese on the Andaman Islands in India, which is considered to be the 
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most secluded community in the world. They rebuff any outside contact, typically with 
force, and their language is different enough from others on the island to suggest that they 
have been isolated for thousands of years. The Sentinelese, as well as other isolated 
communities, typically include relatively small populations – no more than a hundred or 
rarely up to a couple hundred people. There are also examples of entire nations that are 
isolated, such as North Korea, whose people do not have access to external media and do 
not have freedom to leave, outside of a privileged few. Largely, the citizens of North 
Korea, as well as those in isolated communities, are excluded from many of the processes 
of globalization. Nevertheless, overall, this phase of globalization has a far greater reach 
than previous epochs. 
Despite the reach of cultural globalization, there are different opinions on how 
globalization affects cultures. There are three primary theories developed to explain how 
cultures are transformed as a result of globalization: homogenization, diversification, and 
hybridization (Bekhuis, Meuleman, Lubbers 2013). Because global culture tends to 
follow the global economy, homogenization typically refers to “Americanization or 
Westernization,” in which one culture dominates by spreading its domestic products 
around the world (Beck, Sznaider and Winter, 2003; Crane, 2002; Holton 2000). Those 
who see globalization in this light often view it as encroaching on their own culture 
(Wise 2008). This is seen as a type of cultural imperialism, which assumes globalization 
is a one-way phenomenon. This notion is often supported by media scholars who note the 
West’s dominance of the global film and television industries, as well as international 
news services. This idea suggests a homogenization of the world, that the world will look 
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the same everywhere (Wise 2008; Barber 1996). This can lead to a cultural resistance, 
which this chapter further explores in later sections. 
However, according to Arjun Appuradai, “globalization is not the story of cultural 
homogenization” (1996, p. 11). He notes that there are multiple centers of cultural power:  
Koreans are concerned about Japanization; Sri Lankans are concerned about 
Indianization, and so forth (Appuradai 1990). It goes too far to equate cultural 
globalization with Americanization, or homogenization (Rosendorf 2000). As Holton 
explains, there are a number of multi-national corporations that are not America-based, 
such as Benetton, Nokia, Ericsson, and Bertelssman (2000). Benetton projects a 
multicultural image; Ericsson does not standardize products and does marketing, design, 
and production that is catered to different consumer demands. It has a global theme, but 
is local in design and content.   
If globalization does not equate with a homogenization of culture, then that leaves 
two primary alternatives: diversification and hybridization. Diversification refers to a 
state in which the supply from around the world increases (Crane, 2002; Pieterse, 1995). 
Going a step further is polarization in which each culture retains its own identity (like 
with diversification), but those identities are heightened. Polarization can result in 
nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and identity politics, all of which can now be spread by 
technology, in addition to intercultural interactions (Holton 2000). Huntington and Barber 
all saw the world as dichotomous. Huntington anticipated that the end of the Cold War 
would bring a global conflict consisting of culture wars between the West and the non-
West. He foresaw an Islamic resurgence in response to Western domination and an 
attempt to homogenize culture (Huntington 1996). Similarly, Barber saw a conflict 
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between McWorld and jihad. McWorld represents global consumer capitalism – 
McDonald’s, Apple, MTV – comodified cultural products that connect us, whereas jihad 
represents justice for the downtrodden (Barber 1995). They do not see evidence of a 
global culture, but rather distinct cultures that are intensifying. According to Holton, 
“Culture, it seems, is harder to globalize than politics or economic activity” (2000, p. 
145). However, there are critics of the polarization theory because there is evidence of 
identities that cross regions (such as Rastifarian culture, which started in the Afro-
Carribean, but is present in major capital cities around the world); diasporas around the 
world; and hybrid cultural forms. 
The final theory of cultural globalization is hybridization, which refers to 
imported cultures blending with existing cultures, creating new cultural forms and 
products (creolization) so that there are no more authentic, distinct cultures (Pieterse, 
2009; Robertson, 1995). Even when one nation conquers another, it often results in a 
blending of cultures. For example, when the British Empire invaded India, the British 
incorporated some Eastern elements into their Western spiritual practices (Holton 2000). 
Hybridization is most successful in certain realms, such as music, art, literature, religious 
life and it typically leads to hyphenated identities rather than new cultural identities. 
Regardless of how people perceive globalization to affect culture, if they view 
cultural change as something negative, they may experience globalization as a threat to 
their local and national culture and, thus, increase support for cultural protectionism 
(Bekhuis, Meuleman, and Lubbers 2013, p. 1042). As Gerbner explains, “cultivation 
theorists” believe consumers of cultural products from foreign countries may construct a 
reality based on those products. That is one reason why cultural protectionists view 
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foreign products as threatening national cultures (1973). Even in light of “free trade,” 
there are “cultural exceptions” because of these fears of cultural changes (Pager 2011). 
Many people whose understanding of globalization comes from the media or politicians 
understand it as lay people understand it—as “a process that erodes national boundaries, 
integrating national economies, cultures, technologies, and governance, producing 
complex relations of mutual interdependence” (Norris 2000, p. 155). This level of 
uncertainty can be alarming and can cause people to retreat into their own country and 
develop a greater reliance on their own nation. 
National Identity and Nationalism 
Some of the leading scholars on the concepts of nation and nationalism have 
concluded that these are challenging terms to define and analyze (Anderson 2006; Seton-
Watson 1977). Seton-Watson even concedes that “nation” has no scientific definition, 
even though “the phenomenon has existed and exists” (1977, p. 5). Nevertheless, the 
author will endeavor to establish working definitions of nation, national identity, and 
nationalism for the purposes of this research.  
According to Seton-Watson, “a nation exists when a significant number of people 
in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one” 
(1977, p. 5). This is equivalent to saying that a nation is formed if the people forming it 
think they have formed one. Some additional context around the origins of the concept of 
nation is useful to consider along with this definition. With the Enlightenment and the 
decline of religion, the world craved a new (secular) way of transforming mortality into 
continuity. Religion has previously answered questions about mortality. The idea of a 
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nation filled this void (Anderson 2006). The nation provided a way for a person to feel as 
though they could “live on” through the continued existence of their nation.  
Quite notably, Anderson describes a nation as an “imagined community” – one 
that is both limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members never meet most of 
their fellow members of the national community. The image of their community lives 
within their minds. All communities are imagined unless all members know one another 
(Anderson 2006).  This imagined nation is limited because even the largest nations have 
an outside boundary; there are other nations beyond; no nation considers itself to be 
synonymous with mankind.  The imagined nation is sovereign because no monarchy can 
claim authority over a nation, as they use to do when the monarchy was assumed to 
represent God’s authority. Interestingly, the imagined nation is a community because it is 
imagined as a “deep, horizontal comradeship,” despite actual inequalities (Anderson 
2006, p. 7). People perceive all members of their nation to be equal; those who are not 
considered to be the same are not considered to be part of the nation. This deep 
comradeship makes is possible for people to be willing to die for their nation. Clearly, 
based on this discussion of what it means to be a nation, the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are 
not synonymous. A nation can be formed that does not align with the political boundaries 
of a state. ‘Nation’ may refer to a territorial area, one’s citizenship, or ethnic ties based on 
religion and/or language. However, for the purposes of this research, the author will focus 
on the political notion of a nation-state, in part because most data are categorized by 
state. 
Similarly to nation, identity is a fairly complex term, with various definitions and 
understandings based on one’s theoretical framework and purpose for examining identity. 
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According to Hofstede et al, simply put, “Identity answers the question: ‘To which group 
do I belong?’” (2010, p. 22). Identity is something visible and often strongly felt by 
members of a certain identity group and those outside of that group. Identity differs from 
culture in that the base of identity is in the practices, rather than the values, and there can 
be many identities within a culture (Hofstede 2010). It is less about one’s values and 
beliefs and more about how those values are portrayed to the outside world. People with 
shared values can present those values in very different ways and contexts based on their 
identities. Identity is who we are, how others represent us, and how that representation 
affects one’s self-image. Identity can shift when encountering the other; certain aspects of 
one’s identity may be heightened or weakened. For example, before leaving one’s 
country, a person may choose to identify with their ancestral roots (such as an American 
identifying as Italian or Irish). However, when that person leaves her country to visit 
another, and she encounters others who are not from her nation, she may shift to 
identifying herself by her current nation (in this example, America).  
National identity, according to global opinion theory, is actually derived from a 
negotiation between Selbstbild (the image citizens have of their own nation) and 
Fremdbild (a nation’s perceived or actual international image in world opinion) 
(Rusciano 2003). Thus, national identity can be shaped and influenced by encounters 
with an ‘other,’ which increase with extensive globalization. When people feel their 
national identity is threatened, then they exert it more. For example, Fuligni and Tsai 
found that when immigrants are recognizable minorities in their host societies, it creates 
the sense of a threat, which enhances their internal group identification (2015). Going 
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further, when people perceive globalization as a threat to their culture, it may increase 
their connection to their national identity. 
National identity can also be heightened when politicians tap into it for their own 
political gain by creating a culture of fear. Prior to the Rwandan genocide, President 
Habyarimana made accusations about the Tutsi who were in exile in Uganda, claiming 
that they would return to Rwanda to disenfranchise the Hutu majority. He spread fear 
about the Arusha Accords, which were designed to end the civil war within Rwanda, 
claiming that power would return to the Tutsi elite. By creating a culture of fear, 
Habyarimana moved towards extremism, which led to the creation of Hutu Power. 
Eventually, a militia, the Interhamwe, was formed by pulling together mostly young, 
unemployed men who longed for a sense of purpose, which the Hutu Power movement 
provided (Kakwensire and Kamukama 2001). This is just one of many examples of how 
national identity has been heightened through fear politics.  
More recent examples of exploiting national identity through fear politics include 
President Trump’s claims about the threats posed by migrants crossing from the southern 
border of the United States. This is despite the fact that most illegal immigrants entered 
the United States legally and have over-stayed their visa; most drugs enter the U.S. at 
legal ports of entry; and relatively few crimes are committed by migrants, as compared to 
native born citizens (McMinn and Klahr 2019; Gomez 2019; JustFacts 2019 ). This type 
of rhetoric about migrants can lead to emotion-laden symbols of fear, hatred, and 
resentment (Kaufman 2001), all of which can lead to nationalism.  
Those who do “identify strongly with their nation-state” can be defined as 
nationalists (Norris 2000, p. 159). Nationalism emerged in the late 18th century in 
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response to an array of historical forces, but soon became ‘modular’ and capable of being 
transplanted to various social terrains. Anderson identified three paradoxes of 
nationalism: 
1. The ‘modernity’ of the concept according to historians, but the presumed 
‘antiquity’ in the eyes of nationalists.  
2. The universality of nationalism as a concept, but the uniqueness of each 
nation in terms of how it manifests itself. 
3. The political power of nationalism, but its lack of a clear definition (2006).  
As previously established, the term nation does not have a fully agreed upon, scientific 
definition, nor does nationalism. Norris has developed some characteristics of what a 
“nationalist” may think. According to Norris, nationalists “have little confidence in 
multilateral and international institutions, and . . . favor policies of national economic 
protectionism over the free trade of goods and services” (p. 159). Nationalism is the state 
of being in which national initiatives are favored over international, multilateral 
initiatives. Typically, nationalism interferes with a nation-state’s ability to cope with 
internationalism because these two concepts are difficult to reconcile (Saich 2000). 
Nationalistic and Patriotic, however, are not synonymous, as the later represents pride in 
one’s country and nationalist represents favoring one’s own country’s needs over all 
others. Nationalists are positioned in opposition to globalization. 
Nationalism may be actively promoted by the nation-state, such as in China, or it 
may be a sentiment that individuals within a nation-state have developed. The China 
Communist Party (CCP) exerts tight control over the media. For example, there are over 
25,000 newspapers and magazines in China, but government authorities determine the 
issues on which they can report. Beijing also censors television news coverage. The State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and TV has even told TV presenters to cease their 
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imitation of Western appearance and manner and to avoid the use of English words 
(Watts 2004). China is not alone in its defense of nationalism. States such as Singapore, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan have also regularly defended the protections they put 
in place to guard their cultural practices because they believe their cultural practices are 
superior to liberal cultural values and that outsiders do not have a right to interfere in 
their internal affairs (Applbaum 2000). According to Applbaum, on the basis of cultural 
background being necessary for personhood, “governments are justified in restricting at 
least some important individual liberties in order to protect distinctive cultural practices 
from the homogenizing press of globalization . . . cultural rights have priority over 
individual rights” (2000, p. 319-320). For example, the Quebecois promote the French 
language and try to limit the dominance of English. They could restrict the import of 
English products to achieve this goal and protect their culture. As Crane describes, these 
cultural protectionist policies typically have three goals: 
1). Protecting the country’s culture from domination by the cultural achievements 
of other countries and from encroachments by the media industries of other 
countries; 2). Creating and maintaining international images of the country or of a 
region or city within the country; and 3). Developing and protecting international 
markets and venues for the country’s international “exports” (2002, p. 13). 
 
In the most extreme forms of cultural protectionism, regimes remove all foreign 
influences, which Norris and Inglehardt refer to as the Taliban effect because of the 
Taliban’s extreme actions towards protecting the culture of their nation at the exclusion 
of all other cultures (2009). 
It is important here to pause and take note of the relationship between nationalism 
and authoritarian-populism. These two concepts are often conflated as one in the same 
 
40 
and both are receiving a great deal of media attention at present. Populism and 
authoritarianism first need to be defined separately, as they are also not synonymous with 
one another. Populism refers to a movement that challenges the “establishment” – elites 
who have played a significant role in politics for years. The legitimacy of populists 
spawns from the idea that they represent popular sovereignty and, thus, can override 
minority rights, standard processes, and checks-and-balances.   
Authoritarian leadership focuses on the need for security against outside threats, 
aligning with traditional cultural norms, and xenophobic nationalism. Authoritarian-
populism has three primary components: security against instability and insecurity (often 
related to immigration and terrorism), conformity to preserve traditional moral values, 
and obedience toward those leaders who claim to protect the group and “its ways.” 
Authoritarianism prioritizes the group (often the nation) and preserving moral norms and 
security from outsiders over individual rights and freedoms (Norris and Inglehardt 2019). 
Authoritarian populism combines these two concepts. According to Norris and 
Inglehardt, it “favors policies where the state actively intervenes to restrict non-traditional 
lifestyles, typically by limiting same sex marriage, LGBTQ rights and gender equity, 
access to contraception and abortion, and affirmative action or quotas “ (2019, pp. 9-10). 
These restrictions are put in place to retain the cultural values that those in power view as 
critical to the nation. 
Nationalism is more of a mind-set about the need to protect one’s own national 
culture and overall interests, putting one’s own national needs above all else, whereas 
authoritarian-populism encompasses the strategy for achieving nationalistic goals.  It is 
critical to note that populism is not always tied to authoritarianism, as some populists use 
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the strategy to advance a progressive agenda. For instance, Bernie Sanders, who ran to be 
the Democratic nominee for President in 2016, is often considered to be a populist. 
However, the majority of populists are authoritarian. This research will focus on 
nationalism as the core value that can be pursued through various avenues. 
Globalization and Nationalism 
Norris argues that even if structures have emerged to allow for world economies 
and governance, that development does not equate to the erosion of nationalism. In fact, 
it may have served to strengthen “deep-rooted attitudes towards nationalism and the 
nation-state” (2000, p. 157). Tomlinson (2003) notes that a pervasive response to 
globalization has been the strong stand that many have taken in asserting their own 
cultures and identities, often strengthening their presence, rather than seeing them 
subdued under a global culture. This supports this dissertation’s central hypothesis: that 
globalization reinforces nationalism under certain conditions. 
As Barber (1996) theorizes, the homogenization of the world (McWorld) in the 
areas of business and economics has led to jihad1, or the resistance of homogenization by 
asserting one’s own national identity and culture. Barber explained this theory as follows: 
The collision between the forces of disintegrative tribalism and reactionary 
fundamentalism I have called Jihad (Islam is not the issue) and the forces of 
integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization I 
have called McWorld (for which America is not solely responsible) has been 
brutally exacerbated by the dialectical interdependence of these two seemingly 
oppositional sets of forces (2001, p. xii) 
 
1 Barber has a unique utilization of the term jihad to refer to the resistance of cultural homogenization. 
Popularly, jihad has been explained to mean ‘holy war.’ Additionally, jihad may be referred to as a “war of 
Islamic expansion” (Esposito 1999, p. 76). However, according to Islamic teachings, it is unholy to wage war 
unjustly.  Literally, jihad simply means “to strive” and “to struggle” (Ali 2013). Shaykh-ul-Islam stated in an 




Barber contends that this is especially prevalent among fundamentalist Christians and 
fundamentalist Muslims, who strive to hold on to core beliefs in the perceived face of 
cultural homogenization towards values that do not align with fundamentalist ones. Both 
responses to globalization, McWorld and jihad, are made possible by the very 
globalization to which they are responding. The ability to distribute cultural products 
around the world and enter extensive trade agreements and engage in global governance 
had led to what some perceive as a homogenization of the world – a McWorld. Jihad can 
be seen as a response to this homogenization, but it also benefits from globalization in 
terms of the communication systems that allow for the formation of a global community 
united against globalization.  
 Another theory that supports this claim is reflexive modernization. This theory 
contends that globalization has led to a loss of authority of traditional institutions that 
bind groups together, which increases individuation, allowing people to choose their own 
labels, identities, values, and cultural associations, rather than simply adopting their 
parents’ culture. Globalization encourages people to incorporate ideas and values from 
around the world into their own set of core beliefs, allowing them to think outside of their 
local and national communities (Hopper 2007). Many challenge this notion that people 
will so easily abandon their national loyalties and culture in the face of globalization. As 
Alexander notes, national identities exert a strong hold over people, so other identities are 
unlikely to generate the same strength of allegiance (1996). People are bound together as 
a nation by shared myths and memories. Nevertheless, proponents of reflexive 
modernization theory point out that a nation makes demands on people, such as taxation 
and an emotional commitment, so non-national identities are appealing for their lack of 
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required commitments and demands. Reflexive modernization supporters suggest that 
identities will be formed by interests, rather than national identities. In the face of 
globalization, it is easier to create communities based on ideas. We have seen this with 
the success of Islamic extremist groups, as communication and travel are easy, allowing a 
global community to form that claims allegiance to the idea (or the caliphate), rather than 
to an existing nation state.  
 Norris (2000) conducted a significant study to determine the extent to which 
identities may shift as a result of globalization. She utilized the 1990-91 and 1995-97 
waves of the World Values Survey, which included 70 countries. (Additional details 
regarding the World Values Survey can be found in Chapter 3: Methodology.) She 
monitored feelings of nationalism by focusing on three areas: identification with the 
global community, confidence in institutions of global governance, and approval of 
policy mechanisms that support free trade and open labor markets. In terms of 
identification with the global community, theories suggest that increased global 
governance may have weakened national identities. However, Norris found that people 
identified more strongly with their national/local (38%) or regional (47%) communities 
than with the world as a whole (15%), indicating a weak cosmopolitan identity (2000). 
According to this data, beliefs of a global society and culture are exaggerated. One piece 
of hope for globalists, though, lies in generational differences in the data which suggest 
that this idea may be realized in the future as younger generations replace older ones 
(2000).  
On the measure of confidence in global governance institutions, theories suggest 
that globalization may have increased support for institutions of international governance, 
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such as the United Nations, as well as institutions of regional associations, such as the 
European Union (EU), North American Fair Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to the World Values 
Survey data, more people expressed confidence in the UN and regional organizations 
than in their own domestic government, especially in post-industrial and post-communist 
societies, which supports the claims that globalization has led to increased support for 
international governance organizations (Norris 2000). In terms of approval of policy 
mechanisms, Norris anticipated that “globalization may have altered public support for 
the policy mechanisms designed to dismantle national barriers, including policies 
promoting free trade and open labor markets for migrant workers” (2000, p. 160). The 
data demonstrated, however, that two-thirds of respondents favored protectionism 
(limiting trade to maintain jobs), even in affluent post-industrial societies. Only 7 percent 
favored open borders; 38 percent accepted immigrants entering their country for jobs; 43 
percent preferred strict restrictions on migrants; and 12 percent wanted to ban all 
foreigners from entering their country (Norris 2000).  This suggests that people are far 
from supporting policies that dismantle national boundaries. 
Within her research, though, Norris found a generational divide; if a person was 
born after World War II, then they were more likely to identify with the “world.” This 
implies the potential for a major upcoming shift towards a more cosmopolitan identity. 
Additional divisions were found along lines of education, life experience, and social 
background, implying that globalization is a complex and uneven process (Norris 2000). 
Norris concluded that  
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Growing cultural globalism is often assumed, but beyond aggregate indicators, 
such as trends in news flows, movie receipts, or the number of McDonalds around 
the world, we know little about what it means for how people feel about the world 
and whether structural changes have altered fundamental identities. (2000, p. 172-
3).  
 
Her research made great progress in beginning to explore the effects globalization has on 
nationalism, but more work is needed in this area.  
Other research has suggested that the level of education may play a role in 
whether people respond to globalization by shifting toward nationalism. According to 
Crane, socio-economic status affects preference in television programming. Those with a 
lower education tend to prefer national and local content, while those with a higher 
education prefer American programs (2002). Hopper explains that some governments 
adapt to globalization by increasing educational opportunities.  Education has a tendency 
to lead people to question national loyalties because of the vast array of perspectives and 
information to which they are exposed (Hopper 2007). However, only certain classes 
receive this advanced education, so others are left behind; feeling left behind can 
heighten nationalism, thus creating a divide.  
 Bekhuis, Meuleman, and Lubbers addressed a similar question to Norris, but 13 
years later (2013). They essentially questioned which result of globalization was most 
prominent: globalization as something to fear because of the threat it presents to one’s 
own culture or globalization as something positive that presents increased diversity in 
terms of products and experiences. One of their hypotheses was that people who are 
exposed to new cultural experiences and products, thus providing increased choice, will 
view globalization favorably and be less protective of their own culture (less nationalist) 
(based on research by Bauman 1998 and Beck, Sznaider and Winter 2003). Bekhuis, 
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Meuleman, and Lubbers (2013) identified the European Union (EU) as a useful case 
study for cultural globalization because of the specific efforts toward cultural exchange 
and open borders. They view the EU integration as an intense model of globalization.  
Bekhuis, Meuleman, and Lubbers (2013) essentially found contradictory results. 
In general, a higher level of globalization was correlated with a lower level of cultural 
protectionism (nationalism), while the opposite was true in the EU. In most countries in 
the study, higher levels of globalization resulted in less cultural protectionism, supporting 
the notion that people view globalization in terms of increased cultural options and not in 
terms of replacing and jeopardizing national culture. However, in the EU, globalization 
leads to increased cultural protectionism, demonstrating that people are concerned about 
losing their national cultures to a globalized European culture. This dissertation contends 
that the results from the EU may now be replicated across the world in terms of more 
people responding to globalization by turning toward cultural protectionism and 
nationalist policies.  
Examples that support this hypothesis within the EU include the Brexit vote in 
June 2016, as well as the relative success of nationalist parties or candidates in Italy, 
Austria, and Hungary in 2017 and 2018. The June 2016 vote by the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union was in response to fears of the United Kingdom being ‘held 
back’ or hindered by the EU policies around immigration and economics, primarily. 
Voters felt that membership in the EU did not allow London full autonomy to pursue 
policies that favored its own state and people. In Italy, in 2018, two populist parties (Five 
Star Movement and League) formed a coalition with an anti-immigrant and anti-EU 
stance (BBC 2018, “Europe and Nationalism”). In 2017, the far-right Freedom Party in 
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Austria became junior partner in a coalition with the Conservative Chancellor (BBC 
2018, “Europe and Nationalism”). They have proposed a ban on girls under 10 wearing 
head scarves in order to protect children from Islamic influences (BBC 2018, “Austria 
proposes headscarf ban”). In Hungary in 2018, Prime Minister Viktor Orban handedly 
won a third term in office, running on a platform of defending Hungary against Muslim 
migrants. He went as far as to warn Hungarians of the threat of a mixed population in 
Europe leading to a loss of cultural identity (BBC 2018, “Europe and nationalism”).  
The author believes that what Bekhuis at al. (2013) found to be the case in the EU 
(increased nationalism in the face of globalization) may be expanding beyond the EU. 
This hypothesis is supported by similar examples outside of the EU. One example is the 
election of American President Donald J. Trump in November 2016. In his campaign 
launch speech, he pandered to fears around immigration and a declining America. He ran 
on a platform of curbing immigration and prioritizing America, regardless of the effects 
on the rest of the world (Guardian 2015, “Donald Trump announces”).  Most recently, in 
Brazil, far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro won the Presidential election in October 2018. 
He leads the Social Liberal Party (PSL), which is an anti-establishment group combining 
social conservatism and pro-market policies (BBC 2018, “Jair Bolsonaro”). He has 
praised former dictators and made comments perceived to be racist, sexist, and anti-
LGBTQ, which are all signs pointing towards an authoritarian-populist ruler who will 
strive to “protect” Brazilian cultural values against the threat of outside influences.  
There are, of course, counter examples even inside the EU. In France, in the 
spring of 2017, despite extensive media coverage of Marine Le Pen and her far-right 
National Front (FN), she was handily defeated by Emmanuel Macron in the presidential 
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election, with Le Pen earning 33.9% of the vote and Macron earning 66.1% of the vote. 
While it was the largest proportion of the vote a FN candidate had ever received in a 
national election, it fell short of Le Pen’s and her supporters’ expectations, especially 
given the 21% of the vote she had received in the first round compared to Macron’s 24%. 
In the following parliamentary election, her party did not fare well either, only winning a 
few seats (8.75% of the vote); Macron’s party dominated that election as well (43.06% of 
the vote) (IFES 2018). In Germany, the picture has not been quite as clear: Chancellor 
Merkel did secure a fourth term in office, but the far-right Alternative for Germany, 
which proposes strict anti-immigrant policies, became the largest opposition party (BBC 
2018, “Europe and Nationalism”). Despite these counter examples, there is strong 
evidence of increased successes of nationalist-oriented politicians, at least across Europe 
and the United States.  
More recently, in Inglehardt’s 2018 book, Cultural Evolution, he theorizes that a 
decrease in existential security leads to an Authoritarian Reflex and support of 
xenophobic ideas. Existential security provides an environment in which a more tolerant 
society with an open outlook can develop. Declining existential security, on the other 
hand, leads to an Authoritarian Reflex in which people support “strong leaders, strong in-
group solidarity, rigid conformity to group norms and rejection of outsiders” (Inglehardt 
2018, p. 5). When people have existential security, they can shift from materialist values 
(economic growth, maintaining order, and fighting crime) to post-materialist values (free 




A substantial shift toward post-materialist values (and existential security) 
occurred following World War II, in which there was relative peace and a lack of 
scarcity. However, globalization has, in many ways, increased inequality, which 
increases people’s lack of security. This causes many people to revert to xenophobic 
ideas that they feel will protect them and their own people (nationalism). The Great 
Depression saw a similar xenophobic authoritarianism, but that was due to real scarcity of 
resources (objective scarcity). Insecurity today is due to increasing inequality and 
uncertainty, as there are ample resources that exist (Inglehardt 2018). Based on 
Inglehardt’s recent research, the author will explore conditions that relate to a lack of 
security (unemployment, quality of life, inequality) in examining the factors that may be 
present when societies shift towards a nationalist perspective. 
Cultural Change 
The response to globalization is not uniform, but it is apparent that some people 
retreat into nationalism as a means of protecting their own culture. The question begs: Is 
that response necessary? According to Porter (2000), “Globalization will not eradicate 
culture” (p. 28). However, other scholars, among them August Comte, John Stuart Mill, 
Karl Marx, and Anthony Giddens, have predicted a shift toward a global culture and 
society (Norris 2000). With globalization, non-local connections are increasing around 
the world. A central question revolves around how the structures and qualities of cultures 
shift in response to these connections (Wise 2008). As Hopper (2007) explains,  
If the contemporary phase of globalization constitutes an unprecedented 
intensification of multiple forms of global interconnectedness, then it is likely to 
be transforming our social and cultural experiences. For this reason, when 
considering the debates that have come to be associated with cultural 
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globalization, the concern will be to determine the nature and extent of these 
cultural transformations (p. 10). 
This dissertation will examine the extent of cultural change to some degree as a potential 
impact on whether a society shifts towards a more nationalist perspective.   
Globalization aside, cultures are constantly changing. Culture can be understood 
as a process, rather than a static entity (Wilson 1997). It is affected by both internal and 
external forces and is re-created continually. James Clifford (1992) explains cultural 
shifts in terms of movement. Culture is mobile and cannot be understood in terms of 
location alone; it moves. Travelers (migrants) take their cultures with them, interacting 
with other cultures and peoples, allowing new cultural forms to be created.  The same 
holds true for the flow of images, ideas, sounds, symbols, and objects that travel around 
the globe. Ervin (2015) supports this claim, noting tourism, labor migrations, ethnic 
diasporas, religious pilgrimages, exchange students, commercial and industrial 
exchanges, and conferences all as avenues for the expansion of cultural networks. He 
contends these movements of people and their networks are crucial to the world changes 
seen in the globalizing world. One specific example is diasporas, which clearly 
demonstrates how cultures are not confined by space. Diasporas play a significant role in 
cultural changes. It is important to note, though, that these are not quick, instant, fast-
changing shifts. Cultures have long enough moments of stability so people can identify 
with them and form ‘webs of meaning’ (Geertz 1973).  Cultural formation is taking place.  
Cross-cultural interactions are occurring as a part of globalization, but what 
effects do these encounters have on existing cultures? According to reception theory, 
people interpret or adapt foreign products in ways that suit their own national culture 
(Kuppens 2013). For example, Australians watched “cowboy and Indian” television 
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programs, imported from the United States. Largely, the Australians empathized with the 
Indians, rather than the cowboys, putting their own interpretation on the cultural product, 
different from what the producers of the product intended.  Similarly, Bredin found that, 
in aboriginal communities in northern Canada, foreign programs can reinforce existing 
values and identities, as people view the content through their own cultural lens to 
understand and interpret what they see (1996). As a final example, Derne conducted an 
extensive study to determine the effects of globalization on cultural values, looking 
specifically at the impact of Western movies on the values of young Indian men (2005). 
He found that, despite a decade of experiencing films depicting love marriages, the 
percentage of young men supporting love marriages actually fell from 68% to 66% from 
1991 to 2001. The men indicated that they enjoyed the love stories, but still felt that 
marriages arranged by their parents would be more successful. They viewed the love 
stories as fictional. All of this research supports Read’s contention that foreign cultural 
products often reinforce established values, rather than change or influence them (1979). 
The reception theory, in many ways, aligns with the skeptics, suggesting that movement 
toward a global culture will not occur as a result of increased connections and 
interactions alone.  
As Applbaum explains, cultures do not change passively. They only change when 
individuals make certain choices to adopt new cultural values and practices. He notes that 
“French in Quebec is under threat because more and more quebecois are deciding to use 
English in more of their interactions, read more books in English, and watch more 
American movies” (2000, p. 322). Nationalists portray that people are stuck in a strategic 
game in which they are only using English because they fear that if they do not, others 
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will, and then they will be at the disadvantage.  They claim that people are not using 
English because of their own desires and personal preferences, but rather out of strategic 
necessity. A more likely explanation is that there are different types of Quebecois. The 
cosmopolitans want to borrow cultural materials from various sources, which will 
“change the content and boundaries of the cultural practices of Quebec” (Applbaum 
2000, p. 322).  Cultural practices and language-use change as people make intentional 
choices about the life they want to live and the attachments and commitments they want 
to make. 
One important theory of cultural change is Welzel’s (2013) “emancipative 
theory.” He contends that existential pressures keep people’s minds closed. As those 
pressures recede, people begin to “prioritize freedom over security, autonomy over 
authority, diversity over uniformity, and creativity over discipline” (p. xxiii). Such logic 
suggests that when existential pressures subside, people shift from viewing life as a 
source of threats to a source of opportunities. Societies then climb the utility ladder of 
freedoms.  Practicing freedoms becomes advantageous (that is, has more utility). For 
example, prior to the Industrial Revolution, the majority of people had incredibly low 
standards of living. Following the Industrial Revolution, increasing numbers of the 
masses had an improved standard of living. The mindset shifted from a desire to 
“survive” to a desire to “thrive” (Welzel 2013). Climbing the “utility ladder of freedoms” 
(practicing and promoting freedoms) became advantageous, as people could understand 
and see the opportunities that doing so could provide.  Even culture cannot contend with 
this natural preference for taking advantage of what life has to offer. As a result, culture 
will begin to shift its taboos and what it tolerates in order to allow people to take 
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advantage of the utility ladder of freedoms; “cultures shift from denying freedoms to 
guaranteeing them” (Welzel 2013, p. xxiii). The institutions that guarantee freedoms are 
not the cause of cultural change; they are the outcome. This contradicts the institutional 
approach to development and cultural change. 
Somewhat in contrast to this theory, Derne emphasized that structures must be in 
place that allow cultural change (2005). Derne contends that people are more inclined to 
seek freedoms as it becomes more advantageous due to existing structures. He argued 
that cultural changes from globalization on young men in India were limited because of 
institutional constraints. For example, the young men explained that they will rely heavily 
on their parents for support during their first years of marriage (and many will live with 
their parents, along with their new spouse), so it is advantageous to keep their parents 
happy by allowing them to arrange their marriage, rather than pursue a love marriage, as 
they see portrayed in Western films (2005). Bourdieu frames social structures 
(institutions) and values as concepts that need to reinforce one another in order to 
produce cultural change. Following certain cultural norms allows social structures to 
sustain and be reproduced (1992).  Individuals act ways that creates the structure (such as 
arranged marriages), but individuals confront the social structural norm of arranged 
marriages (Derne 2005). The culture and the institutions reinforce one another. 
Despite the various theories of how and why cultures change, Norris and 
Inglehardt have outlined four ways that people respond to cultural changes: 
1. Self-censorship: remain silent when views are in opposition to the majority. 
2. Adaptation: gradually accept change. 
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3. Retreat: find social bubbles of like-minded people, which is easy with social 
media. 
4. Authoritarian Reflex: defense reaction is strongest among socially 
conservative groups feeling threatened by rapid economic, social and cultural 
change, rejecting unconventional social mores, and finding reassurance in 
like-minded community supporting strong leaders willing to express 
politically incorrect views and defend traditional values (2019). 
The defensive reaction of the authoritarian reflex is associated with an increase in 
nationalism. Ervin had explained a cascade of cultural change, through which people 
want to minimize risk by emulating those around them (2015). This would encompass the 
first and second approaches that Norris and Inglehardt referenced. In the cascade 
approach, people have different thresholds of risk for taking action. They may take the 
first steps toward promoting cultural change; they may wait to join once they believe the 
movement will succeed; or they will join in order to avoid being left behind (Ervin 2015). 
What the world is witnessing now is a more proactive resistance to cultural change 
through heightened nationalism and an authoritarian reflex, as Norris and Inglehardt 
theorize (2019).  
 Studying cultural change in terms of globalization presents a unique challenge in 
that it essentially involves most of the world’s billions of people as one unit of study, 
according to Ervin (2015). Another challenge is that national cultures are not fixed and 
stable; because they naturally evolve over time, it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which change can be attributed to globalization. Regardless, this research contends that 
one can at least examine the potential connection between nationalism and cultural 
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change in light of globalization by using nations as the unit of study and by measuring the 
intensity of cultural change. 
Contributions to the Literature 
This dissertation examines nationalism as a response to globalization, with the 
goal of identifying a combination of conditions that have the potential to lead to a less 
nationalistic response. The overarching theory on which this research is based is that of 
the skeptics, who argue that a true global culture or identity will not emerge until global 
institutions become more prevalent. Based on this theory, the researcher also relied on 
Mann (1997), Barber (1996), and Tomlinson’s (2003) contention that one’s national 
identity, as opposed to one’s identity as a world citizen, may strengthen in the face of 
increased globalization. Because national identity is typically a response to an ‘other,’ it 
can be expected that increased interactions with an ‘other’ is likely to lead to an increase 
in identification with one’s national identity. Globalization creates uncertainty and, 
according to Inglehart (1997, 2018), uncertainty and insecurity can lead to increased 
levels of nationalism.  
Some research has begun to explore the connection between globalization and 
nationalism (Norris 2000; Norris and Inglehardt 2009; Bekhuis et al 2013; Inglehardt 
2018), but it either needs to be updated, in the case of Norris, or can be expanded upon, in 
the case of Bekhuis et al. Norris (2000) predicted that the generational differences she 
found would lead to increased identification of people as global citizens. Since Norris’ 
updated research based on 2006 data, a great deal has shifted in the world. The 2009 
economic collapse brought new uncertainties to otherwise previously secure populations 
and increased global migration has left some people with a sense that their culture and 
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access to jobs is threatened. Further, Bekhuis et al. (2013) found that, in most countries, 
increased globalization leads to decreased cultural protectionism (nationalism), but in the 
European Union (EU), by contrast, globalization is correlated with increased 
protectionism. Norris’ (2009; 2016) more recent research updates some of her data, but 
the focus is on ‘the West’ and few cases are examined in depth. Using existing data from 
the World Values Survey, campaign rhetoric on immigration, and election results to 
determine levels of nationalism, as well as widely available globalization data from the 
KOF, the research in this dissertation will consider potential outcomes for Norris’ 
hypothesis for a shift that may occur post-2000, as well as test whether the phenomenon 
that Bekhuis et al. found in the EU has expanded to other regions of the world. As the 
response of every society is not uniform, the researcher will attempt to pinpoint specific 
conditions that lead to a more nationalist response, as well as conditions that lead to a 







CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the mixed methodological approach the researcher utilized 
to determine which conditions or combination of conditions lead to a decline in 
nationalism. The researcher will outline her research question and hypotheses, discuss the 
process of case selection, explain the conditions that she is examining, describe the 
descriptive statistics that will be used to illustrate overall trends, and discuss the fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) approach, including the case studies, 
calibration of conditions, and analysis. This chapter serves as a thorough explanatory 
road map for the in-depth research that the author conducted. 
The most important factors to consider in selecting cases in a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) are the extent of both homogeneity of the universe of cases 
and heterogeneity within that universe. The researcher ensured homogeneity by selecting 
countries that have experienced an increase in globalization. She ensured maximum 
heterogeneity by selecting countries with varying GDPs, populations, development 
levels, regions, and cultural globalization levels. In addition, she ensured diversity in the 
outcomes, which entails selecting countries that demonstrate an increase in nationalistic 
attitudes, as well as those that demonstrate a decrease. This section will explain how the 
researcher used the World Values Survey and election results to determine the level of 
nationalistic attitudes in each country. Finally, the researcher will outline the four-step 
process for selecting the 11 cases to be presented and analyzed. To address the research 
question and assess the extent of the validity of the associated hypotheses, the researcher 
included 11 cases, two or three from each of several world regions (Latin America, sub-
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Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the West) and will examine changes over a 
23-year period (1996-2019).  
The next section outlines the conditions that the researcher identified, examined 
and explained for this study. The conditions were selected based on theories presented in 
previous research and include socio-economic status, income inequality, level of 
education, type and rate of immigration, speed of globalization, and speed of cultural 
change. If each case is similar in its identification and assessment of a particular 
condition, then that condition will be eliminated, as it will not allow the researcher to 
better understand the conditions which impact changes in nationalistic attitudes. 
Similarly, certain conditions may be combined to create one indicator if their impact is 
uniform. QCA is an iterative process and conditions may be excluded or added as the 
research moves forward. The goal is to include fewer conditions, if possible.  
In order to explore overall trends in and relationships between globalization, 
nationalistic attitudes, and the conditions under examination, the researcher will begin 
with some descriptive statistics. She examined data for Wave 3 (1995-1998) and Wave 6 
(2010-2014) of the World Values Survey and then made observations regarding the 
individual waves, as well as changes from one to the next. This section will, to some 
degree, mimic some of the work done by Pippa Norris in 2000 and 2009.  
The core of the research, however, is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, 
which allows for an in-depth exploration of individual cases, while making comparisons 
across cases in order to identify specific conditions or combinations of conditions that 
lead to a decline or increase in nationalism. The QCA begins with in-depth case studies, 
which inform the analysis. Specifically, the research is electing to do a fuzzy set QCA (or 
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fsQCA), which allows for more a more nuanced understanding of the conditions, but also 
a slightly more complicated analysis. This section will explain the process of calibrating 
the conditions and outcomes (that is, assigning a ‘score’ of sorts to each one), as well as 
the analysis through the truth table.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In  2000, Pippa Norris’ book chapter “Global Governance and Cosmopolitan 
Citizens” in Governance in a Globalizing World (eds. Nye and Donahue) examined the 
effects of globalization on nationalist tendencies, namely what level of affiliation people 
identified with most strongly, how much confidence they had in various levels of 
governance (including global), and their viewpoints on national protectionist policies. 
Norris expands on this research in a 2009 article entitled “Confidence in the United 
Nations: Cosmopolitan and nationalistic attitudes,” in which she utilized data through 
2006. In this research, she again focuses on identities (local, national, regional, world), 
but also on confidence in the UN and whether people feel the UN should play a 
prominent role in solving global problems, seeking to answer the question of whether 
people’s identities are becoming more cosmopolitan and what factors may affect this 
shift. Factors considered include whether it is a pre- or post-industrial society, level of 
education, and birth year cohort.  
A great deal has changed in the world since then (economic collapse, migratory 
patterns, etc.), which leads to the following research question, which will be addressed in 
the dissertation’s evidentiary chapter: Under what conditions does a country shift toward 
a more nationalistic orientation in the face of increasing globalization? The hypotheses 
are as follows: 
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 First, the presence of decreasing socio-economic status, increasing income 
inequality, increased immigration from outside similar cultural regions, rapid 
globalization, and rapid changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a shift 
toward a nationalist perspective. Although some of these conditions comprise the 
overall globalization measure, the QCA process will allow the researcher to 
eliminate conditions that are redundant.  
Second, the presence of rising socio-economic status, decreasing income 
inequality, falling or steady immigration (or from similar cultural regions), steady 
globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative values lead 
to a shift away from a nationalist perspective. 
Through the presentation and assessment of these hypotheses, the researcher determined 
whether each condition is necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant in leading to increased 
nationalism (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). A very likely possibility through the fsQCA 
employed in this dissertation is that a combination of conditions (or multiple 
combinations) could lead to the desired outcome, even if no condition in isolation 
consistently leads to the same outcome.  
The researcher focuses on the time frame of 1996-2019 because it allows for the 
inclusion of a time period prior to Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States 
on 11 September 2001, which many view as a turning point for globalization and the 
world’s reaction to it. Because this research utilizes a fair amount of data from the World 
Values Survey, the researcher was limited to years of the survey “waves” as follows: 
1995-98 covers Wave 3; 2010-2014 covers Wave 6; more recent years are covered 
through additional, outside data. Although it may have been ideal to go back to 1991 
 
61 
(immediately following the end of the Cold War), the Wave 2 years of 1990-94 were 
problematic because some countries may have been surveyed during the Cold War and 
others just after the Cold War concluded. Before discussing the fsQCA approach in 
greater depth, it is important to explain the process of selecting cases and conditions, 
which was heavily informed by the methodology. 
Case Selection 
According to Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur (2009), for QCA, case selection must 
be guided by the research question and initial hypothesis, and it is an iterative process 
that does not rely on random sampling. The two primary keys to case selection are 
“sufficient homogeneity of the universe of cases” and “maximum heterogeneity within 
the universe” (Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur 2009, p. 19). To ensure homogeneity of the 
universe, there must be some common thread that binds the cases together, such as an 
increase in globalization, as is true of this study. However, there needs to be maximum 
heterogeneity or differences within that universe. In this research, the cases are countries. 
The countries should not all have similar population, GDP per capita, development level, 
cultural globalization level, or percentage change in cultural globalization. There must be 
some diversity within the cases, as long as they are within the universe of increasing 
globalization. In addition, there needs to be a clearly defined outcome of interest before 
selecting cases and cases with both positive and negative outcomes need to be included. 
Thus, cases with both increases and decreases in nationalism were included. 
Cases may be added or removed as the research progresses. If cases are found to 
no longer be part of the “universe,” then they can be excluded. Similarly, if it is 
determined, after extensive research, that sufficient diversity is lacking, then further cases 
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will need to be added. As the research continues, new cases might be added to test new 
hypotheses that emerge. For example, the initial hypothesis suggests that decreasing 
socio-economic status, increasing income inequality, increased immigration from outside 
similar cultural regions, rapid globalization, and rapid changes to cultural emancipative 
values may contribute to a country shifting toward a nationalist outlook. However, as the 
researcher explores the cases, she may modify her hypothesis to suggest that a specific 
combination of those conditions is associated with an increase in nationalism. This may 
result in the need to add a couple of cases that include that specific combination of 
conditions and/or some that expressly do not.  
The common thread in the universe of cases in this research is that all such cases 
must demonstrate an increase in globalization because the researcher is trying to 
determine which conditions lead to an increase or decrease in nationalism in the face of 
increasing globalization. To determine the level of globalization, the researcher relies 
primarily on the KOF Index. There are numerous globalization indices available, among 
them the Figge and Martens (2014) Maastricht Globalization Index, the Dreher, Gaston, 
and Martens (2014) KOF Globalization Index, the A.T. Kearney and Foreign Policy 
(2006) Globalization Index, and Vujakovic’s (2010) New Globalization Index. Each uses 
its own set of indices and countries of analysis. The researcher eliminated the A.T. 
Kearney/ Foreign Policy Index because the data is over a decade old and thus not current 
enough. She eliminated the New Globalization Index because it is not well established in 
related literature. Only the Maastricht and KOF Indexes provide both an adequate time 
frame of data and have a precedent of being used in similar research. Ultimately, the 
researcher selected the KOF Index for her analysis because it provides an itemized 
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breakdown by category, allowing for analysis of the social, economic, and political 
globalization scores separately. Although the Maastricht Index includes these factors, 
only one comprehensive globalization score is provided.  
As previously noted, for the QCA, the desired outcome must be clearly defined. 
In this case, the desired outcome is a decrease in an exclusionary nationalist perspective, 
which, during the Modern Period of globalization, “paved the way for fascism and 
Nazism” (Hopper 2007, p. 27). Shifts in nationalist perspective will be determined 
through a range of sources, including World Values Survey responses and national 
election results. Among surveys that have nationally representative data, the World 
Values Survey, combined with the European Value Study, has the widest country 
coverage and scope—almost 100 countries in five rounds, including all inhabited 
continents. In every region, societies with the largest population and biggest economies 
are included. The WVS represents 90% of the world’s population (Welzel 2013). Norris 
(2000) reinforced reasons for using the WVS, noting that the Eurobarometer and 
International Social Survey Program are “invaluable sources for monitoring trends over 
time, but the most comprehensive comparative data, which includes a range of 
developing post-communist and post-industrial societies, are available from the World 
Values Survey” (p. 159).  
As a starting point in selecting the questions to utilize that test the level of 
nationalist perspective, the researcher examined those used in Norris’ 2000 study.  Norris 
used questions that examined a person’s identification with the global community, 
confidence in institutions of global governance, and approval of policy mechanisms. Her 
research utilized Waves 2 and 3; in some of the newer waves of the survey there are 
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questions that have since been modified, some that no longer exist, and some that were 
added which clearly relate to sentiments of nationalism. In addition, Norris’ (2009) 
updated study included a question regarding whether the UN or individual nations should 
take the lead on key global problems, such as refugees and human rights; unfortunately, 
this question was omitted from the Wave 6 survey, so the research is not incorporating it 
into her dissertation. (See Appendix A for the complete list of questions.) The responses 
to these questions, per country, are easily obtained from the World Values Survey 
website. The researcher currently does not include the complementary data from the 
European Values Survey because that data only goes through 2008, which is not recent 
enough for this study. However, the EVS began fieldwork for another wave of the 
survey, which they anticipate will be released later in 2019 and may incorporated into 
this research. 
 The other significant data that this project uses to determine the level of 
nationalism is election results. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 
provides an ElectionGuide website, which allows a user to search for all elections in the 
world by date, type, and country. Using this guide, the researcher plans to identify any 
shifts in the extent of nationalist candidates being elected over the course of the period 
under examination. Nationalist candidates typically support a “home country first” 
policy, limiting immigration, decreasing reliance on global partnerships, and promoting 
national autonomy in solving global programs. Including election results provides data on 




 Complimenting the election results, the researcher also examined anti-immigrant 
campaign rhetoric. For each case under examination, she will examine the rhetoric being 
used by major (or widely featured) candidates in various elections as it relates to 
immigration. Major sources of information will include news articles and the websites of 
politicians, when an English version is available. As noted in the literature review, 
“politics of fear” are often used by emphasizes the threat that some group is causing to 
national identity. This type of nationalism is not just putting your country’s needs above 
the needs of other countries; it is about instilling fear that your country as you know it is 
changing and you will no longer have a place in it.   
In addition to election results and anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric, the 
researcher also took into consideration information regarding political protests, rallies, 
and other related events that may be indicative of levels of nationalism. These events can 
gauge the most current trends in a society during the periods between national elections 
and World Values Survey years used in the dissertation. Because this research takes a 
case study approach, this type of qualitative data can be incorporated and can prove 
invaluable in painting a complete picture of the changes in nationalist attitudes within a 
country.  
As Berg-Scholsser and DeMeur (2009) acknowledge, there are pragmatic 
considerations involved in case selection, including accessibility of data. That is true in 
this research, as well. Cases will be selected based on the available data for Waves 3 and 
6 of the World Values Survey (WVS), as that is the most limiting of the data points (as 
compared to the KOF Index, UN Immigration data, or the ElectionGuide, which have 
wide-ranging data in terms of countries and years). To select the cases for this study, the 
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researcher followed a four-step process. Step one was to identify the countries with the 
available WVS Wave 6 data for the nationalism questions. There were 59 countries, 
representing all world regions. The researcher then went through each country to identify 
which had the same data for Wave 3. Generally, countries that did not have both Wave 3 
and Wave 6 data were eliminated. However, some countries were moved forward without 
having Wave 3 data if they instead had Wave 4 data and no other countries from that 
region had sufficient data, such as Iraq and Jordan. Consequently, 27 countries moved to 
step two.  
In this second step, the researcher analyzed which countries had Wave 3 data for 
the cultural values questions (as pulled from Welzel’s ‘emancipative values’ research), as 
cultural values are a key condition that will be examined. (This is discussed in further 
detail in the section regarding conditions.) The Middle East was the most challenging 
region for this stage. While Jordan had the data for all waves, Turkey only had partial 
data for Waves 3 and 4, and Iraq had no data for Wave 3 and partial data for Wave 4. 
Ultimately, the research moved Jordan and Turkey forward. In step two, only three 
countries were eliminated.  
In step three, the researcher sought to ensure diversity among the cases. Four 
cases were already selected going into step three, as they were the only options for their 
regions. Those cases were Nigeria and South Africa for sub-Saharan Africa and Jordan 
and Turkey for the Middle East. The researcher examined a number of factors for these 
four countries, as well as the other 20 still under consideration for the West, Asia, and 
Latin America. These factors included GDP per capita, development score, population, 
percentage change in cultural globalization, level of cultural globalization, and early 
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indicators of whether nationalism increased or decreased from 1995 to 2015 (Wave 3 to 
Wave 6). Population, GDP per capita, and development levels are some of the basic 
indicators that set countries apart from one another. In addition, because of the central 
focus on cultural globalization and cultural changes, it was necessary to ensure some 
diversity in this regard.  
Based on this information, the researcher selected two cases each from Asia and 
Latin America and three cases from the West, in an effort to ensure heterogeneity among 
the cases. The 11 cases are as follows:  
Latin America: Chile, Mexico 
 Asia: China, South Korea 
 West: Germany, Romania, United States  
 Middle East: Turkey, Jordan 
 Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, Nigeria (Appendix B) 
The researcher selected Chile and Mexico because they are similar on most indicators, 
but early signs show Chile increasing in nationalism and Mexico decreasing in 
nationalism, while other Latin American countries do not initially show clear signs of 
increasing or decreasing nationalism. The researcher selected China because it represents 
a high population country with a high percentage change in cultural globalization. South 
Korea was selected as the other representative of Asia because of its vast differences 
from China (significantly smaller population, vastly higher GDP per capita, and more 
modest increase in cultural globalization), but similar level of overall cultural 
globalization. In addition, South Korea appears to be experiencing an increase in 
nationalism, while China appears to have a decrease in nationalism, based upon initial 
results from the WVS only. To represent the West, the researcher selected Germany, 
Romania, and the United States because of the differences in income levels, population 
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sizes, changes in cultural globalization, and overall differences in current levels of 
cultural globalization. In addition, one country appears to be experiencing a clear increase 
in nationalism (Germany), another shows a clear decrease (Romania), and the third 
(USA) is ambiguous at this juncture. Three cases were selected for the West (compared 
to two cases for the other regions) because of the vast diversity between the United 
States, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe.  
A final, fourth step, included double-checking for diversity among the key factors 
noted above. This step included noting how many countries fell into various ranges for 
each indicator. Appendix B provides further detail. Currently, some countries are noted 
as being unclear in terms of whether nationalism is increasing or decreasing. This is 
because the research used an initial analysis of some basic WVS questions. As the 
researcher incorporates additional research, such as from election results, hopefully the 
trend in nationalism will become clear. As previously noted, fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis is an iterative process; cases could potentially be removed or 
added as the research continues (Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur 2009). 
Conditions 
Because the research question seeks to determine which conditions might 
contribute to a country experiencing a decline or increase in extreme nationalism in the 
face of globalization and explain why, the researcher has to carefully consider which 
conditions to include in the study. The conditions shown in Table 1 have been selected 





Table 1 Conditions Included in Study 






(and % change, 
relative to other 
countries) 
Factor is existential security; a 





Quality of Life (see 
below 1a, 1b, and 1c 
for details) 
The following three 
conditions 
(GDP/capita, 
employment rates, and 
quality of life) will be 
grouped into one 
condition (Socio-
economic status).  
1a. GDP/capita 
(and % change, 
relative to other 
countries) 
Bekhuis et al speculated that 
more research is needed to 
determine how income and 
education levels impact the 
effects of globalization 
GDP per capita Higher income per 
capita creates more 





rates (% change) 
“Ronald Inglehart predicts that 
in a situation of growing 
insecurities traditional societies 
may experience a resurgence in 
feelings of nationalism and 
identification with the nation-
state” (Norris 2000) 
UN data, World Bank 
data 
High unemployment 




1c. Quality of 
Life 
Inglehardt (2018) includes this 
in his analysis of how “secure” a 
society may perceive itself to be. 




for Statistics, UN 
Demographic 
Yearbook) 
High quality of life 
leads to more security 




Factor is existential security; a 
decline in security (increased 
inequality) can lead to increased 
nationalism. Not a real scarcity 
of resources, but vast inequality 
(Inglehardt 2018) 
Gini Index  High income 
inequality leads to 
insecurity and, thus, 
more nationalism. 
4. Type and Rate 
of Immigration 
Based on current events 
(particularly around elections), 
there has been emphasis placed 
on the connection between 
immigration and nationalism. 
Threats to security (jobs, 
physical safety) are often 
attributed to immigrants. 
World Bank data, UN 
Office of Migration; 
examine if from 
similar cultural 
region, type of 
migration; record 
movement into and 
out of the country as 




This would be a 
condition that is a 





outside the same 
cultural region, may 
increase nationalism. 
5. Speed of 
Globalization 
Inglehart (2018) suggests that 
growing insecurities may result 
in a turn toward national identity 
KOF data; Maastricht 
index 
Faster changes create 





Table 1 (continued). 
6. Speed of 
Cultural Change 
Norris (2016) and Florida (2017) 
speculate that the rise in 
populism can be attributed to a 
fear of cultural changes  
Emancipative values 
(Welzel 2013), which 
are shown to be a 
reliable measure of 
cultural change (See 
Appendix E for the 
list of questions 
utilized) 
Faster speed of 
cultural change may 
lead to increased 
nationalism (cultural 
backlash) 
The grey text represents the conditions that were combined into one overall condition for socioeconomic status. 
This table, along with conditions that were initially considered, but eliminated, can be 
found in Appendix C. The conditions were drawn from some of the areas Norris (2000, 
2009) and Bekhuis et al (2013) identified as important variables for further exploration in 
terms of their effects on how people respond to globalization. In addition, Norris (2016) 
and Florida (2017) pointed to the potential effects of cultural change on how people 
respond to globalization. Meanwhile, Inglehardt (2018) focused on how existential 
security (which is affected by employment rates and immigration, among other things) 
affects people’s values and willingness to accept xenophobic ideas. 
The six conditions outlined above may be too many to include in the final fsQCA. 
Nevertheless, each of these conditions can be explored in greater depth in the case 
studies. As the cases are compiled, Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur (2009) suggest 
conducting a “quick test” to eliminate some conditions. In addition, if all cases have the 
same condition at a similar level, then that condition can be eliminated. There needs to be 
variation across the cases in terms of the condition in order for it to have any effect on the 
outcome. For example, if all the countries under examination have a similar level of 
education, then the researcher can eliminate education as a factor. Another strategy for 
reducing the number of conditions is to combine similar variables. For example, the 
researcher has proposed combining GDP, unemployment, and quality of life to form a 
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socio-economic status condition. This would be considered a conjunctural approach in 
which conditions can be selected on the basis of “theories that are conjunctural or 
combinatorial in construction” (Amenta and Poulsen 1994, p. 29). A theory may suggest 
that a specific combination of conditions leads to a specific outcome. In that case, the 
combination of conditions can be tested together. 
Ultimately, the goal is to keep the number of conditions as low as reasonably 
possible, especially for a small or intermediate n study such as this one (Berg-Schlosser 
and DeMeur 2009). Otherwise, the number of logical combinations of conditions may 
exceed the number of cases, resulting in individual explanations for each case. As fsQCA 
is an iterative process, it is acceptable to begin the study with a long list of potential 
conditions to assess and then drop or combine conditions as the research progresses.  
Most of the conditions are fairly straightforward; cultural values, however, is 
much more complex. The author has elected to utilize the emancipative values indicator, 
as developed by Weltzel, to measure cultural values (2013). The researcher 
acknowledges that “culture” is very complicated to define, let alone measure; thus, she 
has chosen to rely on the already established indicator of emancipative values, which 
Weltzel found to be a solid indicator of overall culture (2013). The emancipative values 
indicator relies on four sub-indexes: autonomy, equality, choice, and voice. Appendix E 
outlines the specific questions that are utilized from the World Values Survey to develop 
each sub-index. Autonomy measures how important people think the values of 
imagination, obedience, and independence are to teach to children. Equality assesses 
people’s views on gender equity. Choice measures how people feel about divorce, 
abortion, and homosexuality. Voice establishes how much say people think they should 
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have in their jobs, community, and government. The four sub-indexes are combined to 
form the overall emancipative values score, which the researcher utilizes to represent 
cultural values.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Analyzing overall trends is a useful launching pad for the more detailed QCA 
approach. The researcher first conducted a single wave analysis for Wave 3 and for Wave 
6 to compare the level of nationalism to the level of globalization, as well as to the six 
primary conditions under analysis (socioeconomic status, income inequality, level of 
education, rate of immigration, level of cultural globalization, and cultural values 
[emancipative values]), each individually. Starting with Wave 3, for each question under 
examination from the World Values Survey (see Appendix A), the researcher assigned it 
a “nationalist” score based on a segmentation of the response categories. Then, each of 
the scores will be added together to determine an overall nationalist score. (See Appendix 
D for further details.) Data will be gathered for each of the conditions. The cultural 
emancipative values score is the most elaborate as it involves four sub-indexes, each with 
three questions. Appendix E outlines the questions used. The researcher then compared 
the nationalist score to each of the conditions noted above, describing whether, for each, 
there appears to be a correlation between that condition and the level of nationalism. This 
will be repeated for Wave 6. A “1” is the highest score that can be earned (most 
nationalistic). 
 Next, the researcher conducted an analysis to examine changes in nationalism 
from Wave 3 to Wave 6 as they relate to changes in the conditions outlined from Wave 3 
to Wave 6. A percentage change in the nationalist score will be compared to the 
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percentage change in each condition, taking note of the direction of change. The 
researcher anticipates that there may not be a visible correlation between each individual 
variable and changes in nationalism. If this is the case, it could be for one of two reasons: 
a) there is no correlation between that condition and changes in nationalism; or b) the 
effects are only present when certain combinations of conditions are all present. The 
latter question can be better address through the Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
approach. The researcher also compared changes in nationalism to changes in 
globalization. She anticipates a positive correlation between the two, but that correlation 
may ultimately depend on the presence or absence of certain conditions. This can be 
further explored from the fsQCA. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
The qualitative component of the research will utilize a Configurational 
Comparative Method called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), more specifically 
fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA), which allows for a case study approach that capitalizes on the 
advantages of both qualitative and quantitative methods.  According to Rihoux and Ragin 
(2009), the goal of configurational comparative methods is “to allow systemic cross-case 
comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to within-case complexity, particularly 
in small and intermediate-n research designs” (xviii). The case studies allow for an in-
depth understanding of what is occurring, but the information garnered through those 
case studies can be systematically compared across cases.  
 To conduct the cases studies, the researcher provides some background on each 
country, including recent political trends, socio-political events, shifts in globalization, 
economic trends, and other relevant information. The researcher also examined each 
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condition (see Appendix C) in depth, as well as the outcome, in terms of nationalistic 
attitude. This will include an exploration of the WVS responses, campaign rhetoric 
around immigration, and election results. For each region, after developing the case 
studies for the two or three countries, she will make some comparisons between the 
countries within that region. 
 After conducting the case studies, the researcher turned her attention towards the 
fsQCA. The original QCA method, called crisp set, requires the outcome and conditions 
(known as variables in a more statistical approach) to be parsed out as a full member of 
the group (1) or a full non-member of the group (0), without any space for nuance 
between the two extremes. For instance, if a condition under investigation was the wealth 
of a country, the crisp set approach would require the researcher to place each case into 
the category of “rich” or “poor” with no further delineation.  A fuzzy set approach, 
however, allows for a spectrum of categories to better assess the nuances involved. For 
instance, a researcher could create categories such as “definitely poor,” “more poor than 
rich,” “neither rich nor poor,” “more rich than poor,” and “definitely rich.” This allows 
the researcher to retain the nuances within each case more effectively than a crisp set 
approach does (Ragin 2000; Ragin 2009). 
The researcher calibrated each condition to determine membership levels between 
0 (non-membership) and 1 (full membership). A .5 represents full ambiguity.  The 
various cut-off points between 0 and 1 must be determined based on theoretical reasoning 
(Ragin 2009). The benefit is the ability to take into consideration varying levels of 
membership, rather than just ‘fully in’ or ‘fully out’ as a crisp set QCA forces a 
researcher to do. The calibration will occur after the case studies are conducted, as this 
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will yield more meaningful cut-off points for each condition. Ragin (2009) suggests that 
the calibration of the fuzzy set approach is only possible if the researcher has an in-depth 
understanding of the cases under investigation. As such, the calibration cut-offs cannot be 
determined in advance of conducting the case studies.  
In 2009, Ragin outlined improvements to the fsQCA analysis strategy, with a 
major focus on the use of a truth table as a key analytic device. Use of a truth table adds 
transparency to the analysis and provides the researcher with added control over the 
process, which is important in a case-oriented approach (Ragin 2009). Even with using 
the truth table tool, the researcher must still examine the results to ensure that they are 
logical based on theoretical knowledge. Previously, in 2000, Ragin had developed an 
algorithm to analyze fuzzy set data, which bypassed the truth table.  However, his 2009 
version that incorporates the truth table is thought to be a significant improvement as it is 
more parsimonious and transparent, and it facilitates analysis in situations where there is 
limited diversity. 
A conventional truth table is set up by listing all possible combinations of 
conditions, even if there are no instances of that combination in the cases. Then, the 
researcher notes how many cases have a positive outcome and how many have a negative 
outcome for each combination. A consistency column is then added to indicate the 
percentage of cases in each row that display the outcome. The researcher then needs to 
identify and examine contradictory rows (those rows that do not have a 1 or 0 consistency 
and thus include cases with positive and negative outcomes for the same combination of 
conditions). An inconsistency can be acceptable, especially if the inconsistent case is 
explicable by specific circumstances. Rows without cases (that is, there are no cases with 
 
76 
that specific combination of conditions) are known as “remainders” and represent 
“limited diversity.” The truth table is then simplified by combining rows, as it is logical 
to do so. For example, if one row shows that the presence of condition 1, 2, and 4 leads to 
6 positive outcomes and 0 negative outcomes, and another row shows that the presence of 
1, 2, 3, and 4 leads to 8 positive outcomes and 0 negative outcomes, then condition 3 is 
irrelevant and can be removed from that combination.  
The truth table analysis is more complex in a fuzzy set approach, as each 
condition is calibrated, rather than simply being in or out of the membership group. In 
fsQCA, a researcher cannot list every possible combination of conditions. However, an 
initial analysis can be conducted by considering if the calibrated score is more or less 
than .5 and forming a conventional truth table to begin to determine which combinations 
of conditions may lead to the desired outcome.  
Ragin’s 2009 contribution bridges the fuzzy set data with the truth table. Using 
software, a researcher can create vector spaces and analyze fuzzy set scores to weight the 
relevance of each case. In this analysis, the number of causal combinations is the same as 
the number of truth table rows, which is the same as the number of vector space corners. 
The truth table solution is a list of different combinations of causal factors that have met 
specified criteria of sufficiency for the outcome to occur. This would entail the 
membership score for the outcome being consistently higher than the membership score 
for the causal combination.  
The researcher used this refined 2009 approach to analyze her fuzzy set data, 
which includes the outcome of nationalistic attitudes and conditions of socioeconomic 
status, income inequality, level of education, rate of immigration, level of cultural 
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globalization, and cultural values [emancipative values]. The researcher established one 
truth table to examine the level of nationalistic attitudes (wave 6) as compared to the 
current levels of the conditions noted. She will establish and analyze a second truth table 
to examine changes in nationalistic attitudes to the changes in the conditions listed above. 
Through this approach, she will be able to determine if certain combinations of 
conditions consistency lead to a similar outcome with respect to nationalistic attitudes 
and whether certain shifts in those conditions leads to a particular shift in nationalistic 
attitudes.  
Overall, the methodological approach to this chapter is appropriate for the 
question being asked. Nationalistic attitudes is an incredibly nuanced concept. The 
researcher is taking an approach that allows for an examination of overall trends through 
descriptive statistics, as well as a nuanced understanding of 11 cases through a fsQCA. 
The fuzzy set approach, as compared to a crisp set approach, acknowledges that most of 
the conditions under consideration are not simple to analyze. Very few countries would 
be considered fully in the membership group of emancipative values or fully outside of 
that membership group, for example. The fuzzy set approach will allow the researcher to 
retain the necessary nuance to make some sound conclusions and observations about 







CHAPTER IV – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The goal of this dissertation project is to determine whether certain conditions or 
combinations of conditions lead to a greater nationalist perspective in the face of 
increasing globalization. Largely, through this medium-n study, this objective will be met 
through the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach, which allows the 
researcher to retain the nuances within each case. However, to set the stage for that 
analysis, this chapter is a basic descriptive statistical analysis of the data. The researcher 
compared indicators of nationalism to those associated with each of the following 
conditions: cultural globalization, cultural values (emancipative values), economic 
equality, immigration rates, and socio-economic status. A likely conclusion is that no 
single condition has a strong association with a nationalist perspective, but the later QCA 
analysis to be presented in Chapter 10 is expected to help determine whether a 
combination of conditions leads to a certain outcome. Of great interest in this chapter is 
whether the changes within a condition (for example, immigration) affect the changes in 
nationalism over time. The period of assessment for this chapter is 1995 to 2014, which 
represents Wave 3 and Wave 6 of the World Values Survey, where data was obtained to 
establish the nationalism indicator, as well as the emancipative values score. For all other 
data, the researcher used the mid-points of each wave, which were 1996 and 2012, 
respectively. This chapter is designed to paint an initial picture of how nationalism is 
related to cultural globalization, cultural emancipative values, economic equality, 
immigration, and socio-economic status, as well as changes within each of these. In the 
process, it will provide a necessary foundation for the QCA analysis to follow. 
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Establishing the Nationalism Indicator 
 As a reminder, the researcher is defining nationalism as a mind-set of needing to 
protect one’s own national culture and interests, putting one’s own national needs above 
all else. A nationalist identifies strongly with his or her nation state. In order to establish 
the level of nationalism that was present in each case (country) for each year under 
analysis for the descriptive statistics section, the researcher relied on the World Values 
Survey, as noted in Chapter 3 on the Methodology employed in this dissertation. 
(Appendix A outlines the questions that the researcher utilized.) The biggest challenge 
came in comparing the nationalism score for Wave 3 to that of Wave 6, due to the 
significant shift in how the question regarding “to which group do you belong?” was 
framed. In Wave 3, it asked two distinct questions – the first being which group one feels 
a sense of belonging to the most and the second asking which group one feels a sense of 
belonging to next. In Wave 6, it asked how strongly one identifies with each level of 
society (local, national, regional, world) – each being a distinctive question. Determining 
how to score these very differently formatted questions was a challenge, but the 
researcher determined a system of assigning a particular score to various percentage 
ranges, similarly to how Weltzel determined scores for his Emancipative Values 
indicator.  
 As evidenced in Table 2, in Wave 3, the average rate of nationalism was .582, 
with 1 representing fully nationalistic and 0 representing not at all nationalistic. The 
ranges were from .435 (Germany) to .659 (South Africa). The researcher identified all 
countries within .03 of the true average as being within the average range. Consequently, 
three countries were considered to have an average level of nationalism (Chile, China, 
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and Jordan); three countries had a below average level of nationalism (Mexico, Germany, 
and the United States); and five countries had above average nationalism (South Korea, 
Romania, Turkey, South Africa, and Nigeria). Overall, the Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries were average or higher for nationalism, while both Africa countries were above 
average; Latin American countries were average or below for nationalism; the Western 
countries showed great variety, with two below average and one above average.  

















Chile 0.12 0.82 0.81 0.625 0.46 0.57 
Mexico 0.26 0.85 0.87 0.25 0.47 0.54 
China 0.20 0.83 0.76 0.625 0.63 0.61 
South Korea 0.39 0.93 0.64 0.75 0.40 0.62 
Germany 0.07 0.61 0.53 0.5 0.46 0.44 
Romania 0.33 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.45 0.62 
USA 0.10 0.65 0.92 0.375 0.51 0.51 
Turkey 0.35 0.81 0.90 0.625 0.55 0.65 
Jordan* 0.40 0.95 0.89 0 0.70 0.59 
South Africa 0.19 0.87 0.92 0.75 0.57 0.66 
Nigeria 0.20 0.88 0.81 0.75 0.46 0.62 
       
AVERAGE 0.24 0.82 0.80 0.55 0.51 0.58 
*Wave 4 used 
 
In Wave 6, the average level of nationalism declined slightly to .570, with ranges 
from .498 (Germany) to .711 (Jordan), meaning both the low and high increased, which 
can be seen in Table 3. There was a pull toward the middle, as compared to Wave 3, with 
six countries in the average range (Mexico, China, South Korea, Romania, South Africa, 
and Nigeria); only two above average (Turkey and Jordan); and three below average 
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(Germany, United States, and Chile). Overall, the Middle East had the highest levels of 
nationalism; Asian and African countries were in the average range, and both Latin 
America and the West were at average or below average levels of nationalism. It is 
interesting to consider the increased polarization here, with a wide range of scores than 
were represented in 1996. Perhaps, as some countries became less nationalistic and more 
outward facing, others countered by turning inward, heightening their own sense of 
nationalism. The decreased nationalism in some countries, which is usually accompanied 
by an expansion of rights and increased cosmopolitan thinking, could create fear in other 
countries about shifting patterns and cultural values, thus prompting rising nationalism. 
This idea would be supported by Barber’s McWorld theory in which globalization has led 
to ‘jihad’ (1996). We know that globalization increased over this period (and among the 
countries represented in this study), which has led some countries to embrace global 
values while others have rejected them. Part of what this dissertation serves to answer is 
what conditions determine which is the case in any given country. 

















Chile 0.08 0.76 0.81 0.59 0.45 0.54 
Mexico 0.12 0.69 0.93 0.53 0.46 0.54 
China 0.12 0.78 0.71 0.58 0.59 0.56 
South Korea 0.44 0.82 0.71 0.53 0.44 0.59 
Germany 0.21 0.53 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.50 
Romania 0.21 0.81 0.75 0.57 0.40 0.55 
USA 0.14 0.63 0.83 0.59 0.50 0.54 
Turkey 0.31 0.71 0.92 0.52 0.57 0.60 
Jordan 0.37 0.95 0.94 0.63 0.65 0.71 
South Africa 0.41 0.65 0.84 0.52 0.50 0.58 
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Table 3 (continued). 
Nigeria 0.20 0.80 0.86 0.52 0.43 0.56 
       
AVERAGE 0.24 0.74 0.82 0.56 0.50 0.57 
 
 As noted, there was a slight decline in nationalism from Wave 3 to Wave 6, with 
an average of negative 2%. The range, however, was from declines of 12% (Romania) to 
increases of 21% (Jordan). Overall, seven countries declined in their level of nationalism 
(Chile, China, South Korea, Romania, Turkey, South Africa, and Nigeria), while four 
countries increased (Mexico, Germany, United States, and Jordan).  Despite the increases 
in Mexico, Germany, and the United States, those three were among the lowest levels of 
nationalism in Wave 6. The next step was for the researcher to discern if there is any 
connection between the levels of nationalism in each wave, as well as the changes from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6, and various conditions under examination: globalization, cultural 
emancipative values, economic inequality, immigration, and socioeconomic status. 
Globalization and Nationalism 
As outlined in further detail in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the researcher is defining 
globalization as connections across national boundaries that crystallize into institutions. It 
involves multiple forms of global interconnectedness. Cultural globalization, more 
specifically, refers to increased flows of people, images, sounds, and symbols. The 
researcher utilized the KOF Globalization Index to measure globalization, drawing from 
both the overall Globalization score as well as the Overall Cultural Globalization Index 
(KOFCuGI). Largely, the scores were similar between the two, but there was certainly 
some variation. The researcher decided to continue focusing on Cultural Globalization 
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and utilized the KOFCuGI score for this analysis. The researcher utilized 1996 data to 
represent Wave 3 and 2012 data to represent Wave 6, as these were the middle points for 
each Wave. The researcher compared globalization to nationalism within Wave 3, within 
Wave 6, and then the changes in each from Wave 3 to Wave 6.  
 In Wave 3, cultural globalization ranged from 11.24 (Nigeria) to 82.49 
(Germany), with an average of 54.33 among the 11 cases under consideration. Only 
Nigeria, China, and Turkey were below a score of 50. On average, the West had the 
highest average cultural globalization (73.03), while Africa had the lowest (30.67). The 
Middle East, Latin America, and Asia all had comparable averages with 50.82, 51.09, 
and 56.72, respectively. In Wave 3, the researcher found that, generally, higher rates of 
cultural globalization were associated with lower rates of nationalism. Table 4 and Figure 
1 below show a summary of the relationship between globalization and nationalism in 
Wave 3. The highest levels of nationalism are associated with the lowest levels of 
cultural globalization. Above average and high levels of globalization have more 
instances of average and lower nationalism (4) than of above average nationalism (2). In 
Figure 1, the triangles represent each country, plotted by level of globalization and 
nationalism. There is not a clear, constant association between the two variables, but the 
overall trend does indicate that higher levels of nationalism tend to be paired with lower 
levels of cultural globalization.  
Table 4 Wave 3 Globalization and Nationalism 
Country Globalization Nationalism 
Chile 0.61 0.57 




Table 4 (continued). 
China 0.28 0.61 
South Korea 0.74 0.62 
Germany 0.82 0.44 
Romania 0.59 0.62 
USA 0.77 0.51 
Turkey 0.42 0.65 
Jordan 0.59 0.59 
South Africa 0.50 0.66 
Nigeria 0.11 0.62 
 
Figure 1. Wave 3 Globalization and Nationalism 
 
 
 These results support the idea that more global connections, specifically those 
involving people, symbols, images, and sounds (cultural globalization), soften people’s 
feelings around the need to protect their own nation and national cultural. Increased 
interactions reduce the sense that “others” are a threat. Inversely, lack of interactions with 
other ideas and cultures can lead to high levels of nationalism as the “other” is perceived 





















In Wave 6, the average cultural globalization score was 65.90, with ranges from 
30.49 (Nigeria) to 88.83 (Germany). The most significant gains were in the countries 
previously at the lower end of the spectrum. By Wave 6, only Nigeria was below 50. 
Most countries were above 60, with just Nigeria, China, Jordan, and South Africa below 
that. In Wave 6, the trend of lower globalization being associated with higher nationalism 
weakened. Table 5 and Figure 2 below show a summary. Once again, the triangles 
represent each country. The highest level of cultural globalization was still associated 
with the lowest level of nationalism, but this only involved one country. All of the below 
average and low levels of nationalism are associated with above average or high levels of 
globalization. Those with average or above average nationalism are associated with 
various levels of globalization, from low to high. Overall, in both waves 3 and 6, the 
regression line moves from lower nationalism with higher globalization to higher 
nationalism with lower globalization, but there is a great deal of error.  
Table 5 Wave 6 Globalization and Nationalism 
Country Globalization Nationalism 
Chile 0.68 0.54 
Mexico 0.63 0.54 
China 0.53 0.56 
South Korea 0.79 0.59 
Germany 0.89 0.50 
Romania 0.75 0.55 
USA 0.85 0.54 
Turkey 0.63 0.60 
Jordan 0.59 0.71 
South Africa 0.59 0.58 




Figure 2. Wave 6 Globalization and Nationalism 
 
The softening of the correlation between high cultural globalization and low 
levels of nationalism may be the result of feeling threatened due to interactions with other 
people and cultures. As outlined in the Literature Review, national identity is comprised 
both of one’s view of their own nation, but also of how others perceive them. Interactions 
across national boundaries can shift one’s sense of national identity. The question here is 
what was different in 2012 from 1996. Perhaps the answer is more in what shifts were 
occurring (and other conditions) than it is in the static figures. If a country had a low level 
of globalization, but it still had increased rapidly from its previous level, people’s 
reaction could be different than if they had a low level of globalization to begin with and 
it changed very little. An examination of the changes in globalization within each 
country, paired with the changes in nationalism, is the next logical step. 
The primary interest of the researcher is to explain the effects that changes in 
globalization have on changes in nationalism. Overall, with respect to the cases under 




















is excluded. (Nigeria is excluded because it would significantly skew the average due to 
its extremely high rate of increase (171%)).  (See Table 6.) The increases in cultural 
globalization ranged from 0% (Jordan) to 171% (Nigeria). Most countries fell within the 
range of 7% to 26%, while China and Turkey were significantly higher, with 87% and 
49%, respectively. Vastly different rates of increase are reflective of both the varying 
starting points in 1996, as well as the very different paths that each country followed in 
the early 21st century. During this same time period (roughly 1996 to 2012), for the 
countries under examination, nationalism declined by 2% overall, but some declined as 
much as 12% (South Africa and Romania) while other increased by up to 21% (Jordan). 
Seven of the 11 cases saw a decline in nationalism (Chile, China, South Korea, Romania, 
Turkey, Nigeria, South Africa), while the remaining four experienced an increase 
(Jordan, United States, Germany, and Mexico). 
Table 6 Wave 3 to Wave 6 Changes in Globalization and Nationalism 
Country Globalization Nationalism  
Chile 12.23% -5.20% 
Mexico 20.12% 0.59% 
China 86.69% -8.49% 
South 
Korea 7.18% -5.15% 
Germany 7.69% 14.44% 
Romania 25.86% -11.83% 
USA 10.62% 5.54% 
Turkey 49.47% -6.48% 
Jordan -0.03% 21.10% 
South 
Africa 18.20% -11.72% 




In comparing the shifts for each of these indicators, the researcher found that 
when globalization did not increase or only increased slightly, two-thirds of the time, this 
was associated with a mild or significant increase in nationalism (Germany and Jordan). 
In one case, this was associated with a slight decline in nationalism (South Korea).  Only 
3 cases saw an increase of less than 10% in cultural globalization; most countries 
experienced a mild or significant increase (greater than 10%) in globalization. These 
countries with mild or significant increases in globalization had a slight increase in 
nationalism (Mexico and the United States) or a slight to mild decrease in nationalism 
(Nigeria, China, Romania, Turkey, Chile, and South Africa). Generally, a steeper 
increase in cultural globalization is associated with a decline or less significant increase 
in nationalism, as can be seen in Figure 3. Each triangle represents one case and it is clear 
that the 3 cases with the highest rates of increase in nationalism also had the lowest rates 
of increase for cultural globalization. These results counter the theorists who predicted 
that increased globalization may evoke greater nationalism. Instead, these results support 
the globalists who see globalization as breaking down national barriers. Faster increases 
in cross-national cultural interactions are perhaps shifting the way that people see 
themselves in the world, moving towards a more global identity, rather than simply a 
national one.  There may still be particular issues that are magnified, but the QCA 
evaluation will allow for a more nuanced understanding of what is occurring at the layers 






Figure 3. Wave 3 to Wave 6 Changes in Globalization and Nationalism 
 
 
Cultural Change and Nationalism 
To determine cultural values, the researcher used the emancipative values 
indicator, developed by Welzel (2013), which includes four sub-indexes: Autonomy, 
Equality, Choice, and Voice. Chapter 3 further outlines this approach, while Appendix E 
outlines the questions used for each sub-index. All data was available with the exception 
of the Choice sub-index questions for Wave 3 for Turkey. Neither Wave 2 nor Wave 4 
data was available as a substitute, so the researcher took an average of the changes from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6 for the Choice index for the other Middle Eastern and African 
countries and applied the same percentage change for Turkey. It aligned with the changes 
seen overall in the emancipative values indicator for Turkey. For the emancipative 
values, “1” refers to having fully emancipative values, while “0” represents a lack of 


















The average emancipative values for Wave 3 is .414, ranging from .219 (Jordan) 
to .592 (Germany). The Middle East (.269), Africa (.296), and Asia (.358), have the 
lowest levels of emancipative values, while the West (.499) has the highest levels, 
followed by Latin America (.398). Table 7 provides a summary of the values. Figure 4 
shows each case (represented by a triangle) charted on the graph. The regression line 
generally shows lower emancipative values (culture) associated with higher rates of 
nationalism, although the line is pulled by the two countries with the highest cultural 
emancipative values and lowest levels of nationalism (Germany and the United States). 
In addition, higher emancipative values are associated with lower rates of nationalism. Of 
the three countries with below average nationalism, one has an average level of 
emancipative values (Mexico), while two have higher than average emancipative values 
(Germany and the United States). In the five cases of above average nationalism, four 
cases have lower emancipative values (South Korea, Turkey, South Africa, and Nigeria), 
while one has an average level of emancipative values (Romania).  Average rates of 
nationalism are associated with average emancipative values (Chile) and lower 
emancipative values (China and Jordan).  





Chile 0.41 0.57 
Mexico 0.39 0.54 
China 0.35 0.61 
South Korea 0.37 0.62 
Germany 0.59 0.44 
Romania 0.43 0.62 




Table 7 (continued). 
Turkey 0.32 0.65 
Jordan 0.22 0.59 
South Africa 0.35 0.66 
Nigeria 0.25 0.62 
 
 
Figure 4. Wave 3 Cultural Emancipative Values and Nationalism 
 
 
The average emancipative values for Wave 6 is .409, with ranges from .240 
(Jordan) to .582 (Germany). Technically, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa are still the 
lowest, with averages of .278, .393, and .35 respectively, although Africa saw a 
significant increase from .296 to .35 in Wave 3 due to a 27% increase in South Africa. 
The West is still the highest with an average of .505, with Latin America close behind at 
.472. Similar to Wave 3, the regression line generally shows lower emancipative values 




















average level of nationalism with vastly varied emancipative values (low, average, and 
high). (See Table 8 and Figure 5.) The only significantly higher than average country for 
nationalism (Jordan) has the lowest emancipative values. The other country that is above 
average on nationalism (Turkey) also has a lower level of emancipative values. The only 
country with a significantly lower level of nationalism from the average (Germany) has 
the highest level of emancipative values. The two other cases with below average levels 
of nationalism, although very close to the defined range for average, also have higher 
emancipative values (United States and Chile). Overall, those with an average rate of 
nationalism have varied emancipative values, while those at the extremes for nationalism 
are at the extremes for cultural values (with an inverse relationship). 





Chile 0.49 0.54 
Mexico 0.45 0.54 
China 0.37 0.56 
South Korea 0.42 0.59 
Germany 0.58 0.50 
Romania 0.41 0.55 
USA 0.53 0.54 
Turkey 0.32 0.60 
Jordan 0.24 0.71 
South Africa 0.44 0.58 











For both Wave 3 and Wave 6, lower levels of emancipative values are associated 
with higher levels of nationalism and vice versa. This aligns with Weltzel’s theory around 
emancipative values. When existential insecurities are low, people are more open to 
expanding freedoms, which leads to emancipative values. One existential insecurity can 
be the threat of outsiders, either physically or on one’s culture. When that threat is 
minimized in people’s minds, they are likely to be less nationalistic, while also expanding 
freedoms and embracing more emancipative values.  
In comparing shifts in nationalism to shifts in emancipative values (culture), the 
researcher found that the regression line was nearly flat, as shown in Figure 6, with each 
case represented by a triangle. On average, emancipative values increased by 10% from 
Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 6 (2012). South Africa increased the most with a 27% rise. Three 




















Turkey. Table 9 shows the percentage change in both nationalism and emancipative 
values from Wave 3 to Wave 6. In five out of seven cases, a decline in nationalism is 
associated with an increase in emancipative values: Chile, China, South Korea, South 
Africa, and Nigeria. However, in two out of seven cases, a decline in nationalism is 
associated with a decline in emancipative values: Romania and Turkey. Where 
nationalism increased, in three out of four cases, emancipative values also increased 
(Mexico, United States, and Jordan), but in one case, emancipative values decreased 
slightly (Germany). 
Figure 6. Wave 3 to Wave 6 Changes in Cultural Emancipative Values and Nationalism 
 
Table 9 Wave 3 to Wave 6 Changes in Cultural Emancipative Values and Nationalism 
Country 
% Change in Cultural 
EmancipativeValues 
% Change in 
Nationalism 
Chile 21% -5% 
Mexico 17% 1% 
China 5% -8% 
South Korea 14% -5% 
Germany -2% 14% 























Change in Cultural Emancipative Values
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Table 9 (continued). 
USA 10% 6% 
Turkey -1% -6% 
Jordan 9% 21% 
South Africa 27% -12% 
Nigeria 6% -9% 
 
An above average increase in emancipative values is associated with an average 
(Chile and Mexico) or below average change in nationalism (South Africa), which 
amounts to a decline or steady state for nationalism. An average increase in emancipative 
values shows an array of changes in nationalism (two are below average, two are above 
average and one is average).  The same holds true for below average changes in 
emancipative values.  
 Overall, in Wave 3, there was a correlation between lower emancipative values 
and higher nationalism, as well as between higher emancipative values and lower 
nationalism.  This phenomenon leveled off to some degree by Wave 6, with many 
countries being close to the average level of nationalism, with widely varied 
emancipative values. However, the finding of lower nationalism being associated with 
higher emancipative values and higher nationalism being associated with lower 
emancipative values did still hold true at the extremes of the nationalism spectrum. In 
terms of changing cultural emancipative values, an above average increase in 
emancipative values was associated with a decline or steady rate of nationalism, which 
refutes the idea that nationalism increases in response to rapid cultural change, but 
supports the idea emancipative values are a result of feeling less existential threats to 
one’s security, as nationalism is often enhanced when existential threats are perceived. 
 
96 
Overall, though, in only 6 out of 11 cases did the direction of change align with this 
second theory (declining nationalism with increasing emancipative values and rising 
nationalism with declining emancipative values). This indicates that, perhaps, a 
combination of factors affect whether nationalism rises or falls. 
Economic Inequality and Nationalism 
The researcher used the GINI Index to measure economic inequality in the 
countries under examination. “0” represents complete equality, while “1” represents full 
inequality. For Wave 3, the average was .43, with Romania being the most equitable 
country with a .28 on the GINI Index to South Africa being the least equal society with a 
.61 on the GINI Index. As Table 10 below shows, four countries were below .40 on the 
GINI Index (China, Germany, Romania, and Jordan), with ranges from .28 to .36; two 
countries were close to .40 (USA and Turkey), with scores of .41 and .41; and both Latin 
American and African countries were above .40, with scores between .48 and .61. 




Chile 0.57 0.55 
Mexico 0.54 0.48 
China 0.61 0.35 
Germany 0.44 0.29 
Romania 0.62 0.28 
USA 0.51 0.41 
Turkey 0.65 0.41 
Jordan 0.59 0.36 
South Africa 0.66 0.61 




The regression line shown in Figure 7 below indicates some association between a 
lower GINI score (higher equality) and lower nationalism, as well between higher GINI 
scores (less equality) and higher nationalism. Nationalism consistently increases as 
inequity increases (GINI score rises), until it reaches a nationalism score of .57. This 
trend includes four cases. When nationalism is above .57, the GINI score varies widely. 
Overall, each level of nationalism (average, above average, and below average) is 
associated with each level of the GINI Index (average, above average, and below 
average). Similarly to the emancipative values, though, the regression line holds true at 
the extremes. The country with the lowest level of nationalism (Germany) has nearly the 
lowest GINI Index (28.8 as compared to Romania’s 28.2) and the country with the 
highest level of nationalism (South Africa) has the highest GINI Index score. 
Figure 7. Wave 3 Economic Inequality and Nationalism 
 
In Wave 6, the average level of equality improved slightly, dropping to .41 on the 
GINI Index, with ranges from .31 (Germany) to .63 (South Africa). There were still four 



















Turkey. Four countries were close to the average, with ranges from .41 to .43: China, 
United States, Turkey, and Nigeria. Three cases were well above the average (.45 to .63), 
representing the lease equitable countries: Mexico, Chile, and South Africa. In Wave 6, 
the trendline nearly flattens in terms of the association between equity and nationalism, as 
can be seen in Figure 8. In part, this is due to the convergence of nationalism toward the 
average.  The slight trend that is present shows a lower GINI score (more equity) being 
associated with higher nationalism. The two cases with an above average level of 
nationalism have average (Turkey) and below average (Jordan) GINI scores. Table 11 
shows the nationalism and GINI index score for each case. 
Figure 8. Wave 6 Economic Inequality and Nationalism 
 




Chile 0.47 0.54 
Mexico 0.45 0.54 





















Table 11 (continued). 
South 
Korea 0.32 0.59 
Germany 0.31 0.50 
Romania 0.37 0.55 
USA 0.41 0.54 
Turkey 0.40 0.60 
Jordan 0.34 0.71 
South 
Africa 0.63 0.58 
Nigeria 0.43 0.56 
 
 As Table 12 below shows, some countries improved and some worsened in terms 
of economic equality from Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 6 (2012). Overall, the average 
improved by 3%, which is represented by a decline in the GINI score, as “0” represents 
full equality. Changes ranged from a 17%  improvement (Nigeria) to a 29% increase in 
inequality (Romania). Five countries improved on this condition (Chile, Mexico, Turkey, 
Jordan, and Nigeria), while four countries worsened (China, Germany, Romania, and 
South Africa). The United States did not demonstrate notable change and South Korea 
could not be assessed since Wave 3 data was unavailable. As is evidenced in Figure 9, the 
change in equity from Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 6 (2012) does not have a consistent 
association with changes in nationalism over that same period. This was to be expected, 
given the weak association that was evidenced in Wave 3 and Wave 6 individually. 
However, from a theoretical perspective, the researcher anticipated an association 
between improved equality and a decline in a nationalistic perspective. Equality can 
generally make a population feel more secure and, thus, less likely to feel threatened by 
outsiders. As with other conditions, this may be indicative of the impact that 
combinations of conditions have, rather than isolated factors alone. 
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Chile -14% -5% 
Mexico -6% 1% 




Germany 7% 14% 
Romania 29% -12% 
USA 0% 6% 
Turkey -3% -6% 
Jordan -7% 21% 
South Africa 4% -12% 
Nigeria -17% -9% 
 





















Change in Economic Inequality
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Immigration and Nationalism 
 The researcher drew the data on immigration through the United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. She examined the sheer number of 
immigrants and calculated immigration as a percentage of the population. In Wave 3, the 
average immigration rate, as compared to population was 6%, with a range between .04% 
(China) and 34% (Jordan), as can be seen in Table 13. Eight countries had immigration 
rates between 0% and 2% - all countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, in addition 
to Romania and Turkey. Germany and the United States had 9% and 11% immigration 
rates, respectively. An overall regression line is not particularly useful for this analysis 
because so many countries are within the 0-2% range, with wide-ranging levels of 
nationalism. However, in two out of the three cases of countries with below average 
nationalism, there is a higher immigration rate per population (United States and 
Germany). In the third case, the country has a low immigration rate (Mexico). The United 
States and Germany are by far the countries with the lowest rates of nationalism. In all 
cases with high levels of nationalism, there is a low immigration rate. (However, this is a 
likely occurrence because of the vast number of countries with low immigration rates.) 
Of the three countries with high levels of immigration, two have low rates of nationalism 
(United States and Germany) and one has an average rate of nationalism (Jordan). So, 
one may discern the possibility of a link between higher immigration rates and low or 
average nationalism. This would refute the idea that interactions with people from other 
countries makes the threat of the “other” real and increases nationalism. Instead, those 








Chile 1% 0.566931 
Mexico 1% 0.540837 
China 0% 0.607384 
South 
Korea 0% 0.621947 
Germany 9% 0.435369 
Romania 1% 0.621768 
USA 11% 0.509505 
Turkey 2% 0.645666 
Jordan 34% 0.586724 
South 
Africa 2% 0.658797 
Nigeria 0% 0.620411 
 
 In Wave 6, the average immigration rate by population increased to 7%, with a 
range between .06% (China) and 37.91% (Jordan), as can be seen in Table 13. Only 7 
countries (rather than the 8 from Wave 3) are in the 0-2% range, as South Africa 
increased to 4%. Germany and the United States remained in the group of high 
immigration at 14% each. Again, the scatter plot for all cases was not useful with such a 
large group converging around 0-2% immigration. However, when the researcher 
removed the three countries with the highest immigration, the scatter plot did reveal some 
interesting data, as can be seen in Figure 10. Each country is charted with a triangle. The 
countries below 1% immigration (Mexico, China, Romania, and Nigeria) all had the 
lowest nationalism scores among this 0-4% group. Those between 1-4% immigration had 
the highest nationalism scores (South Korea, Turkey, South Africa), with the exception of 
Chile, which had the lowest nationalism score among the 0-4% group. So, among the 
lower immigration rate cases, there was a strong association between lower immigration 
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and lower nationalism. This could represent a change from 1996 to 2012 in terms of how 
immigration is utilized by politicians in promoting fear. However, as it did in Wave 3, it 
is still the case that Germany and the United States, which are two of the three countries 
with high immigration rates, have the lowest levels of nationalism (although the United 
States is at the same rate as Chile). 
Table 14 Wave 6 Immigration Rate and Nationalism 
Country Immigration Rate Nationalism 
Chile 2% 0.53744 
Mexico 1% 0.544004 
China 0% 0.5558 
South Korea 2% 0.589941 
Germany 14% 0.498225 
Romania 1% 0.548228 
USA 14% 0.537714 
Turkey 2% 0.603801 
Jordan 38% 0.710531 
South Africa 4% 0.58161 
Nigeria 1% 0.562368 
 























From Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 6 (2012), immigration increased, on average, by 
128%, with ranges from 12% in Turkey to 642% in South Korea, as a raw percentage 
change in the sheer number of immigrants. When examining the shift in immigration as a 
percentage of the population, the average increase was 92%, with a range of a 9% 
decrease in Turkey to a 575% increase in South Korea. These numbers can be seen in 
Table 15 below. Overall, nationalism is increasing where the highest percentage of 
immigration as compared to population exists (United States, Germany, and Jordan). The 
rate of immigration is not increasing faster than in other countries, but the overall 
immigration rate is higher in these countries. Where nationalism is decreasing the most 
(China, Romania, South Africa, and Nigeria), with declines of 8 to 12%, immigration is 
increasing at an average or below average rate. (The average was determined as those 
countries within 25% of the average when excluding South Korea, due to its extremely 
high percentage.) Overall, there is some association between an average immigration 
increase and declining nationalism, while there is also some indication that high rates of 
immigration overall may have been embraced as a mechanism for inspiring nationalism. 
High rates of immigration can certainly be cultivated to instill fear in people regarding a 
loss of culture, jobs, and stability, all of which can lead to a “nation first” attitude. 





(as percent of 
population) 
Chile -5% 159% 102% 
Mexico 1% 111% 54% 
China -8% 92% 63% 
South Korea -5% 642% 575% 
Germany 14% 55% 55% 
Romania -12% 16% 29% 
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Table 15 (continued).  
USA 6% 55% 34% 
Turkey -6% 12% -9% 
Jordan 21% 77% 13% 
South 
Africa -12% 94% 58% 
Nigeria -9% 99% 35% 
 
 
Socioeconomic Status and Nationalism  
 To determine socioeconomic status (SES), the researcher primarily used data 
from the World Bank to determine the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
unemployment rates, life expectancy, and infant mortality rates. The exception for the 
source of data is for Wave 3 Germany, in which the researcher utilized the Organization 
for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), as the World Bank did not have 
available data for this time frame. Table 16 below outlines the data. The average GDP for 
Wave 3 was 8566, with ranges from 461 (Nigeria) to 30,564 (Germany). Three countries 
were above 10,000 (Germany, United States, and South Korea), while four countries 
were below 2,000 (China, Nigeria, Jordan, and Romania). The average unemployment 
rate was 7.9%, ranging from 2% (South Korea) to 25% (South Africa). The life 
expectancy average was 69, with ranges from 45.9 (Nigeria) to 76.7 (Germany), while 
the infant mortality average was 69, with ranges from 5.1 (Germany) to 121.4 (Nigeria). 
Unemployment presented the highest level of inconsistency in relationship to the other 





Table 16 Wave 3 Socioeconomic Status and Nationalism 







Chile 0.57 5383 5.9 75.7 10.6 
Mexico 0.54 4295 5.25 73.2 27.7 
China 0.61 709 3 70.4 36.4 
South 
Korea 0.62 13138 2 74.2 8.3 
Germany 0.44 30564 8.9 76.7 5.1 
Romania 0.62 1644 6.7 69.1 21.8 
USA 0.51 30068 5.5 76 7.7 
Turkey 0.65 3054 6.6 67.6 40.5 
Jordan 0.59 1469 13.7 71.1 25.6 
South 
Africa 0.66 3441 25 60.5 48.2 
Nigeria 0.62 461 4.43 45.9 121.4 
 
 Among the five countries with above average levels of nationalism, three 
(Romania, Turkey, and South Africa) performed poorly on all four SES indicators, while 
one (Nigeria) performed poorly on three of the four indicators (the exception being 
unemployment, which, as previously noted, is less consistent with the other indicators). 
The outlier was South Korea, which had a high rate of nationalism, but performed well 
on all SES indicators. In two of the three countries with low nationalism scores (Germany 
and the United States), they performed well on three of the four SES indicators (the 
exception, once again, being unemployment). In one of the three low nationalism 
countries (Mexico), they only performed well on one indicator, but they were very close 
to the average on the other three. Overall, there appears to be some association between 
higher nationalism and lower SES, as well as between lower nationalism and higher SES.  
 In Wave 6, the overall average improved on three of the four SES indicators; the 
exception was unemployment, which remained constant. The average GDP in 2012 was 
 
107 
16,917, with ranges from 2,746 (Nigeria) to 51,603 (United States). As can be seen in 
Table 17, there were six countries with a GDP below 10,000: Mexico, China, Romania, 
Jordan, South Africa, and Nigeria, so one from each world region, plus both from Africa. 
There were two countries above 25,000, both being from the West: Germany (44,065) 
and USA (51,603).  As noted previously, the average unemployment remained relatively 
constant at 7.98, with ranges from 24.7 (South Africa) to 3.2 (South Korea). There were 
four countries with unemployment rates below 5: Mexico, China, South Korea, and 
Nigeria). Only two countries were over 10: Jordan and South Africa.  The average life 
expectancy increased to 73.1, with Nigeria remaining with the lowest life expectancy at 
51.7 and South Korea having the highest life expectancy at 80.8. 
Table 17 Wave 6 Socioeconomic Status and Nationalism 








Chile 0.54 15432 6.7 78.8 7.2 
Mexico 0.54 9940 4.9 76.4 14.1 
China 0.56 6338 4.1 75.6 11.6 
South Korea 0.59 24359 3.2 80.8 3.3 
Germany 0.50 44065 5.4 80.5 3.3 
Romania 0.55 8535 6.8 74.4 9.4 
USA 0.54 51603 7.9 78.7 6.1 
Turkey 0.60 11720 8.1 74.7 14.3 
Jordan 0.71 3871 12.2 73.7 17 
South Africa 0.58 7478 24.7 58.5 36.1 
Nigeria 0.56 2746 3.8 51.7 75.7 
 
The potential connections between high levels of nationalism and SES are less 
clear in Wave 6. Of the three countries with high levels of nationalism, one performed 
well on all four indicators (South Korea); one performed in the “middle of the pack” on 
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all four indicators (Turkey); and the other performed poorly on three indicators and 
average on one (Jordan). This wide range does not demonstrate any connection between 
high nationalism and any particular performance on SES indicators. However, for 
countries with low levels of nationalism, there is some association with positive 
performance on the SES indicators. Two of the three countries (Germany and United 
States) with low nationalism performed well on three indicators and average on the 
fourth, while the third country performed well on two indicators and average on two 
indicators (Chile).  
There were significant changes in SES indicators from Wave 3 (1995) to Wave 6 
(2012). GDP grew by 254% on average, with ranges from only 44% growth in Germany 
to an increase of 794% in China.  The average unemployment rate actually increased by 
10%, with increase as large as 60% (South Korea) and declines as low as 39% 
(Germany). Life expectancy rose by 6%, with ranges from a 3% decline in South Africa 
to an increase of 13% in Nigeria. Infant mortality dropped by 44% with some decreases 
as low as 21% (USA) and others declines as high as 68% (China).  The percentage 
changes per indicator and country are available in Table 18 below. 
Table 18 Wave 3 to Wave 6 Changes in Socioeconomic Status and Nationalism 








Chile -5% 187% 14% 4% -32% 
Mexico 1% 131% -7% 4% -49% 
China -8% 794% 37% 7% -68% 
South Korea -5% 85% 60% 9% -60% 
Germany 14% 44% -39% 5% -35% 
Romania -12% 419% 1% 8% -57% 
USA 6% 72% 44% 4% -21% 
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Table 18 (continued).  
Turkey -6% 284% 23% 11% -65% 
Jordan 21% 164% -11% 4% -34% 
South Africa -12% 117% -1% -3% -25% 
Nigeria -9% 496% -14% 13% -38% 
 
In examining trends between increases or decreases in nationalism and shifts in SES 
indicators, a clear picture did not emerge. However, when the researcher focused her 
attention on the three most significant improvements and the three least significant 
improvements (or declines), some interesting findings emerged. The researcher listed the 
countries with the top three advances for each SES indicator. Then, she identified 
whether each country listed had a better than average decline in nationalism, and average 
decline in nationalism, or an increase in nationalism. As Table 19 indicates, after listing 
each country and tallying the totals, there were seven cases with a better than average 
decline in nationalism, four cases with an average decline in nationalism, and only two 
cases with an increase in nationalism, thus indicating some association between the most 
significant improvements in SES and declining nationalism. Conversely, the researcher 
also listed the three cases with the slowest improvements (or in some cases declines) for 
each of the SES indicators. After tallying the results, there were three cases with better 
than average declines in nationalism, five cases with average declines in nationalism, and 
six cases with an increase in nationalism. This indicates an association between the below 
average changes in SES with rising nationalism. See Table 20 for details. This aligns with 
the expected results as a strong increase in SES can alleviate existential threats and allow 
a society to be more open, while the reverse would also hold true.  
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Table 19 Top Three Improvements per SES Indicator, for changes from Wave 3 to Wave 
6 
Indicator First Second Third 
GDP China Nigeria Romania 
Unemployment Germany Nigeria Jordan 
Life Expectancy Nigeria Turkey South Korea/Romania 
Infant Mortality China Turkey South Korea 
Green =  increase in nationalism    Blue =  average decline in nationalism    Orange = better than average decline in 
nationalism 
 
Table 20 Bottom Three Performers per SES Indicator, for changes from Wave 3 to Wave 
6 
Indicator First Second Third 
GDP Germany USA South Korea 
Unemployment South Korea USA China 
Life Expectancy South Africa Chile/Mexico/USA/Jordan 4-way tie for 
second 
Infant Mortality USA South Africa Chile 




With only 11 cases under examination, statistical analysis is limited in its ability 
to inform overall patterns; however, descriptive statistics can still be useful in setting the 
stage for further exploration through the QCA to follow in Chapter 5. Overall, in Wave 3, 
higher nationalism was associated with lower cultural globalization, lower emancipative 
values, lower equity, and lower socioeconomic status, while the connection to 
immigration was not clear. Meanwhile, lower nationalism was associated with higher 
cultural globalization, higher emancipative values, higher equity, and higher 
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socioeconomic status, while the connection to immigration was still complicated. This 
was similar to Wave 6, although many of the associations became less clear or weakened. 
In terms of changes from Waves 3 to 6, a decline in nationalism or a less than average 
increase is associated with higher levels of increase in cultural globalization, 
emancipative values, and socioeconomic status, as well as with a slower rate of increase 
in immigration. Rising nationalism is associated with a slower increase in globalization 
and socioeconomic status, as well as with a higher rate of immigration, although not an 
above average increase. These associations are summarized in Table 21. 











Wave 3 Low Low Low Low  No 
association 









Low High rate 
(not change) 
 
The connection between lower cultural globalization (and lower rates of increase) 
with higher nationalism (and increases in nationalism) refutes the idea of Mann (1997) 
that globalization may actually solidify a national identity and increase nationalism. In 
these cases, higher levels of globalization are not associated with higher levels of 
nationalism. This could indicate that the globalist theorists (Giddens 1990; Ohmae 1990) 
are correct: globalization is shifting the world order away from a nation-state focus. If 
globalization is creating other benefits, such as access to technology, jobs, cyber-
communities, and ideas, within a society, then people will not feel threatened by it and 
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will not respond with a defensive, nationalistic approach. Part of the researcher’s 
hypothesis was that rapid cultural globalization is associated with increasing nationalism. 
On the surface, among these eleven cases, this does not hold true. However, there were 
some instances in which this was the case. The researcher did anticipate that additional 
conditions would impact whether a country shifted to a more nationalistic orientation in 
the face of rising nationalism.  
In a static state (Wave 3 and Wave 6), lower emancipative values are associated 
with higher levels of nationalism, while changes in emancipative values are not 
necessarily connected to changes in nationalism. The static state of lower emancipative 
values with higher nationalism aligns with Weltzel’s (2013) theory that emancipative 
values represent a shedding of existential threats. Once people feel secure in their ability 
to meet basic needs, they are more likely to feel comfortable granting freedoms to those 
in their society. Nationalism can be a sign of not sensing that security and, instead, seeing 
an existential threat. Often, politicians, such as President Trump, will utilize this fear and 
make immigration the face of that threat. Logic would follow that lower emancipative 
values represent a lack of existential security and higher nationalism can also represent a 
lack of existential security, so the two may be correlated, as we see among these 11 cases.  
How people respond to cultural change (which, in this study, is defined through 
emancipative values) can vary widely, so the inconsistency when comparing changes in 
emancipative values to changes in nationalism is to be expected. As Norris and Inglehardt 
(2019) had observed, there are four ways that people respond to cultural change: remain 
silent, accept and adapt, retreat to a community of like-minded people, and a defensive 
reaction to support strong leaders and defend tradition. The later approach would be 
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connected with an increase in nationalism, while the first two approaches would not. 
Additional factors may determine which way a society responds and those factors can be 
further explored through the QCA. 
In many ways, each of the remaining conditions relate to existential security. 
Within these 11 cases, higher nationalism was associated with lower economic equality 
(GINI Index). Higher nationalism can be exhibited in the face of existential threats and a 
lack of equality can lead to not feeling secure enough to grant more freedoms (as the 
emancipative values theory outlines). In addition, when the socioeconomic status of a 
country is lower, it can create feelings of insecurity, which can heighten nationalism. As 
Inglehart (1997, 2018) had observed, uncertainty and insecurity can lead to increased 
levels of nationalism.  
With immigration, the results are not quite as clear. In Wave 3, there is no clear 
association between nationalism and immigration; in Wave 6, high immigration is 
associated with higher nationalism, but only among the eight countries with the lowest 
level of immigration; and nationalism increased the most from Wave 3 to Wave 6 in 
countries with the highest rate of immigration, but not the largest percentage increase. 
Some of this lack of consistency could be due to the nuanced details of the immigration 
(type, region, etc.) As Fuligni and Tsai found, when immigrants are recognizable 
minorities in their host societies, it creates the sense of a threat, which enhances their 
internal group identification (2015). Countries with immigration from outside their 
cultural region will respond differently than countries with immigration primarily from 
within their cultural region. The QCA analysis will allow the researcher to extract further 
details and nuance. 
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Each of these conclusions is based on purely statistical data from eleven 
countries. A deep dive into the nuances of each case through the QCA should illuminate 
whether there are specific combinations of factors that predict a decline or rise in 
nationalism. Chapters 5 through 9 will consist of detailed case studies for each country, 
separated by region. The researcher will delve into the nuances of the current climate and 
recent changes within each country, with a focus on campaign rhetoric around 
immigration and recent election results, as well as any shifts in the conditions under 
examination (emancipative values, SES, globalization, equality, and immigration). 
Through the development of these case studies, the researcher also calibrated each 
condition for the QCA analysis, which she will explain. She will then draw some 
conclusions regarding each region before moving on to the actual QCA analysis. Chapter 
10 will consist of an analysis of the fsQCA truth table in order to determine if there may 
be combinations of conditions that inform whether a country shifts to a more nationalistic 
perspective or away from one. 
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CHAPTER V – LATIN AMERICA: CHILE AND MEXICO 
This chapter takes a deep dive into the two case studies in this dissertation located 
in Latin America – Chile and Mexico. The researcher closely examines the conditions 
that were outlined in previous chapters to better understand what may be occurring. She 
also strives to further understand the level of nationalism within the country by 
examining two areas beyond the World Values Survey: campaign rhetoric around 
immigration and election results. Each case study will begin with some basic background 
on the country, followed by an exploration of the conditions under consideration in terms 
of how that country compares to others in the study and what changes they have 
experienced from 1996 to 2012. The second section of each case study will explore 
nationalism, first by re-visiting the World Values Survey questions, and then by delving 
into campaign rhetoric around immigration, as well as election results of “nation first” 
presidential candidates. By painting a clearer picture, the researcher then calibrated each 
condition and the outcome in order to prepare for the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis in Chapter 10. The chapter concludes with some general observations about the 
evidence presented in the two cases and the implications. 
Chile 
Chile, a primarily Spanish-speaking country that spans most of the western coast 
of South America, has a population just over 18 million. Most of its population is of 
European descent, while around 10% is comprised of indigenous groups.  Chile is one of 
the smallest countries in this study, only larger than Jordan, but it has a fairly high 
development score of .847 (2016), which is the fourth highest among cases in this study. 
Chile is the world’s leading copper producer and it relies on exports of minerals, wood, 
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fruit, seafood, and wine. Chile has generally been a stable country since the end of the 
Augusto Pinochet dictatorship in March 1990, although it witnessed countless human 
rights abuses during his decades-long rule. Chile has a sound financial system and is 
among the least corrupt countries in South America. Protests are common when people 
are striving to bring awareness to an issue or fight for change. For example, students have 
held countless protests over the past year to demand free education. 
Overview of Conditions that Impact Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitude within a country. A reminder of how these conditions were selected and 
measured can be found in Appendix C. The cultural emancipative values indicator is 
outlined in detail in Appendix E. Table 22 shows all of the data for Chile for the present 
or the year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw 
data, the chart notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well 
as what the change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have 
occurred (both direction and extent).  
Table 22 Conditions Within Chile 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 







GDP/capita 15,432 (2012) 4th highest 187% increase 
from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 6.7 (2012) 6th lowest 14% increase from 
1996 (negative) 





Table 22 (continued).  




GINI .474 (2012) 10th lowest 14% decrease 
(positive) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 





3% (2015) 5th lowest 160% increase 
from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .494 (2012) 3rd highest 21% increase from 
1996 
Autonomy .42 (2012) 8th highest 12% increase from 
1996 
Equality .70 (2012) 4th highest 15% increase from 
1996 
Choice .42 (2012) 3rd highest 79% increase from 
1996 
Voice .41 (2012) 3rd highest .2% increase from 
1996 
 
Chile generally ranks around the “middle of the pack” or slightly better on most 
conditions. On the various socioeconomic indicators, it ranged from 3rd to 6th among the 
11 cases in this study.  There were significant improvements in GDP per capita; moderate 
improvements in infant mortality; and minimal improvements in life expectancy. 
Unemployment, however, rose by 14%, but this was close to the average shift among the 
cases, so although it was not positive, it mimicked the global trend. The GINI coefficient, 
which measures equity, was nearly the worst, but did improve by 14%, which was better 
than the average rate of improvement. Immigration as a percentage of the population was 
7th in 2010 and 5th in 2015, which is right in the middle.  Numerous countries had 
immigration rates between 1-3% though. From 1995 to 2010, Chile had the second 
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largest increase, although its 159% pales in comparison to Korea’s 642% increase. It also 
saw the second largest increase from 1995 to 2015 with a gain of 230%, which was 
second to Korea’s 971% increase. The rapid increases in immigration could have played 
a role in the anti-immigration campaign rhetoric that appeared across all political parties 
for the first time in 2018.  
In terms of cultural globalization, Chile had the 5th highest score in both 2012 and 
2016. From 1996 to 2012, it experienced a 12% increase, which was the fourth lowest 
increase and below the average change. From 2012 to 2016, there was no change, even 
though most countries experienced some minimal increase. Even though Chile has 
experienced minimal change in cultural globalization, its emancipative values were the 
3rd highest in 2012 and it saw a 21% increase, which was higher than the average 
increase. The most significant increase was a 79% increase in the Choice indicator which 
measures people’s views on homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. 
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
The desired outcome is this dissertation is decreasing nationalism. Measuring 
nationalistic attitudes is challenging. In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher 
utilized results from the World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalistic 
attitudes. Table 23 outlines each question that was used in determining the nationalism 
score, along with the score for Chile in 2012, and the change since 1996. The full 
questions can be found in Appendix D. Overall, compared to the other 10 cases in this 
study, Chile was less nationalistic than other cases in this study with a .54 score, which 
was 2nd best, along with Mexico and the United States. On many specific indicators they 
were more nationalistic than most of the other cases, but on the few where they were less 
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nationalistic, the extent of the difference was significant, thus bringing down their overall 
score.    
Table 23 Nationalistic Attitudes in Chile, Based on World Values Survey Results 
 
Note: “1” represents “fully nationalistic,” while “0” represents “not at all nationalistic”   
Full list of questions can be found in Appendix D.  
*Measure that was used for the Descriptive Statistics chapter. 
 
On the question regarding whether it would be opposed to having foreign 
neighbors, Chile was the least nationalistic in 2012 and had experienced a 35% decrease 
on this question from 1996. This was the 3rd largest decrease among the cases and 
significantly better than the 18% average increase. Chileans showed stronger attitudes 
toward prioritizing its native-born population when asked whether native Chileans should 
be given priority for jobs when they are shortages. They ranked 6th and demonstrated less 
improvement from 1996 in comparison. This score had only declined by 7%, which was 
less than the average 10% decrease and the 7th worst.  National pride in Chile is fairly 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = less 
nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .08 1st 35% decrease  
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.76 6th 7% decrease 
National Pride .81 5th 0% change 
Confidence in UN .53 8th 24% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.38 2nd 24% decrease (confidence decreased) 
Identify with “world” .39 7th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .79 6th Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .59 9th (tie) 6% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.53 3rd 5% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.54 2nd (3-way tie) 5% decrease 
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change on this indicator, which was close to the average 3% increase. Their change 
ranked 5th. The questions around group belonging were difficult to compare, as has been 
previously noted, because the format changed from Wave 4 to Wave 5. For just Wave 6, 
Chile was more nationalistic than most cases in this study, ranking  7th and 6th on its sense 
of belonging to the nation and world, respectively, and 9th overall. Based on the 
comparison approach that the researcher used, Chile declined 6%, which was better than 
the 9% average increase, but only put Chile at 7th for improvements.  
A person’s sense of identity with the world or their own nation can differ from 
their sense of confidence in the United Nations (UN) or their own government. In 2012, 
Chileans ranked 8th in their confidence in the UN and 2nd in their confidence in their own 
government, both of which represent a lack of confidence. Overall, they ranked 4th. In the 
combined “confidence” measure, Chile saw a 2% decline in nationalism, which was close 
to the 3% average. For the nationalistic attitude overall, when the “group belonging” 
score was excluded for easier comparability, Chile was the 3rd least nationalistic country 
in this study. It saw a 5% decline from 1996, which was slightly better than the 3% 
average decline, putting Chile in 5th for level of decline in nationalism. The results did 
not change significantly when “group belonging” was included. Chile’s score with .54, 
which was the second lowest (along with 3 other countries) and that was a 5% decline 
from 1996, putting it in the middle of the pack, as the average was a 2% decline.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey 
Questions from a survey do not provide the full picture on the level of nationalism 
that is felt and demonstrated within a country. The researcher has chosen to include 
information on anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric and election results for “nation first” 
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candidates to supplement the quantitative data from the World Values Survey. Chile has 
experienced significant changes in immigration patterns in recent decades. In order to 
understand some of these shifts, it is helpful to briefly explain the Pinochet dictatorship. 
In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet assumed leadership through a bloody military coup, 
which was supported by the United States. He overthrew President Salvador Allende, a 
democratically elected Socialist president. In place of this, Pinochet established a military 
dictatorship and committed countless human rights violations. At least 3,200 people were 
executed or disappeared and many more were detained, tortured, or exiled. At the same 
time as these abuses, Chile also experienced strong economic growth. In 1990, Pinochet 
gave up the presidency after the implementation of a new Constitution. However, he 
remained Commander in Chief until 1998, allowing him to continue to exert significant 
influence. He was able to protect security forces and himself from persecution for the 
myriad of human rights abuses.  
After Pinochet took power in 1973, more than 500,000 Chileans fled the country. 
Migration to Chile fell to less than 1% of the population by 1982 (Reveco 2018). 
Pinochet’s rule ended in 1990, and immigration to Chile began to rise again. From 1990 
to 2016, the foreign-born population in Chile increased four-fold, with the sharpest rise 
occurring between 2005 and 2014 (Reveco 2018). The immigration rate compared to the 
total population was still under 3% in 2015, but was the third highest among countries in 
the region, after Venezuela and Argentina. Not only did the sheer number of immigrants 
rise, but so did their origins. Since 2010, the number of African-descendent Haitians who 
immigrated to Chile increased by tens of thousands, rendering the presence of immigrants 
more visible in the Chilean population (Reveco 2018). This increase in immigration by 
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Haitians was largely a result of the 2010 earthquake. Prior to this, there were only around 
50 residency permits filed each year by Haitians. By 2015, there were more than 1,110 
each year. In 2016, 44,000 Haitians arrived in Chile. (Reveco 2018). Consequently, there 
has been a public backlash and calls for increased restrictions on immigration (Reveco 
2018).  
The only law regulating visa administration in Chile is the Immigration Act of 
1975. Some people argue that it is a relic of the Cold War and dictatorship and it reflects 
a view of immigrants being a risk to national security. Others, however, say that it is too 
open because immigrants are permitted to arrive as tourists, then obtain a temporary visa 
(Reveco 2018). The 1975 Act focuses on regulating entrances, allowing the government 
to develop temporary initiatives to address urgent matters. Thus, it is a law, but with 
administrative-led policies that are not approved by Congress and can be modified by the 
next administration (Reveco 2018). 
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. For the first time in recent history, 
candidates for President from the main political coalitions called for a halt in immigration 
or more restrictive policies during the 2017 campaign. Traditionally, these calls had only 
been made by more fringe parties (Reveco 2018). According to Esposito and Iturrieta, 
“Latin American politics has rarely featured this type of criticism of immigrants by 
hopefuls on both the right and left, at times recalling the language that has helped build 
support for Donald Trump in the United States, Nigel Farage in Britain, and Marine Le 
Pen in France” (2017, np). For example, Pinera, who won the election, blamed Chile’s 
immigration laws for “importing problems like delinquency, drug trafficking, and 
organized crime” (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017, np). He has noted that many criminal 
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gangs are foreigners and that the problem is worst in regions where a large percentage of 
the population includes immigrants (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017). This is very similar to 
the approach that Donald Trump took when he launched his presidential campaign by 
claiming that immigrants from Mexico are rapists.  
Pinera was a more right-leaning candidate, so that type of rhetoric is not as 
surprising from him, although it still represented a shift for his party. However, even 
Guillier, of the leftist bloc, indicated that Chile needed a more selective immigration 
policy. His mining region in the north has seen an economic downturn and has the 
highest immigration rates in the country (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017). Even President 
Bachelet, who was not running in the election, but was finishing her term as president, 
had indicated she would propose a bill to change the immigration rules, indicating a 
strong focus on this topic. This increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric has concerned some 
scholars and advocates who worry that the focus on immigration is making immigrants 
the scapegoat for all of Chile’s problems (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017). It is common to 
blame those who are not “us” and put “us” first. Independent Senator Pedro Araya went 
as far as to refer to this as nationalist rhetoric (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017).  
Furthermore, this rhetoric is misleading. According to Chile’s government 
migration office, immigrants commit fewer crimes than Chileans, proportionally 
(Esposito and Iturrieta 2017). Nevertheless, according to a Cadem Poll in December 
2016, 75% of Chileans indicated that Chile needs stricter immigration policies, while 
45% said that immigration is bad for Chile. Only 41% indicated that immigration is good 
for Chile (Esposito and Iturrieta 2017).  Politicians are then using fears and existential 
insecurity to provoke nationalism and to encourage nationalist ideology, making 
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immigrants the scapegoat for the nation’s issues. This approach is based on emotion 
rather than fact. 
Election results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes: Chile. Michelle 
Bachelet Jeria was President of Chile from 2006 to 2010 and again from 2014 to 2018. 
She was the first female head of state in Chile and focused heavily on gender equality, 
among other social issues. She created the first Ministry of Women and Gender Equity 
(Londoño 2017). Chile experienced a shift from her progressive social stances during the 
2017 Presidential election, which they held on November 19, 2017. The voter turnout for 
the run-off election was only 46%, a dismal showing compared to the average voter 
turnout of 68.32%. This may represent a disillusionment among voters. The major 
presidential contenders are noted in Table 24, with the winner noted in yellow and the 
two closest contenders in gray. In the run-off election, Pinera received 54.6% of the 
votes, while Guiller, a centre-left candidate, received 45.4% (Al Jazeera 2017). However, 
in the first round, Pinera only received 36.6%, while Guiller received 22.7%, and 
Sanchez, representing the left, received 20.27%. The votes for Guiller and Sanchez 
combined show strong support for leftist ideology. Furthermore, Sanchez’s Broad Front 
Party increased its Lower House seats from just three to twenty (Pribble and Luna 2017). 
Table 24 Major Candidates in Chile November 2017 Presidential Election 
Candidate Party % of Vote 
(1st round) 
% of Vote 
(2nd round) 





Independent 22.7% 45.4% 
Antonio KAST Independent 7.9% n/a 
Sebastian PINERA Independent 36.6% 54.6% 




Pinera was previously president from 2010-2014. He is a 69-year-old 
businessman worth 2.8 billion USD (as of 2019). Although he had several business and 
political scandals, he still retained the support of the business community. With the 
election of Pinera, Chile represents the most recent Latin American country to shift to the 
right.  However, Pinera will likely be unable to roll back popular social reforms, as he 
does not hold a majority in the legislature (Al Jazeera 2017). Pinera ran on three issues: 
cutting corporate taxes, doubling economic growth, and eliminating waste. He is viewed 
as “miner-friendly.” In addition, he captured lower income voters with proposals for a 
public pension fund and expanding free education (Guardian 2017). In June 2017, at a 
campaign rally, Pinera made a joke about rape in order to fire up the crowd (Londoño 
2017). Again, this mimics some of the rhetoric used by Donald Trump in the U.S. 
Kast, who only received less than 8% of the vote in the first round, ran a 
nationalist campaign. He supported the construction of a border wall between Chile and 
Peru. After the first round, Pinera tried to get these same voters (Pribble and Luna 2017). 
He did successfully pick up many of these voters, but he also pulled from the far left, 
making it difficult to discern whether the election of Pinera represents a shift towards a 
more nationalistic attitude or not.  
In October 2019, it became clear that Pinera did not have the full support of the 
country, especially of the far-left. The announcement of a 3% hike in subway rates results 
in the most wide-spread protests and worst violence in Chile since the Pinochet 
dictatorship ended in 1990 (McGowan 2019). Protesters called for Pinera to step down as 
president. The protesters have caused substantial damage; initially they smashed most 
subway stations in Santiago, but then moved on to damaging statues, shops, houses, and 
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churches, and have even used gasoline bombs to destroy some stores and hotels. 
Although these protests have been strongest in Santiago, they have spanned across the 
country. The Treasury Minister, Ignacio Briones, estimated that 300,000 jobs will be lost 
due to the damage (Vergara and Luna 2019).  
The protests were initially led by high school students, who would 
disproportionately feel the impact of the transportation rate hike and who have led many 
of Chile’s protests for social reform, but they have since been joined by people of all ages 
and social classes (Vergara and Luna 2019; McGowan 2019). They have social and 
economic demands, including calling for an end to the 2-tier system of education and 
health care that has created two levels of service in Chile. According to Sergio Gonzalez, 
a psychologist and anthropologist at the University of Santiago de Chile, “protesters are a 
product of our system . . . they have been generated by the exclusion, marginality, and the 
lack of social sensibility in our economic system” (Vergara and Luna 2019). Chile is a 
prosperous country within Latin America, but it also has very high economic inequality. 
As outlined above, among the cases in this study, Chile ranks 10th out of 11 for equality. 
This has been a central focus of concern for protesters. In addition to economic and social 
concerns, or perhaps as a framework for them, protesters have also called for a new 
constitution, as the current one was developed during the Pinochet dictatorship. They 
want a constitution that prioritizes human beings over private interests and companies 
(McGowan 2019). 
Pinera’s initial response was to declare a state of emergency, which allowed him 
to deploy the military and enact a curfew. This approach, however, was not well-received 
by protesters who did not feel that their concerns were being heard. Additionally, any 
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approach that involves a heightened response by the military could be reminiscent of the 
dictatorship and, thus, could draw a more oppositional response. As a result, Pinera 
changed course; he lifted the state of emergency and replaced 8 cabinet members. Pinera 
also introduced some modest proposals for social reforms, including: increasing the 
pension by 20% for the poorest members of society; increasing the minimum wage by 
16%; cancelling electricity rate hikes; reducing the cost of public transportation for 
elderly in poverty and students with loans; reducing the pay for legislators; and 
increasing taxes on the wealthy (Vergara and Luna 2019). One criticism of these 
proposals is that they come at a cost to the state, rather than to wealthy companies. One 
councilwoman in Santiago noted that the problem with the right-wing administration is 
that they do not understand this concern (McGowan 2019).  
As a result of the protests and violence, as of November 20, 2019, at least 26 
people have died, some from efforts at arson and looting, but others at the hands of the 
military (Vergara and Luna 2019; McGowan 2019). In addition, Pinera had to cancel two 
major global events that Chile was slated to host in 2019: the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Trade Forum and the United Nations Climate Summit. Additionally, Chile’s 
former President and the current UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Michelle 
Bachelet, has initiated an independent investigation into the deaths and reports of 
excessive force against protesters (McGowan 2019). Although the protests have become 
more controlled and less violent, it is yet to be seen what the final outcome will be of 
these initiatives.  
Although Pinera has lost some support, both his election and the recent protests 
against his policies, may actually be signs of increasing nationalist sentiments in Chile. 
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According to Villanueva (2019), protests and “rising up” to enact change can be signs of 
nationalism taking the form of bringing people of a country together. Nationalism does 
refer to identifying with one’s own nation and supporting its interests. In the case of 
Chile, these protests certainly represent a strong identification as Chilean and a genuine 
desire to improve their nation for all Chileans. The piece that may be missing in drawing 
a line between nationalism and these protests is the exclusion of the interests of other 
nations and people. Having to cancel two global conferences in order to focus on Chile’s 
own interests could hint at this latter part of the nationalism definition though. Overall, 
the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the 2017 presidential elections, the far-right Pinera’s 
ultimate election, and the coming together of Chileans to fight for improvements in the 
lives of Chileans do not support the idea of a decline in nationalistic attitudes, as the 
World Values Survey results indicate. In combining this evidence, the researcher’s 
assessment is that nationalistic attitudes may be declining slightly, overall, but not 
significantly.  
Mexico 
Mexico, officially named the United Mexican States, is the southernmost country 
in North America. To its north lies the United States, to the south and west is the Pacific 
Ocean, to the east is the Gulf of Mexico, and to the south are Guatemala, Belize, and the 
Caribbean Sea. Although part of North America, Mexico is also a major country in Latin 
America. It is the third largest Latin American country, after Brazil and Argentina, in 
terms of land size. With a population of 132,328,035 in 2019, it is the second most 
populous country in Latin America and the fourth largest in this study. Mexico, however, 
falls in the lower half of the cases in terms of development, with a score of .762 in 2016. 
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Mexico has struggled with significant drug cartel crime and violence, causing many 
Mexicans to emigrate to the United States. At the time same, many migrants from Central 
America have traveled to Mexico, in hopes of also reaching the United States.  
 
Overview of the Conditions that may Impact Nationalistic Attitudes: Mexico 
Table 25 shows all of the data for Mexico that the researcher gathered and 
explained in Chapter 4. As it did for Chile, the chart outlines data for 2019 or the year 
closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the 
researcher noted how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as 
what the change has been since Wave 3, in order to give an indication of what shifts have 
occurred (both direction and extent). 
Table 25 Conditions Within Mexico 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 






GDP/capita 9,940 (2012) 6th highest 131% increase from 
1996 (positive) 
Unemployment 4.9 (2012) 4th lowest 7% decrease from 
1996 (positive) 
Life Expectancy 76.4 (2012) 5th  highest 4% increase from 
1996 (positive) 
Infant Mortality 14.1 (2012) 7th lowest 49% decrease 
(positive) 
GINI (Equality) GINI .454 (2012) 9th highest 6% decrease 
(positive) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 





1% (2015) 2nd lowest 160% increase from 
1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 












Overall .5 (2012) 4th highest 17% increase from 
1996 
Autonomy .36 (2012) 9th highest 12% decrease from 
1996 
Equality .71 (2012) 3rd highest 37% increase from 
1996 
Choice .33 (2012) 5th highest 30% increase from 
1996 
Voice .41 (2012) 2nd highest 10 % increase from 
1996 
 
For the various conditions, Mexico is generally around the middle of the pack. It 
was fourth through seventh on the various indicators for socioeconomic status. Mexico 
moved in a positive direction on all of them from 1996 to 2012, although improvements 
for unemployment and life expectancy were minimal. The GDP increased by 131%, 
which was the seventh strongest increase and less than the average 254% increase. 
Unemployment fell by 7%, putting it in 3rd, and showing a much more positive change 
than the average 10% increase in unemployment. Life expectancy increased by 4%, 
which was less than the 6% average increase and the lowest after South Africa, which 
declined. Infant mortality declined by 49%, a figure that, while significant, was close to 
the average and put Mexico in 5th place for rate of decline. Overall, despite Mexico’s 
improvements on socioeconomic status, those changes were generally less significant 
than improvements in other cases.  
 The GINI Indicator was .45 in 2012, which put it in 12th among the other cases. 
Mexico did become more equitable from 1996 to 2012, with a 6% decrease in its score. 
This was better than the average 1% increase in GINI (less equitable) and was the fourth 
best improvement. In terms of immigration, Mexico had the second lowest immigration 
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rate as a percentage of population (1%) in 2010 and 2015. From 1995 to 2010, 
immigration increased by 111%, which was less than the 128% average and represented 
the third highest increase. From 1995 to 2015, immigration increased by 160%, which 
was also less than the average 208%, but was again the 3rd highest. This is because the 
extremely high percentage increase in South Korea drew up the average. 
 Another major condition under consideration relates to culture – cultural 
globalization and cultural values (emancipative values). Mexico scored in the lower half 
for cultural globalization in both 2012 and 2016, ranking 7th and 8th, respectively. From 
1996 to 2012, cultural globalization increased 20% in Mexico, which was a slower 
increase than the average 24%, and was the 7th highest. (That average is without Nigeria, 
which saw an incredibly high increase, thus creating a deceptive average.) From 2012 to 
2016, cultural globalization in Mexico decreased by 5%. It was one of only two countries 
to see a decline; the average was a small increase. Despite the slower than average 
increase from 1996 to 2012 and the decline in cultural globalization from 2012 to 2016, 
Mexico did see significant shifts in cultural emancipative values. In 2012, Mexico ranked 
4th for emancipative values with a .5. It had the third largest increase from 1996 to 2012, 
with a 17% increase. Among the individual indicators, Mexico actually declined in 
autonomy, which asks about the importance of independence, imagination, and obedience 
in children. It increased by 10 to 37% on the other indicators.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes  
As noted previously, the desired outcome is this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher utilized results from the 
World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalism. Table 26 outlines each 
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question that was used in determining the nationalism score, along with the score for 
Mexico in 2012, and the change since 1996. Overall, compared to the other 10 cases in 
this study, Mexico was less nationalistic; it had a .54 score, which was 2nd best, along 
with two other cases. On several specific indicators Mexico were more nationalistic than 
most of the other cases, but on the few where they were less nationalistic, the point 
difference was significant, thus bringing down their overall score. 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors, 
Would Like to Have 
.12 2nd (tied) 56% decrease  
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.69 4th 18% decrease 
National Pride .93 10th 6% increase 




.41 4th 0% change  
Identify with “World” .23 3rd Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .83 9th Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .53 4th (tie) 112% increase 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
“group belonging”) 
.55 5th (tie) 11% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
“group belonging”)* 
.54 2nd (3-way tie) 1% increase 
Note: “1” represents “fully nationalistic,” while “0” represents “not at all nationalistic” 
*Measure that was used for the Descriptive Statistics chapter. 
 
Based on the World Values Survey results, Mexico ranks toward the less 
nationalistic end of the middle on most indicators. In terms of acceptance of foreign 
neighbors, Mexico was one of the most open countries in the study, placing 2nd. This 
represented a 56% improvement (decline), which was the most significant decline among 
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all the cases and much larger than the 18% average increase in resistance. Mexico also 
demonstrated a decline in nationalistic attitudes on the question regarding prioritizing 
home country nationals when jobs are scarce. From 1996 to 2012, Mexico saw an 18% 
decline, which is better than the 10% average decline and the second largest decline after 
South Africa. However, when it comes to national pride, Mexico had one of the highest 
levels in 2012 and this presented a 6% increase from 1996. This put Mexico close to the 
average 3% increase across the cases in this study.  
 In terms of confidence in the United Nations and in their own government, 
Mexico ranked 4th among the cases in this study. Their confidence in the UN increased 
from 1996, resulting in a 5.6% decline in nationalism, while their confidence in their own 
government remained unchanged. In the combined measure of confidence, Mexico 
ranked 5th and saw a decline of 4%, making it average among the cases. In 2012, 
Mexicans identified strongly with both the “world” and with their “own nation,” meaning 
they ranked 3rd on one indicator (low nationalism) and 9th on the other (high nationalism). 
In the overall “group belonging” measure, Mexico was tied for 4th and saw a 112% 
increase, which was by far the largest shift (the average was a 9% increase.) All of these 
measures combined create the overall nationalistic attitudes score. When the researcher 
excluded group belonging (due to the challenges in comparing Wave 3 and Wave 6), 
Mexico ranked 5th and showed an 11% decrease in nationalism, which is the largest 
decline. However, when group belonging is included (using the method explained in 
Chapter 4), Mexico ranks 2nd (along with 2 other countries) and shows a 1% increase in 
nationalism. This is close to the 2% decline, but one of only four countries that showed 
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an increase. For the purposes of the descriptive statistics, the researcher used the indicator 
that included “group belonging,” but she can consider both indicators in this chapter.  
 
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey 
 As noted earlier in this chapter, survey results alone do not provide the full picture 
around nationalistic attitudes within a country. Campaign rhetoric around immigration, 
along with election results based on a nationalistic platform, can help complete the 
picture. Mexico has a unique experience with immigration at present. Mexico has 
historically been a country of “out” migration; people wanted to leave Mexico. That trend 
has slowed and there has been a significant increase in the flow of migrants from Central 
America to and through Mexico to reach the United States (Selee 2019). From October 
2018 to May 2019, there were 444,309 Central Americans apprehended at the US- 
Mexico border. That is double the number from all of fiscal year 2018. Furthermore, over 
80% of groups had children (either as part of a family or alone) (Selee 2019). In 2017, 
Mexico has 12,700 asylum requests from Central Americans; this represented a 
significant increase from 8,800 in 2016 and 3,400 in 2015. In 2017, Mexico was second 
only to the U.S. in the number of asylum requests from Central Americans (Romero 
2018). Mexico was issuing humanitarian visas, but halted this practice to encourage 
people to apply in their home country (Reuters 2019). However, as part of the Migrant 
Protection Protocol (MPP), the Mexican government has been readmitting Central 




Mexican President, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador  (or AMLO, as he is 
commonly called) has focused his attention on enforcement of existing immigration laws. 
He has detained and deported high numbers of migrants since the start of 2019. In May 
2019, his administration apprehended 23,000 migrants and deported 15,000. This was 
about two times as many as May 2018. In addition, AMLO sent 6,000 members of the 
national guard, along with the Navy and Army, to the southern border of Mexico to back 
up migration authorities (Seelee 2019). Given these vast immigration shifts in Mexico, is 
interesting to assess what impact this has had on campaign rhetoric and elections.  
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. Immigration was certainly a topic of the 
2018 Mexican Presidential election. Although not all candidates agreed on all aspects of 
immigration, all four main Presidential candidates did agree that Mexico would no longer 
enforce U.S. immigration laws for them (Romero 2018). As a candidate, AMLO, who 
ultimately won, denounced Trump’s policy of separating migrant families as “racist” and 
“inhumane” (Romero 2018). He also criticized the incumbent President Nieto’s Southern 
Border Program as violating human rights because of the way it deported and persecuted 
Central American migrants (Romero 2018). AMLO noted that he would still watch the 
southern border, but that he would also follow laws to respect human rights and to allow 
asylum seekers to find refuge in Mexico (Romero 2018). He called on Mexico to serve all 
people: rich and poor, city and country, migrants, believers/non-believers, and all sexual 
preferences (Ahmed and Villegas 2018). In addition to AMLO, Ricardo Anaya, the right 
of center candidate who received the second most votes, also criticized Nieto’s policy of 
detaining and deporting Central American migrants (Romero 2018). He encouraged 
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Mexico to treat migrants as humanely as they wanted the U.S. to treat Mexican migrants 
(Romero 2018). 
AMLO’s campaign called for a policy that would respect the rights of migrants 
and create legal pathways to stay in Mexico. In addition, he also stressed the need to help 
address the root causes of migration in Central America (Seelee 2019). However, as 
president, AMLO’s plans are on hold because of negotiations with the U.S. Now, 
enforcement is the top priority, just like Mexico’s previous administration (Seelee 2019). 
It has been challenging for AMLO to match his campaign rhetoric with reality. He could 
liberalize migration policy and create legal pathways and have strong border enforcement 
(Seelee 2019). Instead, there have been mixed messages from the administration. On the 
one hand, they emphasized treating migrants like people who are just seeking a better 
life, but then, on the other hand, have implied that they will close the border entirely 
(Seelee 2019). Nevertheless, campaign rhetoric emphasized a more welcoming and 
humane environment for migrants, unlike the anti-immigrant rhetoric that was seen in 
Chile’s election.  
Election Results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. Elections for 
President, Mexican Chamber of Deputies, and Mexican Senate were held on July 1, 2018. 
Andres Manual Lopez Obrador (who is commonly referred to as AMLO) was elected 
President of Mexico with 53.2% of the vote (ElectionGuide.org). He is considered a 
leftist president. Table 27 shows the main candidates, their coalition, the parties that 





Table 27 Candidates in Mexico’s Presidential Election (July 2018) 
Candidate Coalition Parties Percent of Vote  
Andres Manuel 
LOPEZ Obrador 











All for Mexico Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, 
Ecologist Green 













Independent n/a 5.23% 
 
AMLO is the first leftist leader elected in Mexico in decades. Naturally, this gives 
some people hope, but fills the elites with trepidation. He campaigned on the rejection of 
the status quo, which had been centrist and embraced globalization. AMLO ran on the 
core promises of ending corruption, reducing violence, and addressing Mexico’s endemic 
poverty (Ahmed and Villegas 2018). He vowed to cut his own salary and raise wages of 
the lowest paid government employees. With AMLO’s coalition, he holds a majority in 
Congress, so he should be able to enact many of his policies (Ahmed and Villegas 2018). 
However, his coalition is a mixture of leftists, unions, far-right conservatives, and 
religious groups, so he does have competing visions with which to contend. AMLO 
campaigned on a promise that he would return Mexico to being a free and independent 
country (Romero 2018). This is part of putting your own nation first. However, he also 
called on Mexico to serve all people: rich and poor, city and country, migrants, 
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believers/non-believers, and all sexual preferences (Ahmed and Villegas 2018). Overall, 
there is no evidence that electing AMLO represents a shift towards a more nationalistic 
attitude for Mexico. 
Calibration and Initial Conclusions 
 In this section, the researcher will discuss how the conditions and outcome were 
calibrated in preparation for the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and will 
make some initial conclusions regarding the Chile and Mexico case studies.  
Calibration of the conditions and outcome to prepare for the truth table  
 Chapter 3 outlined the process of calibrating conditions and outcomes in detail. In 
short, the process of calibration assigns a number to each variable. Fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) allows the researcher to retain more nuance within each 
variable. The original, crisp set, QCA required the researcher to assign a 0 or 1 to each 
variable to indicate whether it was in the group or out of the group. Fuzzy set allows the 
researcher to create multiple breaking points. For example, she could create five different 
points: 0 (fully out), .25 (more out than in), .5 (neither out nor in), .75 (more in than out), 
1 (fully in). It is important to note that the fuzzy set calibration is not the same as rank 
ordering. If “fully out” is determined to be at a certain threshold, then all cases within that 
threshold would be considered “fully out,” without further differentiation. The nuance 
within that category becomes irrelevant.  
 Appendix F shows the results of the calibration for the conditions and outcomes 
for Wave 6 (generally 2012, unless otherwise noted). Appendix G illustrates the 
calibration for the changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6 for the conditions and the outcome. 
The calibration key that is provided for each indicator explains the cut off points for each 
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category. Chapter 10 will focus on the analysis of this information. For now, the 
researcher will focus on a deep dive into the two Latin American countries. Tables 28 and 
29 below shows the calibration for just Chile and Mexico for both Wave 6 as a point in 
time, as well as for the changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6.  



















Chile 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25  
Mexico 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25  
        
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 




































Chile 0.25 1  1  0.25   1 1 .25 
Mexico 0.75 .75 0.25 0.25 1 1 .75 
 Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
Chile and Mexico are fairly similar to one another for the stand alone point of 
Wave 6 (2012, typically), with the exception of socioeconomic status (SES) and cultural 
globalization. For equity and cultural emancipative values, both countries are “more out 
than in” the group for high levels. For both SES and cultural globalization, Chile is “more 
in than out,” while Mexico is “more out than in” the group. For immigration, Chile is 
“more out than in” and Mexico is “fully out” of the group of countries with high 
immigration as a percentage of population. With reasonable consistency across the 
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conditions, it may not be surprising that both countries are “more out than in” for the 
group of cases with high levels of nationalism.  
There is a similar level of variation and differentiation in the changes from Wave 
3 to Wave 6. Both countries are “more out than in” for significant increases in cultural 
globalization and both are “fully in” for significant increases in cultural emancipative 
values. Both countries saw an improvement in equality on the GINI index. One notable 
difference is with significant increases in immigration, where Chile is “fully in,” while 
Mexico is “more out than in.”  Based purely on numbers, Mexico would be “more in than 
out.” However, if the researcher considers that the hypothesis allows for increases in 
immigration from similar cultural groups to still align with a decrease in nationalism, she 
has to consider Mexico differently. Although Mexico has experienced significant 
increases in immigration, it has primarily been from Central American countries – a 
similar cultural group. In contrast, Chile’s immigration rate has increased significantly, 
but with an influx from Haiti. Beyond some different details within immigration, the only 
other significant difference on the conditions is with significant improvements in 
socioeconomic status, where Chile is “more out than in,” but Mexico is “more in than 
out.”  
The calibration of nationalism is more nuanced than the conditions. The 
calibration of the conditions, with the exception of immigration which considers the 
cultural origins of migrants, is based solely on quantitative data sources. Initially the 
calibration of nationalism was based on the quantitative assessment of the World Values 
Survey results, using the nationalism score that included the questions on “group 
belonging,” as previously explained. However, because the researcher engaged in an 
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exploration of campaign rhetoric around immigration, as well as election results of 
candidates on a nationalist platform, she must take those factors into account in assessing 
overall changes in nationalistic attitudes. In the case of both Chile and Mexico, this 
resulted in a manual manipulation of the calibration for nationalistic attitudes. For Chile, 
based purely on the World Values Survey, nationalistic attitudes appeared to decline 
significantly. With a 5% decline, it would have just barely been in the “more in than out” 
group for significant decreases in nationalism.  However, when considering the “first of 
its kind” incorporation of immigration rhetoric in the presidential campaign and the 
election of Pinera, who promoted immigration restrictions and utilized nationalistic 
rhetoric, the researcher manipulated the calibration for Chile to be “more out than in” for 
significant decreases in nationalism. She retained Chile in the group with overall 
declining nationalism, but when considering the additional data, it is counter-intuitive to 
classify Chile as significantly declining in nationalism, thus she placed Chile as “more 
out than in”. 
The situation with Mexico is nearly the opposite. The World Values Survey, when 
including the “group belonging” category, showed a slight increase in nationalism, 1%.  
However, Mexico is one of the few countries where the “group belonging” questions 
significantly shifted the results. Prior to incorporating those questions, Mexico showed an 
11% decline in nationalism. In addition, in the most recent presidential election, the 
country elected AMLO, who called on Mexico to serve all people, including migrants. 
Overall, the campaign rhetoric of most candidates showed support for treating migrants 
humanely and not attempting to respond harshly to the increase in migration to Mexico. 
Because of these factors, the researcher shifted Mexico from being “fully out” of the 
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group of significant decreases in nationalism to the group of “more in than out” 
indicating that there is evidence of declining nationalism.  
The calibration will be further explored in Chapter 10, the analysis of the fsQCA 
truth table. In examining Latin America in isolation, though, it is interesting to consider 
how each country aligns with the hypotheses. Table 30 below outlines the second 
hypothesis which is that the presence of rising socio-economic status, decreasing income 
inequality, falling or steady immigration (or from culturally similar regions), steady 
globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a 
shift away from a nationalist political perspective within a population. (The first 
hypothesis is the inverse of this.) For each condition and the outcome, the researcher 
indicated whether that country met that criteria (by inserting “YES”) or did not meet that 
criteria (by inserting an “X”).  To meet the criteria, the condition needed to have a 
calibration of .75 or 1 (or the inverse depending on the framing of the condition.)  






















Chile X YES X YES X X 
Mexico YES YES YES YES X YES 
*or slower than avg increase or increasing, but from same cultural group 
 The researcher indicated which conditions align with the outcome by highlighting 
it. For example, in Chile, there is no significant decrease in nationalism. Thus, the 
hypothesis is in alignment for any condition that was not met (an “X.”) For a visual 
representation, she highlighted each “X” for Chile. In Mexico, the outcome of a 
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significant decrease in nationalism was met; thus she highlighted each condition that was 
also met. Interestingly, there is alignment of 3 of out 5 conditions with the outcome for 
Chile and for 4 out of 5 conditions for the outcome in Mexico. Initially, the conditions 
that are in alignment for both countries relate to socioeconomic status and immigration. 
In Chapter 10, the fsQCA truth table analysis will indicate whether any of these 
conditions are necessary or sufficient for achieving the desired outcome of significant 
decreases in nationalism.  
Initial Latin American Regional Conclusions  
Latin America encompasses a large and diverse region of the world. Mexico and 
Chile are just two of the countries within this region, but represent some of its diversity. 
Chile is fairly small in population, whereas Mexico is the second most populous country 
in Latin America. Chile is a relatively developed country, whereas Mexico is in the lower 
half among the cases in this study. Chile and Mexico both had the same nationalism score 
in 2012 according to the World Values Survey. However, based on the inclusion of the 
‘group belonging’ questions, for Chile, this represented a slight decline in nationalism, 
but for Mexico, this indicated a slight increase. As noted above, based on additional 
evidence, these conclusions needed to be adjusted. Beyond the World Values Survey and 
perhaps indicative of changes between 2012 and 2019, there are signs of potential 
increasing nationalism in Chile and decreasing nationalism in Mexico.  
In Chile, there was a focus on anti-immigrant rhetoric during the campaign and 
the country elected a more right-leaning candidate who emphasized the need for 
immigration restrictions. The World Values Survey results for Chile indicated a decline 
in nationalism that would be calibrated as “neither in nor out” of the group with 
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significant declines. Based on the additional research though, the author adjusted Chile to 
be in the group of “more out than in” for significant declines. In Mexico, the campaign 
rhetoric around immigration focused on treating migrants humanly and respecting their 
human rights, and a more left-leaning presidential candidate was elected, a president who 
emphasized serving all people. Additionally, Mexico is one of the only cases where the 
inclusion of the “group belonging” questions significantly shifts the quantitative results. 
Before incorporating those questions, the WVS shows an 11% decline in nationalism. 
Adding those questions to consideration shifts it to a 1% increase. Taking this into 
consideration and bolstered by the campaign rhetoric and election results, the researcher 
feels confident in considering Mexico as a country with declining nationalistic attitudes.   
When examining some of the conditions in relation to the outcomes, there are 
some surprises and some expected correlations. As Table 30 above showed, both 
socioeconomic status and immigration aligned with the outcome for both Chile and 
Mexico. In Chile, a lack of significant improvements in SES and rapid increases in 
immigration from groups outside a similar cultural region corresponded with a lack of 
significant declines in nationalism. In Mexico, significant increases in SES and an 
absence of significant increases in immigration from outside a similar cultural region 
corresponded with a significant decline in nationalistic attitudes.  Each country had at 
least one additional condition that aligned with the hypothesized outcome, but those 
conditions differed in each case.  
There are many possibilities for why all of the conditions do not align with the 
expected outcome. It could be that one or two conditions are necessary, such as SES or 
immigration, and others are sufficient. Perhaps SES will need to align, but a country will 
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need to have at least two other conditions in alignment. None of this will be known until 
all of the case studies are complete and the truth table analysis is conducted.  
In the meantime, it is interesting to explore each of these conditions a bit further 
to understand why they may or may not have aligned. For economic equality, the GINI 
indicator shows improvements for both Chile and Mexico, although more so for Chile. 
Interestingly, despite improvements, Chile had the highest rate of inequality after South 
Africa. The theory would suggest that a decrease in inequality would correspond to a 
decrease in nationalism. However, perhaps this does not hold true if the level of 
inequality still remains high, as is the case in Chile.  
Both countries had relatively slow increases in cultural globalization, as compared 
to the rest of the cases, but significant shifts in cultural values (emancipative values). 
Based on the outcome, this means that the slow cultural globalization aligned with 
Mexico’s significant decrease in nationalism and the rapid cultural change aligned with 
Chile’s lack of significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes. Each country had one of 
these indicators that aligned. It may depend on how the conditions combine. For instance, 
maybe the rapid changes in cultural emancipative values in Mexico were off-set by the 
declines in economic inequality. The reason that theory suggests that rapid changes in 
cultural values will increase nationalism is because of the perceived threat. If overall 
economic equality is improving and, in this case, the overall socioeconomic status as 
well, then people may not feel threatened. In the case on Chile, the significant shift in 
cultural emancipative values was coupled with a rapid influx in immigration from outside 
a similar cultural group, plus a lack of significant improvements in socioeconomic status. 
These factors combined can easily lead to people feeling threatened by outsiders, whom 
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people perceive to be changing the culture of the country and causing economic 
downturn. Theory suggests that an expected response would be heightened nationalistic 
attitudes – a desire to protect one’s own people and culture at the expense of others.  As 
noted, there is not clear evidence of nationalistic attitudes increasing in Chile, but there is 
evidence that declines were quite minimal. 
The researcher did anticipate that not every condition would align with the 
anticipated outcome; she hypothesized that, more likely, a combination of conditions may 
lead to specific outcomes. As she continues to complete the analysis of the remaining 
cases, it will be interesting to begin to see what patterns emerge; however, it will not be 
until Chapter 10 when the researcher conducts the fsQCA truth table analysis that a 
clearer picture will emerge regarding which conditions are necessary or sufficient and 
what combination of conditions may lead to specific outcomes.  
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CHAPTER VI – ASIA: CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 
This chapter takes a deep dive into the two case studies in this dissertation located 
in Asia – China and South Korea. The researcher closely examines the conditions that 
were outlined in previous chapters to better understand what may be occurring. She also 
strives to further understand the level of nationalism within the country by examining two 
areas beyond the World Values Survey – campaign rhetoric focusing on immigration and 
subsequent election results, respectively. Each case study begins with some basic 
background on the country, followed by an exploration of the conditions under 
consideration in terms of how that country compares to others in the study and what 
changes they have experienced from 1996 to 2012. The second section of each case study 
explores nationalism, first by re-visiting the World Values Survey questions, and then by 
delving into immigration and elections. In both Asian cases, campaign rhetoric and 
election results cannot be examined in the same manner as in Latin America, due to a 
lack of rhetoric and conduct of elections that are either not democratic (China) or where 
there was little differentiation on “nation first” platforms (South Korea). An exploration 
of these issues still helps to paint a clearer picture. The researcher will then calibrate each 
condition and each outcome in order to prepare for the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis in Chapter 10. The chapter concludes with some general observations about the 
evidence presented in the two cases and the implications. 
China 
China, or the People’s Republic of China, is the world’s most populous country, 
with over 1.4 billion people. It is also the 3rd largest in terms of land size, almost covering 
the same extent of geographic area as Europe. China has been the “powerhouse” of Asia 
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for the past several decades, with expanding global influence. The capital, Beijing, serves 
as the cultural, economic, and communication center of the nation.  Shanghai and Hong 
Kong are also notable cities, serving as the industrial center and the commercial center, 
respectively, although the latter still retains a measure of autonomy from Beijing. China 
is ruled by the Communist Party with virtually no space for deviation from the 
Communist ideology. This background sets the stage for how the researcher assesses 
nationalistic attitudes, as well as for the economic growth.  
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitudes within a country. (Those conditions are socioeconomic status (SES), equity, 
immigration, cultural globalization, and cultural emancipative values.) Table 31 shows all 
the data for China for the present or the year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS 
(2012). In addition to the raw data, the chart notes how that data point compares to the 
other cases in this study, as well as specifying the changes since Wave 3 to give an 
indication of what shifts have occurred (both direction and extent).  
Table 31 Conditions Within China 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank 
(among those 






GDP/capita 6338 (2012) 9th highest 794% increase 
from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 4.1 (2012) 3rd lowest 37% increase 
from 1996 
(negative) 





Table 31 (continued).  








Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 





.07% (2015) 11th lowest 121% increase 
from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .363 (2012) 8th highest 5% increase from 
1996 
Autonomy .60 (2012) 2nd highest 26% increase 
from 1996 
Equality .54 (2012) 8th highest 2% increase from 
1996 
Choice .17 (2012) 8th highest 38% decrease 
from 1996 
Voice .15 (2012) 11th highest 45% increase 
from 1996 
 
Generally, China is in the lower half of the cases for the conditions under 
investigation. The two exceptions are unemployment, for which China had the third 
lowest rate, and the autonomy indicator within cultural emancipative values, where China 
ranked second. For the socioeconomic status indicators (GDP/capita, unemployment, life 
expectancy, and infant mortality), China largely fell in the lower half among the cases in 
this study. GDP per capita was the 9th highest, only topping Nigeria and Jordon. 
However, China also experienced significant gains in the SES indicators from 1996 to 
2012, with a 794% improvement in GDP/capita. This was by far the most significant 
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improvement, with the second largest growth at 496% in Nigeria. Countering this 
improvement, unemployment rose, as it did in most cases. This rise in unemployment 
was higher than average in China though. This is attributable to its swift economic 
growth, the end of China’s “one child” policy, and more people entering the job market 
as a result. China improved on the other socioeconomic status indicators with infant 
mortality dropping by 68%, which was much better than the average 44% improvement. 
With these swift economic changes, China also became less equal by 20%. Some 
countries improved, while others declined, but China’s was the second worst shift on 
inequality. As an economy expands, it is common for some people to get wealthier, while 
others remain stagnant. Growth may raise everyone up to some degree, but it is typically 
not uniform.  
In terms of immigration, China has the lowest immigration rates per population in 
2010 and 2015, with a lower than average increase since 1995. Increases of 92% from 
1995 to 2010 and 121% from 1995 to 2015 were lower than average, but put China 
around the middle of the cases for percentage change. Largely, China is not a significant 
player in terms of “in” migration and it did not experience significant shifts in terms of 
raw numbers. A more extensive discussion about immigration in China can be found in 
the next section which explores evidence beyond the World Values Survey.  
 In regard to culture, China has experienced significant increases in cultural 
globalization, but not in cultural emancipative values overall. The level of cultural 
globalization is still relatively low compared to other cases in this study, but China did 
experience an 87% increase from 1996 and a 9% increase from 2012 to 2016. The change 
from 1996 to 2012 was the second highest and well above the average 37% increase. 
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Even the 9% increase more recently was the third highest and well above the 1% average 
increase. However, on cultural emancipative values, the overall change has been slower. 
China’s emancipative values increased by just 5%. The only countries below this were 
the three that saw declines in their emancipative values (all of which had started with 
high values). Within the emancipative values indicators, China saw some increases and 
some declines. On the Voice indicator, for example, China increased by 45%, but still 
was in the 11th place among the other cases. The large increase could be contributed to 
the very low starting point, prompting even subtle shifts to result in a large percentage 
change. This aligns with what one might assume given that the voice indicator examines 
how people view having more say in government, free speech, and more say in their jobs 
and community, all of which are largely controlled by a restrictive Chinese government. 
The indicator for this is expected to be low, but it is interesting to note that there are some 
shifts. At the same time, the choice indicator fell by 38%, and China was 8th among the 
cases for 2012. The choice indicator asks about acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, 
and divorce, indicating that people were more opposed to these concepts in 2012 than 
they were in 1996. Perhaps the opposition came from the substantial increases in cultural 
globalization, which brought in new ideas (or at least the perception that this is where 
these new ideas were generated) and, subsequently, a resistance to those ideas.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
As noted previously, the desired outcome is this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher utilized results from the 
World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalism. Table 32 outlines each 
question that was used in determining the nationalism score, along with the score for 
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China in 2012, and the changes since 1996. Overall, compared to the other 10 cases in 
this study, China was in the middle in terms of nationalistic attitudes; it had a score of 
.56. On several indicators China was very high on nationalism, on some it was very low 
compared to other cases, and for some it was in the middle. There was not much 
consistency across the various indicators. Overall, China declined by 8% on nationalism, 
which was larger than the average decline.  




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .122 3rd 40% decrease 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.78 7th 6% decrease 
National Pride .714 3rd 6% decrease 




.77 11th 1% decrease (confidence decreased) 
Identify with “world” .38 6th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .78 7th  Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .58 7th  8% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.55 6th  9% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.56 6th  8% decrease 
Note: “1” represents “fully nationalistic,” while “0” represents “not at all nationalistic” 
*Measure that was used for the Descriptive Statistics chapter. 
According to the World Values Survey results, nationalistic attitudes in China 
declined by 8%. This was greater than the average 2% decline and was the 4th largest 
decline among cases. In fact, China exhibited fewer nationalistic attitudes from 1996 to 
2012 on every indicator. A substantial decline (40%) occurred in Chinese people’s 
aversion to having neighbors who are foreigners, putting China as the 3rd least 
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nationalistic country in this regard, among cases in this study. This is a far greater decline 
than the average 1% increase. Perhaps China’s decline in not wanting foreign neighbors 
could be attributed to its average growth in immigration, whereas countries with rapid 
increases in immigration could be expected to have more resistance towards foreign 
neighbors. However, China did exhibit stronger nationalism on prioritizing Chinese 
people over foreigners when jobs are scarce, indicating an overall acceptance of 
foreigners living next to them, but not if it comes at the expense of jobs for Chinese. Still, 
China declined by 6% on this indicator from 1996 to 2012, putting slightly less emphasis 
on prioritizing Chinese, but this decline was less than the 10% average decline across 
cases. On national pride, China ranked 3rd and saw a 6% decline, whereas the average 
was a 2% increase. Ranking 3rd means that China has less national pride than seven of the 
other countries in this study. This is interesting given China’s tight control over people’s 
speech. Perhaps more in line with expectations, for confidence in one’s own government, 
China ranked 11th, meaning that have more confidence in their government than any 
other country among the cases represented in this research. There was a 1% decline 
(confidence declined). This aligns with the increase in the emancipative value (cultural 
values) indicator for “voice,” which measures people’s attitudes about having more say in 
their government, community, and jobs, as well as free speech. A willingness to say that 
you do not have confidence in your own government aligns with this desire for greater 
voice. Interestingly, along with confidence in their government, China also exhibited 
confidence in the United Nations, ranking first. That confidence also increased by 15%.  
For identifying with the world and identifying with their nation, China ranked 6th 
and 7th, respectively, so around the middle among cases. China’s overall group belonging 
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score dropped by 8% (greater identification with the world over one’s nation), which is 
interesting compared to the overall 3% average increase. As a whole for nationalistic 
attitudes, with considering the group belonging indicator, China declined by 8% and 
finished exactly in the middle. This was a larger decline in nationalistic attitudes 
compared to the 2% average decline. China declined on every single indicator within the 
overall nationalistic attitudes score, which provides the researcher with great confidence 
in the accuracy of what the WVS results depicted. However, further exploration of what 
was happening in China in regard to immigration and political campaigns will provide 
further detail and evidence. 
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 As noted in Chapter 5, shifts in nationalism typically cannot be solely determined 
through the World Values Survey. In most cases, the researcher is also assessing 
campaign rhetoric around immigration, as well as election results. However, China’s lack 
of democracy provides a challenging context in which to consider these additional 
factors. The overall immigration patterns and policies are somewhat informative, and the 
general lack of democracy is also telling. Nonetheless, the case of China is a little 
different than the others because of the heavy reliance on the World Values Survey as a 
way of gauging nationalism. Without a true liberal democratic system in place, one 
cannot assess the views of the people based on election results.  
 Immigration to China did not shift significantly from 1995 to 2015. Rates were 
low in 2010 and 2015 compared to the rest of the world, despite a 92% increase from 
1995 to 2010 and a 121% increase from 1995 to 2015. Although these increases may 
appear significant, and to some degree they are, they are lower than the average increase 
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across the cases in this study. Global migration has been on the rise, so, while China has 
experienced some increases, they have not been at the same level as some of the other 
cases in this study.  
In 2017, China had the smallest share of migrants as a percentage of population of 
any country in the world – just .07% of its population were migrants. Most migrants who 
are there come from Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, and the Philippines. Three of those 
are due to their proximity to China, while Brazilians are drawn to China because it is 
their largest trade partner (Kopf 2017). Some explanations for the low migration rates 
include the large number of rural workers in China who can fill low-skill jobs, the 
language barrier, and restrictive migration policies (Kopf 2017).  
 Although overall migration to China is relatively low, economic growth of recent 
decades has encouraged further immigration. From 1985 to 2012, the Law of 
Administration of Entrance and Exit of Foreigners dictated how immigration to China 
would work. The strong economy, excellent universities, low cost of living, and simple 
visa process (especially prior to 2012) drew many of the migrants. During that time 
period, there was a 35-fold increase in the number of immigrants (both short and long 
term), with the largest numbers coming from the Republic of Korea, the United States, 
Japan, Burma, and Vietnam. Migrants brought many benefits to China, including 
international traders who could push products to global markets, tourists who had a 
positive economic impact, and students who helped fund universities through the student 
fees that they paid (Haugen 2015).  
Immigration Changes that May Reflect Views. However, in the 1990s, people 
began to express some concerns regarding immigration to China, commenting especially 
 
156 
on “low quality” immigration from North Korea and Vietnam. The economic crisis of 
2008 led to expanded criticism of all migrants. Protests and riots by African immigrants 
spawned fears in some Chinese that immigrants may present a threat to China’s social 
stability (Haugen 2015).  As a result, in 2004, the Ministry of Public Security started to 
examine the 1985 immigration law. Their goal was to balance economic development, 
national security, and social stability. In 2012, Congress passed a new law, with more 
restrictive immigration policies. As the first article explains, “In order to regulate 
exit/entry administration, safeguard the sovereignty, security and social order of the 
People’s Republic of China, and promote foreign exchanges and opening to the outside 
world, this Law is hereby formulated” (Haugen 2015). The law made a distinction 
between desirable and undesirable immigrants, just as many policies in Western countries 
do.  
 Overall, the law aimed to reduce illegal entry, residence, or work, which China 
dubbed as the “three illegals.” The law increased penalties for immigration violations and 
added fines for those who assisted with illegal immigration, such as by providing fake 
documents. The law also required immigrants to register their rented housing location 
with local authorities within 24 hours of arrival. This added another avenue for tracking 
when visas expire and allowed the government to manipulate where migrants could live. 
However, despite the 2012 law creating additional immigration restrictions, it did 
streamline the process for some groups, such as Chinese who live overseas (or those with 
family ties to China), skilled professionals, and refugees. Interestingly, this law has not 
be evenly enforced and is largely left to local provinces, who have the authority to pass 
even more restrictive guidelines (Haugen 2015). 
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 More recently, in August 2019, a law went into effect that loosened some 
immigration restrictions, in the hope of retaining higher skilled workers. This decision 
ran counter to most countries that were working to restrict immigration. China, though, 
realized that increased immigration, especially of highly skilled workers, would be 
beneficial to their economy and would create additional jobs. Where previously one 
could only apply for permanent residency if they made “extraordinary contributions” to 
China or if they filled a special skills gap, the new laws allow people to apply if they 
have worked in China for four or more years, make at least $82,000 annually, and pay 
taxes. Additionally, their family members can also apply (CGTN America). This change 
allowed more migrants to establish their long-term residency in China.  
Chinese Political System and Elections. Discussing elections in China is under a 
different backdrop than many other cases within this study. There is not a single Chinese 
election even represented in the IFES Election Guide. As a brief summary of the Chinese 
political system, the National People’s Congress is comprised of 2,987 elected seats, the 
holders of which elect the President to a five-year term.  The President then elects the 
Prime Minister, who is confirmed by Congress. Members of the Congress are indirectly 
elected by regional legislatures to five-year terms. The current President is Xi Jinping and 
the Prime Minister is Li Keqiang.  
On the surface, this may appear to be a partial democracy. However, the elections 
for Congress are a bit of a farce. Only members of the Communist Party are eligible, and 
the candidates have been pre-approved by the Party. Furthermore, the person that is 
elected by the people could be removed by Party leadership, especially if they hail from a 
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city of a former presidential rival (Babones 2017). Despite these restrictions, there is still 
typically some minimal campaigning by other candidates via weibos on the internet.  
Even elections at the local level are manipulated by the central government. In 
Beijing, Zhang Shangen ran for local elections on a platform of making changes to the 
current Communist Party. The Chinese government intimidated him and his supporters 
and, the night before the election, they whisked him away, 800 miles from Beijing. The 
government saw him as a threat to the Communist Party and saw it necessary to restrict 
his influence (Hernandez 2016). Again, there is a surface-level guise of democracy, with 
signs encouraging people to “treasure democratic rights” and to “cast their sacred and 
solemn ballot.” However, there are no debates or town hall sessions – some of the 
hallmarks of democracy. Not surprisingly, President Jinping has taken a stand against 
democracy, branding it as a Western influence that should be restricted. In contrast, there 
are some movements to promote true democracy. They push the idea of allowing all 
qualified citizens to enter a race. Many of these movements have been shut down by the 
government, which threatens those leading the movements. They refused to add of these 
candidates to the ballot (Hernandez 2016).  
In addition to restrictions on elections for Congress and local elections, the 
President recently acquired the power to retain the presidency for life. In 2018, President 
Jinping proposed a constitutional change that would remove the two-year limit on the 
presidency, allowing him to serve as president for life. This proposal was approved by 
Congress with only two “no” votes and three abstaining out of nearly three thousand. In 
the current power structure, few people are ever brave enough to go against the President 
or the Party. Additionally, because of China’s restrictions on free speech, as well as the 
 
159 
censorship, it is challenging to gauge the actual feelings and beliefs of the people (BBC 
2018, “China’s Xi”.)   
Given the lack of democracy, assessing campaign rhetoric and election results as 
a metric for nationalistic attitudes will not be fruitful. As the author has outlined here, 
China has made some changes to restrict immigration from “undesirable countries,” but 
has loosened other regulations to draw in and retain higher skills workers. The latter is 
designed to boost China’s economy, while the former is designed, in part, to restrict 
outside cultural influences. The President’s restrictions on democracy, in part to 
minimize Western influence, could be viewed as a nationalistic move - centering power 
and culture around one Party and person. However, this may not be representative of the 
people and some movements to increase democracy, despite the risks to self, indicate that 
there are Chinese who express less nationalistic views. This does align with the World 
Values Survey results, which show a decline in nationalistic attitudes on all indicators 
and overall. Because of the restrictions on free speech and the lack of democracy, it is 
difficult to gauge nationalistic attitudes based on elections; consequently, one must rely 
more heavily on the World Values Survey results. Those results were not refuted by the 
additional research on immigration and elections.  
South Korea 
The Korean peninsula was a single state until the end of World War II in August 
1945, when it was divided into North and South Korea as part of its independence from 
Japan, which occupied been Korea from 1919-1945. Following this, the Korean War was 
fought from 1950 to 1953 as part of the U.S.-led struggle against communism. During 
this time, roughly 10 million people from the communist north moved to South Korea. 
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After the war, beginning in the 1960s, South Koreans started to migrate to the United 
States, a trend which grew further from the 1980s onward (Park 2017).   
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
Table 33 shows all of the data for South Korea that the researcher gathered and 
explained in Chapter 4. As it did for China, the chart outlines data for 2019 or the year 
closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the 
researcher noted how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as 
what the change has been since Wave 3, in order to give an indication of what shifts have 
occurred (both direction and extent).  
Table 33 Conditions Within South Korea 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 







GDP/capita 24359 (2012) 3rd highest 86% increase from 
1996 (positive) 
Unemployment 3.2 (2012) 1st lowest 60% increase from 
1996 (negative) 
Life Expectancy 80.8 (2012) 1st highest 9% increase from 
1996 (positive) 






GINI .316 (2012) 2nd highest No data from 19996 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 





2.6% (2015) 5th lowest 971% increase from 
1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .42 (2012) 6th highest 14% increase from 
1996 




Table 33 (continued).  
 Equality .56 (2012) 6th highest 20% increase from 
1996 
Choice .30 (2012) 6th highest 23% increase from 
1996 
Voice .28 (2012) 7th highest 6% increase from 
1996 
 
 Overall, South Korea ranks high on the conditions under investigation. The only 
indicators in the middle or lower half are the cultural emancipative values. For GDP per 
capita, South Korea ranks 3rd among the cases in this study, only behind the United States 
and Germany. This represented an 86% increase, which was below average, but expected 
for a high middle country. South Korea ranks first on the other three Socioeconomic 
Status indicators. It did experience a 60% increase in unemployment, which was the 
highest increase, but this large percentage change could be due to its small starting value 
in which small shifts result in large percentage changes. Life expectancy improved a bit 
more than the average improvement and infant mortality had the third best improvement, 
with a 60% decline. In terms of equality, South Korea ranked 2nd. There is no information 
regarding change, as there was not a starting data point for 1996 or any close year. For 
immigration, in both 2010 and 2015, South Korea ranked close to the middle (5th) for 
immigration as a percentage of the population. However, South Korea experienced a 
significant increase from 1995 forward. From 1995 to 2010, there was a 642% increase 
(the next largest increase was 159% in Mexico) and from 1995 to 2015, there was a 
971% increase (the next largest was 230% in Mexico). The magnitude of the immigration 
increases in South Korea could certainly factor into how people respond to increasing 
globalization and their views as they relate to nationalism.  
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 South Korea ranks high among cases in this study for cultural globalization. It is 
3rd, behind only Germany and the United States. However, it experienced slow growth 
from 1996 to 2012, with the second lowest increase in cultural globalization. In contrast, 
from 2012 to 2016, South Korea’s 10% increase in cultural globalization was the second 
highest. For cultural emancipative values, South Korea is in the middle of the cases. It did 
experience a 14% increase from 1996 to 2012, which was the 4th largest increase. 
Changes across the indicators for emancipative values was consistent in that they all 
increased. Autonomy and Voice saw smaller gains, whereas Equality and Choice saw 
larger gains. All ended up around the middle of the pack (6th or 7th), except Autonomy, 
which was 3rd. Interestingly, China was second on Autonomy, demonstrating a potential 
value within Asia.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
As noted previously, the desired outcome is this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher utilized results from the 
World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalism. Table 34 outlines each 
question that the researcher used in determining the nationalism score, along with the 
score for South Korea in 2012, and the change since 1996. Compared to other cases in 
this study, South Korea had high nationalism on some indicators and low nationalism on 
others. Overall, they rated as one of the more nationalistic countries with a .59. Only two 
countries showed stronger nationalistic attitudes. However, South Korea declined by 5% 
in nationalism, when including the group belonging score, which was more than the 




Table 34 Nationalistic Attitudes in South Korea, Based on World Values Survey Results  
Question Score (2012) Rank  
(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .44 11th 15% increase 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.82 10th 12% decrease 
National Pride .71 2nd 10% increase 




.48 8th 2% increase (confidence 
increased) 
Identify with “world” .34 5th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with 
“Nation” 
.72 1st Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging 
Overall 





.60 9th (tie) 3% increase 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.59 9th 5% decrease 
Note: “1” represents “fully nationalistic,” while “0” represents “not at all nationalistic” 
*Measure that was used for the Descriptive Statistics chapter. 
 
 Based on responses to select World Values Survey questions, South Korea was a 
fairly nationalistic country in 2012. However, it experienced a decline in nationalism 
from 1996, based on the score that includes the group belonging indicator. Nationalistic 
attitudes increased substantially on some indicators, but declined on others, especially the 
group belonging question (indicating greater identification with the world and less 
identification with the nation). Interestingly, South Korea rated as the most nationalistic 
country in terms of their views on having foreign neighbors. Furthermore, they had a 
15% increase on this indicator, which is far greater than the 1% average. This could be 
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tied to the extreme increases in immigration, which may prompt a resistance to foreign 
neighbors. Often, when a minority group becomes more visible, resistance or opposition 
to that perceived threat increases accordingly. Perhaps in contrast to this measure, on the 
question regarding whether native South Koreans should be given priority over 
immigrants if jobs are scarce, South Korea declined (less nationalistic) by 12%, which 
was even more than the average 10% decline. However, they still ranked 10th, so 
remained highly nationalistic on this indicator. One would expect this indicator to also be 
impacted by the increase in immigration.  
 Although South Koreans’ pride in their country increased more than average, they 
remained one of the least nationalistic countries on this indicator. Again, an increase in 
pride could be a response to increased immigration, but there could certainly be other 
factors at play. South Korea also improved on many major socioeconomic indicators 
during this time, too, which can also instill pride in your country. However, during this 
same time, confidence in their national government declined and remained relatively low, 
ranking as the 8th most nationalistic. At the same time, their confidence in the United 
Nations also declined, but they remained 2nd, indicating high overall confidence still.   
Overall, in 2012, South Koreans identified with their nation less than other 
countries did and South Korea was the least nationalistic overall on this indicator. This 
could be attributed to their relatively short time as citizens of “South Korea,” since being 
partitioned from the northern portion of the peninsula. At the same time, their 
identification with the world was in the middle of the pack.  When one examines these 
Wave 6 indicators in comparison to the comparable data for Wave 3 to determine a group 
belonging score, South Korea declined in nationalism, indicating an overall shift toward 
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identification with the world over one’s nation. Where South Korea declined in 
nationalism by 29% on this indicator, the average among cases in this study was a 3% 
increase (towards nation and away from the world). This shift really accounts for the 
difference in the overall nationalistic attitudes indicator when including the group 
belonging score or excluding the group belonging score. When it is included, nationalistic 
attitudes appears to have declined by 5%, putting South Korea as the 9th least nationalistic 
country (so, still more nationalistic than most). When group belonging is excluded, it 
appears that nationalistic attitudes increased by 3%, but South Korea was still 9th. 
Overall, South Korea did not experience a significant shift in nationalistic attitudes, but 
the 5% decline does represent a shift that is greater than the average 2% decline. Because 
of the discrepancy caused by including or excluding the group belonging indicator, 
further research will be particularly informative in determining how nationalistic attitudes 
have shifted in South Korea. 
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey 
Surveys of public opinion only tell one part of the story of nationalistic attitudes. 
In this study, the researcher is also considering campaign rhetoric of politicians, as well 
as election results to demonstrate the overall level of nationalistic attitudes. South Korea, 
though, presents an interesting case. Immigration was essentially a non-issue during the 
election, meaning that there is very little campaign rhetoric to assess. In addition, among 
the presidential candidates, very little differentiated each one in terms of a more 
nationalistic stance or platform. Nonetheless, there are some recent events in South Korea 




 Some background on immigration in South Korea is important to understand 
before delving into recent events or election results. South Korea is a low immigration 
country, but has seen rapid increases over the past two decades. As noted above, in 2010, 
immigrants represented just 1.7% of the population and in 2015, they represented 2.6% of 
the population. The raw numbers were a 642% increase from 1995 to 2010 and a 971% 
increase from 1995 to 2015. These were, by far, the largest percentage increases of any 
country within this study. Traditionally a country of outward emigration, similarly to 
Mexico, the expansion of immigration to South Korea is relatively new. In contrast to 
Mexico, this immigration to South Korea was planned by the government, which 
loosened immigration restrictions as a response to an aging population and low fertility 
rate, which has created a worker shortage. Additionally, a higher educational attainment 
rate has resulted in a shortage of native population willing to engage in the low-skilled 
jobs.  New policies were designed to counter illegal immigration, while also attracting 
migrant workers. The South Korean government recognized the need to increase 
immigration to bring in foreign workers to fill the jobs created by the growing economy. 
South Korea is one of the “Asian Tigers” that experienced huge GDP growth (Park 
2017).  
 Before new policies were developed, South Korea had a significant issue with 
unauthorized workers in the country. In fact, in 2002, 70% of the South Korean foreign 
labor force were unauthorized workers. Because of the lack of pathways for low skilled 
workers, many entered on a tourist visa that they overstayed. In 2002, South Korea 
implemented the Employment Management System, but that only allowed for foreign 
workers with Korean ancestors who were entering the service sector. As a result, this 
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system only netted 156 visas in 2002, which did not make a dent in the unauthorized 
workers problem. The following year, in 2003, the government launched the Employment 
Permit System (EPS), which was an expanded guest worker program. The EPS allowed 
unauthorized workers a way to apply for a permit contingent upon how long they had 
been in the country. This program increased the number of authorized foreign workers by 
57.2% from 2002 to 2003 – just one year. Additionally, EPS reduced discrimination 
against foreign workers by ensuring that labor laws applied equally to migrant workers 
and Korean workers. This includes access to the four major insurance systems. Under 
these policies, delays in wages for migrant workers dropped from 36.8% 2001 to 1.1% in 
2011. Despite these improvements, there are still claims of unfair treatment and 
exploitation of foreign workers (Park 2017).  
 Although most of the immigration to South Korea has revolved around filling 
low-skilled jobs, migration from North Korea is important to note. While some refer to 
these migrants as “refugees,” they technically are not, as South Korea considers North 
Korea to be part of its territory. Over the past decade, the number of migrants from the 
north to the south have increased. Previously, North Koreans in South Korea were 
considered to be heroes who successfully fled the repressive regime up north. However, 
as numbers have increased and tensions between the two countries have intensified, there 
is less enthusiasm for these migrants. This is an additional issue to consider in analyzing 
campaign rhetoric and election results (Park 2017).  
 A further increase in permanent migrants is unlikely in the future. South Korea 
generally enjoys being a “one blood” country with ethnic and cultural homogeneity. 
Immigration, thus far, has not been an issue because it is primarily temporary migrants or 
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those who have married South Koreans. It can be telling to see how this issue plays out in 
politics, elections, and national responses, as South Korea will need to continue grappling 
with low fertility and an aging population (Park 2017).  
Recent Events that Illuminate Some Views on Immigration. Information on 
campaign rhetoric related to immigration in the South Korean presidential election is 
lacking. It was not a primary focal point of the election, in part because immigration 
levels are relatively low, the increases in immigration were largely government planned, 
permanent foreign residents are extremely minimal, and South Korea remains a 
predominantly monocultural country. However, recent events provide some insight into 
where Koreans might stand on the issue of immigration.  
 In 2008, 500 Yemeni refugees arrived on the South Korean island of Jeju, which 
does not require a visa in advance to visit for up to 30 days, due to its popularity among 
tourists (Epstein 2018). There was a significant and immediate public response that 
consisted of fearful conclusions about the intentions of the refugees. Largely, these views 
were inspired by Islamic terrorism in Europe, as well as anti-refugee rhetoric in other 
countries (Epstein 2018; Kwon 2019). This response led to greater attention on Muslim 
refugees as a whole. Despite efforts by the Korean government to alleviate these 
concerns, many Koreans still demanded that the refugees be sent home, regardless of the 
civil war in Yemen (Kwon 2019). 
 During this time, there was a call to distinguish between “real refugees” and “fake 
refugees.” Many people were conflating refugees from Muslim countries with Islamist 
extremist terrorists, spawning the call to differentiate between legitimate refugees and 
those who were coming to commit crimes (Kwon 2019). The false association between 
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Muslim refugees and terrorism was repeated in the media, thus exacerbating fears. In 
addition to concerns regarding public safety, another aspect of people’s resistance to the 
Yemeni refugees was a desire to not disturb Korea’s largely monocultural society. 
Although Korea has become more multicultural since the early 2000s, with the increase 
of foreign workers and globalization, it is still not the accepted ‘norm’ (Kwon 2019). 
Refugees bring their culture and, in this case, Muslim culture, presents some significant 
departures from Korean culture. Korea has prided itself on being a single nation with a 
common bloodline for millennia (Kwon 2019).  As Kwon (2019) notes, “discrimination 
and exclusion can be expressed by some Koreans through distinguishing ‘we’ and 
‘others’ based on a sense of national unity” (np). However, this xenophobia is a fruit of 
Korea’s longstanding multiculturalism, which was bolstered by years of occupation and 
war (Seo 2018). Those experiences intensified the desire of many Koreans to keep 
outsiders at bay.  
As of April 2019, nearly 715,000 people had signed petitions calling for various 
refugee acts and policies to be revoked and even for Korea to withdraw from the 1951 
Refugee Convention (Kwon 2019). In response to Korean petitions, Moon tightened 
refugee policies, which were already quite restrictive. He added additional screening 
measures and Yemen was added to the list of countries that cannot visit Jeju visa-free, in 
addition to being placed on the terrorist watch-list (Epstein 2018; Kwon 2019).  
 However, the opposition to the refugees may not be entirely based on culture and 
fears of terrorism. Although roughly 49%-56% of the general population in Korea 
opposed allowing the refugees to stay, those percentages were 70% among those in their 
20s and 60% among those in their 30s. Rather than an opposition based solely on race, 
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these youth were responding to high youth unemployment (Seo 2018).  The xenophobic 
fears were probably still there on the surface, but those fears caused underlying issues 
and deeper insecurities to bubble up. Some petitions indicated a desire to regain control. 
As one sign at a recent protest read, “I am a national of the Republic of Korea, the people 
of our nation come first” (Seo 2018).  
 Overall, the response of South Korea to the Yemeni refugees is indicative of a 
society with nationalistic attitudes. Many of the ‘tell-tale’ signs are there: wanting to 
maintain cultural homogeneity, putting the people of your own country first at the 
expense of others, fearing the effects of immigrants on employment.  Generally, South 
Korea has maintained very low levels of immigration, only raising it when the economy 
needed additional workers. Still, those visitors have generally only been permitted to stay 
for short periods of time, thus having a more minimal impact on overall society and 
culture.  The harsh response to the Yemeni refugees could also be indicative of the 
rapidly rising immigration rates in South Korea, despite the overall low numbers as 
compared to the rest of the world. (South Korea’s immigration rate was 3% in 2015, 
which is below the 7% average among cases in this study.) People often fear change. It 
produces instability and causes many to turn inward towards more nationalistic ideology. 
There is no question that South Korea is a nationalistic society; the question remains how 
their nationalistic attitudes shifted over the period of this study. 
Election results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. The most recent 
presidential election in South Korea was held in May 2017. The voter turn-out was a high 
77%, which is a stronger showing than the two most recent presidential elections where 
turn-out was 76% (2012) and 63% (2007). The incumbent was Hwang Kyo-ahn, who 
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became acting president in December 2016, following the impeachment of Park Geun-
Hye, who was near the end of her term (Election Guide 2019). Park was impeached for 
charges related to corruption and later jailed. Given the embarrassment that Park caused 
many Koreans, there was great enthusiasm among many voters to instill change and a 
new era in South Korea. Some voters supported Jun-pyo Hong, who was trying to re-
instill confidence in the conservative party of which Park had led.  Other voters 
welcomed more radical change and voted for Moon Jae-in, who represented the 
Democratic Party.  
In South Korea, the president is selected by popular vote in a single-round system 
to a five-year term. The president appoints the prime minister, contingent upon approval 
by the National Assembly.  The results of the 2017 election are reflected in Table 35 
below. As anticipated based on polling figures, Moon secured a victory by a sizable 
margin. In fact, it was the largest margin of victory in history, thus supporting the idea of 
a strong desire for change among South Koreans (Economist 2017).  
Table 35 Results of the 2017 Presidential Election in South Korea 
Candidate Party Percent 
of Vote  
MOON Jae-in Democratic Party (Liberal) 41.1% 
Jun-pyo HONG Liberty Korea Party 
(Conservative) 
24.0% 
Cheol-soo AHN People’s Party (Centrist) 21.4% 
Seong-Min YOO Bareun Party 6.7% 
Sang-jung SIM Justice Party 6.2% 
Date from electionguide.org 
 Moon is a former human rights lawyer in his mid-60s (Kwon, Boykoff, Griffiths 
2017).  Interestingly, in the 1970s, he was imprisoned for protesting against the 
authoritarian regime of Park Chung-hee, the father of Park Geun-Hye. Protests against 
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Park Geun-Hye led to her impeachment and the rise of Moon. He is the first left-of-center 
president in nearly a decade (Economist 2017). Moon is sometimes referred to as a 
“liberal,” in part because of his openness to talks with North Korea and his economic 
policies, but, overall, many would refute that title. He has engaged in some liberal 
economic policies, like increasing the minimum wage and reducing the power of major 
businesses. However, he combines those policies with a social conservatism that is 
popular in South Korea. He has publicly opposed homosexuality and expressed hostility 
towards immigration (Epstein 2018). Generally, an anti-homosexuality stance in South 
Korea is widely accepted.  
 In this election, many voters wanted a change, given Park’s hard-line stance on 
North Korea and the charges of corruption that eventually landed her in prison. Citizens 
wanted to see improved relations with North Korea, an improvement in the economy, and 
increased transparency in government. Over 40% of voters felt that Moon could fulfil 
those goals (Kwon, Boykoff, Griffiths 2017). During the campaign, he pledged to take 
the initiative on North Korea, rather than letting progress be dictated by foreign powers. 
In some ways, this is a nationalistic approach of putting one’s own country in the driver’s 
seat (Graham 2017).  
 It is hard to gauge very much about the nationalistic attitudes of South Koreans 
based on this presidential election. Because of the impeachment of Park, many Koreas 
were voting for ‘change’ more so than for any specific policy. Additionally, few divides 
emerged in terms of policies or viewpoints among the candidates that could be defined as 
nationalistic or not.  Overall, Moon does, in some ways represent a desire to protect 
South Korea by maintaining current cultural norms, limiting immigration, and taking the 
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lead on relations with North Korea.  Whether the election of Moon over someone else 
indicated a stronger sense of nationalism is difficult to determine, but Moon certainly 
does represent some level of nationalistic attitudes.  
 Overall, South Korea remained more nationalistic than average in 2012, but there 
was a larger than average decline in nationalism from 1996 to 2012, based on the WVS. 
There is a great deal of variation within the various indicators of nationalism. South 
Korea experienced exorbitantly higher increases in immigration from 1996 to 2012 and to 
2015 than any other country. Nevertheless, the raw numbers remain relatively low and 
the increase was largely government controlled. South Korea did relax some immigration 
restrictions due to economic needs, similarly to China, but Seoul also issued very few 
permanent residencies. Even the response to the Yemeni refugees on Jeju island is 
indicative of nationalistic attitudes (whether due to a desire to protect Korean culture or 
to protect jobs). Overall, there is no evidence in immigration changes and responses or 
the election to refute the World Values Survey results indicating a 5% decline in 
nationalistic attitudes.  
Calibration and Initial Conclusions 
This section will describe how each condition and the outcome were calibrated. 
Calibration is a necessary step before performing the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
Then, the researcher will explore some initial conclusion regarding China and South 
Korea.  
Calibration of the conditions and outcome to prepare for the truth table 
As explained in Chapter 5 (and elaborated on in Chapter 3), in order to conduct 
the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), the researcher must first calibrate 
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the data. In this case, the calibration involves determining and then specifying which of 
the following categories applies to each indicator: fully in, more in than out, neither in 
nor out, more out than in, or fully out. For example, the first condition is socioeconomic 
status. A “1” indicates that a country is “fully in” the group of having a high socio-
economic status. A “.75” indicates that it is not a “high” socio-economic status, but it is 
closer to being in that group than not. Appendix F shows the results of the calibration for 
the conditions and outcomes for Wave 6 (generally 2012, unless otherwise noted). 
Appendix G illustrates the calibration for the changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6 for the 
conditions and the outcome. The calibration key that is provided for each indicator 
explains the cut off points for each category. Chapter 10 will focus on the full analysis of 
this data. For now, the researcher will delve into the information for the two case studies 
in Asia. To aid in this discussion, Chart X below shows the calibration for China and 
South Korea only. 


















China 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.75 
South 
Korea 0.75 1 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 


































China 0.75 0 0.25* 1 0.25 1.00 0.75 
S. Korea 0.75 .25 0.75* 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.75 
*manually adjusted                Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
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Overall, there is more variation across the two Asian cases than between the two 
Latin America cases. In Asia, by contrast, China and South Korea were not calibrated the 
same on any condition, but did share the same outcome of “more in than out” of the 
group of countries with high levels of nationalistic attitudes.  For the conditions, China 
and South Korea were similar on some of the conditions. High immigration and 
emancipative values skewed towards “more out,” while equity skewed towards “more 
in.” The largest variations were in cultural globalization and socioeconomic status (SES), 
where China was “more out than in” and South Korea was “more in than out” for both 
conditions. 
 In terms of changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6, just as there was in Latin America, 
there was a great deal of variation within the two Asian cases.  China and South Korea 
were similar in their changes on a few conditions. For socioeconomic status, they were 
both “more in” the group for significant improvements and they were both “fully out” or 
“more out” for strong improvements in equity. They had more differentiation in cultural 
globalization, where China was “fully in” on globalization increases and South Korea 
was “mostly out” and on shifts in cultural emancipative values, where nearly the inverse 
was true – China did not see significant increases, but South Korea did.  For immigration, 
China was calibrated to be “more out” of the group for significant increases in 
immigration (or increases from outside one’s cultural group), while South Korea was 
considered to be “more in” this group. It is important to note here that the researcher 
manually adjusted the calibration for both countries, as is allowed by the QCA approach. 
Based on its percentage increase, South Korea would clearly be “fully in” the group for 
significant increases in immigration. However, because the immigration was planned by 
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the government to fill a societal need and because the raw numbers remained relatively 
low, the researched shifted this to a .75 (more in than out). In China, the percentage 
increase put China at a .75, but because most immigration was from within the same 
cultural group and the raw immigration percentage remained incredibly low (less than 
1%, the researcher adjusted this to be “more out” of the group for significant increases in 
immigration. Despite the variations, both countries are “fully in” the group of those with 
declining nationalism and “more in than out” for experiencing significant declines. Any 
attempt to attribute certain conditions to certain outcomes would be futile when only 
examining the two Asian cases. However, each of these charts of calibration will come 
together in Chapter 10 for a deeper analysis of which conditions are most often tied to 
which outcome.  
The calibration will be further explored in Chapter 10, the analysis of the fsQCA 
truth table. In examining Asia in isolation, though, it is interesting to consider how each 
country aligns with the hypotheses. Table 38 below outlines the second hypothesis which 
is that the presence of rising socioeconomic status, decreasing income inequality, only 
moderate increases in immigration (or from culturally similar regions), steady 
globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a 
shift away from a nationalist perspective within a population. (The first hypothesis is the 
inverse of this.) For each condition and the outcome, the researcher indicated whether 
that country met that criteria (by inserting “YES”) or did not meet that criteria (by 
inserting an “X”).  To meet the criteria, the condition needed to have a calibration of .75 
or 1 (or the inverse depending on the framing of the condition.) If a condition was .5 
(neither in or nor out), then the researcher inserted a “?”. 
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China YES X YES X YES YES 
South 
Korea 
YES X X YES X YES 
*or from same cultural group 
 The researcher indicated which conditions align with the outcome. Interestingly, 
just as was the case in Latin America, socioeconomic status aligns with the expected 
outcome for both countries. In China, the outcome was a significant decline in 
nationalism. The World Values Survey results indicated this, and that evidence was 
supported by recent resistance to the national government in the form of non-approved 
candidates and candidates outside the Communist party pushing to be elected. Based on a 
“YES” for significant decline in nationalism, the only condition that is in alignment is the 
significant improvement in socioeconomic status, although an additional two conditions 
were in the “neither in nor out” category.  
In South Korea, the outcome was that South Korea was “more in than out” of the 
group for significant declines in nationalism. The World Values Survey shows a decline 
in nationalistic attitudes. It remains highly nationalistic, but it did decline. There is 
alignment with the significant improvements in socioeconomic status and slower 
increases in cultural emancipative values. However, the other indicators do not align. 
Although it is tempting to start adding each case to a “master chart,” the researcher will 
wait until Chapter 10 when all cases can be examined together and she can conduct the 
fsQCA truth table analysis. That analysis will indicate whether any of these conditions 
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are necessary or sufficient for achieving the desired outcome of significant decreases in 
nationalism.  
Initial Asian Regional Conclusions  
 The story in China was one of huge economic growth with the highest percentage 
growth of any country, even though it remained 9th among the cases under examination. 
The level of GDP started so low that even incredibly strong growth left it towards the 
bottom among cases in this study. This economic growth likely contributed to its 
increased unemployment, as well as improvements in infant mortality, and perhaps its 
increase in inequality (GINI). As an economy expands, often there are some people who 
benefit more than others. While the economy expanded, so did cultural globalization. 
China saw significant increases in cultural globalization, although its raw score remained 
among the lowest. Similarly to GDP, the cultural globalization started so low that strong 
growth still left it among the lowest. The continued lower score aligns with the 
government’s restrictive policies regarding media and communication flows. Despite the 
largest increases in cultural globalization, overall, cultural emancipative values did not 
shift significantly. However, there were some significant shifts within individual cultural 
emancipative values indicators. For example, the voice indicator increased, while the 
choice indicator fell. Essentially, this indicates that people increased their support for a 
greater voice in their government, jobs, and community, along with free speech, but 
declined in their acceptance of homosexuality, divorce, and abortion. The later three 
could be seen as outside cultural influences that Chinese wanted to defend against, while 
at the same time increasing the free speech and greater say over their lives that they may 
have been exposed to through increased cultural globalization. China has regularly 
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restricted immigration, in part, to ward against outside cultural influences. China realized 
that they needed to increase immigration of higher skilled workers and did relax some 
policies for obtaining permanent residency, but their rate of immigration still remains 
relatively low. 
 South Korea stands in contrast to China in many ways. South Korea ranked very 
high on all of the socioeconomic (SES) indicators, placing 3rd on GDP per capita and first 
on unemployment, infant mortality, and life expectancy, all of which are positive. It 
experienced a positive shift on all of these SES indicators, except unemployment, which 
rose. Overall, South Korea is significantly higher on SES than China, but experienced 
slower improvements. This is consistent with the growth that lower SES countries 
experienced compared to higher SES countries in the later 20th century and early 21st 
century. Neither China nor South Korea have high rates of immigration compared to the 
other cases, as they both rank around the middle. However, while China experienced an 
average level of immigration growth (with the largest growth from the Republic of 
Korea, the United States, Japan, Burma, and Vietnam), South Korea had the highest 
increases of any country (with most immigrants coming from Southeast Asia), with 
vastly higher immigration growth than the next highest country. Although it was largely 
government planned to help achieve desired economic growth and fill jobs, this rapid 
increase in immigration sets South Korea apart among cases. Despite the rapid increase in 
new ideas from new people coming in, cultural globalization overall did not rise very 
quickly from 1996 to 2012. South Korea focused on producing its own content (music, 
television, movies) export, rather than allowing an influx in cultural goods entering the 
country. However, from 2012 to 2016, South Korea saw the second highest rate of 
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increase in cultural globalization. Perhaps this was a delayed effect from the rapid 
immigration. By 2012, South Korea had the 3rd highest cultural globalization score. This 
is in contrast to China, which experienced high rates of increase from 1996 to 2016, but 
still had a low score overall. However, all of the changes cannot be attributed to rapidly 
rising immigration rates since the raw numbers remained quite low. South Korea’s 
cultural emancipative values rose at an average pace and each indicator increased. It 
ended around the middle overall and for all indicators, except Autonomy, where it had 
the 3rd highest score. China, similarly, was quite low on all of the indicators, but was 2nd 
on Autonomy. This indicator measures the importance of independence and imagination, 
and a de-emphasis on obedience.  
 Both China and South Korea declined in their nationalistic attitudes from 1996 to 
2012, according to the World Values Survey results, but both remained in the more 
nationalistic half of the cases in this study. One significant difference between the two is 
that China declined on every indicator of nationalism, while there was a great deal of 
variation among the indicators for South Korea. China had more confidence in their own 
government than any other country, but they also saw an increase in the “voice” indicator 
of cultural emancipative values, indicating an increased desire for say in their 
government, as well as free speech. The latter is supported by the increase in oppositional 
candidates in the local elections in China. Although these candidates will not be elected 
under the current system, the fact that they continue trying and that the central 
government sees them as a threat is indicative of a shift in attitudes.  
 Both South Korea and China have made efforts to restrict immigration from 
‘undesirable’ groups, while expanding immigration for ‘desirable’ migrants to support an 
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expanding economy. South Korea, though, planned an incredibly vast increase in 
immigration compared to any other country. This resulted in a significant percentage 
change. In 1996, South Korea had about a quarter the number of immigrants that China 
had. By 2015, South Korea had more immigrants than China (1.3 million compared to 
fewer than 1 million). This could explain the high levels of nationalism on issues of 
having foreign neighbors or giving preference to Koreans when jobs are scarce. However, 
in both countries, immigration was not a large enough issue to warrant an analysis of the 
campaign rhetoric around the topic. As an added complication, China generally does not 
have town halls or debates and all approved candidates are from the Communist Party. In 
neither case were either campaign rhetoric around immigration or election results 
analyzed in quite the same manner as they were considered in Latin America.  
 China is a Communist country and President  Xi has tremendous control over the 
media and people’s lives. Generally, Chinese have demonstrated pride in their country 
and confidence in their nation. However, there have been increased movements for non-
Communist party members to be able to run as candidates in elections and the Chinese 
decreased in their nationalistic attitudes on every indicator of the World Values Survey. 
As the socioeconomic status of China improved significantly, people could reduce their 
sentiments of needing to prioritize the Chinese at the expense of others. There was a 
greater sense that they were not competing for resources in an “us/them” environment. 
China’s average rate of immigration growth likely also played a role in this. Although 
there has been some rhetoric against “less desirable” immigrants from some neighboring 
countries, largely immigration has helped the Chinese economy. Absent is also an 
emphasis on there being a lack of resources – housing or jobs – so people do not feel 
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threatened by the presence of immigrants. Additionally, cultural emancipative values did 
not increase at a quick rate, so there was not a sense of societal changes that were leaving 
people behind. Feeling threatened by immigrants and a rapidly changing culture can often 
be a precursor to heightening one’s sense of national identity. These conditions were not 
present in China, so people could respond to globalization by decreasing their 
nationalistic attitudes.  
In South Korea, the picture is not as clear. South Korea has long prided itself on 
being a monocultural society, or a one blood nation, resulting in high rates of 
nationalism. However, what is of greater interest to the researcher is how nationalistic 
attitudes are shifting in response to globalization. South Korea did not see as strong a 
shift away from nationalistic attitudes as China. The WVS results showed some mixed 
indicators, even though, overall, it demonstrated a decline in nationalistic attitudes for 
South Korea. Based on the WVS and additional context in-country, South Korea is not a 
case with a significant decrease in nationalism. It also did not have a significant 
improvement in socioeconomic status and its cultural emancipative values shifted 
relatively quickly. This can cause people to view outsiders as a threat and result in people 
being more likely to prioritize their own country. This was demonstrated in how many 
South Koreas responded to the Yemeni refugees, citing concerns about both job 
availability and changing cultural emancipative values. These factors could affect why 
South Korea did not see a significant decline in nationalistic attitudes over this period.  
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CHAPTER VII – THE WEST: GERMANY, ROMANIA, AND THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter takes a deep dive into the three case studies in this dissertation 
located in the West – Germany, Romania, and the United States. The researcher closely 
examines the conditions and outcome that were outlined in previous chapters to better 
understand what may be occurring. The conditions include socioeconomic status, equity, 
immigration, cultural globalization, and cultural emancipative values, while nationalistic 
attitudes are assessed through various questions on the World Values Survey. She also 
strives to further understand the level of nationalism within the country by examining two 
areas beyond the World Values Survey – campaign rhetoric focusing on immigration and 
subsequent election results, respectively. Each case study begins with some basic 
background on the country, followed by an exploration of the conditions under 
consideration in terms of how that country compares to others in the study and what 
changes they have experienced from 1996 to 2012. The second section of each case study 
explores nationalism, defined as a mind-set of needing to protect one’s own national 
cultural and overall interests, putting one’s own national needs above all else. The 
researcher achieves this first by re-visiting the World Values Survey questions, and 
second by delving into immigration and elections. An exploration of these issues helps to 
paint a clearer picture of the overall nationalistic attitudes for each country. The 
researcher will then calibrate each condition and each outcome in order to prepare for the 
fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Chapter 10. The chapter concludes with 





Germany is a powerful country in Western Europe. It has the 5th largest population 
among the cases in this study and the second highest GDP per capita. Within the 
European Union (EU), Germany is the most populous country and has the 8th highest 
GDP per capita (World Bank 2018). One of the most notable figures in German history is 
the infamous Chancellor Adolf Hitler, who ruled Germany from 1933-1945 and was 
behind the Holocaust, which led to the murder of millions of Jews and others who were 
considered inferior. Germany was one of “axis of evil” forces, along with Italy and Japan, 
that the Allies (the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom) fought 
against in World War II.  Following the downfall of Hitler and the end of the war through 
unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan in May and August 1945, respectively, 
Germany was partitioned into two countries -  the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
West, which was occupied by the Western Allied forces, and the German Democratic 
Republic in the East, which was part of the Soviet communist bloc. This lasted until 
1990. The year prior, the Berlin Wall, which separated Western and eastern Germany, 
was torn down and, in 1990, the two states merged into the Federal Republic of Germany 
(BBC 2018). This history of persecution, divisions, and reunification inform current 
conditions in Germany, as well as how people perceive nationalistic ideas.  
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which had the potential to contribute to determining the level of nationalistic attitudes 
within a country. Table 39 shows all the data for Germany for the present or the year 
closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the chart 
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notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as what the 
change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred (both 
direction and extent).  
Table 39 Conditions Within Germany 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 







GDP/capita 44065 (2012) 2nd highest 44% increase 
from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 5.4 (2012) 5th lowest 39% decrease 
from 1996 
(positive) 
Life Expectancy 80.5 (2012) 2nd highest 5% increase 
from 1996 
(positive) 




GINI .308 (2012) 1st lowest 7% increase 
(negative) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 





14.7% (2015) 9th lowest 61% increase 
from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .58 (2012) 1st highest 2% decrease 
from 1996 
Autonomy .64 (2012) 1st highest 9% increase 
from 1996 
Equality .74 (2012) 2nd highest 1% decrease 
from 1996 
Choice .50 (2012) 1st highest 17% decrease 
from 1996 





Overall, Germany ranks very high on these various conditions. On socioeconomic 
status, for example, it is first or second on three of the four indicators, but ranked in the 
middle on unemployment. Overall, Germany improved on all indicators, but at a slower 
rate than other countries. This is intuitive given the relatively high position where 
Germany began. The exception is unemployment, which drastically improved over this 
time period. In fact, Germany saw the most significant improvement (39%) of any 
country in this study; the next highest decline in unemployment was 14% in Nigeria.  In 
Germany, this significant improvement is partly a testament to the very high 
unemployment rate that it had in 1996. When East and West Germany reunified in 1990, 
they decided that the two currencies would be exchanged at parity. That meant that wages 
in East and West Germany became the same. However, because East Germany was far 
less productive, must of its economy was shut down, creating high unemployment. In 
2012, Germany was considered the country with the highest rate of equality among those 
in the study, but it did become increasingly unequal between 1996 and 2012. This may be 
due to the post-unification shift, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
 Partly due to its strong socioeconomic presence, Germany is one of the three 
countries in this study, along with the United States and Jordan, with the highest rates of 
immigration per population – standing substantially higher than the other eight countries. 
Germany also experienced an increase from 1995 to 2010 and to 2015, but the increases 
paled in comparison to many of the other cases in this study. Given the already high 
numbers of immigrants, even large shifts in the raw numbers do not result in as high 
percentage changes as some of the very low-immigration countries experienced. This 
data alone does not adequately articulate the vast wave of migrants that arrived in 2015, 
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as a result of wars in the Middle East. This sudden up-tick in immigration from countries 
with dissimilar cultures caused great strains on German society. The policies and 
reactions will be further explored in the next section, but were important to allude to here.          
Perhaps because of already high rates, Germany experienced slower than average 
growth in cultural globalization from 1996 to 2012 and nearly no growth from 2012 to 
2016, although the later was the norm for that time period. Despite the slower growth, 
Germany was the most globalized country culturally in 2012 and the second most in 
2016.  
 Perhaps not surprising given the tendency of cultural groupings, Germany is the 
country with the highest level of emancipative values among all cases in the study, 
ranking as the highest overall, as well as on three of the four indicators (and second on 
the remaining one). Emancipative values are used to indicate cultural emancipative 
values and are determined based on research by Weltzel (2013), as outlined in Chapter 2. 
However, despite remaining with high cultural emancipative values, Germany declined 
slightly in these values overall, declining on every indicator, except autonomy. Across 
the cases generally, emancipative values increased; Germany was one of only three 
countries to decline. The reason behind this decline could be the result of a cultural 
backlash – people develop emancipative values when they have a strong sense of 
existential security. In the inverse, when faced with certain changes that can be deemed 
as “threatening” to one’s way of life and well-being, emancipative values can decline.  
Increases in migration can create that sense of “threat,” in some instances; 
however, in the case of Germany, immigration was not rising a rate higher than global 
trends at the time of the 2012 WVS questionnaire. Additionally, Germany improved on 
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all socioeconomic indicators, which also can decrease people’s sense of “threat” to their 
well-being. The decline in emancipative values could be related to how immigration may 
have been used to instill fear and insecurity in people, whether valid or not. Or perhaps 
the decline in emancipative values was due to a shifting ethnic population in Germany 
that brought different cultural values. The following sections may help illuminate some 
reasons behind this decline.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes  
As noted previously, the desired outcome in this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. (In order to perform the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, a desired 
outcome must be established to determine which conditions, or combinations, of 
conditions lead to that outcome. Terminology aside, the researcher hopes to determine 
which factors lead to an increase or decrease in nationalistic attitudes.) In Chapter 4 
(Descriptive Statistics), the researcher utilized results from the World Values Survey to 
determine the levels of nationalism. Table 40 outlines each question that was used in 
determining the nationalism score, along with the score for Germany in 2012, and the 
change since 1996. Overall, compared to the other 10 cases in this study, Germany had 
the lowest level of nationalistic attitudes. Interestingly, Germany was the lowest on 
nationalism for some indicators, but high or around the middle on others. The areas of 
low nationalism were strong enough to pull down the overall score, making it the least 
nationalistic country in this study, at least according to the 2012 World Values Survey 









(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .214 6th 197% increase 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.53 1st 13% decrease 
National Pride .671 1st 26% increase 
Confidence in UN .52 5th 7% decrease (confidence increased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.46 6th 30% increase (confidence increased) 
Identify with “world” .42 10th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .75 2nd  Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .58 8th 17% increase 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.48 1st  14% increase 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.50 1st 14% increase 
 
On the question of how Germans felt about foreign neighbors, they ranked around 
the middle among cases in this study. This represented a significant increase in Germans’ 
resistance to foreign neighbors. The 197% increase was far higher than the average 18% 
increase of this study. Interestingly, this was in 2012, before the height of the migration 
into Germany in 2015. In contrast, Germany declined in its level of nationalistic attitudes 
in relation to the question on whether Germans should be prioritized over immigrants 
when jobs are scarce. In fact, they were the least nationalistic on this indicator. Similarly, 
they were the country with the lowest level of national pride, despite a 26% increase that 
was far greater than the average increase of 3%. For confidence in the United Nations 
(UN) and their own government, it was split. Germany ranked around the middle on both 
of these, but there was an increase in confidence in the UN (representing a decrease in 
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nationalistic attitudes) and an increase in confidence in their own government 
(representing an increase in nationalistic attitudes).   
 Interestingly, Germany was ranked as one of the most nationalistic countries in 
terms of having a low level of identification with the world (although Romania and the 
United States were not far behind), but also the least nationalistic in terms of also having 
a lower level of identification with their nation, compared to other cases. This resulted in 
an overall “group belonging” score that put Germany at a higher rate of nationalistic 
attitudes than most in this study, with a 17% increase. That increase was greater than the 
9% average. This increase in identifying with the nation over the world may be indicative 
of the high rates of immigration in Germany, where Germans were faced with the 
“other,” causing a heightened sense of national identity. The immigrants considered to be 
the “other” largely are those coming from Muslim-majority countries, such as Turkey.  
Overall, whether the researcher incorporated the “group belonging” score or not, 
Germany ranked as the least nationalistic country among these cases, despite showing a 
14% increase in nationalism. Overall, based on the World Values Survey, Germany 
appears to be the least nationalistic, but is one of the few where nationalistic attitudes are 
on the rise. The 14% increase was the second highest after Jordon and one of only four 
countries where an increase occurred, based on WVS results. The following section will 
further explore whether campaign rhetoric and election results support this quantitative 
data.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 Surveys of public opinion provide a starting point for understanding levels of 
nationalistic attitudes among people, but they are just one source. An examination of 
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political elections can help inform a more nuanced understanding. In that examination, 
the researcher took into consideration campaign rhetoric related to immigration, as well 
as the ultimate election results. For most cases, the researcher has focused on the election 
of the primary leader (president, chancellor, prime minister) as the major election that 
involves the entire country and, for which, there is greater information available on 
candidates and outcomes. In the case of Germany, the election of the leader is not as 
straight-forward. Germans elect members and political parties to the Bundestag, the 
federal legislative body. The Bundestag then elects the Chancellor with a majority vote. 
Because a majority is needed, the leading political party typically must form a coalition 
with one or more additional parties in order to gain the votes required (Schulze 2017). 
Thus, for Germany, an analysis of the election of the Bundestag is appropriate, along 
with some exploration of the formation of coalitions. The most recent election was in 
2017.  
 As a federal republic, in Germany, power is distributed between federal and state 
governments. Within the federal government, power is divided between the executive 
branch, the legislative branch, and the judiciary. The head of state is the Chancellor. She 
or he controls the federal government and appoints federal ministers. The Bundestag also 
elects a President, which is a largely ceremonial role. There are two legislative branches – 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The Bundestag has roughly 600 members (varying a bit 
each election) and is the legislative body that wields the greatest power. The Bundesrat 
has 69-members and its primary role is to represent the interests of the states. All 
legislation begins with the Bundestag. For these reasons, a focus on the election of the 
Bundestag is appropriate for this research.  
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 Before delving into campaign rhetoric and election results, the researcher will 
explore the current backdrop around immigration for Germany. As noted previously, 
Germany has a very high rate of immigration per capita and that rate increased from 1996 
to 2012, albeit at an average rate compared to many cases in this study. Traditionally, 
immigrants have come for reasons of family (48%), employment (19%), and education 
(5%). Within the “family” and “employment” categories, 72% and 85% respectively 
came from other European countries, namely Poland, Romania, and Italy. Only 15% of 
migrants came as refugees; half of those were from the Middle East (Winter 2019).  
 A significant migrant population in Germany are of Turkish origin; in fact, there 
are almost 3 million people of Turkish origin or descendants who live in Germany. Many 
Turks came as guest workers during the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s; now 
their second and third generation relatives are still there. They comprise the largest 
minority group in Germany (Smith and Eckhardt 2018). Perhaps because of this, many 
have conveyed that they have never felt accepted in Germany. Many live in Turkish 
enclaves within Germany’s cities, living and working within their Turkish cultural 
traditions and language. However, even Turks who have fully integrated face racism. 
This was exhibited in 2018 when Mesut Ozil resigned from the German national soccer 
team. He was a German-born superstar of Turkish descent. He claimed that when the 
team was winning, he was German, but when they were losing, he was Turkish; he faced 
racism by officials of the national team, as well as fans (Smith and Eckhardt 2018). 
 In 2015, the immigration scene in Germany shifted significantly. As a result of 
conflict in the Middle East, primarily the civil war in Syria, there were massive numbers 
of refugees who needed a new place to live. Chancellor Merkel opened Germany’s doors 
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to them. 298,000 Syrian migrants arrived in 2015 alone: 66,000 more than the previous 
year. In total, over 2 million migrants arrived in Germany in 2015, a 46% increase from 
2014. Largely, the migrants were refugees, but many also came from newer European 
Union countries, such as Albania and Romania (Kroet 2016). By 2018, numbers returned 
to pre-2015 levels.  
 However, the large, sudden spike in immigrants from culturally dissimilar areas, 
had lasting impacts. This influx in immigrants has brought many challenges for Germans, 
including housing crises and cross-cultural tensions. Some people feel out of place in 
their own community, both native Germans and immigrants. Native Germans visibly 
notice the influx of immigrants and refugees from these areas because of their different 
race or ethnicity and religious practices, in many cases (Der Spiegle 2018). Beyond the 
visible differences, over 60% of Germans believe that most Muslims in Germany do not 
want to integrate and would prefer to be a separate group within Germany (Pew Research 
2017). Nevertheless, a similar percentage of Germans also think that refugees’ hard work 
and talents make Germany better. As politicians try to convey that people should 
welcome immigrants and should feel comfortable with them, it causes some people to 
further resist the shifting demographics that are the result of immigration increases. Many 
fear their national identity will fade away if Germany is “overtaken” by “the other.” They 
do not want this forced upon them. 
 Germany has been a relatively open country for immigrants. However, 
immigration has still been a topic of debate within society and politics. Most recently, in 
2019, Germany approved a package of immigration reforms. One component was the 
“Orderly Return Law,” which “facilitates the deportation of failed asylum seekers and 
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expands related powers of police and immigration authorities” (Mischke 2019). The goal 
of this law was to increase the number of deportations, as currently only half of those 
deportations planned are carried out successfully. Another major component of the 
immigration reform was a law to increase migration of skilled workers because of the 
current shortage and expected growth in demand moving forward. This change was 
encompassed under the “Skilled Labour Immigration Act,” which was designed to bring 
an additional 25,000 skilled workers to Germany each year, mainly doctors, nurses, IT 
specialists, engineers, and the like (Zech 2019).  
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. Immigration was a primary campaign 
topic in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Each of the six major parties has a unique 
stance on immigration, refugees, and deportations, although there is some overlap 
between parties. Generally, the platforms range from the far-right Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), which seeks a “zero immigration” policy and has expressed concerns 
about migrants from Muslim-majority countries and Africa to the more liberal Left Party, 
which proposes no restrictions on the number of refugees and asylum seekers and wants 
to halt all deportations. Table 41 below outlines the core of each party’s platform around 
immigration, especially as it relates to refugees. 









deportations result in 
net zero; reduce 
number given asylum 
Increase number of 




majority countries and 
Africa disrupting 









Social Union (CSU) 
CDU Opposes cap on 
refugees, but CSU 
wants limit of 
200K/yr 
Wants to increase 
deportations of rejected 
asylum seekers; debate 




Prefers a “skilled 
workers immigration 
law” requiring migrants 
to find a job before 
getting visa approved 
Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) 
Opposes cap on 
asylum seekers 
Increase voluntary 
returns of rejected 
asylum seekers; enforce 
deportations more; but 
pathway for rejected 
asylum seekers to stay 
Wants immigration law 
like Canada that 
considers degrees, job 
experience, language 
skills. Need legal ways 
to immigrate if want to 
stop illegal migration. 
Green Party Opposed to cap for 
refugees 
Focus on voluntary 
deportations; see uptick 
in deportations as 
inhumane; do not 
believe safe to deport to 
Afghanistan 
Similar to SPD, want 
point-based 
immigration law; also 
want children of legal 




Opposes cap for 
refugees; want to 
allow people to file 
for asylum from 
abroad 
Must deport people who 
were not approved for 
asylum; thinks 
Afghanistan is safe for 
deportation 
Similar to Green and 
SPD parties, want point 
system based on educ 
and job experience  
Left Party Strongly oppose cap 
on refugees. View 
current gov’t as 
passing laws that 
threaten fundamental 
right to asylum 
Wants to immediately 
halt all deportations 
Against quotas or point 
systems because overly 
selective; want humane 
system 
Source: Information for chart pulled from Bierbach 2017 
In this most recent national election, campaign rhetoric was certainly charged. 
Perhaps not surprisingly based on their platform, the AfD made some of the strongest 
remarks designed to instill fear about migrants. Beatrix von Storch, an AfD lawmaker, 
stated that "People who won't accept STOP at our borders are attackers, and we have to 
defend ourselves against attackers" (Breitenbach 2018). This is the same kind of rhetoric 
that was utilized in the Rwanda genocide in the spring of 1994. The idea that “we” are 
being attacked by those crossing our borders and that “we” need to defend ourselves was 
the basic premise of the Hutu Power argument that led neighbors to kill neighbors. It is a 
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highly nationalistic argument designed to instill fear and capture votes, in the case of 
Germany – votes for people who will protect the nation. Further reinforcing this notion, 
after the Berlin Christmas market attack in December 2016, Marcus Pretzell, former 
chairman of the North Rhine-Westphalia AfD, claimed that “These are Merkel’s dead,” 
insinuating that the immigration policies of Angela Merkel and her CDU party had led to 
the attack (Breitenbach 2018). The attacker was a Tunisian migrant who originally 
arrived in Italy, but then moved to Germany. He supported the Islamic State and ISIS 
even claimed that it inspired the attack. Critics of Merkel believe that he would not have 
been in the country if Merkel’s policies were not so welcoming to migrants. This rhetoric 
stirs up a “kill or be killed” type of mentality or at least a “halt immigration or be killed” 
mentality. Numerous other quotes from AfD officials could be shared that contribute to 
this fear politics around immigrants – statements that stir up fear and promote the need to 
dispose of immigrants.  
 This type of rhetoric is in stark contrast to the Social Democratic Party, which 
rejected limits on asylum seekers. Martin Schulz, SPD leader, questioned, "What would 
we do with the first refugee to reach the European border once the quota is reached? 
Would we send them back to a certain death? As long as this question hasn't been 
answered, a debate about [an upper limit] does not make sense” (Bierbach 2017). 
 The only televised debate between potential chancellors, Merkel (CDU) and 
Martin Schulz (SPD) during that campaign, was almost solely focused on immigration, 
refugees, and deportation policies. This heightened focus on immigration actually gave 
the AfD an edge (Kirby 2017). It demonstrated the importance of this topic to the nation; 
it demonstrated how much people were cared about immigration, whether supporting it or 
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halting it. When so much focus in on the implications of the presence of “the other,” it 
makes a society ripe for being susceptible to fear-mongering and identity politics.  
Election Results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. Largely, the 2017 
legislative elections in Germany were viewed as a victory for nationalism. Although 
Merkel’s party, the CDU, retained the largest share of votes, with the SPD holding the 
next largest share, both of these parties lost seats; meanwhile, the “nationalist and 
populist right of Alternative for Germany” became the third largest force by picking up 
94 seats (Kirby 2017). According to many, this represented a nationalistic shift. Figure 11 
provides a visual representation of the election results. For the AfD, this represented the 
largest share of the vote that any far-right party has received since the National Socialist 
era.  
Figure 11. Election Results, 2017 German Federal Elections 
 
Image citation: Kirby 2017; Data separately confirmed by IFES Election Guide 
Soon after the election results were clear, Alexander Gauland, the AfD’s co-
leader stated that they would "hunt down the government, Mrs. Merkel, and get our 
 
198 
country and people back" (Kirby 2017). This is a clear sign of nationalism – protecting 
your “own” at the exclusion of “others.” A poll among those who voted for the AfD 
revealed that many voters felt that the AfD could address their concerns about the influx 
of migrants and help them feel safer. Nearly 90% of AfD voters viewed Merkel’s 
immigration policies as disregarding the concerns of the people (Mudde 2017; Kirby 
2017). Many of the AfD voters (55%) acknowledged that the positions of the AfD were 
too extreme, especially those around immigration and Islam, but they voted for them 
anyway (Kirby 2017). People were convinced of the risk that migrants posed to their own 
livelihood; their sense of existential security was diminished, caused them to shift 
towards more exclusionary and nationalistic attitudes. Overall, the success of the AfD 
was more representative of opposition to the major parties (notably the ruling coalition); 
the AfD received more votes from previous non-voters than from previous CDU and SPD 
voters (Mudde 2017). 
The 14% increase in nationalistic attitudes that was demonstrated through the 
World Values Survey results from 1996 to 2012 is supported through the campaign 
rhetoric and election results in Germany. This uptick in nationalistic attitudes appears to 
have sustained and grown through 2017.  
Romania 
In contrast to Germany, Romania is located in Eastern Europe and is one of the 
smaller countries in Europe. It has the 7th highest population in the European Union (EU), 
with just under 20 million, which pales in comparison to the over 80 million in Germany. 
Romania has the second lowest GDP per capita in the EU. Among cases in this study, it 
ranks 6th for GDP per capita, putting it around the middle, but certainly a long way from 
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the United States and Germany (World Bank 2018). Romania is predominately 
comprised of Romanians (83%), but there is also a strong contingent of Hungarians (6%). 
The remaining population consists of Romani, Ukrainian, German, and other ethnicities. 
Eastern Orthodox is the primary religion that is practice (82% of the population, while 
Protestants and Roman Catholics each comprise 6% and 4% respectively. Other religions 
make-up less than 1% of the population (CIA 2020). 
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
with the potential to contribute to determining the level of nationalistic attitudes within a 
country. Table 42 shows all the data for Romania for the present or the year closest to 
representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the chart notes how 
that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as what the change has 
been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred (both direction and 
extent).  
Table 42 Conditions Within Romania 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank 
(among those 






GDP/capita 8535 (2012) 7th highest 419% increase from 
1996 (positive) 








9.4 (2012) 5th lowest 57% decrease (positive) 
GINI 
(Equality) 





Table 42 (continued). 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 




1.15% (2015) 4th lowest 68% increase from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 
74.83 (2012) 4th highest 26% increase from 1996 
CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 




Overall .41 (2012) 7th highest 5% decrease from 1996 
Autonomy .54 (2012) 4th highest 9% decrease from 1996 
Equality .58 (2012) 5th highest 9% increase from 1996 
Choice .21 (2012) 7th highest 59% decrease from 1996 
Voice .29 (2012) 6th highest 13% increase from 1996 
Romania is a bit more of a mixed bag in comparison to Germany on these 
conditions that affect nationalism. For socioeconomic status, Romania is generally in the 
lower half of cases among those in this study, but it did improve on three of the four 
indicators, and nearly had no change on the fourth (unemployment). In fact, the 
improvement in Romania far outpaced the average among cases in this study. The 
GDP/capita growth stood apart with three other cases that had extremely strong growth. 
Even the slight increase in unemployment was better than the average 10% increase. 
Thus, Romania was not strong overall in socioeconomic status, but did experience 
marked improvements. Despite its lower socioeconomic status, Romania fared well on 
equality, ranking 4th; this did represent a decline though. Perhaps that decline in equality 
relates to the rapid GDP growth, which we have seen paired together in other cases.  
 Intuitively, based on Romania’s lower socioeconomic status, its immigration rate 
per population is lower than most cases in this study. In 2010, immigration to Romania 
was less than 1% and had only increased by 16% in the previous 15 years. However, 
from 1995 to 2010, it increased 68%, demonstrating a substantial increase in the rate of 
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increase from 2010 to 2015. Despite this marked uptick in immigration after 2010, the 
increase was still less than the average among these cases, and Romania remained in the 
lowest grouping of countries for immigration.  
 Despite relatively low movements of people into Romania, it still had the fourth 
highest rate of cultural globalization in from 2012-2016. This could be a result of 
Romania joining the European Union in 2007, creating new avenues for trade and the 
exchange of ideas. There was an increase in cultural globalization from 1996 to 2012 at 
26%, but then no change from 2012 to 2016, both of which were average among the 
cases. In terms of cultural values (emancipative values), Romania is around the middle 
and represented the average. However, while there was an average increase of 9% among 
all cases, Romania declined by 5% in cultural emancipative values, similarly to Germany. 
This occurred through a combination of increases on some indicators and decreases on 
others. Most notably, there was a 59% decrease on the choice indicator, which assesses 
views on abortion, homosexuality, and divorce. As with Germany, it will be interesting to 
explore some other factors to determine what may have caused the declines. The rapid 
increases in socioeconomic status could have created some insecurities.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes  
 Romania is interesting because it largely fell around the middle of the rankings on 
each indicator of nationalistic attitudes through the World Values Survey, but it also 
decreased in nationalistic attitudes overall and according to every indicator except 
confidence in the UN, where there was a modest increase. Romania is one of the 
countries with a very clear decline in nationalistic attitudes, based solely on this 
quantitative data, as is seen in Table 43.  
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(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = less 
nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .21 6th 35% decrease 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.81 9th 2% decrease 
National Pride .75 4th 1% decrease 
Confidence in UN .52 5th 4% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.27 1st 32% decrease (confidence decreased) 
Identify with “world” .40 9th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with 
“Nation” 
.75 3rd Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging 
Overall 





.54 4th 8% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.55 5th 12% decrease 
 
The largest decrease in nationalistic attitudes among Romanians was on the 
indicator for how they felt about foreign neighbors. Although Romania was in the middle 
of the cases in 2012, this represented a 35% decrease – a much sharper decline than the 
18% average. Despite this increased openness to foreign neighbors, the needle did not 
move very much on Romanian’s desire to prioritize Romanian’s over immigrants when 
jobs are scarce. They were one of the more nationalistic countries on this indicator and 
had only declined by 2% since 1996, a much smaller decline than the 10% average. Their 
overall prioritization of Romanians when jobs are scare could be indicative of their lower 
GDP per capita and higher unemployment rate. There was little movement on national 
pride, as well, which was common across cases.  
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 The confidence that Romanians have in both the UN and their own government 
declined from 1996 to 2012. In the case of the UN, the change was minimal, but did 
represent the only increase in nationalistic attitudes among all of the indicators. In the 
case of their own government, their confidence was so low that Romania was the least 
nationalistic of all cases on this indicator. It also represented a 32% decline in confidence 
– far more than the typical shift that the researcher observed.  
 In examining identity, there are many similarities between Germany and Romania 
in 2012. Germany was 10th for identifying with the “world” and 2nd for identifying with 
the “nation”, both indicating low levels of identification with these levels of identity. 
Similarly, Romania was 9th and 3rd, respectively. Overall, Germany ranked 8th on this 
combined indicator, while Romania was 6th, both falling in the higher half. The notable 
difference, however, is that these results were indicative of a 17% increase in 
nationalistic attitudes for Germany, but a 23% decline for Romania, meaning that they 
were at opposite ends of the spectrum and have each moved inward towards the other. 
Romania, overall, shifted away from a national identity and toward a more global 
identity, while the opposite was true of Germany. The lower levels of immigration could 
have helped Romanians avoid feeling the need to turn towards a heightened sense of 
national identity since they were not faced with perceived threats from the “other.” 
 Whether the group belonging score is included or not does not make a significant 
difference in the overall nationalistic attitudes score for Romania. In including “group 
belonging,” Romania is the 5th least nationalistic country and experienced a 12% decline, 
which is sharper than the 2% decline that was the average across cases. Romania is one 
of the very clear cases where the World Values Survey shows a significant decline in 
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nationalistic attitudes, which put it in stark contrast to Germany. Examining the United 
States as the third case for this chapter will provide an additional perspective.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 The World Values Survey captures viewpoints at one moment in time through one 
particular mechanism. Additional societal factors are useful to include when assessing the 
overall shift in a country’s nationalistic attitudes. Romania has relatively low migration 
and the increases per capita were very low from 1995 to 2010, with a more significant 
increase from 2010 to 2015, albeit remaining at a slower growth level than average and 
certainly for Europe. Interestingly, the most recent presidential campaign in Romania 
occurred differently from those in Chile, Mexico, Korea, and Germany; there were no 
debates and major policies were not discussed very openly. This creates a challenging 
situation for a researcher to assess campaign rhetoric around immigration, as well as what 
election results may signal regarding nationalistic attitudes. However, in the case of 
Romania, the researcher will endeavor to explain the overall response to the 2017 surge 
in immigration, as well as what the presidential election results may indicate.  
Response to the Immigration Surge. Romania has not been a major recipient of 
immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers during the migrant crisis in the years prior to 
2020. However, when several borders closed, Romania shifted to become an entry point 
of interest and immigration rose significantly between July and August 2017. While 
many neighboring countries were utilizing the immigration increase to employ 
“discourses of fear” and gain votes, in Romania, “key government officials sought to 
assuage public anxieties” (Global Detention Project 2019). Romania’s Interior Minister 
stressed that Romania could handle it. In 2018, Romania decided to endorse the Global 
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Compact for Migration, despite opposition from some neighboring countries. The 
Compact sought a comprehensive approach towards migration in order to avoid 
xenophobia, intolerance, and racism (Global Detention Project 2019). Even prior to the 
height of the migrant “crisis,” in 2012, Romania moved to decriminalize immigration 
violations. In 2015, it developed laws for detaining asylum seekers, but only detained one 
asylum seeker between 2016 and 2018 (Global Detention Project 2019). Based on laws 
and the limited political rhetoric around immigration, there is evidence to support the 
World Values Survey results indicating a decline in nationalistic attitudes. Immigration 
was not utilized as a mechanism to incite fear in the public and to close borders.  
Political Parties and Election Results. There was significant movement in 
Romanian politics in 2018 and 2019, with some disruptions continuing into 2020. The 
goal of this dissertation is not to present a thesis about the many nuances of Romanian 
politics, but a basic understanding for the reader may be useful in digesting some of the 
political party shifts that have occurred. Two primary political parties have dominated 
national politics in Romania – the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). In 2019, the President was Klaus Iohannis of the PNL and the 
Prime Minister was Viorica Dancila of the PSD.  The Prime Minister is appointed by the 
President, with approval from Parliament, which is why the latter need not be from the 
same political party as the President. After a 2019 vote of no confidence in the PSD, 
Dancila was removed from her position. The vote of no confidence in the PSD was 
spawned by several issues of corruption, including efforts by the PSD to pass legislation 
offering immunity to politicians. President Iohannis appointed Ludovic Orban, from the 
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PNL, as the new Prime Minister, starting in October 2019, just prior to the November 
Presidential elections (IFES 2019).  
 The National Liberal Party (PNL) is a right-wing liberal party, with some 
conservative members. It is popular with younger generations and is viewed as less 
corrupt than the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The PNL is the least religious and most 
socially liberal Romanian Party, but that is relative considering the Orthodox Church still 
wields great power. According to Terry (2014), “In recent years, the party has come to 
have certain nationalistic tendencies and instincts, refusing to govern with the ethnic 
Hungarian UDMR, for instance.” According to some assessments, PNL was pro-
European, but has started to become more Eurosceptic. However, Coman (2019) stated 
that Iohannis, the PNL candidate, “won because of his clear pro-European stance,” 
indicating that the PNL remained more open and less nationalistic than Terry observed. 
 The other major party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) is considered a socialist 
party that focuses on social justice and solid social policies. However, as previously 
noted, that party has been riddled with corruption scandals in recent years. The PSD has 
traditionally been a pro-European party that promoted integration into the European 
Union (EU). However, in 2004, it hesitated to strengthen some aspects of the EU. Since 
2016, the PSD has utilized “issue-based Euroscepticism, a nationalist view on economic 
affairs with increased references to national sovereignty” (Coman 2019). Party members 
have often mentioned a need to revisit conditions for remaining in the EU. Alluding to a 
separation from a major regional entity is a common nationalistic approach. In the United 
States, we have seen President Trump criticize NATO and question whether we should 
remain a member. This is a mechanism for promoting the ways in which we should be 
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“America First.” Overall, information on exact policies of the parties is challenging to 
discern. In this election, Iohannis refused to debate Dancila.  
 In part due to frustration over the lack of information on platforms and also the 
frustration of continual corruption, voter turnout for the 2019 Presidential election was at 
an incredibly low rate of 50% (Coman 2019). Nevertheless, the PSD candidate, Dancila, 
captured just 22% of the vote, which was the worst outcome for the party since 1989 
(Coman 2019). Generally, the success of the PNL (albeit with just 38% of the vote) and 
the dismal showing by the PSD shows some support for the less nationalistic party and 
certainly does not provide any evidence to refute the results of the World Values Survey, 
which indicates that nationalistic attitudes in Romania are declining.   
United States 
 The United States is one of the leading global powers. Among cases in this study, 
it by far has the highest GDP per capita, and the second highest population after China. 
The United States is located in the middle of North America, anchored by Mexico to the 
south and Canada to its north. The United States has long been considered a country of 
immigrants, although Native Americans lived in the US before European settlers arrived. 
Currently, about 72% of the population is white, 16% is Hispanic, 13% is black, 5% is 
Asian, and less than 1% is Amerindian and Alaska native. (The overall percentage is 
more than 100% due to the way that Hispanics are recorded in the US Census, falling 
under one of the other categories.) The predominant religion is Protestant, with 21% of 
Americans identifying as Roman Catholic, less than 2% identifying of Jewish or 
Mormon, and less than 1% identifying with other religions. Remarkably, nearly 23% of 
Americans are “unaffiliated” with any religion (CIA 2020). The United States was 
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grouped with Germany and Romania to represent “the West” due to the common cultural 
features of western countries and the desire to represent a diverse array of countries from 
“the West,” as was outlined in the methodology chapter. 
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes  
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitudes within a country. Table 44 shows all the data for the United States for the 
present or the year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the 
raw data, the chart notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as 
well as what the change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have 
occurred (both direction and extent).  
Table 44 Conditions Within the United States 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 






GDP/capita 51603 (2012) 1st highest 72% increase from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 7.9 (2012) 8th lowest 44% increase from 1996 
(negative) 
Life Expectancy 78.7 (2012) 4th highest 4% increase from 1996 
(positive) 
Infant Mortality 6.1 (2012) 3rd lowest 21% decrease (positive) 
GINI (Equality) GINI .408 (2012) 6th lowest 0% change from 1995 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 




14.54% (2015) 9th lowest 64% increase from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 
85.34 (2012) 2nd highest 11% increase from 1996 
CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .53 (2012) 2nd highest 10% increase from 1996 
Autonomy .52 (2012) 5th highest 16% increase from 1996 
Equality .78 (2012) 1st highest 12% increase from 1996 
Choice .48 (2012) 2nd highest 28% increase from 1996 
Voice .32 (2012) 5th highest 36% decrease from 1996 
 
The United States is in the top tier among cases in this study for socioeconomic 
status, but is certainly not the consistent leader, as is the case for Germany. The United 
States ranks highest on GDP per capita, but that is the only indicator. It is 3rd for infant 
mortality, 4th for life expectancy, and then 8th (in the lower half) for unemployment. 
Granted, the effects of the 2008 recession were still being felt in 2012 and affected the 
unemployment rate. From 1996 to 2012, the United States did improve on each of these 
indicators, except unemployment, where it increased by 44%. However, where the United 
States improved (GDP, life expectancy, and infant mortality), it was at a much slower 
rate than the other countries in this study, as compared to the average. Similarly, 
unemployment rose at a much higher rate than it did across the cases. Perhaps the slower 
improvements are not surprising given already solid performance on those indicators. 
There was less room for improvement. Perhaps connected to slower than average changes 
overall in socioeconomic status, the level of economic equality essentially did not change 
over this time period.  
 The United States is very similar to Germany in terms of immigration rates – it is 
one of the top three countries in this study for incoming immigration compared to its 
population. Despite substantial increases from 1995 to 2010 and to 2015, it represented 
one of the slowest rates of increase among cases in this study. Again, similarly to 
Germany, the United States ranks as the highest and second highest for cultural 
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globalization in 2012 and 2016. The increases from 1996 to 2012 were at a smaller rate 
than other countries, on average, but the 6% increase from 2012 to 2016 represented a 
more significant increase then many countries which largely remained steady. 
Nevertheless, overall shifts in globalization were not hugely jarring, mimicking the 
slower than average increases in immigration rates.  
 Not too surprisingly, given global cultural groupings, the United States has the 
second highest emancipative values among countries in this study. On specific indicators, 
the United States was first, second, or fifth, showing the strongest value in equality and 
choice, which is not too surprising given that these are values that America widely 
promotes as being at the core founding of the country. America declined in voice 
(questions related to whether people should have more say in their jobs, government, and 
community), but increased on all other indicators. The overall 10% increase in 
emancipative values was about average among the cases in this study.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
 In the United States, indicators of shifting nationalistic attitudes, based on the 
World Values Survey, are not as clear as they are in Germany and Romania, because the 
incorporation of the “group belonging” indicator does change the results. Some indicators 
show an increase in nationalistic attitudes, such as declining tolerance for foreign 
neighbors, decreasing confidence in the UN, and group belonging shifting towards a 
national identity, while other indicators show a decline in nationalistic attitudes, such as a 
decrease in prioritizing Americans over immigrants for jobs, declining national pride, and 
decreasing confidence in own government. Overall, nationalistic attitudes in the United 
States were low compared to other cases in this study. When omitting the “group 
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belonging” indicator, it represented a small decrease in nationalism, but when including 
it, it showed a moderate increase in nationalistic attitudes. This makes the United States 
an ideal case for incorporating additional research on campaign rhetoric and election 
results to gauge the overall trend. Table 45 outlines the primary indicators for 
nationalistic attitudes. 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .14 4th 43% increase 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.63 2nd 2% decrease 
National Pride .83 6th 10% decrease 
Confidence in UN .59 10th 15% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.41 3rd 20% decrease (confidence 
decreased) 
Identify with “world” .39 8th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .80 7th Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .59 5th 58% increase 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.52 2nd 4% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.54 3rd 6% increase 
Resistance to foreign neighbors represented one of the sharpest increases in 
nationalistic attitudes in the United Stated, even the raw score remained one of the lowest 
across indicators. This could be viewed as intuitive given the large number of immigrants 
per capita, if one follows the theory that contact with the “other” increases fears and 
resistance rather than leading to a global culture and identity. In contrast, they declined 
slightly in their desire to prioritize Americans over immigrants when jobs are scarce. 
Overall, though, Americans are still more concerned about immigrants taking their jobs 
than they are about having an immigrant as a neighbor. The concerns about having 
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foreign neighbors are rising toward the concerns about immigrants taking jobs. However, 
these concerns may spawn from different immigrant groups. Often people associate the 
loss of jobs with immigrants from Mexico and Central American countries, whereas their 
fears are often associated with Muslim immigrants, which they have linked with Islamic 
extremism. These fears, and how politicians have stoked them, will be further explored in 
the next section. 
The United States did decline in its level of national pride, although it remained 
around the middle among the cases in this study. The decline is interesting, as the average 
across the cases was a 3% increase in national pride. This could be indicative of the 
polarization of politics in the United States and the approach of some conservatives to 
discredit President Barack Obama on the basis of race. (He served as President from 2008 
to 2016.) For some, having a black president represented a shift in America that made 
them uncomfortable. For others, living in a country where the legitimacy of a president 
was questioned because of his race, made them loose pride in the United States. Perhaps 
corresponding to the decline in national pride in the USA, confidence in their national 
government also declined for Americans. This could be more indicative of a loss of 
confidence in institutions, as Americans also showed a decline in their confidence in the 
United Nations, putting the United States at second to last. The decline in confidence in 
national government signals a decrease in nationalistic attitudes, while the decline in 
confidence in the UN signals an increase in nationalistic attitudes. 
In terms of group belonging, the USA ranked in the bottom half for identification 
with the world and in the upper half for identifying with their nation. Overall, they were 
in the middle for group belonging, with a 58% increase in nationalistic attitudes 
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(signaling an overall shift towards the nation and away from the world.) This increase 
was markedly higher than the average 9% increase across cases. This shift towards a 
national identity may have set the stage for the election victory of Donald Trump, who, 
four years later, won on a “Make America Great Again” platform. Because of the strong 
shift in group belonging, it is not surprising that the overall nationalistic attitudes score is 
slightly different when including or excluding this indicator. When omitting this 
indicator, the overall nationalistic attitudes score for the USA is .52, putting it as the 2nd 
least nationalistic case; however, including group belonging, bumps up the score to .53 
and puts it as the 3rd least nationalistic. The first score represents a 4% decrease in 
nationalism, while the later represents a 6% increase. The latter is the one that was 
utilized in the descriptive statistics chapter and is our starting point for the fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. However, the additional research on campaign 
rhetoric and election results can help indicate whether this is reflected beyond the 
quantitative data.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 In the case of the USA, indicators of nationalistic attitudes beyond the World 
Values Survey are crucial to assessing how much and in which direction the needle 
moved. As noted above, the researcher is following the final indicator showing that 
nationalistic attitudes in the USA increased by 6% from 1996 to 2012. However, as also 
discussed, when the questions around group belonging are omitted, the results show a 4% 
decrease in nationalistic attitudes. For the purposes of the descriptive statistics, the 
researcher utilized the former – an increase in nationalistic attitudes. Nevertheless, if 
additional research provides indicators that the latter is more accurate, then she will 
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manually adjust the calibration and use that for the fuzzy set QCA truth table analysis in a 
subsequent chapter. There is no question that immigration and other nationalistic topics 
were up for discussion in the most recent presidential debate of 2016.  
 The United States has the highest raw number of immigrants of any country in the 
world. As of 2017, one-fifth of the world’s migrants lived in the United States. The 
immigrants come from nearly every country in the world, which provides a diversity in 
immigration. However, roughly 25% of the immigrants come from Mexico, with the next 
largest representation from China and India at 6% each. The number of immigrants in the 
United States has been increasing steadily since 1965 when American immigration laws 
replaced a national quota system. Immigrants made up 13.6% of the population in 2017, 
which was triple the 1970 rate of 4.7% (Radford 2019). So, although the increases in 
immigration from 1990 to 2010 were aligned with the average rate of increase in the 
world, there was a significant increase over the past several decades, which older 
populations in the United States may recognize.  
 Immigrants in the United States are generally there legally (77% of them), but 
about a quarter are in the country without proper documentation. Nearly half (45%) of the 
country’s immigrants are naturalized U.S. citizens (Radford 2019). The USA generally 
provides a process for documented immigrants to become permanent residents and then 
citizens. There is no similar process for undocumented migrants, which is often a point of 
contention and debate. The number of undocumented immigrants rose significantly from 
1990 to 2007, but then declined leading up to 2017. So, while the total number of 
migrants rose, as a proportion of the population, the percentage of undocumented 
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immigrants declined (Radford 2019). This decline was largely due to the drop in 
migration from Mexico. 
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. The most notable recent election in the 
United States was the 2016 Presidential general election between the Republican Donald 
Trump and Democrat Hillary Clinton, who each earned their respective party’s 
nomination at the conclusion of the primary process. There were a few other candidates 
in the general election, but with the two-party U.S. system, no other candidate was on the 
debate stage or had a legitimate chance of winning. Campaign rhetoric on immigration 
was certainly at the forefront of this election. According to a Business Insider report by 
Louise Liu, “one of the most controversial issues in this election cycle (was) US 
immigration reform” (2016). Most observers of the U.S. presidential election would 
agree. Trump and Clinton represented widely varying platforms on immigration, making 
differentiation easy.  
There are many contrasts between the campaign rhetoric of each candidate. Table 
46 provides a basic summary of some of their key viewpoints. From the very launch of 
his campaign in 2015, Trump utilized tactics of fear to link immigration to crime. He 
proposed his ban on Muslim immigration following the mass shooting in San Bernardino, 
California, and he utilized families of those who lost loved ones to killings by illegal 
immigrants to support his position (Liu 2016, Gamboa et al. 2016). The San Bernardino 
attack was committed by Syed Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik in December 2015; 
they opened fire at a Christmas party at the Inland Regional Center, where Farook 
worked. Farook was born in Illinois, but Malik was raised in Pakistan and lived in Saudi 
Arabia before marrying Farook. He had traveled to the Middle East before the attack. It is 
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believed that they were self-radicalized, claiming allegiance to the Islamic State, but 
having no direct financial support from domestic or foreign groups. Although Farook was 
American, this did not deter Trump from connecting Muslim immigration to terrorism in 
the U.S.  
Table 46 Trump vs. Clinton: Viewpoints on Immigration  
Donald Trump Hilary Clinton 
Said he would build a wall along entire 
US-Mexico border (and have Mexico pay 
for it) 
Proclaimed US-Mexico border is most 
secure border the US has 
 Pushed comprehensive immigration 
reform and a path to citizenship 
Proposed mass deportations of all illegal 
immigrants 
Focused on deporting only immigrants 
who pose violent threat 
“Extreme” vetting of refugees and a ban 
on Muslim immigration 
Welcome Syrian refugees and give all 
asylum seekers a chance to tell their story 
Chart adopted from Liu (2016). 
Although Trump was rarely clear on specific policies, his strategy of criticizing 
immigrants and connecting them to crime continued to the Republican National 
Convention, where he was officially nominated as his party’s candidate for the 
presidential election, and through the general election (Gamboa et al 2016).  His strategy 
was one of eliciting fear. According to Gamboa et al, “He officially accepted the party's 
nomination for president by telling a pumped-up crowd that the nation's security is under 
threat from immigrants and illegal immigration” (2016). He noted that 180,000 illegal 
immigrants who had been ordered deported were roaming free on the streets, able to 
threaten law-abiding citizens. As one strategy to handle the illegal immigration, Trump 
proposed tripling the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials 
(Liu 2016).  
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 Trump has tried to set himself in contrast to Clinton and to spark fear that 
Clinton’s plan would not protect Americans. Clinton positioned herself as being 
committed to immigration rights, wanting to protect undocumented immigrants from 
deportation and integrating them into America (Liu 2016, Clinton 2019). As her official 
policy stated, “we are a nation of immigrants, and we treat those who come to our 
country with dignity and respect – and that we embrace immigrants, not denigrate them” 
(Clinton 2019). This is in stark contrast to Trump’s portrayal of immigrants as rapists, 
criminals, and drug lords. Clinton often campaigned on the idea of creating pathways to 
citizenship for those immigrants who are already here. She promoted upholding laws and 
protecting borders, while bringing people into the formal economy (Clinton 2019).  
Rather than positioning immigrants as a threat to our nation, she positioned them as part 
of our national fabric. 
 Before the researcher analyzes the final results of the election, she will first focus 
further on campaign rhetoric. Trump and Clinton did not magically become their party’s 
nominees. They were first elected by their political parties through a primary nomination 
process. According to an NPR article, where they researched the specific policy stances 
of each of the major candidates in the primary election, there was no differentiation 
between the three Democratic Party contenders (Kurtzleben 2015). In many ways, the 
Democratic candidates were vying to have the most welcoming policy to immigrants. 
They all agreed with developing a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants 
and protecting those immigrants who were brought to the United States as youth and only 
know America as their home (Agbafe 2016). Thus, the election of Clinton as the Party’s 
nominee is not very indicative of any particular stance on immigration among Democrats. 
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The Republican Party nomination process tells a very different story though. The 
more than a dozen candidates in the Republican primary had varied views on 
immigration; thus, the success of Donald Trump is indicative of how Republicans felt 
about immigration. As noted, Trump launched his campaign by referring to Mexican 
immigrants as “criminals” and “rapists.” After seeing the success this provided him, other 
Republican candidates began to shift their rhetoric, as well. Many candidates called for 
an end to birthright citizenship, whereby children who are born in the United States, even 
to illegal immigrants, are granted citizenship (Elliott and Altman 2015). Even former 
Florida Governor Jeb Bush, who used to refer to illegal immigration as an “act of love” 
and once criticized Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, shifted his own rhetoric to talk 
about discontinuing “anchor babies” – those babies who are born in the United States to 
illegal immigrants and granted citizenship, then whose citizenship is utilized as an 
advantage for gaining legal entry for family members (Elliott and Altman 2015). Sen. 
Ted Cruz (R—TX), who remained in the contest nearly to the end, also shifted his 
position on immigration. He previously supported a pathway to citizenship for illegal 
immigrants; after seeing the positive response to Trump, he campaigned on “no amnesty” 
and deporting all undocumented immigrants. He gained momentum as a result (Alvarez 
2015). 
 The Republican Party leadership had urged candidates not to alienate Hispanic 
voters after they saw the dismal support they earned from the Hispanic population in the 
2012 presidential election. The Hispanic vote helped lift Obama to a second term (Elliott 
and Altman 2012). However, many commentators think that the Republican Party 
candidates were more responsive to their base. They recognized the fears and anxieties 
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that many Republicans (and even those not identifying with a party) had. The rhetoric 
was a huge shift from Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, both previous Republican 
presidents, who used to preach “compassionate conservatism,” even promoting a pathway 
to citizenship. The more recent presidential nominees of the Republican Party, John 
McCain and Mitt Romney, for example, aligned with this sentiment (Gonyea 2018). 
However, in 2016, the economy had weakened and people were concerned about their 
jobs and having enough to “get by.” Candidates like Trump were able to exacerbate these 
fears and place “illegal immigrants” as the source of the country’s woes, causing a plunge 
in wages and a loss of jobs for citizens (Gonyea 2018). It did not matter that most 
economists would argue that wages are driven by much more than immigration. The 
underlying lack of existential security was there and Republican candidates used that to 
their advantage. The question may be whether viewpoints on immigration shifted that 
significantly or whether previous candidates did not adequately represent the electorate.  
 According to a poll conducted between April 2015 and January 2016, 53 percent 
of Republicans agreed that immigrants “constitute a threat to traditional American 
customs and values” (Alvarez 2015). Furthermore, there was a divide between younger 
Republicans and older ones. Only 22 percent of Republicans aged 65 and older believed 
that “immigrants strengthen American society,” while slightly more than half of those 18 
to 29 agreed with that statement (Alvarez 2015). Another poll indicated that 60% of 
Republican voters felt that immigrants were “more of a burden than a benefit on our 
society” (Agbafe 2016).  
 The campaign rhetoric of the Republican Party in particular was indicative of a 
shift towards less acceptance of immigrants. However, there is certainly a polarization at 
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play. The two major parties split the country roughly in half in terms of their general 
support. The Democratic Party remained very welcoming and supportive of immigrants, 
making this an incredibly divisive issue. However, even if one half of the electorate is 
shifting toward a more nationalistic attitude, it does pull the entire country that direction.  
Election results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. Donald Trump 
won the 2016 Presidential election in the United States. On the surface, this may suggest 
strong support for his “nation first” platform and his anti-immigrant rhetoric. However, 
Hillary Clinton actually received more votes – more Americans opted for her more 
outward looking approach to governing and more welcoming rhetoric to immigrants. 
Clinton received 48.2% of the votes, while Trump received 46.1%. Notably, neither 
candidate received a majority of the votes. The remaining votes went to a few candidates 
outside of the two major parties. The American presidential election does not operate on 
a popular vote system though; rather, it utilizes the electoral college, in which each state 
receives a certain number of delegates. As a result, Trump earned 306 electoral votes to 
Clinton’s 232, resulting in his election victory (IFES 2019).  
 Beyond immigration rhetoric, Trump’s overall campaign had a very nationalistic 
focus. His campaign slogan was “Make America Great Again.” Through his policies and 
rhetoric, it was clear that this meant “at the exclusion or expense of others,” whether that 
was other countries or even those outside of mainstream America. As noted in the 
Literature Review, Trump ran on a platform of curbing immigration and prioritizing 
America, regardless of the effects on the rest of the world (Guardian 2015, “Donald 
Trump announces”). In contrast, Clinton, a former Secretary of State, promoted 
diplomacy and collaboration with international partners to lead to success for all 
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countries. In many ways, it was the old “pie” analogy. In Trump’s world, the pie is finite, 
so America can only grow and succeed at the expenses of others; in Clinton’s world, the 
entire pie can grow.  
 There is little doubt that Trump represents a nationalistic approach, while Clinton 
does not. However, it is challenging to discern what exactly his election means. Some 
commenters feel that the voters of the Republican Party have held the same nationalistic 
views for decades; Trump was just the first candidate who resonated with those beliefs. 
Others view his election as representing a shift in the electorate. Regardless, he has 
shifted the Republican Party toward nationalism. His rhetoric on immigration has been 
reminiscent of some of the world leaders that have used emotion-laden symbols of fear, 
hatred, and resentment to drone up nationalistic support that excludes others. For the 
purposes of this research, the author will retain the original assessment of a 6% increase 
in nationalistic attitudes, as it is according to the World Values Survey. Those survey 
results, coupled with the shift in campaign rhetoric and ultimate election of Trump, 
support this notion of rising nationalistic attitudes in the United States. 
Calibration and Initial Conclusions 
 This section explores how the conditions and outcome were calibrated in 
preparation for the fsQCA truth table analysis. Then, the author will share some initial 
conclusions about the case studies for Germany, Romania, and the United States.  
Calibration of the conditions and outcome to prepare for the truth table 
As noted in the previous chapters, the calibration process assigns a number to 
each variable, allowing the researcher to ultimately conduct the fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA). The fuzzy set approach allows for nuance within each 
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variable, rather than a strict “in the group” or “out of the group” approach, as the crisp set 
QCA dictates. Appendix F provides the results of the calibration for the conditions and 
outcomes for Wave 6 for all cases, while Appendix G does the same for the changes from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6. A key provides the cut off points for each level of calibration. 
However, in all instances, the following numerical key was utilized: 0 is fully out; .25 is 
more out than in; .5 is neither in nor out; .75 is more in than out; and 1 is fully in. This 
refers to whether or not that case is in or out of the set of cases represented by the 
variable noted, such as a high socioeconomic status or a significant increase in cultural 
globalization. Tables 47 and 48 below provides the calibration for the West - Germany, 
Romania, and the United States. A brief analysis follows.  

















Germany .75 1 1 1 0.75 0.00 
Romania .25 .75 .25 .75 0.25 0.25 
USA .75 .75 1 1 0.75 0.25 
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 





































.75* .25 0 0 0 
Romania 0.75 0 .25 .75 0 1 1 
USA 0.25 0 .75* .25 .75 0 0 
*Manually adjusted  
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
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In Wave 6, Germany and the United States are the same on all of the conditions 
except the GINI indicator, where they differ by just one category. Both countries are 
more in the group than out of the group for high socioeconomic (SES) status and high 
emancipative values, and are fully in the group for high cultural globalization and high 
levels of immigration; they were both “fully in” or “more in than out” of the group for 
high equity (GINI), as well. On the outcome, both countries were similar; Germany is 
“fully out” and the United States is “more out than in” for the group with high 
nationalistic attitudes, indicating that they had lower levels of nationalism compared to 
other cases in this study. Romania, in contrast, was similar to Germany and the United 
States on some conditions, but very different on others. The most significant differences 
were on SES, where Romania was more out of the group with high SES and was nearly 
out of the group with high immigration. For its outcome, Romania was the same as the 
United States – “more out” of the group with high nationalistic attitudes.  
For changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6, the researcher did make one manual 
adjustment to a condition. In the case of decreasing immigration, or slower than average 
increases, or increases from within a similar cultural group, Romania is clearly in that 
group as its rise in immigration rates was quite slow. On the surface, Germany and the 
United States are in that group as well, due to below average increases in immigration 
rates per capita. However, both of these countries started with very high immigration 
rates, so it would have taken a huge increase in raw numbers in order to result in a 
significant percentage increase (in contrast to countries with relatively low immigration 
rates, where a much smaller shift results in a significant percentage change). In addition, 
both countries have high levels of immigration from outside their cultural groups. In the 
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United States, this is from all over the world; in Germany, the surge was from Muslim-
majority countries. In both cases, politicians used immigration as such a central theme of 
their campaigns, that it may have given the impression to people of rapidly rising 
immigration rates. Given all of these additional factors, the researcher is inclined to place 
both Germany and the United States as “more in than out” of the group of significant 
increases in immigration for the purposes of this analysis.   
 In terms of changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6, again Germany and the United 
States were similar. They both skewed towards being out of the group for significant 
improvements in SES, strong improvements in equity, and significant increases in 
cultural globalization, and they were both skewed towards being in the group for 
significant increases in immigration. Emancipative values were the main differentiator, 
with Germany being out of the group for significant increases and the United States being 
more in the group than out. Both Germany and the United States were out of the group 
for decreasing nationalistic attitudes, as there is evidence of rising nationalism in both 
cases. In contrast, Romania has some stark differences. Although it was similar to 
Germany and the United States for skewing out for improving equity, Romania was in (or 
more in than out) the group for significant improvements in socioeconomic status and 
rapidly rising cultural globalization. The outcome is also quite different with evidence of 
declining nationalistic attitudes and a significant decline at that.  
 Although the more thorough fsQCA in Chapter 10 will help discern whether 
certain combinations of conditions may lead to a specified outcome (declining 
nationalism in this case), it is informative to do an initial assessment of how well these 
cases in the West align with the original hypotheses. Table 49 below outlines one of the 
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hypotheses, that increasing socioeconomic status, improved equality, decreasing 
immigration (or increasing, but from similar cultural groups), slower increases in cultural 
globalization, and slower changes in cultural emancipative values will result in a decrease 
in nationalistic attitudes. For each country, the researcher indicated whether or not that 
case aligns with the condition noted, based on the calibration. A “YES” indicates that the 
case does meet that criteria and an “X” indicates that it does not. The yellow highlights 
indicate where the outcome aligns with the expected condition.  




















Germany        X X X**    YES YES X 
Romania   YES X YES   X YES YES 
USA     X X X** YES X X 
*or slower than avg increase or increasing, but from same cultural group 
**See below. Manual adjustment. 
 Interestingly, there is alignment with socioeconomic status, immigration, and the 
outcome for all three cases. For equality and changing cultural values, only two of the 
three cases align with the condition. Oddly, the condition of changing cultural 
globalization is the exact opposite of what was expected for all three cases, based on the 
outcome. This could imply that the impacts of cultural globalization on things like the 
economy could wield more influence on nationalistic attitudes. Additionally, sometimes 
cultural globalization is accompanied by increases in immigration, while other times it is 
not. This could also be a more significant influence than just cultural globalization itself. 
At least within the West, socioeconomic status and immigration seem to be key indicators 
for the outcome of whether nationalistic attitudes increase or decrease. In many ways, 
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these go together. If socioeconomic status is decreasing, then it is easier for politicians to 
use immigration to stoke fear and a reassertion of national identity. When people’s 
existential security is threatened, such as through unemployment or a declining economy, 
they are more likely to prioritize protecting themselves and their own people.  
Initial Regional Conclusions for the West 
 The regional focus on the West provided three cases for examination: Germany, 
Romania, and the United States. Germany ranked very high on the conditions and it 
recorded improvements on everything, albeit slower than average compared to the other 
cases. This is likely because it started out so strong, so it would require a much larger raw 
change to result in a significant percentage shift. Germany has incredibly high rates of 
immigration per capita, putting it alongside the United States and Jordan within this 
study. Despite having declined in cultural emancipative values, Germany remained with 
the highest level of cultural emancipative values. The decline could be the result of a 
sudden influx in immigrants, especially from dissimilar cultural groups. This influx may 
have increased people’s fears, making them less secure, and less likely to be open to 
cultural change. Germany does have the lowest rate of nationalistic attitudes, according 
the World Values Survey, among all cases in this study. It was the lowest on some of the 
indicators, but one of the highest or towards the middle, on others. Overall, Germany had 
a 14% increase in nationalistic attitudes, making it the second highest increase and only 
one of four countries with an increase at all. 
 Germany had an average increase in immigration, but with most coming from 
Syria and a sharp increase of African migrants for a couple of years starting in 2015. As a 
result, immigration was a significant topic in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Many 
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politicians utilized a “kill or be killed” type of rhetoric, which incited fear and made 
people to believe their options were to protect themselves or be welcoming to immigrants 
and refugees. Thus the 2017 election was largely seen as a victory for nationalism due to 
the success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the loss of seats for the other two 
major parties.  
 In Romania, the conditions were much more varied, but typically fell in the 
middle among the cases. Generally, conditions shifted in a positive direction from 1996 
to 2012, with the exception of equity, which actually declined. The expansion of the 
wealth gap may be tied to the rapid increase in socioeconomic status. As wealth 
increases, it often is not distributed evenly. Romania also had a 5% decline in cultural 
emancipative values, similar to Germany. Perhaps due to it slower socioeconomic status 
within Europe, Romania has a lower rate of immigration compared to many other cases 
in this study and certainly compared to the two other representatives from the West. 
Migrants tend to be drawn to countries where they see increased opportunities for their 
families through jobs and quality of life. The nationalistic attitudes, based on the World 
Values Survey, declined in Romania by roughly 12%, with a decline of every indicator, 
except one (where Romanians expressed less confidence in the UN). Despite a surge in 
immigration, political leaders urged calm and stressed that they could handle the 
refugees. Leaders stressed a comprehensive approach to immigration in order to avoid 
xenophobia and intolerance.  
 The United States was also varied on the conditions. Despite having the highest 
GDP per capita and strong numbers for life expectancy and infant mortality, the United 
States also had high unemployment. The United States did improve on all of the 
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conditions from 1996 to 2012, with the exception of unemployment. Overall, the United 
States had a low level of nationalistic attitudes, but there is evidence that it increased by 
6% when the group belonging indicator was included. This increase was generally 
supported by the campaign rhetoric and election results or, at the very least, was not 
refuted by it. Trump certainly utilized fear mongering to drum up support. His campaign 
launch framed immigrants as “rapists” and “criminals;” he regularly referenced recent 
killings of U.S. citizens by illegal immigrants; and he used the San Bernardino killing to 
support his plan to ban Muslim immigrants. He created a narrative in which many 
Americans felt they had to choose between protecting their own interests and having a 
welcoming, tolerant society. This is similar to the tactics utilized in Germany by some 
politicians, and to the shift that was seen there. 
 Both Germany and the United States increased in their nationalistic attitudes, 
while Romania declined. In Romania, there was improvement in socioeconomic status, 
which instills confidence in people and allows them to not feel as threatened by the 
presence of the “other.” Romania did not have significant increases in migration overall, 
but when they did experience a spike in Middle Eastern and African immigrants as other 
European Union countries closed their borders, politicians assured Romanians that they 
could handle it. Likely, the confidence that people already had due to the improving SES 
allowed them to hear this message and not respond to the temporary spike in immigration 
with nationalistic attitudes. In contrast, neither the United States nor Germany had 
significant improvements in socioeconomic status, but they did experience a spike in 
migration, particularly from the Middle East and Africa, in the case of Germany, and 
from Latin America in the United States. Also, in both cases, there were politicians who 
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utilized these spikes (along with any negative act committed by a migrant or anyone of 
Middle Eastern descent) to instill fear in people. They claimed that the migrants would 
take jobs from hard-working Americans or Germans, commit crimes, and potentially 
bring unwanted cultural changes. As the researcher delves into the remaining cases, it 
will be interesting to note whether this connection between SES, immigration, and the 
nationalistic attitudes holds true, as well as the role that political candidates play in 





CHAPTER VIII – MIDDLE EAST: TURKEY AND JORDAN 
This chapter takes a deep dive into the two case studies in this dissertation located 
in the Middle East – Turkey and Jordan. The researcher closely examines the conditions 
that were outlined in previous chapters to better understand what is occurring. She also 
strives to further understand the level of nationalism within the country by examining two 
areas beyond the World Values Survey – campaign rhetoric focusing on immigration and 
subsequent election results, respectively. Each case study begins with some basic 
background on the country, followed by an exploration of the conditions under 
consideration in terms of how that country compares to others in the study and what 
changes they have experienced from 1996 to 2012. The second section of each case study 
explores nationalism, first by re-visiting the World Values Survey questions, and then by 
discussing immigration, elections and the relationships between the two. In Turkey, 
campaign rhetoric and election results can be analyzed in a standard manner, but in 
Jordan, because the only body that the Jordanians elect is the House of Deputies, the 
analysis is more challenging. Instead, the researcher assesses rhetoric of the monarchy, as 
well as the overall support or lack thereof for the monarchy, as demonstrated by the 
election results for the House of Deputies. An exploration of these issues helps to paint a 
clearer picture of the overall nationalistic attitudes for each country. The researcher will 
then calibrate each condition and each outcome in order to prepare for the fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Chapter 10. The chapter concludes with some 






 Turkey is uniquely positioned in both Europe and Asia, but is also considered part 
of the Middle East. Geographically, only about 3% of Turkey is in Europe, while the 
remaining 97% is in Asia. Turkey has the 6th largest population among countries in this 
study and, with just under 80 million people, has nearly the same population as Germany. 
Turkey’s most populous city is Istanbul, which is considered the economic, cultural, and 
historic center, even though Ankara is the political capital. Istanbul is the only major city 
in the world to straddle two continents.  
 A majority of residents are Turkish (70-75%), while nearly 20% are Kurdish; the 
remaining 7-12% is comprised of other minorities (CIA 2020). Tensions between the 
Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority are ever-present and often emphasized in 
politics. These conflicts have also been tied to an increase in terrorist attacks. Nearly the 
entire country is Muslim, with less than half a percent identifying with other religions 
(CIA 2020). Some leaders have taken a highly secular approach, while others have tried 
to install an Islamic state.  
 Turkey is often associated with the Ottoman Empire, as modern Turkey was 
formed in 1923 from the defeated Ottoman Empire by Mustafa Kemal, who is largely 
considered the “father of the Turks” and thus known as Ataturk (CIA 2020). By 1950, 
Turkey had multiple political parties and the number of them continued to grow. Despite 
the establishment of a democratic political system, one increasingly illiberal in 
orientation since the start of the 21st century, Turkey has experienced periods of 
instability and military coups, most recently in 2016, where more than 240 people were 
killed and over 2,000 injured (CIA 2020). Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has served as 
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either Turkey’s Prime Minister or President since 2003, responded aggressively to the 
coup attempt by suppressing the opposition. During his rule, Turkey has experienced 
several terrorist attacks in both Ankara and Istanbul, in addition to the Kurdish 
southeastern region. As Kirisci and Sloat explained: 
The democratic and economic achievements of the AKP’s early years helped 
launch membership negotiations with the European Union (EU) and made Turkey 
a model for neighboring states undergoing reforms. However, this positive picture 
did not last long: Democratic gains eroded, economic growth stalled, EU 
accession ground to a halt, and relations with most neighbors grew acrimonious 
(2019) 
 
This backdrop is key in understanding some of the nationalistic attitudes demonstrated in 
Turkey, especially through the presidential campaign and elections.  
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the she thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic attitudes 
within a country. Table 50 shows all the data for Turkey for the present or the year 
closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the chart 
notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as what the 
change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred (both 
direction and extent).  
Table 50 Conditions Within Turkey 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank 
(among those 





GDP/capita 11720 (2012) 5th highest 284% increase from 
1996 (positive) 





Table 50 (continued).  
 Life Expectancy 74.7 (2012) 7th highest 11% increase from 
1996 (positive) 




GINI (Equality) GINI .42 (2012) 5th lowest 3% decrease 
(positive) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 
2% (2010) 5th lowest (3-
way tie) 





4% (2015) 7th lowest 144% increase from 
1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .32 (2012) 9th highest 1% decrease from 
1996 
Autonomy .43 (2012) 7th highest 12% increase from 
1996 
Equality .43 (2012) 9th highest 13% decrease from 
1996 
Choice .14 (2012) 9th highest 43% increase from 
1996 
Voice .27 (2012) 9th highest 12% decrease from 
1996 
 
Turkey ranks in the bottom half of the cases in this study for socio-economic 
status, but Ankara did improve on all indicators except unemployment, which was typical 
among the cases. Although Turkey remained in the bottom half of the cases, it still 
displayed some of the strongest growth between 1996 and 2012. Its GDP grew by 284%, 
which was the fourth highest after China, Nigeria, and Romania. Life expectancy grew 
11%, which was second only to Nigeria, and infant mortality dropped by 65%, which was 
just shy of the largest decline of 88% that was seen in China. However, at the same time 
as Turkey experienced these significant improvements, unemployment grew by 23%, 
which was the third highest expansion. Overall, percent shifts in Turkey were similar to 
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those in China: strong GDP growth, coupled with large increases in unemployment, but 
significant improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality.  
Unlike China, though, economic equality in Turkey, based on the GINI indicator, 
improved by 3%, but remained 5th among cases in this study. Turkey was one of only five 
cases to demonstrate improvement in equality, although it showed the smallest 
improvement amongst these. Immigration per population in 2010 was the 5th lowest, but 
was a three-way tie; by 2015, it was the 7th lowest, indicating that other countries saw 
slower increases in immigration than Turkey. Between 1995 and 2010, immigration rates 
only increased by 12%, which was the slowest rate of increase. Most countries were close 
to or over 100% in increases. Between 1995 and 2015, the increase was much starker at 
144%. This was the 6th highest increase. Notably, the increase from 2010 to 2015 was 
117% indicating that most of the growth in immigration from 1995 to 2015 occurred after 
2010. This aligns with the sociopolitical situation in the region during this period.   
Turkey remained among the lower half of the countries for cultural globalization, 
among those in this study, ranking 6th and 7th in 2012 and 2016, respectively. The 49% 
increase from 1995 to 2012 was significant; it was the third largest increase after Nigeria 
and China. However, there was no further expansion of cultural globalization between 
2012 and 2016; this was close to the average increase of 1%. Despite the relatively strong 
expansion in cultural globalization, cultural emancipative values hardly shifted; 
according to the world values survey questions, there was just a 1% decrease from 1996 
to 2012. (The cultural values were measured by the emancipative values indicators 
outlined by Wetzel (2013)). This is significantly different from the average 9% increase 
in cultural emancipative values; Turkey was the only country outside of Western Europe 
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to show a decline. This could be, in part, because of their leader’s (Erdogan) increasingly 
authoritarian approach, which limited freedoms. When one’s own freedoms are limited, 
they are less inclined to extend freedoms to others. Among the indicators that comprise 
cultural emancipative values, Turkey showed a lack of consistency. It increased on 
autonomy and choice. Generally, autonomy refers to the extent that one values 
independence, imagination, and obedience, while choice assesses views on 
homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. It declined in equality and voice; equality measures 
views on gender equality, while voice assesses how much say people think they should 
have over their community, jobs, and government, as well as freedom of speech. Overall, 
Turkey had one of the lowest scores on cultural emancipative values, ranking 9th out of 
11. On the individual indicators, it was 9th on three of the four. Although comparable data 
to assess where Turkey is at on cultural emancipative values in 2020 is not available, a 
recent article by Kirisci and Sloat, suggests that Turkey may have declined even further 
in emancipative values: 
On the domestic side, the country has a political culture that is willing to accept 
“big man” rule, feels less attached to core civil liberties associated with liberal 
democracy (such as freedom of expression and media), and has become more 
conservative and less tolerant of diversity. Erdoğan’s abandonment of inclusive 
politics in favor of exclusionary policies further aggravated Turkey’s societal 
polarization along conservative-religious and secular-progressive lines, 
complicating efforts to defend shared democratic values (2019, np). 
 
This generally aligns with what was demonstrated through the WVS in 2012. It is 
challenging to assess if what is demonstrated in political society (a decline in 




An explanation of the “big man rule” noted above may be useful here. Erdogan 
has expanded his dominance over Turkish politics since 2002, when he was first 
appointed Prime Minister. He served in that role until 2014, when he won the election for 
President. According to Goodman, Erdogan “has jailed journalists, seized the assets of 
political opponents and crushed dissent while amassing complete control over the levers 
of Turkish power. He has run the economy like a patronage network, lavishing credit on 
companies controlled by cronies, while yielding growth through debt” (2018). His 
spending bolstered the Turkish economy on the surface level, but eventually the bills had 
to be paid. In this situation, populist leaders tend to become more authoritarian and 
oppressive, which Erdogan has. In 2017, he pushed through a law that removed the Prime 
Minister position and gave him, as President, expanded powers (Kirisci and Sloat 2019). 
The researcher will discuss Erdogan at greater length in a later section, but a minimal 
understanding of the increasingly authoritarian regime that Erdogan has established is 
helpful in understanding shifts in emancipative values. Interestingly, overall, those values 
only shifted by 1% from 1996 to 2012. This could be reflective of the societal 
polarization that has resulted in a “net zero” change, so to speak.  
 Overall, Turkey demonstrated mediocre rankings on socioeconomic status, but 
also showed notable growth and improvement. Economic equality also rose. Immigration 
rates are very low in Turkey, but she experienced notable increases between 2010 and 
2015 and beyond. Perhaps tied to the expanding GDP, Turkey experienced a significant 
increase in cultural globalization, although it was still relatively low, comparatively. 
Perhaps the overall lower cultural globalization helps explain the very minimal shift in 
cultural values.  
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Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
As noted previously, the desired outcome in this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. (A desired outcome must be specified per the requirements of a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis approach.) In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher 
utilized results from the World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalistic 
attitudes. Table 51 outlines each question that was used in determining the nationalism 
score, along with the score for Turkey in 2012, and the changes since 1996. Overall, 
compared to the other 10 cases in this study, Turkey has one of the highest levels of 
nationalism. It is consistently among the highest for each of the indicators, with the 
exception of “group belonging,” where Turkey shows higher levels of identification with 
the world than most, resulting in a lower level of nationalistic attitudes. Despite 
remaining as one of the more nationalistic countries, there is evidence that Turkey 
declined in its nationalistic attitudes between 1996 and 2012, based solely on indicators 
from the World Values Survey. The researcher will delve into each indicator further 
below. 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .31 8th 12% decrease 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.71 5th  13% decrease 
National Pride .92 9th  3% increase 
Confidence in UN .57 9th 1% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.57 10th 6% increase (confidence increased) 
Identify with “world” .22 3rd Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .82 8th Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .52 3rd  17% decrease 
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Table 51 (continued).  
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.62 9th  4% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging) 
.60 10th  6% decrease 
 
Turkey ranked among the more nationalistic countries in this study for its views 
on having foreigners as neighbors. However, there was a 12% decrease, meaning Turkey 
displayed increased openness to foreign neighbors. Due to the timing of the Wave 6 
World Values Survey, the researcher questions whether this decrease would still be 
present if the questions were posed a few years later, allowing for the effects of the sharp 
increase in immigration between 2010 and 2018 to be felt. During this time period, 
millions of people from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan sought refuge in Turkey. By the end 
of 2015, over 2.5 million people sought asylum in Turkey and by 2018, 3.5 million 
people just from Syria had come to Turkey, displaced by the Civil War (IOM 2020). This 
rapid shift certainly impacted Turks, but, again, this would not have been reflected in the 
2012 WVS. The same question would apply to the viewpoint of the Turkish on 
prioritizing Turkish natives over foreigners if jobs are scarce. This was one of the 
indicators where Turkey demonstrated lower nationalistic attitudes (around the middle, 
among the cases). Similar to the question on foreign neighbors, there was a decline in 
nationalism for this indicator. However, there is additional evidence “post-2012” that a 
resistance to immigration developed. As Turkey accepted millions of migrants from 
Syria, many Turkish citizens were initially proud of the role they could play on the world 
stage; they were a country that was strong enough to welcome refugees. However, as the 
years went on, that pride waned. By 2018, people felt the strains that migration was 
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placing on society and they sought a solution that would reduce the number of migrants 
in the country already, as well are cut-back on new arrivals. (Sazak 2019).  
 National pride increased in Turkey from 1996 to 2012. Turkey had a very high 
level of national pride, ranking 9th among the cases in this study (11th presents the highest 
level of national pride and thus the highest level of nationalism). Perhaps in line with this, 
confidence in the Turkish government also increased, while confidence in the United 
Nations decreased slightly. Both of these shifts represented an increase in nationalistic 
attitudes, albeit a relatively small shift. However, as power in Turkey has increasingly 
solidified centrally and the crisis in the Middle East continued to expand, it is reasonable 
that people in Turkey began to increasingly put their confidence behind their own 
government and not behind an international body that they may have seen as 
exacerbating problems, such as immigration. In a crisis, there is a tendency to turn to 
your own populist, authoritarian leader to navigate your country through to the other side. 
 Despite Turks’ overall strong nationalistic attitudes and confidence in their own 
government, coupled with a lack of confidence in the United Nations, they demonstrate a 
strong identification with the “world,” ranking third among cases in this study. Perhaps 
this is an indication of Turkey’s unique geographic position as a bridge between Asia, 
Europe, and the Middle East, as well as its multi-decades long attempt to join the 
European Union, as outlined in the next section. Turks may see themselves as a “world 
player” and identifying with the “world” helps solidify that position. At the same time, 
and perhaps in line with the other indicators, Turks also show a strong identification with 
their own nation, which aligns with the increased confidence they have in their own 
government. As noted previously, a direct comparison between Wave 3 and Wave 6 is 
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challenging because of the way the questions shifted. However, based on the approach 
used by the researcher, as outlined in Chapter 4, there appears to be a 17% decrease in 
nationalistic attitudes in Turkey for the group belonging indicator. This means that 
Turkey generally shifted to stronger identification with the world than with their own 
nation. It ranked 3rd among the cases; Turkey shows the lowest levels of nationalistic 
attitudes on this indicator compared to others.  
 Overall, Turkey remained a nationalistic society, but it did show signs of 
decreasing nationalistic attitudes from 1996 to 2012. This is the case whether considering 
the overall score with or without the group belonging indicator.  Without the group 
belonging indicator, Turkey demonstrated a 4% decline and with that indicator, a 6% 
decline. The latter is the final indicator that we are using and represents a larger decrease 
than average. It represents the fifth largest decline in nationalistic attitudes. The potential 
impact of post-2015 immigration will be further explored in the next section. 
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 Survey results from the World Values Survey are only one indicator of 
nationalistic attitudes in Turkey, and they only represent viewpoints up to 2012. 
Especially in the Middle East and much of Europe, there have been significant changes 
since this time. The “Arab Spring” Uprising, which began in 2011, spawned some 
transitions to democracy, such as was the case in Tunisia, but also led to an 
intensification of authoritarian regimes in others, and full blown civil wars in Libya and 
Syria. This generally created instability in the region which, naturally affected Turkey, 
even though Ankara did not experience its own “Arab Spring.”  Many of these effects, 
though, set the stage for attitudes of Turkey’s citizens, as well as presidential elections. In 
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this section, the researcher will examine campaign rhetoric related to immigration, as one 
indicator of nationalistic attitudes, as well as the results of said elections in order to 
determine if the World Values Survey results present an accurate picture of the situation 
in Turkey.  
 Similarly to South Korea, Turkey had long been a country of outward migration. 
From the early 1960s through the 1970s, significant numbers of people from Turkey 
emigrated to Western Europe, with a nexus around West Germany. (This was outlined in 
Chapter 7 in the section on Germany.) However, in the late twentieth century, Turkey 
started to become a country of transit for migrants from Asian countries, particularly 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, who were attempting to reach the 
European Union countries. From 1988 to 1991, nearly half a million Kurdish refugees 
from Iraq fled to Turkey (Kirisci 2003). Migration into Turkey continued to rise into the 
21st century.  By the end of 2015, over 2.5 million people sought asylum or temporary 
refuge in Turkey. They primarily hailed from war-torn countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan (IOM 2020). That number continued to rise over the next few years. By 
2018, 3.5 million people, displaced by the Syrian war, had sought refuge in Turkey. 
Through migration and births, their numbers reached 1,000 per day (Kirisci, Brandt, and 
Erdogan 2018).  More than 95% of the Syrian migrants live in Turkey’s urban centers. 
For example, Kilis, a city near the Syrian border, has more Syrian refugees than Turkish 
residents (Kirisci, Brandt, and Erdogan 2018). Europe did not allow migrants to flow 
from Turkey into the European Union, largely leaving Turkey to address this crisis on 
their own. Many of the migrants who came were well-educated and competed for jobs 
against lower-skilled Turks (Goodman 2018).  
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The sudden influx in migrants led to challenges for Turkey in terms of 
humanitarian assistance, protections for migrants, and overall strategies. Now, Turkey 
needs an overarching national strategy and an international plan for sharing the migration 
burden (IOM 2020). Overall, local districts have made great strides in accommodating 
refugees by offering language courses, developing social support programs, and allowing 
some legal flexibility for Syrians to open businesses. In fact, a migration policy center 
has been established by the Marmara Municipalities Union, which includes almost 300 
local governments in Istanbul and the surrounding area. The center “enables its 
constituents to share best practices, coordinate refugee support activities, and develop 
evidence-based policies to promote integration” (Kirisci, Brandt, and Erdogan 2018). 
Despite the influx in immigration, the migrants have largely hailed from similar cultural 
regions as Turkey, which often leads to less resistance and fear regarding their arrival. On 
the other hand, these have often been immigrants with the highest levels of resource 
needs, having fled from devasting wars in their own countries; this can put a strain on the 
Turkish economy, influencing people’s acceptance of the migrants and overall 
immigration policies. People did begin to feel that strain and push back on the presence 
of migrants and their flow into the country.  
In addition to understanding the immigration backdrop, before delving into 
Turkey’s 2018 presidential election, it is imperative to understand the incumbent, 
Erodgan. He became president of Turkey 15 years prior to the 2018 elections, having run 
as a pro-European, moderate Islamist who supported democracy and economic 
liberalization (Gall 2018). However, over his decade and a half of rule, his philosophy 
was replaced by an ever more autocratic perspective. This approach intensified following 
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the 2016 coup attempt. Although all political parties agreed that the coup attempt was an 
attack on democracy, Erodgan seized the opportunity to repress opposition. He 
transformed the parliamentary system into one of centralized presidential power, 
removing many long-standing checks and balances (Kirisci and Sloat 2019). In 2017, he 
passed a referendum to abolish both the Prime Minister and several Council Ministers. 
This allowed him to expand the role of the President. At the same time, he established a 
Vice President position. After enacting these changes, he called for snap elections in 
2018, long before the planned November 2019 elections (IFES 2020). He claimed that 
elections were needed to strengthen Turkey’s government as it fought against Kurdish 
groups in Syria and Iraq. However, speculators believe he knew the economy was going 
to take a downward turn and he wanted to ensure the elections occurred before things 
worsened (Fahim 2018). These snap elections, which were the first time that Turks voted 
for the president and parliament at the same time, set the stage for this discussion of 
campaign rhetoric and election results.  
Finally, another key piece to understanding some of the campaign rhetoric and 
platforms is Turkey’s attempt to join the European Union (EU). Turkey submitted its 
formal request for membership into the EU in 1987. This request was rejected by the 
European Commission in 1989; the stated reason was a lack of true democracy. However, 
the Commission did confirm that Turkey was eligible for membership, even though it did 
not yet meet all of the requirements, unlike Morocco which was deemed to be ineligible. 
In 1996, Turkey entered the EU customs union, which led to economic integration, but in 
1997, the European Council noted that Turkey still did not meet the requirements for 
candidacy. However, two years later, the Council granted Turkey its candidacy, but 
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would not allow accession negotiations to move forward quite yet. Instead the 
Commission was instructed to monitor Turkey’s progress in achieving reforms; Turkey 
was provided with a list of reform recommendations. The review date was set for 
December 2004. This gave the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
which was elected in 2002, a roadmap (Tocci 2014). According to Goodman, “To win 
European favor, Turkey abolished notorious state security courts, elevated human rights 
and scrapped the death penalty” (2018, np). At the review, the Council determined that 
Turkey had met the criteria and accession talks could begin the next year. However, at 
that point, progress slowed significantly and halted entirely from 2010 to 2013 (Tocci 
2014). According to Goodman, Europe never fully accepted the idea of admitting a 
majority Muslim nation. Turkey became offended as other countries, such as Bulgaria 
and Romania, gained membership during this time period, despite widespread corruption 
in their states (2018). At this time, no one is certain about the future of Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union. No other country has taken more than a decade to reach 
membership after becoming a candidate; Turkey has been engaged in the process for over 
three decades. Ankara’s relationship with Europe provides a consistent backdrop for 
political campaigns and immigration policies, hence its importance in this research. 
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. Despite Erodgan’s tactics to shore-up power by 
repressing the opposition following the 2016 coup attempt, he did not have full support of 
the Turkish people. In fact, Gall (2018) noted that the parliament in 2018 was one of the 
most politically diverse in 35 years, representing the deep polarization of Turkey. There 
were starkly contrasting visions for the country. In the presidential election, Erodgan had 
several contenders, but the leading opposition candidate was Muharrem Ince of the 
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Republican People’s Party (CHP). Despite many overall differences, they did have a 
great deal in common in regard to immigration.  
Both President Erdogan and Ince committed during their campaigns to force 
millions of Syrian refugees back across the border. This resonated with many Turks who 
were concerned about the fast-growing numbers of Syrian refugees (Butler 2018). At the 
time of the election in summer 2018, there were 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
Many Turks feared that the migrants were causing an economic burden and threatening 
their jobs (Butler 2018). As previously noted, this sentiment did not come through in the 
2012 World Values Survey, which is why the survey data shows a decreased support for 
favoring Turks over foreigners for jobs.  
However, the International Crisis Group supported the notion that there was a 
growing resistance to immigrants. They warned of increased hostility towards the 
migrants, as well as a threefold increase in intercommunal violence. They noted that 
many Turks believe that Syrians were receiving preferential treatment and access to 
public services (Lerner 2018).  The Hrant Dink Foundation supported this, having found 
an increase in racism against Syrians; in 2017, Syrians were the second most targeted 
group, after Jewish people, for hate speech in print media. They also explained how the 
elections were likely to enhance the nationalist discourse and only expand discrimination 
against certain groups (Lerner 2018). Many Syrians expressed fears that Erdogan would 
use anti-Syrian rhetoric to win votes in the snap election. CHP party leaders did use this 
type of rhetoric. Kemal Kilicdaroglu had said that “some places, like hospitals in Turkey, 
where Turks are treated as second-class citizens because priority is given to Syrian 
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refugees. . . a Syrian is able to open a shop and be treated as a first-class citizen, but our 
citizens open a shop and pay taxes” (Lerner 2018). 
The fact that both main candidates made similar statements around forcing Syrian 
migrants home, highlights how commonly accepted this viewpoint was. Erdogan and 
Ince represented very different parties, but both of their constituents largely believed that 
the massive migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey was bad for Turkey. Previously 
Erdogan had allowed Syrian migrants to move back and forth freely over the border, but 
largely halted this practice in 2015 with new regulations, only allowing this movement 
during Ramadan (Lerner 2018). The shift in rhetoric may represent a nationalistic 
viewpoint or it could demonstrate a strain on society that Turks could no longer tolerate. 
Overall, Turkey is highly nationalistic compared to the other cases in this study, so this 
type of rhetoric aligns with that understanding and does not necessarily represent a shift 
in views.  
Election results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. Presidential 
elections were held on June 24, 2018. Erodgan, the incumbent representing the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) was challenged primarily by Muharrem Ince of the 
Republican Peoples Party (CHP), while additional candidates included Meral Aksener of 
the Good Party and Selahattin Demirtas of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). 
Erodgan won a decisive victory with over 52% of the vote, allowing him to avoid a run-
off election and to extend his 15-year rule. Ince came in second with nearly 31% of the 
vote (IFES 2020). Most commentators expected that Erodgan would be close to the 50% 
margin that he needed to secure an outright victory without a run-off. Nevertheless, 
Ince’s strong showing for the CHP was encouraging for many voters.  
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 Ince’s party is secularist, but he secured cross-party votes due to his pious 
background and ability to connect to religious people. Because he was formerly a physics 
teacher from a rural area, people viewed him as a “regular guy,” not one of the political 
elite. Ince established a platform built on hope. He contrasted this with Erdogan’s 
nationalist agenda, which blamed the West for Turkey’s economic problems, and focused 
on the threat of terrorism (Weise 2018). Ince framed this as creating a “society of fear,” 
while Ince’s “hope” platform emphasized democracy, rule of law, a stable economy, and 
greater freedoms (Weise 2018). He even visited the candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, for 
the main Kurdish Party, while in jail. He drew some accusations of sympathizing with 
terrorists, but his inclusive approach was attractive to Kurdish voters (Weise 2018). 
 On the political side, Ince stressed the need to bring back the parliamentary 
democracy in Turkey, end the state of emergency that Erdogan declared, allow for free 
speech of journalists, and, as previously noted, force Syrian refugees back to Syria 
(Shaheen 2018). He also proposed moving forward with Turkey’s accession negotiations 
to join the European Union, which had been stalled for many years. He claimed that 
Erdogan had slowly discarded the idea, even though he had been involved in the various 
reforms that allowed Turkey to reach candidacy. Ince noted that the youth of Turkey 
supported the potential for better employment opportunities and higher education options 
through European integration (Fahim 2018). In addition to appealing to the Kurds, Ince 
also gained some conservative support by emphasizing his own religious background and 
that his mother still wears a headscarf. (Shaheen 2018). Other than Ince’s support for 
forcing Syrian migrants to return to Syria, he largely put forth a more cosmopolitan 
perspective with European integration, a participatory democracy, and an inclusive 
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approach. This was in stark contrast to Erdogan’s plans which included strong nationalist 
rhetoric (Fahim 2018).  
 Thus, Erdogan’s re-election was a nod toward a country that favored a more 
nationalistic approach. As such, Erdogan is now likely to be Turkey’s longest-serving 
president after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey (Gall 2018). His 
victory came despite a failing economy during the previous year, which saw Turkey 
inherit its first debt and currency that declined in value. However, people likely voted for 
Erdogan because of nationalist tendencies and a confidence that he could carry them 
through the threats of the day. As noted, Erdogan had tightened his authoritarian rule, 
weakening governance structures of state institutions, harming the previously strong 
economy, and prioritizing nationalistic concerns in foreign policy decision making 
(Kirisci and Sloat 2019). In regard to the final point, according to Gall (2018), Turkish 
voters seem to have accepted the argument that a strong central government was the key 
to guarding against threats of terrorism. This argument aligns with Norris’ (2000, 2016) 
theory about strong, populist leaders. These leaders play into people’s fears about the 
unknown and weaken their existential security. Erdogan promised to protect people from 
the threat of terrorism and they were willing to give up many freedoms in exchange. A 
slight majority of the Turkish people decided they would prefer to hold up an 
authoritarian leader in times of uncertainty, rather than risk a new figure who could cause 
further disruption to their societal norms. Erdogan’s victory seems to imply support of 
nationalist attitudes. In addition, his reliance on the Nationalist Movement Party in order 
to secure a majority likely means that his policies will continue to be influenced by 
nationalist considerations (Gall 2018). 
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 Although there is strong support for Erdogan’s nationalistic approach, he still only 
received 52% of the votes. This indicates a strong polarization between those who 
support Erdogan and those who oppose him. Despite his control over the media and his 
ability to control the message, he still only squeaked by without having to go to a run-off 
election. This is a similar percentage victory that he received in 2014, so there is no 
indication of increased support for Erdogan and his policies. If anything, it may reflect a 
decrease in support given the crackdown on opposition parties, which may have sparked 
some level of voter suppression.  
 The World Values data shows a decrease in nationalistic attitudes. The election 
results and campaign rhetoric represent strong nationalistic attitudes. The question is 
whether those results and the rhetoric represent an increase in nationalistic attitudes or 
just a steady state of high levels of nationalism. Because Turkey is the second most 
nationalistic country among cases in this study, the researcher would expect election 
results to indicate high levels of nationalistic attitudes. As another way of explaining, a 
country could move from a 10 to a 9 on nationalism; this would mean the country still 
has strong nationalistic attitudes, but did decline slightly in these views. Erdogan was 
already the president, so his re-election does not necessarily represent a shift in any 
direction. In addition, the parliament that was elected at the same time represented the 
most diverse parliament in decades for Turkey. This could be an indication of varied 
viewpoints that do not necessarily favor Erdogan. As a result, the researcher is inclined to 
accept the World Values Survey results indicating a slight decline in nationalistic 




 Jordan represents the smallest population among cases in this study, with 
approximately 10 million people and a land size smaller than the U.S. state of Indiana. 
(The population is quickly rising, though, due to a net migration gain.) Despite its 
relatively smaller size, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is strategically located in the 
Middle East, bordering Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and the West Bank (European 
Forum 2020). Because of its location, Jordan has welcomed a large number of migrants. 
In 2015, they accepted over 3 million migrants, which was a rate of 35% compared to its 
population. Syrian refugees have been a significant source of migration in recent years. 
Between 2011 and 2018, over 670,000 Syrians sought asylum in Jordan (Roth 2018). As 
a result, less than 70% of the population is comprised of Jordanians, over 13% are Syrian, 
nearly 7% are Palestinian, and the rest predominately come from neighboring countries 
(CIA 2020). Most of the country is Muslim (97%), with a majority of the remaining 3% 
identifying as Christians. 
 A brief history of Jordan is useful in understanding some of its potential for 
nationalistic perspectives. Following the end of World War I, when the Ottoman Empire 
was dissolved, Britain was granted most of the Middle East to govern. They created a 
semi-autonomous region called Transjordan, which was cut from Palestine. In 1946, this 
area gained independence and became The Hasemite Kingdom of Jordan. Its ruler, King 
Hussein, had to navigate the powers of the United States, United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union, along with the surrounding Middle Eastern states. In the June 1967 Six 
Day War, Jordan lost the West Bank territory to Israel in a brief war, and in 1988, King 
Hussein officially released any claims to the territory. In 1994, Jordan signed a peace 
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agreement with Israel, becoming only the second Arab Muslim majority state with formal 
relations with the Jewish State (Egypt was first in 1979). (CIA 2020). 
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitudes within a country. Table 52 shows all the data for Jordan for the present or the 
year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the 
chart notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as what 
the change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred 
(both direction and extent).  
Table 52 Conditions Within Jordan 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 






GDP/capita 3871 (2012) 10th highest 164% increase from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 12.4 (2012) 10th lowest 11% decrease from 1996 
(positive) 
Life Expectancy 73.7 (2012) 9th highest 4% increase from 1996 
(positive) 
Infant Mortality 17 (2012) 9th lowest 34% decrease (positive) 
GINI (Equality) GINI .337(2012) 3rd lowest 7% decrease (positive) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 




34% (2015) 11th lowest 102% increase from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 
59.2 (2012) 9th highest 0% change from 1996 
CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 




Overall .24 (2012) 11th highest 9% increase from 1996 
Autonomy .34 (2012) 10th highest 25% increase from 1996 
Equality .34 (2012) 11th highest 12% increase from 1996 
Choice .12 (2012) 11th highest 22% increase from 1996 




 In Jordan, the socioeconomic status is among the lowest in this study. It ranked 9th 
or 10th for each indicator. However, Jordan did experience positive increases on all four 
indicators. The increase in GDP was not as remarkable as it was in Turkey, and Jordan 
was around the middle among the cases. However, it was one of only four countries with 
declining unemployment. The life expectancy increase was on par with others, while the 
infant mortality decline was the 8th smallest. One of those with a weaker decline was the 
United States, which already had a relatively low infant mortality rate. Despite a lower 
socioeconomic status, Jordan ranks 3rd on economic equality and it was one of four 
countries to show improvement between 1996 and 2012.  
 One of the most notable statistics for the conditions within Jordan is the rate of 
immigration as a percentage of population. The rate was 38% in 2010 and 34% in 2015. 
This is by far the highest rate of immigration and more than twice as much as the next 
two countries, the United States and Germany. Both increases in the rates (from 1995 to 
2010 and 1995 to 2015) were below average, but that was anticipated because the rates 
started so high. Although the immigration percentage dropped from 38% to 34% between 
2010 and 2015, the sheer number of immigrants did increase by 14%. The discrepancy is 
due to a net migration gain. The population of Jordan was larger, so even an increase in 
the number of migrants did not increase the percentage, compared to the overall 
population. The increase in migration, and the overall extremely high percentage, is a 
result of geopolitical circumstances in the region, most notably civil wars in neighboring 
countries, which will be further outlined in the next section. 
 Despite the incredibly high rate of immigration to Jordan, cultural globalization 
was one of the lowest in 2012 and, remarkably, was the same rate as it was in 1996. 
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However, from 2012 to 2016, cultural globalization increased by 15% and Jordan 
climbed three spots to be close to the middle among cases in this study. This was by far 
the highest spike in that four-year period and was only one of two cases to see a double-
digit increase. Perhaps the type of immigration during this period shifted, allowing for 
further cultural globalization and connections to form. Although Jordan did not 
experience any change in cultural globalization from 1996 to 2012, cultural emancipative 
values still increased by 9%. This may have set the stage for an openness to cultural 
globalization in the years following. There is a “chicken or the egg” argument at play 
though: does cultural globalization lead to a change in cultural values or does a shift in 
cultural values lead to an openness to globalization? Interestingly, Jordan increased on 
three of the four indicators for emancipative values, but declined significantly (23%) on 
“voice”, which measures how much people value freedom of speech and having a say in 
their own lives. Despite an average overall increase in emancipative values, Jordan still 
had the lowest level among cases in this study. This aligns with many theories on 
existential security and emancipative values. With Jordan demonstrating low levels of 
socioeconomic status and incredibly high rates of immigration, a substantial amount of 
uncertainty is generated. As a result, people are less likely to be open to valuing 
freedoms, such as imagination, sexual orientation, gender equality, and freedom of 
speech.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes 
The situation in Jordan is similar to that of Turkey in terms of nationalistic 
attitudes, according to World Values Survey questions. Jordan is even more nationalistic 
though, ranking as the country with the strongest nationalistic attitudes among all cases in 
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this study. Table 53 outlines each question that was used in determining the nationalistic 
attitudes score, along with the score for Jordan in 2012, and the percentage change since 
1996. Jordan is consistently among the highest for each of the indicators, without 
exception. Additionally, there is notable evidence that nationalistic attitudes increased in 
Jordan from 1996 to 2012, although it is a mix of increases and decreases for each 
indicator. The researcher will discuss each indicator further below. 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = 
less nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .37 9th 7% decrease 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.95 11th  0% change 
National Pride .94 11th 6% increase 




.55 9th  29% decrease (confidence 
decreased) 
Identify with “world” .43 11th Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .83 10th  Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .63 11th  100% increase (because started at 
0 in 1996) 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.73 11th  0% change 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.71 11th 21% increase 
 
 When asked their opinions on having foreign neighbors, people in Jordan did not 
view this favorably compared to other countries; Jordan ranked 9th. However, there did 
appear to be some increased openness to having foreign neighbors, as there was a 7% 
decrease in nationalistic attitudes for this indicator. On a related question, whether people 
think Jordan natives should receive priority over foreigners if jobs are scarce, people 
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strongly favored this, putting Jordan as the most nationalistic. However, this largely 
paralleled people’s viewpoints in 1996, resulting in essentially no change. A consistent 
viewpoint on prioritizing Jordan nationals is expected given the incredibly high rates of 
immigration in Jordan, which have been in place for the entire time period of this study.  
 Jordan had the highest level of national pride in 2012 and experienced a 6% 
increase on this indicator since 1996. Interestingly, though, during the same time period, 
confidence in their own government and in the United Nations (UN) decreased for 
Jordanians. The declining confidence in the UN represents an increase in nationalistic 
attitudes, while the decline in confidence in one’s own government represents a decrease 
in nationalistic attitudes. Nevertheless, Jordan ranked as the most nationalistic in terms of 
national pride and lack of confidence in the UN, and 9th for confidence in their own 
government (high confidence). The declines in confidence in the UN and national 
government were significant, 22% and 29% respectively. This may represent some 
instability during this time period, leading to a lack of confidence in all institutional 
mechanisms.  
The group belonging indicator provides interesting data for Jordan. In Wave 3, 
Jordan was the least nationalistic for group belonging. Jordanians identified more 
strongly with the “world” than any other case in this study and they identified the least 
with their nation. Based on the system used to provide an overall score for Wave 3, this 
put Jordan at “0,” the lowest possible score for nationalistic attitudes. By 2012, 
Jordanians had greatly increased their identification with their nation and the other cases 
under consideration in this dissertation surpassed Jordan in their identification with the 
world. Jordan went from being the least nationalistic on this indicator to being the most 
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nationalistic. This represented a 100% increase because it started at 0. It is hard to 
pinpoint the exact reason for this shift, but it may be attributed to the increases in 
immigration. As people are faced with increasing pressures from the outside, they are 
likely to turn inward, perhaps elevating their sense of national identity. However, it could 
also be attributed to a generational shift. Jordan only became an independent nation in 
1946. Some of the older generation in 1996 may have still embraced more of a global 
identification, given some of the fluid shifts in territories and such. By 2012, most 
generations were more solidified in their national orientation. 
Whether the researcher includes the group belonging score or not, Jordan is the 
case with the highest level of nationalistic attitudes. When the group belonging score is 
excluded, there no evidence of any change in nationalistic attitudes in Jordan. However, 
when the group belonging score is included, then there is a 21% increase in nationalistic 
attitudes. Obviously, this is due to the sharp shift toward greater identification with the 
nation of Jordan. An overall 21% increase is, by far, the largest jump; the second highest 
is Germany at a 14% increase. Because this increase is solely attributed to the inclusion 
of one indicator, the researcher is hesitant to assume that nationalistic attitudes increased 
by such a large percentage. Additional research on elections and rhetoric around 
immigration will be helpful in affirming or adjusting this conclusion.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 Survey results alone are not sufficient to determine whether a country is shifting 
towards or away from nationalistic attitudes. Additional indicators must be taken into 
consideration. In Turkey, as well as several other cases within this study, the researcher 
closely examined major elections, analyzing both campaign rhetoric around immigration, 
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as well as the outcome. However, in Jordan, much like in China, an analysis of elections 
is not as straightforward. There is no presidential or prime ministerial election, where the 
researcher can compare just a few candidates. The only election where the people directly 
elect candidates is for the House of Deputies. Because this type of election involves so 
many candidates (130 candidates are selected) and most do not run as part of a political 
party, it is challenging to analyze the campaign rhetoric or nationalistic views of those 
running for office. Thus, in this section, the researcher will explore the overall 
immigration situation, the political system, and some shifts in the rhetoric and stances of 
King Abdullah, the leader of Jordan.   
 As noted previously, Jordan has the highest level of immigration per population 
of any country in this study – more than double the percentage of the United States or 
Germany, the countries with the next highest immigration rates. Immigration rates in 
Jordan have increased since 1996, but at a slower rate than many other countries. 
However, it did see a significant jump between 2010 and 2015, largely as a result of the 
Syrian intra-state conflict. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), between 2011 and 2018, over 670,000 Syrians sought refuge in 
Jordan. In total, more than 85% of Syrians in Jordan lived outside of refugee camps (Roth 
2018). 
 In order to understand any response to immigration in Jordan, it is imperative to 
first understand the political system. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy in which the 
King wields near absolute power. Since Hussein bin Talal became King of Jordan in 
1952, democratic institutions were introduced. After his death in 1999, Hussein’s oldest 
son, Abdullah, succeeded him. Despite some democratic institutions, the King still holds 
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the power. He appoints a Prime Minister, as well as the Senate. Although the House of 
Deputies is elected by the people, the King can dissolve it at any time. The monarch is 
not even required to appoint a Prime Minister. The King signs all laws, appoints judges 
(and can dismiss them), approves constitutional amendments, declares war, and overseas 
the armed forces (European Forum 2020). For these reasons, the actions and rhetoric of 
King Abdullah carry tremendous weight, but do not necessarily reflect the views of 
ordinary citizens.  
 The Prime Minister during the most recent House of Deputies elections in 2016 
was Hani-Al Mulki. He became Prime Minister in 2016, but when he introduced a new 
tax law in May 2018, major protests erupted throughout the country and he was forced to 
resign. King Abdullah then appointed Omar al-Razzaz, the former Education Minister, as 
the new Prime Minister (European Forum 2020).  
 As noted, the Senate is appointed by the monarchy, but they also advise the House 
of Deputies on general policies. Technically, the two houses can curb the King’s powers 
to some degree, but this is tenured by the fact that the King can dissolve the House of 
Deputies at any time. However, the Senate is generally respected by the people and has a 
significant influence on the public domain (European Forum 2020). The House of 
Deputies is the only political group that is directly elected by Jordanian citizens. Of the 
130 seats, 9 are set aside for Christian candidates, 3 for Jordanians of Chechen or 
Circassian descent, and 15 for women. The House of Deputies can approve, reject, or 
amend legislation, but it cannot put forth new legislation or laws. Most representatives 
are not affiliated with any political party, again making an analysis of election results a 
challenge. Even when there are political parties, they are typically formed around tribal 
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and familiar ties rather than political viewpoints (European Forum 2020). Proper 
campaigning is a challenge, especially for opposition parties. Some reforms in 2016 made 
elections fairer and freer, but most candidates elected were loyal to the government 
(European Forum 2020). The 2016 Election Law replaced the one-person-one-vote 
system with a list-based system that encouraged political parties. However, the new 
system favored the sparsely populated East Bank over heavily populated cities, where 
Islamic strongholds exist (European Forum 2020). 
 King Abdullah has continued his father’s tradition of maintaining a pro-Western 
stance, keeping close relationships to the United States and United Kingdom, and signing 
a non-aggression pact with Israel (European Forum 2020). Jordan has also experienced a 
marked increase in protests and unrests, with people rising up against prices, corruption, 
and unemployment. They have demanded true constitutional reform, with some groups 
calling for gender equality (European Forum 2020).  
Jordan’s Response to Immigration. Between 2016 and 2020, there was a 
combination of rhetoric and actions that could be viewed as inclusive of immigrants and 
some that could be viewed as anti-immigrant. In 2017, the Prime Minister at the time, Al-
Mulki, in reference to the bread subsidy that Jordan provides, indicated that refugees and 
immigrants were benefiting from Jordanian citizens’ hard work because they also receive 
the subsidy. He noted that immigrants make up a third of the population (Roya News 
2017). This type of rhetoric sets up an “us vs. them” mentality and positions immigrants 
as the enemies who are freeloading off of native Jordanians.  
 Overall, there is not a great deal of evidence of this type of rhetoric in Jordan. 
However, in 2016, King Abdullah explained to his European counterparts that Jordan was 
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at its “boiling point” because of the influx of Syrian refugees. He explained that Jordan 
had welcomed refugees for decades – from Palestine, Iraq, and Syrian. He emphasized 
how open they have been by noting that Syrian refugees comprised nearly 20% of 
Jordan’s population at that temporal juncture. However, he explained that their schools, 
healthcare system, and job market were all under great strain and could no longer support 
a continued flow of migrants into the country (Doucet 2016). He believed that the 
Europeans may be able to be empathize with his situation, as they, too, have had 
significant increases in refugees at levels not seen for decades. He thinks the European 
countries understand that they must help Jordan deal with this crisis or the refugees will 
have to pass through to the European countries.  
Jordan did slow the flow in 2018 by not allowing Syrians to enter the country to 
seek asylum, but they made an exception for roughly 400 Syrian “White Helmet” rescue 
workers who were allowed, along with their dependents, to wait in Jordan for 
resettlement in a third country (Roth 2018). In 2019, Macaron reported that “the 
Jordanian government is advancing a nationalist agenda by cracking down on illegal 
immigration; . . . 6,000 foreign workers were deported in the past five months” (2019, 
np).  
 Despite the concerns that King Abdullah expressed on behalf of his country and 
some of the actions that his government took, Jordan also took some steps to create a 
more welcoming environment for refugees. In March 2018, the government regularized 
the status of many Syrian refugees who had been living outside of camps without 
permits, proving them with protection from arrest and allowing them access to jobs, aid, 
and education (Roth 2018).That same year, they continued the Jordan Compact, which 
 
261 
was designed to improve the lives of Syrian refugees by providing additional work 
opportunities and improvements to education. Despite this, many professions were “off 
limits” to non-Jordanians and many Syrians continued to work in the informal realm 
without protections (Roth 2018). Nevertheless, Jordan had been very generous in 
welcoming migrants for decades.  
Overall, Jordan was truly reaching a limit on the number of refugees that they 
could accommodate. Because the immigration rate was so high (more than 30%), it is 
hard to attribute any resistance to additional migrants as being indicative of nationalistic 
attitudes. In this case, it seems to truly be about the actual resources available. There is 
not much evidence of highly charged rhetoric against migrants or a utilization of migrants 
to instill fear in people.  
Parliamentary Elections. Elections cannot be analyzed in the same fashion as they 
are for most other cases in this study because there are no presidential elections and 
political parties are not significant in Jordanian parliamentary elections. In the 2016 
parliamentary elections, most candidates ran as independents. Of the 130 seats available, 
the main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, earned 10 seats, while five other 
parties secured a collective 32 seats. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) made its return 
during this election and is considered to be the political arm of Jordan’s Muslim 
Brotherhood and the main political opposition to the current monarchy. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was founded in 1946. Their core goal was to 
revive Islamic values and education in Jordan. They have also focused on their support 
for Palestine. Although the Muslim Brotherhood had a strong relationship with the 
monarchy in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, it weakened in the 1980s when the Brotherhood 
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started criticizing the monarchy for corruption, immorality, and a lack of respect for 
religious life (Muslim Brotherhood 2020). Their comeback left fears in their secular 
revivals who were concerned about the revival of Islamism. In response, secularists 
increased calls for the separation of politics and religion (European Forum 2020).  In all, 
according to the European Forum, “the percentage of government critics in this 
parliament is lower than in the previous” (2020). Most of the 130 candidates elected to 
the House of Deputies were loyal to the government. 
 In assessing the response to immigration and, to a small degree the level of 
support for the current monarchy, there is no strong evidence of shifting nationalistic 
viewpoints. The World Values Survey results demonstrated a strong increase in 
nationalistic values (21%), but only when incorporating the question about group 
belonging. That means that people showed a strong shift towards greater identification 
with their own nation and less identification with the world. These results, though, were 
based on a 2012 survey, which means they predated the most significant increases in 
immigration, post-2015. However, if those shifts towards even greater nationalism were 
there, then King Abdullah’s recognition that his people were at a breaking point in terms 
of their tolerance of such high levels of migration in Jordan makes sense. Because there is 
a lack of evidence to refute the idea of increasing nationalistic viewpoints, and there is 
some support given Jordan’s expression of intolerance for continuing to accept such high 




Calibration and Initial Conclusions 
 In this section, the researcher explains the calibration of the conditions and 
outcome in preparation for the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. She then 
provides some initial conclusions about Turkey and Jordan, based on the case studies.  
Calibration of the conditions and outcome to prepare for the truth table 
As noted in the previous chapters, the calibration process assigns a number to 
each variable, allowing the researcher to ultimately conduct the fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA). The fuzzy set approach allows for nuance within each 
variable, rather than a strict “in the group” or “out of the group” approach, as the crisp set 
QCA dictates. Appendix F provides the results of the calibration for the conditions and 
outcomes for Wave 6 for all cases, while Appendix G does the same for the changes from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6. A key provides the cut off points for each level of calibration. 
However, in all instances, the following key was utilized: 0 is fully out; .25 is more out 
than in; .5 is neither in nor out; .75 is more in than out; and 1 is fully in. This refers to 
whether or not that case is in or out of the set of cases represented by the variable noted, 
such as a high socioeconomic status or a significant increase in cultural globalization. 
Tables 54 and 55 below provide the calibration for the Middle East – Turkey and Jordan. 
A brief analysis follows.  


















Turkey 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 
Jordan 0.25 1 1.00 0.25 0 1.00 





































0.75 0.75 0 1.00 0.75 
Jordan 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0 
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
For the steady state of Wave 6, Turkey and Jordan are similar, hitting at the same 
or only one calibration difference for all indicators except immigration. Both countries 
are more out of the group of high socioeconomic status, fully in or mostly in the group of 
strong equality, more out of the group for high cultural globalization, more out or fully 
out for high cultural emancipative values, and more in or fully in the group for high 
levels of nationalistic attitudes. On immigration, it is no surprise that Jordan is fully in the 
group with high levels of immigration and Turkey is more out than in that group.  
There is greater differentiation among the shifts from Wave 3 to Wave 6. The 
only similarity is improvements in socioeconomic status, where both countries were more 
in the group for significant improvements. Jordan was also more in the group for strong 
improvements in equity, while Turkey was mostly out of this group. The inverse was true 
for significant increases in immigration. Jordan was fully out of the group for significant 
increases in cultural globalization (although we know there was a strong increase post-
2012), while Turkey was more in than out. Turkey was fully out of the group for 
significant increases in emancipative values, while Jordan was more in this group. 
Overall, Turkey was in the group for decreasing nationalism, while Jordan was out of the 
group. Obviously, Jordan was also out of the group for significant decreases in 
nationalism, while Turkey was more in than out of that group. 
 
265 
 While is it interesting to see the calibration, the fuzzy set QCA truth table analysis 
in Chapter 10 will provide more insights. For now, the researcher will assess how each 
indicator aligns with the hypothesis. Table 56 below represents the hypothesis that 
significant socioeconomic status improvements, improved equality, decreasing 
immigration (or slower than average increase or increasing, but from similar cultural 
group), slower increases in cultural globalization, and slower changes in cultural values 
will lead to significant decreases in nationalistic attitudes.  


























Turkey YES X X    X YES YES YES 
Jordan YES YES YES   YES X X X 
*or slower than avg increase or increasing, but from same cultural group 
In this chart, a “YES” indicates that the case meets the criteria listed (more in the 
group or fully in the group) and an “X” means it does not (more out of the group or fully 
out of the group). The researcher has highlighted yellow where there is alignment. In 
Turkey, this involves highlighting all the “YES” boxes because the outcome (significant 
decrease in nationalism) was a “YES.” For Jordan, this entailed highlighting all of the 
“X” boxes because the outcome lacked a significant decrease in nationalism (in this case, 
no decrease). There is not strong alignment between the conditions and the outcome for 
these two cases. Slower changes in cultural values is the only condition that aligns as 
anticipated for both cases, while significant improvements in socioeconomic status also 
aligns in Turkey. Chapter 10, the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, will allow 
the researcher to discern more holistically what the connections are between these 
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conditions and the outcomes. Perhaps the Middle East is an outlier or perhaps there are 
some additional factors at play.   
Initial Regional Conclusions for the Middle East 
 Turkey and Jordan represent the Middle East as two diverse cases. Turkey is 
uniquely situated as a bridge between Europe and Asia and it houses the only major city 
in the world that bridges two continents. Jordan, meanwhile, is centrally located within 
the Middle East, bordering major players such as Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the 
Palestinian Gaza Strip and West Bank, and Iraq. The two countries are very similar on 
many of the indicators that the researcher anticipated may impact nationalism. They both 
have low socioeconomic status, strong equality, low emancipative values, and high levels 
of nationalistic attitudes. Turkey has low levels of immigration and an average level of 
cultural globalization. Jordan has the highest levels of immigration per population and a 
low level of cultural globalization. Immigration has been a key issue for both countries as 
they both accepted significant numbers of refugees from Syria. Jordan has long 
welcomed refugees from neighboring war-torn countries. Turkey has commonly been a 
place of “through migration” for migrants seeking to reach Europe from the Middle East, 
but thousands of migrants become “stuck” in Turkey in recent years, as Syrian 
immigrants flowed into the country.  
 In terms of shifts on the indicators, Turkey and Jordan experienced fewer 
significant improvements in economic growth and development than some regions. 
Turkey had strong increases in socioeconomic status, while Jordan showed significant 
improvements in an already strong GINI indicator for equality. Jordan had very little 
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change in cultural globalization. Turkey had a decline in emancipative values. In the end, 
Turkey declined in nationalistic attitudes, while Jordan showed significant increases.  
 Because the levels of nationalistic attitudes are so high in both Turkey and Jordan, 
it can be easy to confuse this with an increase in nationalism. Similarly, with the strong 
nationalistic rhetoric in the campaigns in Germany and the United States, it was easy to 
forget how low the overall levels of nationalism were. Turkey and Jordan have both 
grappled with the repercussions of conflicts in the Middle East. While Jordan has been 
very welcoming of refugees, the monarchy acknowledges that the heavy influx, in 
addition to already high rates of immigration, is straining social systems. This does not 
necessarily represent an increase in nationalistic attitudes, as it was perhaps a result of the 
realities of infrastructure. There is little evidence that the monarchy resisted additional 
immigration because of pre-conceived notions of the “other,” but rather the resistance 
spawned from legitimate strains on educational and health systems. Still, overall, the 
World Values Survey did represent a significant increase in nationalistic attitudes in 
Jordan. This was largely attributed to a shift in identification towards the “nation” and 
away from the “world.” In Turkey, the World Values Survey showed a slight decline, 
prior to the influx of Syrian refugees, in nationalistic attitudes.  
  In Turkey, there is increased polarization. As Erdogan has squashed many 
democratic ideals and pro-democracy critics by granting himself increased power and 
suppressing the media, some people have been drawn to him as a populist leader who can 
lead them through the threats of today, including terrorism and an impeding economic 
disaster that he created. Turkish citizens were also reaching their “breaking point” so to 
speak in their willingness to accept refugees, notably from Syria. Although originally 
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proud of the role they could play on the international stage, as the numbers of migrants 
arriving continued to increase, people began to feel the strains. Erdogan seized on this 
opportunity and capitalized on a platform, in part, of forcing migrants to return home. 
However, the main opposition candidate, Ince, gained significant support with his 
message of hope, increased freedoms, and reinvigorating the stalled accession talks with 
the European Union. The fact that Erdogan only received a slight majority, even with his 
control over the media, and that the parliament that people elected was the most diverse 
in decades, demonstrates that there is significant support for a more global outlook for 
Turkey. This aligns with Turkey’s strong growth in socioeconomic status, along with an 
overall average increase in immigration. There are some existential threats with multiple 
terrorist attacks having occurred throughout the country and a sharp influx in migrants, 
but overall, Turkey is on a positive trajectory. This allows people to decrease in their 
nationalistic attitudes.  
 In Jordan, on the other hand, there is not such a clear divide. The monarchy 
retains full control and there were fewer government critics elected to the parliament 
recently than in previous elections, demonstrating continued support. Although Jordan 
has high levels of emigration, for decades, it has also been a country of heavy 
immigration. Nearly 30% of the country is comprised of immigrants. Perhaps having a 
monarch and so much immigration has caused people to exhibit high levels of 
nationalistic attitudes. Although the increase in immigration does seem to have caused a 
true strain on society, the fact that a country that has been so welcoming to immigrants 
for decades is now saying that they can no longer continue to accept such high numbers 
of migrants could be indicative of increased nationalistic attitudes. The lack of significant 
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growth in socioeconomic status could also support this. If people do not see 
improvements in their own lives, they may feel more defensive of protecting the 
resources that they do have from any “outsiders.”  
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CHAPTER IX  - AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA AND NIGERIA 
This chapter examines the two case studies in this dissertation located in Sub-
Saharan Africa – South Africa and Nigeria. The researcher closely examines the 
conditions that were outlined in previous chapters to better understand what is occurring. 
She also strives to further understand the level of nationalism within the country by 
examining two areas beyond the World Values Survey – campaign rhetoric focusing on 
immigration and subsequent election results, respectively. Each case study begins with 
some basic background on the country, followed by an exploration of the conditions 
under consideration in terms of how that country compares to others in the study and 
what changes they have experienced from 1996 to 2012. The second section of each case 
study explores nationalism, first by re-visiting the World Values Survey questions, and 
then by focusing in depth on immigration and elections. In South Africa, the campaign 
rhetoric and election results can be analyzed in a standard manner. In Nigeria, however, 
the analysis proves more challenging, as there is very little evidence to support views on 
immigration or overall “nation first” platforms. The researcher took this lack of evidence 
as an indicator that these issues were not at the forefront and, thus, there was no support 
for a nationalistic ideology. An exploration of these issues helps to paint a clearer and 
more robust picture of the overall nationalistic attitudes for each country. The researcher 
will then calibrate each condition and each outcome in order to prepare for the fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Chapter 10. The chapter concludes with some 






Positioned at the southern tip of the continent, South Africa’s population is over 
50 million, similar in population numbers to South Korea. Despite being larger in size 
than Nigeria, its population is a third the size.  The country is primarily Christian (86%), 
with traditional African religions and “no religion” each representing 5% of the 
population, and Muslims and other religions each representing less than 2%. The majority 
of the population is black African (81%), while colored and white residents comprise 8% 
to 9% each, and influxes in Indian and Asian people represent a collective 2.5%. 
South Africa is unique within sub-Saharan Africa. The researcher still remembers 
when she was in Cameroon doing her student teaching. Her host family asked why she 
chose Cameroon. She explained that she really wanted to do her student teaching in 
Africa and the only options were Cameroon or South Africa. The family immediately 
responded, “oh, yeah, South Africa isn’t really Africa.” There was a sense of South 
Africa being “different” from the rest of the continent. This is likely due to its system of 
apartheid that lasted until 1994, as well as its relatively strong economy compared to 
those of other countries in the region. As a result, South Africa has the highest level of 
Western influence and the largest population per capita of Western and Asian migrants. 
In addition, it boasts a strong tourism industry.  
However, South Africa also has very deep societal struggles. Its unemployment 
rate is incredibly high (around 1 in 4 South Africans are unemployed), inequality is 
rampant (the worse among cases in this study), some of the major cities experience high 
rates of crime, there are extremely high rates of HIV/Aids, and there have been several 
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episodes of xenophobia violence aimed at African migrants which have embarrassed the 
country. Many attribute these struggles to the long-standing practice of apartheid.  
Apartheid is an important concept to understand before delving further into this 
case study. At its basic level, apartheid is a system of segregation or discrimination based 
on race. Although not formalized until 1950, the premise for apartheid dates back to the 
1913 Land Act, which began the separation of black Africans, forcing them to live in 
reserves and not allowing them to be sharecroppers. An opposition group was formed in 
response to this Land Act; that group later became the African National Congress (ANC), 
the party which would become the first ruling party post-apartheid, with Nelson Mandela 
as its president.  Over 30 years after the Land Act was passed, in 1948, the Afrikaner 
National Party won the general election on a platform of “apartheid.” They further 
separated the white minority from the non-white majority and separated non-whites from 
one another as a way to minimize their power. In 1950, further apartheid laws went into 
effect, including a ban on marriages between whites and other citizens, as well as a 
system to classify every South African by race, including black Africans, colored, white, 
and Asian. In addition, more than 80% of land was designated for the white minority. 
Non-white South Africans were forcibly removed from their homes, their land was sold 
at a fraction of its worth to white South Africans, and they were placed in designated 
areas where poverty was rampant. 
The system of apartheid regularly came under criticism from other African 
countries and the rest of the world, especially later into the twentieth century. In 1991, 
President F.W. de Klerk began to repeal much of the apartheid legislation. He worked 
closely with Nelson Mandela, an activist who was in prison for 27 years for his efforts to 
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combat apartheid, and they developed a new constitution. In 1994, the ANC, led by 
Mandela, won the election and the first non-white government took power. Because of 
South Africa’s vast diversity, the image of a Rainbow Nation was evoked to represent the 
multiracial society (Larson 2019; History.com 2020). 
Shortly after Mandela took office, the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
was formed in South Africa to investigate human rights abuses that occurred during 
apartheid from 1960 to 1994, including abductions, killings, and torture. It covered 
abuses by the state and the liberation movements and could involve institutions or 
individuals. Notably, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was permitted to grant 
amnesty to perpetrators who confessed their crimes fully. This was controversial, as 
many felt that very few people were held accountable for the abuses they orchestrated. In 
the end, the Commission made recommendations for reparations that should be paid to 
victims, as well as some adjustments to civil and political society in South Africa (Daley 
1997).  
The system of apartheid left most non-whites at a significant disadvantage, even 
when apartheid ended. They had been placed in extreme poverty, with no means to get 
out. Ending a decades-long system is not like “flipping a switch;” it takes generations for 
a country to recover. This is likely a cause of South Africa’s continued high 
unemployment rate, crime, corruption, and lingering xenophobia. This background in 
South Africa presents a unique setting for the exploration of conditions that may impact 





Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitudes within a country. Table 57 shows all the data for South Africa for the present or 
the year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, 
the chart notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as 
what the change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred 
(both direction and extent).  
Table 57 Conditions Within South Africa 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank (among 






GDP/capita  7478 (2012) 8th highest 117% increase from 1996 
(positive) 
Unemployment 24.7 (2012) 11th lowest 1% decrease from 1996 
(positive) 
Life Expectancy 58.5 (2012) 10th highest 3% decrease from 1996 
(negative) 
Infant Mortality 36.1 (2012) 10th lowest  25% decrease (positive) 
GINI (Equality) GINI 63.2 (2012) 11th lowest 4% increase (negative)  
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 




6% (2015) 8th lowest 213% increase from 1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 
59.2 (2012) 8th highest 18% increase from 1996 
CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 




Overall .44 (2012) 5th highest 27% increase from 1996 
Autonomy .52 (2012) 6th highest 40% increase from 1996 
Equality .55 (2012) 7th highest 8% decrease from 1996 
Choice .36 (2012) 4th highest 43% increase from 1996 
Voice .33 (2012) 4th highest 17% increase from 1996 
 
Overall, South Africa ranks low on the various conditions that may affect how a 
country reacts to globalization – low socioeconomic status, poor equality level, low 
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immigration, low cultural globalization, and median cultural emancipative values. For 
GDP per capita, South Africa only had a higher rate than Nigeria, Jordan, and China, and 
increased in its GDP by a total of just 117% from 1996 to the present. This was one of the 
slowest rates of growth among the cases under consideration in this dissertation, only 
outpacing Germany, the United States, and South Korea. Among countries with low 
GDP, it was the slowest growth rate. While South Africa’s unemployment rate did 
improve slightly, it still had an incredibly high rate of 24.7 in 2012. The next highest was 
12.2 in Jordan, with all remaining cases having single digit unemployment rates. This 
incredibly high unemployment rate (nearly 1 in 4 people) has been a source of strife for 
South Africa. In addition, life expectancy is the second to last (Nigeria being the lowest) 
and actually declined since 1996, where every other case in this study increased. Infant 
mortality was also second lowest (Nigeria being the worst again), and only decreased by 
25%. This was nearly the smallest decline, with the United States being the only country 
with slower improvement. The United States, notably, already had a low infant mortality 
rate, so had less room for large percentage declines. South Africa had the capacity to 
make great improvements, given its high infant mortality rate, but only improved 
minimally compared to other cases in this study.  The socio-economic status is not strong 
in South Africa and, in many cases, it either declined since 1996 or did not improve as 
much as many other cases, especially given its “room for improvement”.  
In addition to a lackluster socioeconomic status, South Africa also had the lowest 
level of equality, by far, with a 63.2. By comparison, the next lowest was Mexico with a 
47.4. Despite being highly unequal in 1996, South Africa worsened by 4% in 2012. This 
is logical given the increased unemployment rate and declining life expectancy.  
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Given its weak socioeconomic status and lack of equality, it is not surprising that 
South Africa has low levels of immigration. However, its rates are above the seven cases 
in the 0-2% range, with South Africa experiencing 4% and 6% immigration per capita in 
2010 and 2015, respectively. This rate is largely attributed to immigration from other 
African countries, countries where GDP and life expectancy are even worse than in South 
Africa. From 1995 to 2010, the immigration rate increase of 94% was not remarkable, 
really falling around the median. However, from 2010 to 2015, there was a significant 
boost, with an increase of 213%. This represented the third highest increase during this 
time period and is the result of instability in neighboring countries.  
Cultural globalization levels place South Africa in a similar position as its 
immigration rates – 8th and 9th highest. Both the 18% increase from 1996 to 2012 and the 
lack of change from 2012 to 2016 were about average among the cases. Despite 
unremarkable changes in cultural globalization and overall scores towards the lower end, 
South Africa did experience a 27% increase in emancipative values from 1996 to 2012. 
This was the highest rate of change and much larger than the 9% average increase. The 
raw level in 2012 put South Africa in the middle among cases in this study. There were 
significant increases in the autonomy (valuing independence, imagination, and a lack of 
obedience in children) and choice (the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion, and 
divorce) indicators, and a mild decrease for equality (mainly, gender equality). This 
increase in emancipative values aligns with the end of apartheid. As individuals 




Generally, despite being one of the strongest economies in sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Africa has a weak GDP, including extremely high unemployment, and a high rate 
of inequality. The changes from 1996 to 2012 were typically unremarkable, trending in 
ways comparable to the other cases, or changed in a negative direction (such as with the 
increase in inequality). One area where South Africa stood out is in its expansion of 
emancipative values.  
Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes  
As noted previously, the desired outcome in this dissertation is decreasing 
nationalism. (A desired outcome must be specified per the requirements of a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis approach.) In Chapter 4 (Descriptive Statistics), the researcher 
utilized results from the World Values Survey to determine the level of nationalistic 
attitudes. Table 58 outlines each question that was used in determining the nationalistic 
attitudes score, along with the score for South Africa in 2012, and the change since 1996. 
Overall, compared to the other 10 cases in this study, South Africa falls around the 
middle for nationalistic attitudes and it is in line with the 9 cases that have similar rates of 
nationalistic attitudes. South Africa is inconsistent within each indicator, sometimes 
ranking as one of the most nationalistic, sometimes as one of the least, and other times in 
the middle.  There is evidence that nationalistic attitudes in South Africa declined 
between 1996 and 2012, but the research beyond the World Values Survey provides some 










(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = less 
nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .41 10th 120% increase 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize People 
Born in this Country 
.65 3rd  26% decrease 
National Pride .84 7th  9% decrease 
Confidence in UN .52 5th 7% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in government .47 7th 27% decrease (confidence decreased) 
Identify with “world” .26 4th  Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .77 4th  Question changed on WVS 
Group Belonging Overall .52 1st (3-way tie) 31% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.60 8th  6% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with group 
belonging) 
.58 8th  12% decrease 
  
Recent news has revealed some significant xenophobia toward foreigners in South 
Africa; thus, it is not shocking to see that South Africa has one of the highest scores on 
the indicator that assesses whether or not people would want to have foreign neighbors. 
South Africans’ lack of tolerance for foreign neighbors was high in 2012 and this 
represented a 120% increase, which is a significant shift. Despite a resistance to foreign 
neighbors, South Africans did not express a strong desire to prioritize South Africans 
over foreigners if jobs are scarce. Based on the incredibly high unemployment rate in 
South Africa (roughly 25%), it is surprising that there was not more resistance to 
foreigners having the jobs that are scare. Since 1996, South Africans became less 
nationalistic on this indicator. Their national pride also declined over this period, putting 
them as the 7th lowest.  
A common trend has been declining confidence in institutions and that is no 
different for South Africa where confidence in both the United Nations (UN) and the 
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South African government declined.  This represented an increase in nationalistic 
attitudes for the former and a decrease for the later. In both cases, South Africa was 
around the middle among cases in this study. However, for group belonging, South 
Africa was the least nationalistic, signaling strong identification with the world and 
weaker identification with their nation. Perhaps this is due to the multiple ethnic groups 
within South Africa, thus encouraging greater local (tribal) identification, rather than 
national identification. In addition, South Africa is known as a hub for trade, connections, 
and travel within the continent, which could encourage greater identification with the 
world as a whole. This represented a significant shift for South Africa – a 31% decline in 
nationalistic attitudes for this indicator. Post-apartheid, as freedoms were granted, 
citizens likely had the existential security to be able to look outward to the world.  
Overall, South Africa ranks 8th among cases in this study. It has a 6% or 12% 
decline in nationalistic attitudes. The 6% and 12% figures represent scores with and 
without the group belonging indicator, respectively. The decline largely grows out of 
national pride and confidence in their own government decreases, as well as a declining 
desire to prioritize citizens over foreigners when jobs are scarce. The research in the next 
section will provide further insights into whether nationalist attitudes are declining, by 
how much, and what factors may contribute to these shifts in the face of increasing 
globalization.  
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
In assessing shifts in nationalistic attitudes, the researcher is also taking into 
account campaign rhetoric on immigration, as well as election results of candidates with a 
“nationalistic” platform. Before discussing these campaigns and results in depth, it is 
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important to understand some background on immigration and political parties in South 
Africa. Immigration is a complex issue in South Africa. During the apartheid era, prior to 
1994, immigrants were defined as those migrants who could assimilate to white culture. 
Thus, even migrants from neighboring African countries were not considered immigrants, 
but, rather, were viewed as labor migrants. This differentiation between African and other 
migrants continues today. Following the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa struggled 
to define a new immigration policy and the migrant labor system remained in place 
(Crush 2008).  
In the 1980s, South Africa became a destination for African migrants. Roughly 
350,000 Mozambicans fled their civil war and came to South Africa. Although 20% 
returned home after the war, the rest remained in South African communities along the 
border. During the war, these refugees were welcomed by South Africans, but this 
perception shifted after apartheid ended. South Africans began to view these refugees as 
“outsiders” and their relationships worsened (Crush 2008). 
Over the years, the proportion of immigrants from the African continent, as 
compared to the rest of the world, has increased. Between 1990 and 2004, about 27% of 
immigrants were from Africa. However, in both 2003 and 2004, they made up nearly half 
of immigrants to South Africa (Crush 2008). Those specifically seeking asylum has also 
increased since 1990. During apartheid, many migrants came from Western countries; 
after apartheid, many white immigrants, as well as white South Africans, emigrated, as 
the conditions no longer favored them over other residents. Since 1994, South Africa has 
deported nearly two million undocumented migrants to neighboring countries, but several 
human rights organizations, such as the South African Human Rights Commission, have 
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compared the methods to those utilized by the apartheid rulers to control black South 
Africans (Crush 2008).  In 2002, a new Immigration Law was signed into law that went 
into effect in 2005. It laid out goals to end xenophobia, without any clear tactics for 
achieving them. It still included deportation methods that relied on neighbors spying and 
reporting one another (Crush 2008).  
As a backdrop to these changes, significant xenophobia has existed. In May 2008, 
South Africans killed nearly 70 migrants and injured countless others. Migrants from 
Zimbabwe faced the brunt of the attacks (Crush 2008). The negative sentiments about 
immigrants has been focused so much on those from Africa that some have dubbed it 
“Afrophobia” rather than “xenophobia” (Griffin 2019). These “Afrophobia” outbursts 
have affected national elections.  
In South Africa, the most significant national election is the one deciding the 
membership of the National Assembly. The delegates are elected based on political 
parties and the leader of the majority party becomes the president. This research focuses 
on the May 2019 National Assembly election. The African National Congress (ANC) has 
been the ruling party since apartheid ended in 1994, when Nelson Mandela became the 
first democratically elected president. Mandela had been a member of the ANC since 
1944. In 1963, he was arrested for leaving the country without permission and planning a 
strike; he was then found to have been planning an armed resistance to apartheid rule and 
imprisoned for nearly three decades. In 1990, he was released and immediately became 
involved in talks to end apartheid. In 1991, he was elected President of the ANC. He 
worked closely with then President FW de Klerk and, together, they won the Nobel Peace 
Prize for transitioning South Africa away from apartheid and towards democracy. 
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Mandela then become president in 1994 when the ANC won 62.65% of the vote. De 
Klerk became his deputy president, as part of a coalition government. Mandela served as 
president until 1999, when he stepped down, keeping his promise to only serve one term.  
The ANC has continued to rule South Africa ever since. Most recently, Jacob 
Zuma served as president from 2009 to 2018. However, he had to resign before his term 
ended because his presidency with rife with corruption scandals. Corruption in South 
Africa has been rampant for many decades. During the apartheid era, international 
sanctions led to the establishment of intermediary systems designed to by-pass those 
restrictions. These systems required lax fiscal controls and oversights at the federal level. 
This set the stage for corruption. Zuma, specifically, was shown to have given millions to 
Atul Gupta, an immigrant to South Africa who built a business empire. Some even 
accused Zuma of allowing Gupta to run a “shadow government” (Larson 2019). That 
scandal, coupled with high unemployment and slow economic growth led to a decline in 
support for the ANC. Their vote share was at an all-time high of nearly 70% in 2004, but 
it dropped to 66% in 2009 and further to 62% in 2014. In the municipal elections in 2016, 
the ANC share was just 54%, and they lost Johannesburg and Pretoria for the first time. 
These losses were widely attributed to Zuma (Campbell 2019). Thus, the 2019 National 
Assembly elections, as the first elections since Zuma resigned, were set to be informative 
about where the country stood on the ANC and its various policies.  
Campaign Rhetoric Around Immigration. As outlined in the introduction, South 
Africa has a long-standing problem with xenophobia towards African migrants. The lack 
of inclusion worsened in the wake of the 2019 election, with politicians utilizing African 
migrants as scapegoats, rather than addressing the issues that plague society (Griffin 
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2019). There were two main political parties in the spotlight – the ANC, the ruling party, 
and the Democratic Alliance (DA), the primary opposition party. In addition, the 
Economic Freedom Fighters gained some attention, but were never expected to win a 
majority. The more than a dozen other parties only picked up a single percentage or less 
of the seats. The focus in the media was on the ANC and the DA, thus the researcher will 
focus on these two main political parties.  
Both parties had official stances on immigration that did not always align with the 
rhetoric of some of their leaders. The ANC decided to highlight immigration after 
speaking to voters and hearing their concerns around undocumented immigrants. They 
placed great emphasis on the need to reduce illegal immigration, while stressing the 
benefits of legal migrants. The ANC put great emphasis on border security in order to 
limit the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa (Modjadji 2019). While launching 
the ANC’s manifesto in Durban, President Cyril Ramaphosa (the leader of the ANC) 
spoke about border management and made promises to crack down on illegal trading and 
the exchange of counterfeit products, thus connecting these practices to immigrants 
(Griffin 2019). Two months later, in Durban, there was an attack on African migrants that 
killed six and displaced 150 people. Some organizations connected these attacks to the 
statements made by Ramaphosa.  
Some view the DA as having taken a harsher stance against immigration 
compared to the ANC. They released an immigration policy in advance of the elections. 
However, some commentators viewed it as being filled more with myth and fantasy then 
with facts – a piece that was designed to rile support, rather than provide practical 
solutions to some of the country’s immigration challenges (Landau 2018). Notably, the 
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DA’s immigration policy explicitly rejected anti-immigrant sentiment, but it still 
promoted a connection between social ills - like crime, unemployment, inequality, and 
poverty - and immigration and border control issues. This policy aligns with politicians 
who link foreigners with corruption and blame them for South Africa’s issues with 
security and social cohesion (Landau 2018). The DA did develop a campaign slogan of 
“All South Africans First,” a concept that “others” poor immigrants. This slogan is 
reminiscent of the “Make America Great Again” slogan utilized successfully by now 
President Donald Trump in the United States. The nationalist, anti-immigrant sentiments 
in the United States and other parts of the world have proven successful and it appears the 
DA wanted to capitalize on that momentum (Heleta 2019).    
The juxtaposition between some of the DA’s statements about avoiding anti-
immigrant sentiments and their linking of immigrants to the country’s social issues is 
challenging to navigate. For instance, on their website, they note, “As a party committed 
to liberal democratic values we believe that this debate can be approached with a 
responsible and balanced approach, beyond a crude nationalism . . . ” (Julius 2018). They 
explicitly say they want to avoid nationalism, but at the same time appear to link 
immigration to social issues. Even when they address xenophobic violence, they note the 
harm it causes to the economy and social cohesion of the country (Julius 2018).  
On the surface, there are not stark contrasts between the ANC and the DA in 
terms of immigration policy. They both agree that it is important to correct people’s 
misperceptions about foreigners, but they disagree on the best approach. Both parties 
participated in an interview on Cape Talk, a radio program in South Africa. Small 
Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu represented the ANC and Jacques Julius, 
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MP, represented the DA (Luckhoff 2019). According to Julius, “The perceptions right 
now in South Africans' minds are that jobs are being taken away by illegal immigrants, 
that whether they are documented or not, they are illegal in the country” (Luckhoff 2019). 
He stressed that the DA needs to change the perception about African immigrants to 
South Africa. Zulu, of the ANC, stressed a more holistic approach that examines 
economic and social implications, along with border security (Luckhoff 2019). Although 
some nuances exist between the approaches, they are not notable. The DA even accused 
the ANC of borrowing much of their policy from the DA policy.  
While the actual policies are not riddled with anti-immigrant sentiments, there are 
some false connections made between immigrants and societal ills. Additionally, some of 
the informal rhetoric has really take a nationalistic approach. The South Africa Health 
Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi said that foreign nationals were overcrowding hospitals. 
Although his statement was false, he still created the imagery that immigrants were 
taking something away from native South Africans – their access to health care (Griffin 
2019). This link between the woes of the health care system and immigrants was a 
common theme. DA member and mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, wrote on 
Twitter that they were not going to allow immigrants to come freely, noting “our health 
facilities are already stretched to the limit.” In the same statement, he linked immigrants 
to Ebola (Griffin 2019). Additionally, the DA detailed a plan for placing foreigners in 
camps rather than allowing them to live freely in South Africa, especially if they 
partnered with the Freedom Front Plus to build a coalition (Heleta 2019). 
In addition to the health care access imagery, officials have also connected 
immigrants to the trash in the cities, increases in crime, and job shortages, even though 
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research has shown that immigrants lower the unemployment rate and contribute to 
economic growth (Griffin 2019). Notably, the Home Affairs Minister’s spokesperson, in 
explaining new consequences for employers hiring undocumented immigrants, stated, “It 
should also be noted that not all migrants are involved in criminal activities” (Modjadji 
2019). This phrasing implies that most migrants are criminals, but not all of them.  A 
more pro-immigrant statement may have emphasized that very few migrants are 
criminals. Even the ANC leader and current President has linked safety to immigration, 
noting that “Effective border management is an important aspect of ensuring that the 
country and its people are safe” (Modjadji 2019). 
Although not a focus in this case study, the Economic Freedom Party, the party 
with the third highest number of representatives on the national level, has advocated for 
better treatment of migrants from Africa (Griffin 2019). In contrast with the Economic 
Freedom Party, both the ANC and the DA are anti-immigrant and display nationalistic 
rhetoric at times. Both parties have criticized the xenophobic attacks that have become 
common in South Africa, but this is not the same as bolstering and supporting the 
community of Africa immigrants in the country. Their focus has been on securing the 
border, a common theme of nationalism, rather than more successfully integrating 
migrants into the country or creating pathways for legal entry. In an election, it can be 
advantageous to utilize immigrants as a scapegoat for the issues that plague a country. 
This is especially true for the ANC, as they have had 25 years in power to rectify many of 
those issues. However, with foreigners comprising less than 5% of the total population, 
any attempt to blame all of society’s woes on them are misplaced (Landau 2018). 
Nevertheless, the rhetoric attributing these issues to immigrants, especially illegal 
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immigrants from Africa, seems to have resonated with people, as both the ruling party 
and the primary opposition party engaged it.  
Election results as a Representation of Nationalistic Attitudes. In the 2019 
election, the ANC received 58% of the vote, while the DA received 21%. The Economic 
Freedom Fighters earned 11%. This represented the first time since democratic elections 
in 1994 that the ANC received less than 60% of the vote (Keane 2019). The ANC lost 
seats compared to the previous year and the DA gained seats; although the ANC retained 
power, the representational shift may signal greater sympathy for the more anti-
immigrant rhetoric of the DA, although both parties, admittedly utilized similar rhetoric. 
Overall, people expressed disillusionment with the system, as only 65% of people turned 
out to vote compared to 73% in the previous presidential election five years before. 
Young people, aged 18 to 30, were especially absent in this election with a roughly 50% 
voter rate (Keane 2019). In addition to the election system, people were also angry about 
corruption in both main parties and the extremely high unemployment rate.  
There are some differing signals at play. While the DA made strides in municipal 
elections in 2016, wining Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Cape Town, the ANC retained the 
province of Gauteng (which houses Johannesburg and Pretoria), despite predictions that it 
would not (Landau 2018; Campbell 2019). Campbell felt this reinforced ANC’s mandate 
(2019). After winning, Cyril Ramaphosa orated about a united South Africa and bringing 
people together. He promoted a South Africa “which is united, which is non-racial, which 
is non-sexist, democratic and prosperous” (Keane 2019).  
The election results really fail to paint a clear picture of whether South Africa has 
shifted toward a more nationalistic perspective or not. The DA appears to utilize the anti-
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immigrant, “South Africans First” platform, to a greater degree than the ANC. Despite 
the ANC’s victory, they did lose seats, while the DA gained some. Because the election 
results present mild evidence at best, it is helpful to take a deeper dive into the 
xenophobic attacks that have occurred in recent years in South Africa. Landau has 
pointed out that the anti-immigrant platform has been more decentralized and violent in 
South Africa than it has been in the United States, Italy, and France, where these 
sentiments were encouraged on a national level (2019). What is similar is that the 
politicians who do use immigrants as the scape goat are doing so as a tactic for avoiding 
the real problems at hand. This is especially apparent in South Africa where inequality 
and unemployment rates are startlingly high (Landau 2019). In fact, the most violent acts 
of xenophobia have been tied to municipal or even neighborhood contests for food, land, 
job, and even political offices (Landau 2019).  
An example of how local municipalities utilize anti-immigrant sentiment for their 
own personal gain can be found in Mamelodi, a township outside of Pretoria, where the 
Phomolong Residents’ Association serves as a de facto government. They collect fees 
and mitigate conflicts. However, they also target migrants, often stealing from their 
shops. As the de facto government, there is no entity to intervene and no one to turn to for 
help for these migrants (Landau 2019). In this same example, after serious attacks against 
Zimbabweans, the local leaders cleared out their houses and then gave them to 
supporters.  
While the xenophobic attacks have been severe, especially in 2008 and 2019, they 
seem to have a different slant than some of the more nationalistic attacks in the United 
States. They appear to be less about protecting the country and more about local leaders 
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utilizing migrants as an excuse for poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Local leaders 
use a xenophobic platform for their gain. The sentiments and rhetoric are different than in 
other countries in this study where there is a clear link between anti-immigrant 
sentiments and a desire to protect one’s own national identity. Nevertheless, even 
politicians at the national level have used immigrants as a scapegoat and the DA, which 
had notable support, promoted an “All South Africans First” platform, indicating a 
nationalist approach. As a result, despite the World Values Survey showing a 12% 
decline in nationalistic attitudes, the researcher cannot assess South Africa as having a 
significant decline, which will be further outlined in the calibration section. 
Nigeria 
 Nigeria and South Africa are connected around the xenophobic attacks that were 
described in the previous section. Nigerians were among the targeted group of migrants 
in the attacks in South Africa in 2019. Their businesses, along with those owned by other 
black Africans, were damaged and looted, although they were not among the 12 people 
killed. At least some South African commentators blamed “criminal Nigerians” (Nwanze 
2019). Although Nigerians have been the target of attacks in South Africa in the past, this 
was the first time that the Nigerian government went further than a verbal reprimand; this 
time, it pulled its ambassador from South Africa, sent an envoy and withdrew from an 
international conference in Cape Town (Nwanze 2019). As the two economic 
powerhouses in sub-Saharan African, Nigeria and South Africa have a long and 
convoluted history. Nigeria was involved in supporting anti-apartheid efforts, while 
South Africa supported pro-democracy efforts in Nigeria. The two countries then formed 
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a close bond to allow traders and investors to flow seamlessly from one country to the 
other (Nwanze 2019).  
 Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with just under 200 million people 
– nearly double the population of the next largest country. Despite its large population, 
roughly a quarter of African countries have a greater land mass. Nigeria is also incredibly 
diverse with more than 250 ethnic groups. The largest groups are the Hausa (30%), the 
Yoruba (15%), the Igbo (15%), and the Fulani (6%). As a result of such diversity, the 
official language is English, which forms a common language for Nigerians to learn 
because there are over 500 indigenous languages. English was also the language of 
Nigeria’s colonial rulers. Despite the ethnic diversity, most Nigerians practice Islam 
(53%) or Christianity (46%) and the contrast between the two is stark, with the Muslim 
population concentrated in the north and the Christian population in the south. 
 Nigeria has a very low GDP per capita, but is still a powerhouse in Africa because 
of its significant population. It has a great deal of cultural influence in West and Central 
Africa, largely through its Nollywood industry. Many Nigerian records, television 
programs, and movies are exported to neighboring countries. Despite Nigeria’s cultural 
successes, it has been plagued by significant internal conflict.  
 As Nigeria approached independence in 1960, the Muslim majority in the north 
threatened succession; a Civil War from 1967 to 1970 involved the Igbos trying to create 
their own state of Biafra; in 1993, the dictator Sani Abacha negated the election results; 
and in 2010, there was a military coup (Bourne 2015). More recently, insurgent activity 
by Boko Haram, has wreaked significant damage, fatalities, and instability throughout the 
country. Boko Haram has initiated mass kidnappings and destruction of entire 
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communities. Much of the presidential elections in recent years have focused on the 
ability to combat this threat. Because of the focus on Boko Haram, it may be useful to 
expand a bit further on their founding and goals.  
In the mid-1990s in northern Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, squashed centuries 
old social and political hierarchies of Islamic power. This incident offers one explanation 
of why many Muslim youths and politicians resorted to shari’a as a strategy to assume 
full control of political affairs in the north (Maiangwa et al 2012). In the early 2000s, 
twelve northern Nigerian states implemented Shari’a. Because of the corruption and 
decay of the central government, many of these youths and politicians wanted to return 
Nigeria to Islamic governance. They placed the blame for the distress of Nigerian 
Muslims and the northern region as a whole on the corrupt, Western-oriented government 
(Maiangwa et al 2012). However, since 2006, shar’ia has ceased to be a major factor in 
northern Nigeria, even though it still provides the basis for the law. The lack of deep 
integration of shar’ia in the north and the failure to instill Islamic governance across 
Nigeria was a central factor in the development of Boko Haram (Cook 2011).  
Boko Haram was officially founded in 2002 by Mohammad Yusuf, a Muslim 
cleric, in Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria. The purpose was to reinstate shar’ia law in 
Nigeria and to resist Western influences. They have carried out numerous attacks on 
churches, police installations, and public facilities (Adesoji 2010). These acts tended to 
be sporadic and small-scale. They launched an armed uprising that was resisted by the 
Nigerian military and resulted in more than seven hundred deaths, mostly of those in the 
Boko Haram sect. This encouraged the group further to pursue its goals; it splintered into 
several groups and began an insurgency against Nigeria (Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013). 
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June 2009 was a pivotal point in the transition of Boko Haram to a more recognizable and 
pervasive force. After July 2009, the name “Boko Haram” was adopted as the 
mainstream name for Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, the official name of 
Boko Haram, which means The Organization Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad. Boko Haram is roughly translated to mean “Western 
education is forbidden” (Zenn 2012).  
In June 2011, Boko Haram progressed to suicide attacks and demonstrated signs 
of shifting into a globalist Salafi-jihadist organization (Cook 2011; Whitlock 2014).  In 
2012, Boko Harm began attacks in other parts of Northern Nigeria (outside of Borno 
state), which presented a geographical expansion of activities into cities such as Kano, 
Kaduna, and Sokoto (Zenn 2012). The scale of their attacks also continued to increase. 
For example in November 2011 and January 2012, their attacks in Damaturu and Kano, 
respectively, were considered to be quite sophisticated by military analysts (Zenn 2012).  
They have continued to escalate their attacks to a point of near daily incidents in mid and 
late 2014 (Whitlock 2014). In 2013, the United States declared Boko Haram to be a 
terrorist organization.  
The founder Yusuf was killed in 2009 and replaced by Abubakr Shekau, who has 
demonstrated anti-American sentiments and has expanded Nigeria’s range of attacks 
outside of Yobe and Borno to points further south (Zenn 2012). Although these attacks 
have largely remained in Nigeria, with some recent attacks in northern Cameroon, Boko 
Haram fighters have left Nigeria to join other campaigns. Dozens to hundreds of Boko 
Haram members joined Islamic insurgents in northern Mali. They may have returned to 
Nigeria with more internationalist visions of militancy and new capabilities, if not 
 
293 
weapons (Zenn 2012). This also speaks to the role of globalization; many extremist 
groups would not exist without globalization as a means of connecting people 
ideologically across the region or globe. This is Barber’s McWorld vs. jihad argument: 
people are resisting the commercialization and homogenization of the world, which 
results from globalization, but their ability to come together in that resistance is 
dependent on the same globalization.  
Considering the implications of Boko Haram in Nigeria creates an interesting 
backdrop for this section. The group has created a great deal of insecurity in Nigeria and 
its defeat has been a focus of the past two presidential elections. At the same time, it can 
impact nationalistic attitudes. Those who sympathize with Boko Haram may not feel a 
sense of attachment to the Nigerian nation, but rather to their Islamic identity. Those who 
oppose Boko Haram may not feel a sense of pride in Nigeria right now or confidence in 
their government, as the country was not effective in squashing them for many years. As 
the author explores conditions that may impact nationalistic attitudes, this is important to 
bear in mind.  
Overview of Conditions that May Affect Nationalistic Attitudes 
In Chapter 4, the researcher gathered details on the conditions under analysis, 
which the researcher thought could contribute to determining the level of nationalistic 
attitudes within a country. Table 59 shows all the data for Nigeria for the present or the 
year closest to representing Wave 6 of the WVS (2012). In addition to the raw data, the 
chart notes how that data point compares to the other cases in this study, as well as what 
the change has been since Wave 3 to give an indication of what shifts have occurred 
(both direction and extent).  
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Table 59 Conditions Within Nigeria 
Condition Indicator Data (year) Rank 
(among those 





GDP/capita 2746 (2012) 11th highest 496% increase from 
1996 (positive) 
Unemployment 3.8 (2012) 2nd lowest 14% decrease from 
1996 (positive) 
Life Expectancy 51.7 (2012) 11th highest 13% increase from 
1996 (positive) 
Infant Mortality 75.7 (2012) 11th lowest 38% decrease 
(positive) 
GINI (Equality) GINI .43 (2012) 8th lowest 17% decrease 
(positive) 
Immigration Immigration as 
percentage of 
population 
1% (2010) 2nd lowest (3-
way tie) 





1% (2015) 2nd lowest (3-
way tie) 
159% increase from 
1995 
Globalization CuGI (Cultural 
Globalization) 









Overall .26 (2012) 10th highest 6% increase from 
1996 
Autonomy .30 (2012) 11th highest 40% increase from 
1996 
Equality .34 (2012) 10th highest 21% decrease from 
1996 
Choice .13 (2012) 10th highest 15% increase from 
1996 
Voice .27 (2012) 8th highest 2% increase from 
1996 
 
For most conditions, Nigeria is the lowest ranked country among cases in this 
study. On socio-economic status, Nigeria is 11th on three of the four indicators – GDP per 
capita, life expectancy, and infant mortality – but not on unemployment, where it ranks 
2nd. For GDP, Nigeria has, by far, the lowest rate per capita. It is roughly one thousand 
less than the next lowest, Jordan. However,  GDP did increase by 496% since 1996. This 
is the second largest increase in the world after China during that period. Other than 
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Romania, which had a similar level of increase, all other cases are far behind. While the 
improvement is significant, it is somewhat tempered by the very low starting point, 
allowing even moderate raw changes to result in a significant percentage change. 
Interestingly, unemployment is very low in Nigeria. Perhaps this is due to the large 
informal economy and perhaps poor structures for gathering data. Regardless, based on 
the data available, the unemployment rate decreased by 14%, which was the second 
strongest improvement after Germany. Despite this, the life expectancy in Nigeria is 
incredibly low, less than 52 years old. This did represent the strongest increase in life 
expectancy among the cases, but is still the lowest among the cases. Infant mortality rates 
are also not positive, with very high rates of mortality. Fortunately, the rate improved by 
38%, but this was behind the average increase among cases in this study. The low GDP 
per capita, low life expectancy, and high infant mortality create an overall poor socio-
economic status in Nigeria. Despite some strong improvements on each of the indicators, 
Nigeria retains the lowest SES score among all cases in this study. Somewhat stronger, 
the level of equality in Nigeria is in the bottom half among cases, but did have the 
strongest level of improvement with a 17% change.  
 Perhaps not surprisingly based on the SES, Nigeria has very low inbound 
immigration rates, less than 1% per capita. Much of the immigration to Nigeria is from 
neighboring African countries; people seek stronger educational opportunities than they 
have access to in their home country. Among central/west African countries, Nigeria is 
known for its educational system. The increases in immigration from 1995 to 2010 and to 
2015 have not been remarkable, but rather fall around the median levels among cases in 
this study. Despite the unremarkable increases in immigration, Nigeria experienced a 
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huge surge in cultural globalization from 1996 to 2012 with a 171% increase. The 
average without Nigeria was 24%; the next highest rate of increase was China with 87%. 
The rapid increase could be attributed to improved technological access during this time 
period, which allowed for great cultural influence through television, music, and 
international calling. The rapid increase to 2012 was followed by an 18% decrease to 
2016. Nigeria was one of only two countries to experience a decrease. This could be 
attributed to either a settling back down after the rapid increase or an interruption to 
cultural globalization caused by the significant conflict rooted in Boko Haram in the 
northern part of the country. Their activities have interrupted schools, caused many 
people to be displaced, and cut off some of the technological access that had been gained 
in the decades prior. Through all of these shifts in cultural globalization, Nigeria has still 
remained at the lowest level among all cases in this study. 
 In alignment with the low rate of immigration, low rate of cultural globalization, 
and weak SES (creating a lack of existential security), Nigeria ranks 10th in emancipative 
values, only slightly higher than the 11th ranked Jordan. Nigeria did have a 6% increase in 
these values, with a notable rise in autonomy (independence, imagination, and lack of 
obedience in children), but a decline in equality (gender equality). It can be challenging 
to pinpoint the exact reasons for the shift, but it is about average, as some countries 
increased in their emancipative values, while others declined.  
 Overall, the conditions under consideration paint an interesting picture of Nigeria 
– low SES, strong equality, low rates of immigration, low cultural globalization, and low 
emancipative values, but generally improvements where “improvements” can be found 
(SES, equality, cultural globalization, emancipative values). As the researcher explores 
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nationalistic attitudes in Nigeria, the impact of the conditions on these attitudes may 
become more apparent. There are intersections between these conditions and nationalistic 
attitudes in Nigeria; the researcher will further explore those intersections in the 
forthcoming sections.  
 Overview of the Outcome: Nationalistic Attitudes  
The situation in Nigeria is similar to that of South Africa in terms of nationalistic 
attitudes, according to World Values Survey questions. Nigeria is slightly less 
nationalistic though, ranking as the 7th least nationalistic country whereas South Africa 
ranked 8th among all cases in this study. Table 60 outlines each question that was used in 
determining the nationalistic attitudes score, along with the score for Nigeria in 2012, and 
the percentage change since 1996. Nigeria sometimes ranks quite high on nationalistic 
attitudes, sometimes quite low, and other times in the middle. There is a lack of 
consistency across the indicators. Additionally, there is evidence that nationalistic 
attitudes decreased in Nigeria from 1996 to 2012, although it is a mix of increases and 
decreases for each indicator. The researcher will delve into each indicator further below. 




(1st = least 
nationalistic) 
Change from 1996 (“decrease” = less 
nationalistic) 
Foreign Neighbors .20 4th 3% increase 
Jobs Scare, Prioritize 
People Born in this 
Country 
.80 8th  9% decrease 
National Pride .86 8th 6% increase 
Confidence in UN .46 3rd  36% increase (confidence decreased) 
Confidence in 
government 
.41 3rd (3-way tie) 31% decrease (confidence decreased) 
Identify with “world” .17 1st  Question changed on WVS 
Identify with “Nation” .86 11th  Question changed on WVS 




Table 60 (continued).  
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (without 
group belonging) 
.57 7th  2% decrease 
Overall Nationalistic 
Attitude Score (with 
group belonging)* 
.56 7th 9% decrease 
 
Nationalistic attitudes in Nigeria are around the middle among cases in this study, 
with quite a bit of variation across indicators. In regard to how Nigerians feel about 
foreign neighbors, they are generally more accepting than people in other countries in this 
study, ranking 4th. There was a slight increase in their hesitation about having foreign 
neighbors, but this is a negligible shift. The situation is about opposite when it comes to 
prioritizing Nigerians over foreigners when jobs are scarce. Nigeria ranks 8th, meaning 
there is a preference for prioritizing Nigerians. However, Nigeria did decrease in 
nationalistic attitudes on this indicator, indicating an increased acceptance of foreigners 
having jobs. During this same period, national pride increased by 6% and Nigeria was 8th 
on this indicator as well.  
 Just as with South Africa, and many other cases, confidence in both the United 
Nations and the Nigerian government declined between 1996 and 2012. This represented 
a 36% increase in nationalistic attitudes and a 31% decrease, respectively. These are both 
significant shifts. During this period, Boko Haram was formed with the goal of taking 
over the country and instating Islamic Law. In 2009, conflicts began to flare. Many 
people were killed or displaced. This could have left some Nigerians feeling as though 
both their national government and the UN had failed them, helping explain the 
significant declines in confidence in these institutions.   
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 Interestingly, Nigeria has two completely opposite rankings for the two “group 
belonging” indicators. It ranks 1st (lowest level of nationalistic attitudes) for identification 
with the world and it ranks 11th (highest nationalism) for identification with the nation. 
This means that Nigeria shows strong identification with both the world and their own 
nation. Overall, though, the identification with the world is so strong that it puts Nigeria 
in a 3-way tie as the least nationalistic country on the group belonging indicator. Nigeria 
achieved the least nationalistic spot for group belonging by having a 31% decrease from 
1996, so a shift away from the nation and towards the world. This strong identification 
with both the world and their nation state is interesting, especially in light of their 
declining confidence in the UN and their own government. Identification with the world 
may be strong due to Nigeria’s large diaspora across the globe, causing Nigerians to 
connect with compatriots who are geographically dispersed. At the same time, their 
identification as Nigerians can also be strong, as they want to ensure their Nigerian 
identity is retained, despite outside cultural influences from that same diaspora.  
 The inclusion of the group belonging indicator does impact the overall 
nationalistic attitudes score, but whether it is included or not, Nigeria demonstrates a 
decrease in nationalistic attitudes. Without group belonging, it is a 2% decrease and, with 
it, it is a 9% decrease. Overall, Nigeria ranks 7th, so around the middle among cases in 
this study. Exploration of additional factors will help explain this decrease and determine 
if it supported by evidence beyond the World Values Survey. 
Nationalism: Beyond the World Values Survey  
 Immigration to Nigeria has been a nearly non-existent issue as its immigrant rate 
in 2012 was less than 1% of its population. Substantial emphasis has been placed on 
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Nigerians who emigrate to other countries, including their illegal migration, how to 
repatriate them, and the role that the diaspora can play in supporting Nigeria. Along these 
lines, because immigration is not a key concern, political candidates have not emphasized 
this topic. Their focus has been on creating prosperity and reducing violence, without any 
emphasis on the role that immigrants might play in tackling these issues. When poverty 
and violence are so extreme, there is little energy to focus on immigration policies. In 
South Africa, politicians chose to utilize immigrants as the scapegoat for these types of 
societal woes, but there is no evidence of the same tactic being employed in Nigeria.   
Presidential Election in Nigeria. In February 2019, Nigeria held elections for 
President and the Senate. In the Presidential election, the primary candidates were 
incumbent Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Atiku 
Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). This marked the fourth time 
Abubakar had run for president. Buhari was victorious with 55.6% of the vote, while 
Abubakar had 41.2%. A few other candidates received very small percentages of the 
vote. Interestingly, voter turnout was incredibly low at 33%. This was a marked decrease 
from the 42% in the previous presidential election in 2015. The rate has been steadily 
declining since 2003, when it was 65%.  Fears of violence at the ballot box kept some 
citizens away. 
 As noted, immigration was not a focus of either campaign. As Arhin-Sam and 
Zanker explained, “migration issues do not matter politically, with little effect on election 
outcomes at the federal level” (2019). Instead, economic concerns may have been at the 
forefront of voters’ minds. The previous year, Nigeria had been deemed the “poverty 
capital of the world” and was not likely to move out of that position, given the country’s 
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low spending on human capital. Unemployment had risen to a remarkable 23.1% (Mules 
2019). Buhari focused on the economy, ending corruption, and eliminating Boko Haram. 
As Buhari said in his victory speech, "The new administration will intensify its efforts in 
security, restructuring the economy and fighting corruption" (Busari and Adeoye 2019). 
Overall, there was little difference between Buhari and Abubakar or their respective 
parties. Voters had difficulty really discerning clear ideological direction from either, 
making it challenging to decide for whom to vote (Mules 2019). This could partially 
explain the low voter turnout, in addition to the threats of violence, as noted.  
The lack of focus on migrants and, thus, the lack of immigration rhetoric makes it 
challenging to assess nationalistic attitudes in Nigeria. However, this lack of focus on 
incoming immigration is informative in and of itself. South Africa, which also has a 
relatively low rate of immigration, places notable emphasis on migrants and politicians 
utilized them as a scapegoat for societal programs. Nigeria, which is also plagued by 
increasing rates of unemployment and tremendous poverty, did not place the blame on 
immigrants or appear to focus on a “nation first” type platform that excluded others. As a 
result, there is no evidence to refute the World Values Survey results indicating a 9% 
decrease in nationalistic attitudes. The increased global connections through a large 
diaspora and the export of the Bollywood industry have, perhaps, allowed Nigerians to 
reduce their nationalistic attitudes in favor of greater global collaborations. Some issues 
that plague Nigeria, such as the presence of Boko Haram, appear to require global 
solutions and efforts.   
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Calibration and Initial Conclusions 
 In this section, the researched explains the calibration process for the conditions 
and outcome for South Africa and Nigeria. Then, she shares some initial conclusions 
about South Africa and Nigeria based on the case studies.  
Calibration of the conditions and outcome to prepare for the truth table 
As noted in the previous chapters, the calibration process assigns a number to 
each variable, allowing the researcher to ultimately conduct the fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA). The fuzzy set approach allows for nuance within each 
variable, rather than a strict “in the group” or “out of the group” approach, as the crisp set 
QCA dictates. Appendix F provides the results of the calibration for the conditions and 
outcomes for Wave 6 for all cases, while Appendix G does the same for the changes from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6. A key provides the cut off points for each level of calibration. 
However, in all instances, the following key was utilized: 0 is fully out; .25 is more out 
than in; .5 is neither in nor out; .75 is more in than out; and 1 is fully in. This refers to 
whether or not that case is in or out of the set of cases represented by the variable noted, 
such as a high socioeconomic status or a significant increase in cultural globalization. 
Tables 61 and 62 below provide the calibration for the Africa – South Africa and Nigeria. 
A brief analysis follows. 



















Africa 0 0 .75 0.25 0.25 0.75 
Nigeria 0 .75 0 0 0 0.25 
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
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1.0 0.25 1.0 1.00 .25* 
Nigeria 0.75 1.0 .25* 1.0 0.25 1.0 1.0 
* Manually adjusted 
Blue = Fully In; Green = More in than out; Orange = More out than in; Orange = Fully out 
 South Africa and Nigeria surprisingly have some notable difference in their 
calibration of the conditions. Although both countries are “fully out” of the group for 
high socioeconomic status (SES), there is a large divide on equality. South Africa is 
“fully out” of the group for high equity, while Nigeria is “more in than out” of this group. 
South Africa has notoriously been an unequal society, spawning from its apartheid 
history. For immigration, Nigeria is fully out of the group for high immigration, as its rate 
is less than 1%. South Africa is “more in than out,” as its rate is just under 6%. This is 
above those that hover in the 0-2% range, but is far lower than those in the teens or 
higher. The two countries are similar in terms of cultural globalization, although South 
Africa is “mostly out” of the group for high cultural globalization, while Nigeria is “fully 
out” of this group. Somewhat similarly, for cultural emancipative values, South Africa is 
“more out than in” of the group for high emancipative values, while Nigeria is “fully out” 
of this group. Finally, Nigeria is “more in than out” of the group for high nationalistic 
attitudes, while South Africa is “more out than in” for this group. Equality, immigration, 
and nationalistic attitudes are the where the most significant differences lie, potentially 
suggesting the equality and/or immigration may play a role in shaping nationalistic 
attitude levels.   
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In addition to differences within Wave 6 between South Africa and Nigeria, there 
are also notable differences with the changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6. Nigeria’s 
socioeconomic status improved notably, putting it “more in than out” of the group of 
countries with significant improvements, while South Africa did not improve much, 
putting it “more out than in” that group. Similarly, but more extreme, Nigeria was “fully 
in” the group with significant improvements in GINI, while South Africa was “fully out” 
of this group.  
There is also a notable divide in terms of immigration. South Africa is fully in the 
group of countries that experienced a significant increase in immigration. Although many 
migrants are from neighboring countries, South Africa also has strong immigration from 
Europe and other continents. There is clearly a xenophobic response towards African 
migrants to South Africa, so the researcher cannot consider the impact or disruption to be 
less, as she can in other cases. In Nigeria, for instance, based on the pure percentage 
increase, it would be “more in than out” of the group for significant increases in 
migration. However, all of the immigration to Nigeria came from West and Central 
Africa, with Benin, Ghana, Mali, Togo, and Niger at the top of the list. There also does 
not appear to be a particularly adverse reaction to these migrants, and little has changed 
in migration patterns into Nigeria in recent years. The condition is really asking about 
sharp increases in immigration and immigration from dissimilar cultural groups. As a 
result, the researcher manually changed the calibration for this condition for Nigeria to be 
“more out than in” the group for significant increases in immigration.  
Despite South Africa having higher rates of immigration, its level of cultural 
globalization increased at a slower level than Nigeria’s, putting South Africa “more out 
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than in” of the group for significant increases in cultural globalization, while Nigeria is 
“fully in” the group. Interestingly, the inverse is true for cultural values. Finally, both 
countries demonstrated some evidence of decreasing nationalistic attitudes, based on the 
World Values Survey, but only Nigeria showed significant declines. Based on the World 
Values Survey, South Africa was also in the group showing significant declines in 
nationalistic attitudes, but, based on evidence gathered through the case study, the 
researcher manually adjusted this for South Africa to be “more out than in” of this group. 
This type of manual adjustment based on research beyond quantitative data is allowed as 
part of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology. It provides an avenue 
to consider all the research on hand, both quantitative and qualitative.   
 While is it interesting to see the calibration, the fuzzy set QCA truth table analysis 
in Chapter 10 will provide more insights. For now, the researcher will assess how each 
indicator aligns with the hypothesis. Table 63 below represents the hypothesis that 
increasing socioeconomic status, improved equality, decreasing immigration (or slower 
than average increase or increasing, but from similar cultural group), slower increases in 
cultural globalization, and slower changes in cultural values will lead to significant 
decreases in nationalistic attitudes.  


























X X X    X X X YES 
Nigeria YES YES YES   X YES YES YES 




In this chart, a “YES” indicates that the case meets the criteria listed and an “X” 
means it does not. The researcher has highlighted yellow where there is alignment. There 
is strong alignment between the outcome of significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes 
and the conditions under investigation in both countries, especially when considering a 
significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes. The only misalignment is with cultural 
globalization in Nigeria. The faster rise in cultural globalization does not align, although 
this could indicate that cultural globalization brought more of a “world view” to Nigeria, 
leading to a decline in nationalism.  
Initial Regional Conclusions for Africa 
 As with many regions, Africa is incredibly diverse. Nigeria and South Africa 
present two contrasting case studies. South Africa was ruled under the shadow of 
apartheid for many years, where the majority black population had diminished rights and 
all power was held by the minority white population. Nigeria did live under colonial rule 
for many decades and was ruled by a dictatorship for years following independence, until 
they shifted to a democracy in the late twentieth century. The two countries have been 
inextricably linked. Nigeria played a role in encouraging an end to apartheid, while South 
Africa pushed Nigeria toward democracy. With Nigeria having the largest population in 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa having the largest economy, the two countries have 
been linked by investors and trade. South Africa attracts a significant tourist population, 
while Nigeria is known for its cultural influence in West and Central Africa through 
music, television programs, and movies – an industry dubbed “Nollywood,” adopted 
from “Bollywood” in India.  
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 Despite being major contenders in the sub-Saharan Africa, both countries have 
extremely poor socioeconomic status, although South Africa’s GDP per capita is notably 
stronger than Nigeria’s. However, the gap between rich and poor is far greater in South 
Africa, which has the worst GINI score by far of any country in this study. Nigeria 
certainly has an equality problem, as well, but it falls closer to the middle among cases 
and it improved from 1996 to 2012. Because of South Africa’s relatively strong 
economy, compared to other African states in the region, it has a higher rate of 
immigration than Nigeria. It is above the slew of countries with 0-2% immigration rates, 
but far lower than those in the teens. Nigeria, on the other hand, has an immigration rate 
below 1% and many migrants come because they are fleeing conflict in their home 
country; all of them come from West and Central Africa.  
 Neither country has very high rates of cultural globalization, perhaps 
demonstrating the somewhat limited global interactions. South Africa’s rate is 
significantly higher than Nigeria’s though, likely because of South Africa’s higher rate of 
immigration and more global economy. In terms of cultural emancipative values, Nigeria 
has the second lowest rate of emancipative values after Jordon. This could be a result of 
Nigeria’s strong Muslim population, similarly to Jordon although not as vast, coupled 
with its lack of cultural globalization and low rates of immigration. Additionally, 
emancipative values tend to increase when existential security is obtained. With Nigeria’s 
incredibly low SES and high rates of crime, it is expected that people are not in the 
mindset to extend freedoms. There is too much uncertainty and instability to feel 
comfortable with deviations from long established cultural norms. In South Africa, the 
cultural emancipative values are higher and fall around the middle among countries in 
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this study; they also experienced significant increases in these emancipative values from 
1996 to 2012. This could be the result of apartheid rule ending in 1994 and greater 
cultural influences playing a role.  
 Both African countries are similar in their nationalistic attitudes, ranking 7th 
(Nigeria) and 8th (South Africa), with 1st representing the least nationalistic country. 
Nationalistic attitudes are denoted by a strong desire to prioritize one’s own nation, and 
people, even at the expense of others, as well as a preference for unilateral solutions, as 
opposed to global collaboration. This can be particularly harmful and can lead people to 
violent acts in defense of their own nation and people.  
For the nationalistic attitudes, the rankings are not particularly informative, as 9 of 
the 11 cases fall within the range of .54 and .60. Nigeria and South Africa fell right in the 
middle of this range, at .56 and .58, respectively. (The two outliers were Germany at .50 
and Jordan at .71.) This does demonstrate one benefit of the fsQCA approach, as each 
case will be categorized, not ranked. Based on the WVS, both countries demonstrated 
significant declines in nationalistic attitudes, as well, with a 12% decrease in South 
Africa and a 9% decrease in Nigeria. There was a slight global trend for nationalistic 
attitudes to decline, but both of these countries declined more than the average. This 
could be due, in part, to the improvements in SES, albeit still deplorable, as well as the 
post-apartheid era in South Africa. As some of these things improve, as one’s own 
security improves, there tends to be greater openness to others.  Also, when globalization 
is lower and immigration rates are relatively low, it can lead to a decrease in nationalistic 
attitudes, as people do not feel as threatened by the “other.”   
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 However, in South Africa especially, there is some contradictory evidence in the 
campaign rhetoric and election results. There was certainly some anti-immigrant rhetoric 
as part of the 2019 presidential campaign and there have been several large-scale 
violence xenophobic attacks. The attacks may have represented an interpretation of 
African migrants as a threat to jobs or they could be viewed as opportunistic crimes. In 
some ways, this may represent more contemporary feelings; however, one of the major 
xenophobic attacks took place in 2008, four years prior to the Wave 6 World Values 
Survey, so those sentiments would have been reflected there. Taking all of this into 
consideration, the researcher made the determination that there is not sufficient evidence 
to deem South Africa as having declined significantly in its nationalistic attitudes, but the 
result showing that it did decline to some degree can be supported.  
 The researcher wants to know which conditions impacted whether Nigeria and 
South Africa, along with other countries, significantly declined in their nationalistic 
attitudes. Globally, nationalism did decline slightly, but what caused some countries to 
decline more than others? In the study of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria declined 
significantly, while South Africa did not. Nigeria did have a significant increase in SES, 
strong improvement in equality, immigration that did not rise much and was from a 
similar cultural group, and slower changes in cultural values. With just two cases, it is 
challenging to discern which of these conditions impacted the level of nationalistic 
attitudes. The fsQCA truth table analysis should shed additional light on which 
conditions, or combination of conditions, really influence a decline in nationalistic 




CHAPTER X – FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TRUTH 
TABLES 
As the researcher outlined in Chapter 3, the core methodology she is using is the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach, specifically fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA). 
This mixed approach combines advantages from qualitative and quantitative methods. It 
provides a method for cross-case comparison, while still allowing for the in-depth case 
study understanding provided by qualitative methods. The case studies allow for an in-
depth understanding of what is occurring, but the information garnered through those 
case studies can be systematically compared across cases. The previous case study 
chapters provided the necessary information to perform the fsQCA truth table analysis, 
which is the focus of this chapter.  
The researcher has completed the first necessary steps for the fsQCA analysis. 
She selected cases and conditions and completed a case study for each country in the 
study. As part of the case study process, the researcher also calibrated the conditions and 
the outcomes, as noted within each case study chapter. The criteria for the calibrations are 
outlined in Appendices F (Wave 6) and G (Wave 3 to Wave 6 changes). This chapter will 
focus on the truth table analysis, which allows for a cross-case analysis, while still 
retaining the nuances within each case. To conduct the truth table analysis, the researcher 
utilized the fsQCA 3.0 software (Ragin 2017). To utilize the software, the researcher 
uploaded the chart containing each case, along with the calibration for each condition, 
including the outcome. (This was performed separately for the Wave 6 analysis and then 
for the analysis of changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6.)  Through this process, the 
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researcher created abbreviated labels for each condition and outcome. Those 
abbreviations are found in Table 64. 
Table 64 Condition and Outcome Abbreviations for Calibration  
Wave 6 Waves 3 to 6 Changes 
SEShigh = high socioeconomic status SESimprove = significant improvements to SES 
GINIhigh = high level of equality GINIimprove = significant improvements to 
equality 
IMMGRTNhigh = high rate of immigration 
per capita 
IMMGRTNincrease = significant increase in rate 
of immigration or spike in immigration from 
outside cultural group 
GLBZhigh = high level of cultural 
globalization 
GLBZincrease = significant increase in cultural 
globalization level 
CULThigh = high level of cultural 
emancipative values, as measured by 
emancipative values 
CULTincrease = significant increase in cultural 
emancipative values 
NAThigh = high level of nationalistic 
attitudes 
NATdecrease = level of nationalistic attitudes 
decreased, any amount 
 NATsigdecrease = significant decrease in 
nationalistic attitudes 
 FEARpolitics = extensive use of fear politics, as 
related to immigration  
 
The researcher then created the truth table. The truth table displayed all of the 
possible configurations of conditions, for example, high socioeconomic status, high 
equality, high immigration, high globalization, and high cultural emancipative values. It 
then specified how many cases aligned with that configuration. In addition, it expressed 
the raw consistency, demonstrating how consistent the results of the configuration were 
with the outcomes. This is more complicated with the fuzzy set approach, which allows 
for more nuance in the calibration than the crisp set approach, where a case is either in or 
out of the group. In the fuzzy set approach, a case can be in or out to varying degrees, 
rendering the computation of consistency more complex, nuanced, and effective in terms 
of explanatory value. A high consistency shows strong alignment with the level of 
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membership and the outcomes, whereas configurations with a low consistency must be 
eliminated. The researcher also eliminated all configurations for which no cases existed.  
For the next step, the researcher conducted a standard analysis. The software 
system aided in this process, but still requires input from the researcher. The analysis 
yielded an intermediate solution, which takes into account some of the logical 
remainders, which are configurations that are not represented by any cases. The results of 
this process are further outlined and explained in the sections below for Wave 6 and the 
changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6.  
Wave 6 Analysis 
Although the focus of this research is on the conditions that affect how 
nationalistic attitudes change over the course of time, it is also of interest to analyze 
which conditions affect whether those nationalistic attitudes are high or low. To conduct 
the fsQCA truth table analysis for Wave 6, the researcher specified the outcome as 
NAThigh, or “high nationalistic attitudes,” and utilized all of the conditions: 
socioeconomic status, equality, immigration, globalization, and cultural values.  
Table 65 below shows the calibration for each case for each condition for Wave 6. 
As discussed in the case study chapters, the calibration coding is as follows: 
 0 = fully out of the group 
 .25= more out than in the group  
 .5 = cross-over point; point of greatest ambiguity 
 .75 = more in than out of the group 
 1 = fully in the group 
 
Six of the 11 cases are fully out or more out than in the group for NAThigh. These are the 
countries with a low level of nationalistic attitudes and they are as follows: Germany, 
Chile, Mexico, Romania, the United States, and Nigeria. There are five cases with a high 
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level of nationalistic attitudes: China, South Korea, Turkey, Jordan, and South Africa. 
Interestingly, all three cases from the West (Germany, Romania, and the United States) 
and both cases from Latin America (Chile and Mexico) are in the group with low levels 
of nationalistic attitudes. On the other side, both Asian countries (China and South 
Korea) and both Middle Eastern countries (Turkey and the Middle East) are more in the 
group with high levels of nationalistic attitudes. The differentiator is Africa, where South 
Africa falls in the group with high levels of nationalism and Nigeria is in the group with 
lower levels of nationalism. However, the two countries have very similar scores, .56 for 
Nigeria and .58 for South Africa. The cross-over point was .57, so each country is very 
close to having been calibrated in a different category. The significant difference between 
the two countries, with respect to the conditions, is that Nigeria has a much higher rate of 
equality and a much lower rate of immigration compared to South Africa. Overall, it 
could be that regional differences are the greatest determinate of whether a country has a 
high level of nationalism or not and, likely a further deep-dive into specific regions, with 
more cases from each region, would be necessary to truly discern the effects of each 
condition vis-à-vis a product of region. Nevertheless, some common configurations of 
conditions can be distilled and assessed in terms of identifying and explaining what 
combinations of conditions lead to high or low levels of nationalism.  
Table 65 Wave 6 (2012) Calibrations for Conditions and Outcome  
Country 
SEShigh GINIhigh IMMGRTNhigh GLBZhigh CULThigh NAThigh 
Germany 0.75 1 1 1 0.75 0 
Chile 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 
Mexico 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
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Table 65 (continued).  
Romania 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 
USA 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.25 
Nigeria 0 0.75 0 0 0 0.25 
              
China 0.25 0.75 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 
South 
Korea 
0.75 1 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 
Turkey 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 
South 
Africa 
0 0 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 
Jordan 0.25 1 1 0.25 0 1 
 
The first analysis that the researcher conducted was on the outcome NAThigh 
(high level of nationalistic attitudes). A quick glance at the chart indicates that low 
cultural emancipative values (~CULThigh) are present in all of the cases with a high 
level of nationalism. This makes ~CULThigh a necessary condition for the outcome of 
high nationalism. However, it is not sufficient, as there are several cases with low levels 
of cultural emancipative values that have a different outcome (low nationalism). Thus, 
the researcher decided to retain this condition in the analysis.  
Utilizing the fsQCA 3.0 software, the researcher created the truth table. As 
mentioned, the truth table produces a chart (see Table 66 below) with every possible 
configuration of conditions, along with how many cases align with that configuration and 
the raw consistency for it. The raw consistency is simply the proportion of cases in that 
row that have the established outcome. Ragin advises utilizing as high a threshold as 
possible for consistency, ideally .8 or higher, but researchers can use their discretion 
based on the number of cases and any clear gaps in consistency levels (2008). A higher 
raw consistency indicates a higher level of alignment with the configuration (combination 
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of conditions) and the indicated outcome. In this case, the researcher used a raw 
consistency threshold of .8, meaning she only included configurations with a consistency 
of .8 or higher. These are highlighted in blue in Table 66. Notably, the configurations that 
meet the threshold requirement are primarily those with cases that have a high level of 
nationalistic attitude. This is intuitive, as the raw consistency measures the outcome 
against the conditions.  
Table 66 Truth Table for Wave 6, Outcome NAThigh (high nationalistic attitudes) 
CULThigh GLBZhigh IMMGRTNhigh GINIhigh SEShigh cases 
raw 
consist. 




1 1 1 1 1 
Germany, 
USA 0.5 
0 0 0 0 0 Mexico 0.777778 
0 0 1 0 0 
South 
Africa 1 
0 1 0 1 0 Romania 0.75 
0 0 1 1 0 Jordan 1 
0 1 0 0 1 Chile 0.714286 




 After developing the truth table and determining which configurations to utilize, 
the researcher then conducted the analysis. For this truth table, the intermediate solution, 
which uses some logical remainders is shown in Figure 12 below. This solution includes 
three configurations and indicates that any of these three configurations (or combinations 
of conditions) has a likelihood of leading to an outcome of high nationalistic attitudes. 
The three configurations taken together are the “solution.” Overall, the solution coverage 
is .904762, meaning the solution explains 90% of the outcome of high nationalism. Or, in 
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other words, 90% of the cases with high nationalism are included in the solution. The 
solution consistency of .904762 indicates a very strong relationship between the 
configurations and the outcome. Most of the time, when that configuration is found, it 
leads to the specified outcome. When a case is greater than the cross-over point (.5) for 
each condition in the configuration, then it almost always leads to the outcome of high 
nationalism. As is shown in the image below, the only case that is included in the 
configurations that does not have the outcome of NAThigh is Nigeria. As previously 
discussed, Nigeria was close to the cut-off point and is an outlier in being separated from 
her regional pair in this study.   
Figure 12. Output of truth table analysis for Wave 6, Outcome NAThigh 
 
In interpreting the truth table solutions, it is critical to know that the ~ sign 
symbolizes “negation” or, essentially, the opposite of that condition. So ~CULThigh 
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signifies low cultural emancipative values. The configurations that generally lead to high 
levels of nationalistic attitudes are as follows: 
Low cultural emancipative values AND low globalization AND high Immigration 
AND low SES: This configuration aligns with Jordan and South Africa 
Low cultural emancipative values AND low globalization AND high equality 
AND low SES: This configuration aligns with China, Turkey, Jordan, and Nigeria 
Low cultural emancipative values AND high globalization AND low immigration 
AND high equality AND high SES: This configuration aligns with South Korea.  
The first two configurations could be combined as follows: 
Low cultural emancipative values AND low globalization AND low SES AND 
(high immigration OR high equality), which is represented as 
 ~CULThigh * ~GLBZhigh * ~SEShigh * (IMMGRTNhigh + GINIhigh) 
This combination covers Jordan, South Africa, China, Turkey, and Nigeria -  four of the 
five cases with high levels of nationalism, plus one with a low level (Nigeria). South 
Korea is unique among the cases with high nationalism. The low cultural emancipative 
values align with all of the configurations and the high equality aligns with all of the 
cases except South Africa. Otherwise, the conditions within South Korea are quite 
different from the other cases that have high nationalism. In many ways it is an outlier. 
The differences could be explained by South Korea’s fairly rapid changes over the past 
few decades, where it may have more closely resembled some of its fellow “high 
nationalism” countries previously, but it has changed on many of those conditions, 
without nationalistic attitudes shifting as rapidly.  
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 Next, the researcher explored the outcome of ~NAThigh (the negation of 
NAThigh, or simply put, low levels of nationalistic attitudes). Combining the outcome of 
~NAThigh with all of the conditions produced the truth table that is shown in Table 67 
below. This time, the researcher selected .75 as the threshold, as this produced a clearer 
cut-off point based on the raw consistency levels that the table produced. The researcher 
has highlighted the configurations that meet the threshold. Similarly to the ones selected 
for the analysis with outcome NAThigh, in this case, the configurations meeting the 
threshold primarily represent the cases with low levels of nationalism. The exceptions are 
South Korea and Nigeria. South Korea is included, but has high nationalism and Nigeria 
is excluded, but has low nationalism. This is consistent with the findings from the truth 
table analysis using NAThigh as the outcome. Both of these cases seem to produce some 
exceptions. Nigeria meets many of the same conditions as countries with high levels of 
nationalistic attitudes, but perhaps its strong history of organizing around tribal groups, as 
well as the colonial history that divided the country, have led to greater reliance on local 
ties, rather than an affinity for the “nation” or protecting the Nigerian nation at the 
expense of others.   
Table 67 Truth Table for Outcome ~NAThigh (low nationalistic attitudes) 
CULThigh GLBZhigh IMMGRTNhigh GINIhigh SEShigh cases 
raw 
consist. 
0 0 0 1 0 
China, Turkey, 
Nigeria 0.692308 
1 1 1 1 1 Germany, USA 1 
0 0 0 0 0 Mexico 1 
0 0 1 0 0 South Africa 0.666667 
0 1 0 1 0 Romania 1 
0 0 1 1 0 Jordan 0.571429 
0 1 0 0 1 Chile 1 




 Utilizing this truth table, the researcher conducted the fsQCA analysis. The output 
is shown in Figure 13 below. The following four configurations were presented: 
Low cultural emancipative values AND high Globalization AND low 
Immigration AND high equality: This configuration is represented by South 
Korea and Romania 
Low cultural emancipative values AND high Globalization AND low 
immigration AND high SES: This configuration is represented by Chile and 
South Korea 
Low cultural emancipative values AND low Globalization AND low Immigration 
AND low equality AND low SES: This configuration is represented by Mexico. 
(This is low on all values.) 
High cultural emancipative values AND high Globalization AND high 
Immigration AND high equality AND high SES: This configuration is 
represented by Germany and the United. Notably, it is the inverse of the 
configuration that represents Mexico, and is high on all values.  
The first two configurations can be combined as follows: 
High SES OR High GINI and low Immigration AND low Cultural emancipative 
values, which can be shown as SEShigh + GINIhigh * ~IMMGTNhigh * 
~CULThigh 
Interestingly, the third configuration represents the negation (opposite) of every 
condition, so a low level, while the fourth configuration is the exact opposite, 
representing the presence of every condition, a high level.  In sum, the solution (meaning 
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all the configurations combined) produces a solution coverage of .869565 and a solution 
consistency of .909091. These are strong numbers, but the range of possible 
configurations is too broad for the researcher to deem it significant.  
Figure 13. Output for Wave 6 analysis, Outcome ~NAThigh (low nationalistic attitudes) 
 
 
Generally, low cultural emancipative values paired with low SES and low 
globalization tends to lead to high levels of nationalistic attitudes with some consistency, 
while high equity or high SES paired with high globalization often lead to lower levels of 
nationalistic attitudes. However, revisiting the beginning of this section, the distribution 
of countries within the same regions is interesting. The fact that each regional pair is 
together (either with high nationalism or low nationalism), with the exception of Africa, 
which actually has very close scores bordering the cross-over point, indicates that 
“region” could be a stronger condition than any other one outlined here. 
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Analysis of Changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6 
Similarly to the conditions for Wave 6, the changes in these conditions from 
Wave 3 to Wave 6 were also calibrated. The calibration criteria are outlined in 
Appendices F and G and Table 68 below shows the calibration score for each case. Bear 
in mind, these calibrations represent changes. Thus, there are some countries, such as 
Nigeria for instance, that are “more in” the group for significant improvements to 
socioeconomic status, even though their status state still remains relatively low; this 
indicates they experienced stronger improvements than other cases.  
Table 68 Calibration of Conditions, Representing Changes from 1996 to 2020 








Chile 0.25 1 1 0.25 1 1 0.25 
Mexico 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 1 1 0.75 
China 0.75 0 0.25 1 0.25 1 0.75 
South 
Korea 
0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 1 0.75 
Germany 0.25 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 
Romania 0.75 0 0.25 0.75 0 1 1 
USA 0.25 0 0.75 0.25 0.75 0 0 
Turkey 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0 1 0.75 
Jordan 0.75 0.75 0.25 0 0.75 0 0 
South 
Africa 
0.25 0 1 0.25 1 1 0.25 
Nigeria 0.75 1 0.25 1 0.25 1 1 
 
 The researcher began by creating a truth table with the output NATdecrease (any 
level of decline in nationalistic attitudes) and all of the conditions. Due to the overall low 
consistency, the researcher had to select a threshold of .7. The output is shown in Figure 
14 below. This resulted in a solution that contained four configurations of the conditions 
 
322 
and only have a .625 solution coverage (thus not capturing nearly 40% of cases that led to 
a decrease in nationalism) and a consistency of only .8696, meaning there were some 
instances of the configuration not leading to the specified outcome. Generally, that level 
of consistency could be utilized, but when paired with the low coverage rate, it is less 
convincing.  
Figure 14. Wave 3 to Wave 6, Outcome NATdecrease, .7 threshold, all conditions 
 
These results were not especially useful due to the vast array of combinations, 
paired with relatively low rates of coverage and consistency. However, SES was clearly 
an important factor, as an improvement was seen in all but one of the cases represented 
by the solution. Surprisingly, immigration was not consistent. Based on case study 
knowledge, the researcher was curious if the way immigration was manipulated by 
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politicians and leaders was more important than the actual rate of increase. This led the 
researcher to add a sixth condition, Fear Politics. Adding and removing conditions is 
permitted as part of the iterative process of the QCA approach. Through the case study 
portion of this research, it became clear that campaign rhetoric around immigration had 
an influence on whether a country exhibited stronger nationalistic attitudes. In order to 
include Fear Politics as a condition, the researcher reviewed the case studies and 
calibrated the condition of “fear politics related to immigration” as follows: 
1 = fully in; used by candidates of multiple, major parties (or several candidates, 
if no party system exists) 
.75 = more in than out; used extensively by at least one major party (or significant 
candidate) 
.5 = cannot discern; mixed rhetoric 
.25 = more out than in; used by some fringe party or used sparingly by a major 
party/candidate 
0 = not used at all; not a topic of a campaign or major focus in the country 
 
Table 69 shows how each case was calibrated on the condition of FEARpolitics.  
















With the new condition available, the researcher performed an updated truth table 
analysis on the outcome of NATdecrease, assessing simply whether nationalistic attitudes 
decreased or increased. Because the previous results utilizing all available conditions 
yielded unfocused results, she only included SES, Immigration, and Fear Politics. She 
included SES because it was a clear factor in the first truth table; she included 
immigration because of her speculation that the actual immigration rates may matter less 
than rhetoric around the topic; she included Fear Politics as the new condition that she 
assumed may have an impact on whether nationalistic attitudes rose or declined. The 
results provided just one configuration, which represented Mexico, China, South Korea, 
Romania, Turkey, and Nigeria, six of the eight countries with a decline in nationalism: 
SESimprove * ~FEARpolitics  (the presence of strong improvements in SES 
along with the absence of Fear politics) 
This provided coverage of .5938 and consistency of .9048. The coverage is lower than 
desired and omits Chile and South Africa, both of which exhibited the opposite for these 
two conditions. However, the consistency rate is quite high, indicating strong alignment 
with these conditions and the outcome. Notably, Immigration was absent from the 
solutions, indicating that it is not a significant determinant in the outcome.  
 While it is interesting to explore which conditions lead to an increase or decrease 
in nationalistic attitudes, it is of even greater interest to the researcher to determine which 
conditions align with significant decreases in nationalistic attitudes. The researcher began 
by utilizing the outcome of NATsigdecrease and all available conditions, including the 
newly developed condition – fear politics. The truth table is shown in Table 70, while the 
output is displayed in Figure 15. Only those configurations that met the threshold of .8 or 
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higher were utilized. This omitted one case from the solution that had a significant 
decrease in nationalism – Mexico. Notably, all three solutions include SESimprove 
(significant improvements in SES) and ~FEARpolitics (absence of fear politics). The 
other conditions vary in each configuration, leading the researcher to discern that these 
two may be the most significant conditions. When utilizing all of the conditions, as 
shown in Figure 15, the solution coverage is .77 and the consistency is .94.  







increase FEARpolitics cases 
raw 
consist. 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
China, 
Romania 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 
USA, South 
Africa 0.142857 
1 1 0 1 0 0 Nigeria 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 Turkey 1 
1 1 0 0 1 0 Mexico 0.666667 
1 0 1 0 1 0 South Korea 0.833333 
0 0 1 0 0 1 Germany 0.166667 
0 1 1 0 1 1 Chile 0.25 
 




While those rates of coverage and consistency are strong, the researcher hoped to 
achieve further simplification, as the solution involved so many varied configurations. 
Because all three configurations included SESimprove and ~FEARpolitics, the researcher 
performed a new analysis only including the conditions of SES, Immigration and Fear 
politics. Figure 16 displays the output. The only configuration in the solution is 
SESimprove * ~FEARpolitics, indicating a significant improvement in SES and a lack of 
fear politics being utilized. This produced a coverage of .8636 and a consistency of .9048. 
The later number indicates a strong association between these conditions and the outcome 
of a significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes and most cases with this outcome are 
represented in the solution.  
Figure 16. Output for Outcome NATSIGdecrease, using SES, IMMG, and Fear only 
 
 In order to ensure that the results for the outcome of NATsigdecrease were not 
simply applicable to all cases in the study, the researcher created a truth table for the 
outcome ~NATsigdecrease, or a lack of significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes. 
This yielded results that supported the analysis of NATsigdecrease. When first including 
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all conditions, in order to use a threshold of .7, the results would have only captured two 
cases. This would not have been significant. Thus, based on the evidence from the 
analysis for NATsigdecrease, the researcher recreated the truth table only including the 
conditions of SES, immigration, and fear politics. This yielded the configuration of 
~SESimprove * IMMGRTNincrease * FEARpolitics, or a lack of significant 
improvement in socioeconomic status, an increase in immigration, and the inclusion of 
fear politics. This solution had a coverage of .6364 and a consistency of 1. Notably, 
Jordan was absent from the truth table because the calibration for fear politics was at the 
cross-over point of .5. That prevented it from being included in the analysis, since there is 
not a clear indicator for this particular condition. Nevertheless, there is sufficient 
evidence that a lack of significant increases in SES coupled with an increase in 
immigration and utilization of fear politics generally leads to an increase in nationalistic 
attitudes.  
Conclusions 
 One of the unique features of the QCA approach is that it is designed to be an 
iterative process. The researcher can add and remove cases and conditions as deemed 
necessary to achieve the most informative and useful results. In this research, the author 
took advantage of the flexibility provided by this method and added a condition – fear 
politics. After assessing the lack of clear results in analyzing the connections between the 
conditions and the outcomes, particularly for changes from Wave 3 to Wave 6, she 
determined that an additional condition might be necessary. Based on the case studies 
conducted, the research demonstrates that the way politicians and leaders utilized 
immigration could be a determinant in shaping people’s nationalistic attitudes. Based on 
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the results of the truth table analysis, that certainly seems to be the case. The inclusion of 
this condition allowed the researcher to hone in on what factors were really affecting 
shifts in nationalistic attitudes.  The final chapter will further explore the results of this 
analysis, along with the overall conclusions that the researcher can make based on the 
descriptive statistics, the case studies, and the fsQCA truth table analysis.  
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CHAPTER XI – CONCLUSIONS 
In the Introduction to this dissertation, the researcher discussed her experience 
with a colleague in Cameroon, in which he expressed his discontent about Western 
cultural influences creating change in that country. These influences spanned from 
clothing and hair to homosexuality, in his view. He demonstrated a clear pride in his own 
country and culture, as well as a desire to protect it. This is one response to globalization 
– a resistance, or jihad. In this instance, jihad is not used in the context of an Islamic 
concept, but rather to represent the resistance to homogenization by asserting one’s 
national identity (Barber 1996). Literally, jihad means “to strive” and “to struggle” (Ali 
2013). People can feel that increased global interactions threaten their culture, their 
autonomy, and their overall well-being (e.g., immigration creating competition for jobs). 
Under these perceived threats, some people will turn inward and heighten their sense of 
national identity. On the other hand, some people will embrace the “McWorld” that is 
created through globalization, relishing in the increased product options and the ease of 
communicating and connecting with people across the world. They also see or experience 
the economic benefits of interconnectedness. Global collaboration is necessary to solve 
the world’s most pressing issues, so understanding the underlying forces that drive people 
to embrace that collaboration or resist it is critical. 
Review of Influential Research 
Throughout this dissertation, the researcher relied on several relevant theories and 
pieces of research. As she will analyze how her research fits within, builds on, and adds 
to these theories, a brief summary may be useful. Pippa Norris is an influential academic 
for the author of this dissertation. Norris relies heavily on the World Values Survey for 
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much of her research and she has often explored how people’s views have shifted toward 
or away from nationalism and cosmopolitan perspectives. In her 2000 article, Norris 
predicated that people will shift away from nationalistic attitudes moving into the future. 
She based this on generational divides she saw in her research at the time, predicting it 
signaled an upcoming change. A related piece of research was conducted by Bekhuis et 
al. (2013). They found that people in the European Union were responding to 
globalization with a heightened sense of nationalism, while in the rest of the world, a 
higher level of globalization equated to a lower level of nationalism (as measured by 
cultural protectionism). The researcher of this dissertation predicted the results found in 
Europe would be replicated to the rest of the world at the start of the project.  
Another influential researcher is Inglehardt. In his 2018 book, Cultural Evolution, 
he outlined how a decrease in existential security leads to an Authoritarian Reflex and 
support for xenophobic ideas. The loss of existential security involves a feeling of threat 
from outside pressures and forces. The authoritarian reflex leads to strong leaders, strong 
in-group identification, rigid conformity to group norms, and rejection of outsiders. 
Building on this idea, Norris and Inglehardt (2019) theorized that one way people 
respond to cultural change is with this authoritarian reflex. In this sense, cultural change 
represents an existential threat (a threat to one’s current way of life). In this response, 
people find reassurances in a like-minded community, support strong leaders who are 
willing to say politically incorrect things, and defend traditional values. As part of her 
research, the author explored how cultural change influences the ways people respond to 
globalization, as well as the role that rhetoric on immigration plays. This certainly ties to 
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the authoritarian and populist leaders who are willing to speak their minds freely, 
particularly in regard to immigration.  
This ties specifically to ideas around how people respond to interactions with the 
“other.” It is understood that national identity is a negotiation between how one views 
themselves and how others view them. One possible outcome is that increased 
interactions with an ‘other’ leads to an increase in identification with one’s national 
identity. When people feel their national identity is threatened, then they may exert it 
more. For example, Fuligni and Tsai found that when immigrants are recognizable 
minorities in their host societies, it creates the sense of a threat, which enhances their 
internal group identification (2015). This was seen in Chile, where black Haitian 
immigrants stood out more so than immigrants from neighboring countries. Of particular 
interest to the researcher is how increased interactions with immigrants affect people’s 
nationalistic attitudes. An especially compelling area to explore is whether the 
interactions with immigrants have an impact or whether the way leaders manipulate those 
interactions has a greater effect. As Kaufman has explained, positioning migrants as a 
threat can lead to emotion-laden symbols of fear, hatred, and resentment (2001), all of 
which can lead to nationalism.  
Methodological Approach 
In order to further explore some of these theories, the researcher developed the 
following research question and hypotheses: 
Research Question: Under what conditions does a country shift toward a more 
nationalistic orientation in the face of increasing globalization? 
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Hypothesis 1: The presence of decreasing socio-economic status, increasing 
income inequality, increased immigration from outside culturally similar regions, 
rapid globalization, and rapid changes to cultural emancipative values lead to a 
shift toward a nationalist political perspective within a population. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of rising socio-economic status, decreasing income 
inequality, falling or steady immigration (or from culturally similar regions), 
steady globalization, and steady or a lack of changes to cultural emancipative 
values lead to a shift away from a nationalist political perspective within a 
population. 
In order to answer this question and determine the extent of the validity of these 
hypotheses, the researcher primarily relied on the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) methodology. The fsQCA approach involves in-depth case studies 
coupled with a systemic cross-case analysis. The fsQCA approach is supported by basic 
descriptive statistics, as well as the evidence presented in case studies themselves.  
To assess the extent of the validity of the hypotheses, the researcher included 11 
cases, two or three from each of several world regions (Latin America, sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the West) and examined changes over a 23-year period 
(1996-2019). The incorporation of cases from across the world allowed the researcher to 
make some broad generalizations, but prevented her from understanding within region 
phenomenon that could be occurring. Overall, the global approach proved a solid starting 
point to draw some generalizable conclusions and keeps the door open for further 




In a purely quantitative analysis of the data, the researcher found that nationalistic 
attitudes declined by 2% overall. However, it is important to note that this represented a 
range from a 12% decline in Romania to a 21% increase in Jordan, so not all countries 
declined in their nationalistic attitudes. The overall decline, though, does align with 
Norris’ prediction that people would shift away from a nationalistic perspective in the 
future (2000). Interestingly, a lower level of globalization was associated with a high 
level of nationalistic attitudes. This lends some evidence to support the idea that a lack of 
exposure to others actually leads to higher nationalistic attitudes. The inverse, more 
exposure through higher levels of globalization leading to lower levels of nationalistic 
attitudes, also holds true. This signals that people are not responding to new ideas and 
people with heightened nationalism. Rather, they are responding by allowing the new 
influences to expand their worldview and outlook.  
There was a mild association between low cultural emancipative values and 
higher nationalism. This was supported in the fsQCA, where low cultural emancipative 
values were a necessary condition for a high rate of nationalistic attitudes. Based on the 
quantitative statistics alone, changes in emancipative values do not have a strong 
association with changes in nationalistic attitudes. However, once changes in nationalistic 
attitudes were adjusted based on qualitative research on campaign rhetoric and election 
results, a correlation was apparent between faster increases in emancipative values and a 
lack of significant decline in nationalistic attitudes. This was the case in Chile, the United 
States, Jordan, and South Africa – all countries where emancipative values shifted 
quickly, but nationalistic attitudes either rose or did not decline significantly. The inverse 
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held true as well, where four of the six countries with significant declines in nationalistic 
attitudes did not have rapid changes in cultural emancipative values; this included China, 
Romania, Turkey, and Nigeria. This aligns with the Norris and Inglehardt’s theory that 
one way people respond to cultural change is by supporting authoritarian leaders and 
nationalistic ideals (2019). Cultural change is a form of insecurity for many people.  
Another source of insecurity can be changes in socioeconomic status. In countries 
where socioeconomic status improved the most, such as Mexico, China, South Korea, 
Romania, Turkey, and Nigeria, nationalistic attitudes declined. Rising socioeconomic 
status creates a stronger sense of existential security and allows people to turn away from 
authoritarian leaders and a nation first platform. They do not feel a need to protect their 
own interests because the “pie” feels big enough for everyone to benefit.  
That finding is particularly noteworthy in terms of its effects on nationalistic 
attitudes and immigration. There is not a strong association with high or low immigration 
and high or low nationalism. Likewise, there is not a close connection between the rate of 
immigration change and changes in nationalistic attitudes. Where there is an interesting 
connection is between a high rate of immigration (not necessarily changes) and an 
increase in nationalistic attitudes (not necessarily high or low rates). The three countries 
that had an increase in nationalistic attitudes – Germany, the United States, and Jordan – 
have the highest rates of immigration by far. Two other countries did not experience a 
significant decline in nationalistic attitudes (although it did decline slightly) and one of 
those, South Africa, had the next highest rate of immigration with a multi-percentage 
point margin over the next highest. What became evident is that politicians and other 
leaders commonly utilized a high rate of immigration to spur fear in their countrymen and 
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women about the “threats” posed by migrants. That point will be explored further in a 
moment.  
The fsQCA analysis allowed the researcher to determine how combinations of 
conditions might work together to produce certain outcomes. Generally, a combination of 
low cultural emancipative values, low globalization, and low socioeconomic status leads 
to a higher level of nationalistic attitudes. This combination is intuitive. A lower 
socioeconomic status can create insecurity, which can cause people to retreat within and 
respond with a desire to protect their own interests in an environment where there is a 
real or perceived scarcity of resources (Inglehardt 2018). High cultural emancipative 
values, as measured by emancipative values, would represent a sense of existential 
security and, thus, a willingness to expand freedoms across society. It is logical that low 
cultural emancipative values would align with lower socioeconomic status and higher 
nationalism. Finally, the low rate of globalization is interesting, as this was a question the 
researcher had. A low rate of globalization represents fewer interactions with different 
people and ideas from other parts of the world. It would appear that, without those 
experiences, people are more likely to favor their own country, their own imagined 
community.  
Conversely, a lower level of nationalistic attitudes is associated with a 
combination of either high socioeconomic status or high equality, coupled with high 
globalization. This is intuitive, as it is the inverse of how the conditions align with high 
nationalism. The high socioeconomic status or high equality represent existential 
security. Globalization represents increased interactions and an exchange of ideas and 
understandings. Bekhuis et al. found that, outside of the European Union, there was a 
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connection between higher globalization and lower nationalistic attitudes. Based on the 
research here, it would appear that these results continue to hold true.  
Beyond the static level of nationalism, the researcher was more interested in what 
conditions might affect changes in nationalistic attitudes. In assessing any decrease in 
nationalistic attitudes, a significant improvement in socioeconomic status was typically 
required. However, there was a lack of clarity around a combination of conditions and 
changes in immigration especially lacked informative value. Upon that realization, the 
researcher created a new condition – Fear Politics. The incorporation of Fear Politics as a 
condition provided some solid evidence for how strongly the manipulation of 
immigration issues affects people’s nationalistic attitudes. In six of the eight cases where 
nationalistic attitudes declined, there was a strong improvement in socioeconomic status 
paired with a lack of fear politics. Chile and South Africa, however, had the opposite for 
each of these conditions. Interestingly, they are the two cases where there was a decline 
in nationalistic attitudes, but it was so small that they were classified as more out of the 
group with a significant decline.  
In assessing the conditions as they related to a significant decline in nationalistic 
attitudes, all six cases aligned in having strong improvements in socioeconomic status 
and a lack of fear politics. This included Mexico, China, South Korea, Romania, Turkey, 
and Nigeria. In analyzing a lack of significant increase in nationalistic attitudes, four of 
the five cases (Chile, Germany, the United States, and South Africa) all had an absence of 
strong improvements in socioeconomic status, a significant increase in immigration (or 
immigration from outside their cultural group), and the presence of fear politics. The 
outlier was Jordan, which did have strong improvements in socioeconomic status, the 
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absence of a significant increase in immigration, and was right at the cross-over point for 
the inclusion of fear politics. However, because Jordan is controlled by a monarch and 
there are fewer opportunities for people to express themselves through democratic 
elections, the researcher questions if she accurately assessed Jordan as having a rise in 
nationalistic attitudes. The determination was made based on a stark change in responses 
for one question on the World Values Survey, coupled with an assessment of Jordon 
becoming increasingly intolerant of the mass migration wave.  
Analysis of Findings: Alignment with Hypotheses and Literature 
The researcher hypothesized that a decline in socioeconomic status, an increase in 
inequality, an increase in immigration (especially from outside the cultural group), faster 
rises in globalization, and rapid changes in cultural emancipative values would lead to an 
increase in nationalistic attitudes. (She hypothesized that the inverse would also hold 
true.) To start, the researcher will explore these conditions one by one. For 
socioeconomic status, a strong improvement is aligned with a decline in nationalistic 
attitudes, and a weak improvement is aligned with an increase in nationalistic attitudes, as 
hypothesized. Changes in equality, though, did not correlate with changes in nationalistic 
attitudes. Largely, increases in immigration rates did not impact changes in nationalistic 
attitudes. However, countries that had a high rate of immigration were much more likely 
to experience an increase in nationalistic attitudes over the past twenty years.  
The hypothesis around globalization was proven false, while the predication about 
cultural change was supported. Although the researcher predicted that faster rises in 
globalization would lead to an increase in nationalism, the inverse was actually true. In 
all five cases that did not experience a significant decline in nationalism, the rate of 
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globalization increases was slow. In four of the six cases that experienced a significant 
decline in nationalism, the rate of globalization had increased rapidly. To simplify, faster 
rises in globalization paired with more significant declines in nationalism. Similarly, four 
out of five cases with a rapid rise in cultural emancipative values did not experience a 
significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes. In four out of six cases with slow changes 
in cultural values, there was a significant decrease in nationalistic attitudes. In simple 
terms, slower changes in cultural values paired with sharper declines in nationalism. This 
juxtaposition between globalization and cultural values is interesting. One would 
anticipate that a rapid rise in globalization would accompany a more rapid shift in 
cultural values, but this was not the case. Thus, changes in globalization aligned with a 
decrease in nationalism, while changes in cultural values aligned with an increase or 
slower decrease in nationalism. In some ways, this really speaks to Barber’s theory of 
McWorld vs. jihad – both seem to be at play here (1996). People are embracing 
globalization and the benefits it brings, but become resistant if they see their culture 
changing.  
Perhaps the most interesting outcome was the addition of fear politics as a 
condition. After seeing the lack of alignment between changes in immigration and 
changes in nationalistic attitudes, the researcher added this element. There was an 
incredibly strong correlation between the utilization of fear politics about migrants and an 
increase in nationalistic attitudes (or a slower than average decrease). Notably, there is 
also alignment with a high rate of immigration. However, in Chile, there is a low rate of 
immigration and a lack of significant decline in nationalism, but it does have the presence 
of fear politics at play. Politicians focused a great deal on immigration, in a way that had 
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not really been done in Latin America. So, while a high rate of immigration may provide 
an easy avenue for leaders to implement fear politics, it can be done with even with low 
rates of immigration, and it certainly appears to be an informative condition for 
nationalistic attitudes to shift.  
Although not all results aligned with the hypotheses, many theories from literature 
were supported. Norris (2000) had predicted a shift away from nationalistic attitudes. 
This was the case, on average, in the eleven countries in this study. Bekhuis et al (2013) 
had found that higher rates of globalization correlated with lower rates of nationalism (or 
cultural protectionism) in most of the world, but the opposite was true in the European 
Union. The researcher predicted that what he found in the EU would now be evident in 
the rest of the world. However, what Bekhuis et al found in 2013 for the world, held true. 
Higher rates of globalization were strongly associated with lower rates of nationalistic 
attitudes. Inglehardt (2018) theorized that a decline in existential security causes people 
to turn to strong leaders, in-group identity, a rejection of outsiders, and xenophobic 
attitudes. This theory did align with the strong correlation between poor socioeconomic 
status and high rates of nationalistic attitudes. Additionally, the absence of strong 
improvements in socioeconomic status (SES) correlate with a lack of a significant 
decrease in nationalist attitudes. So, strong SES and improvements in SES accompany 
lower rates of and declines in nationalism. However, when SES is low and improvements 
are not strong, people turn to strong leaders and a rejection of outsiders – nationalism. 
Finally, Norris and Inglehardt (2019) explored the ways people respond to changes in 
culture. They found that one response is the authoritarian reflex, where people find 
reassurances in like-minded people and defend traditional values, at the expense of 
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others. This notion was supported through this research. Cultural emancipative values 
rose faster where there was an increase in nationalistic attitudes (or a slower than average 
decrease). Significant declines in nationalism were found in places where cultural 
emancipative values had changed more slowly.  
Final Thoughts 
A more global outlook will be necessary to solve the world’s most pressing issues 
– climate change, migration, terrorism, to name a few. As people turn inward and adopt 
nationalistic perspectives, it impedes with identifying and implementing solutions to 
these crises. The encouraging news is that Norris’ predication in 2000 was correct, at 
least among the 11 cases in this study. The average rate of nationalism declined. 
However, there were three cases where it increased and another two where it declined at a 
slower than average rate. In all five of these instances, leaders utilized fear politics about 
migration to convince people that migrants presented a threat to their livelihoods (jobs) 
and way of life (culture). In four of these five countries, they lacked strong improvements 
in socioeconomic status, as well. This supports Inglehardt’s idea that a lack of existential 
security leads to increases in nationalistic attitudes (2018). To move towards a less 
nationalistic perspective (favoring one’s own nation at the expense of others and a 
resistance to international initiatives to solving problems), it is critical to encourage 
improvements in socioeconomic status, globalization, and leaders who do not shape 
migration to be a threat to society.  
As the researcher concludes this final chapter of the dissertation, the world is in 
the midst of the COVID-19 global health pandemic. Globalization created the 
infrastructures for the virus, which first appeared in China, to travel very quickly to every 
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continent and nearly every country on the globe. Some people are embracing 
globalization as a solution, compelling officials and researchers from around the world to 
work together to develop testing and vaccines. However, others view globalization as the 
problem and some have been quick to take a nationalistic approach. For example, the 
United States put some regulations in place to prevent certain equipment from being 
shipped outside of the country. It is far too early to anticipate what the outcome will be of 
the pandemic in terms of how people will feel about globalization, as well as their own 
nation, at the end of the day. Just as rhetoric about immigration played a key role over the 
last several decades in determining how nationalistic attitudes have shifted, the ways in 
which leaders frame this pandemic may very well influence any shifts in nationalistic 
attitudes over the next couple of decades.  
Globalization is happening. Mobility is occurring. Money is flowing between 
countries. Global governance systems are in place.  Creating an environment in which 
people shift away from nationalistic attitudes and embrace being “global citizens” as part 
of their identity will be critical.  Global citizens understand the ways their actions impact 
people across the globe; they have empathy for others, even beyond what they imagine as 
their nation; and they seek collaborative solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. 
They see a pie that can expand to include everyone and envision a world in which all 
people can have fulfilling lives.  
Nationalism is damaging for the country that experiences it, as well as the world 
as a whole. Nationalistic countries tend to favor the majority and the dominant cultural 
norms. While nationalists put their nation’s needs above the needs of others, this usually 
entails the needs of the majority. For instance, nationalists in the United States are not 
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typically standing up for the rights of the LGBTQ+ community or racial and ethnic 
minorities, even though they are residents of the same nation state. Nationalism tends to 
carry with it exclusionary practices, contrary to the idea of one big imagined community. 
In the United States, the protests around the killing of a black man, George Floyd, by 
white police officers in Minnesota has highlighted the inequities and racism in America. 
A nationalist may point to the physical property damage that is occurring as a result of 
some of the protests and signal a need to squash any “riots” in order to preserve and 
protect the nation. However, the prioritizing of physical property may undermine the real 
issue of inequality within the nation. Nationalists only view those who are similar to them 
as being a part of their community. Those who do not fit within the dominant group can 
be perceived as a threat to their nation.    
Nationalism is also damaging to the world.  Prioritizing only one’s own country 
has negative implications for other countries and for one’s own country in the long run. 
Leaders should not have a narrow lens of what is best for “us” at this point in time 
without thinking about the interconnectedness and long-term impacts. For example, not 
spending enough resources on combatting terrorism and addressing other underlying 
issues for many conflicts is ultimately bad for all global citizens, as ongoing conflicts 
create displaced persons and spikes in unplanned migration.  
At its worst, nationalism can lead to brutal extremism. In Rwanda, this was 
evidenced by the use of Fear Politics to promote nationalism. In this instance, the 
“nation” was comprised as the Hutu ethnic group. The extreme nationalism was stoked 
by fear politics, in which leaders promoted the idea that Tutsi expatriates, who had been 
forced to flee from Rwanda to Uganda decades prior, were returning to take over and 
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destroy all Hutu, removing them from power. This generated an “us” vs. “them” 
mentality and heightened national identities. It drove many Hutu to kill Tutsi neighbors in 
an effort to “eliminate them” and preserve the Hutu nation (and power). Because the 
socioeconomic status was low and many young Hutu were out of work, the conditions 
were ripe for this type of fear politics and rising nationalism.  
As explored in the introductory chapter, nationalism can also lead to lone wolf 
violence against those in society who do not represent the dominant culture. For example, 
in July 2011, when Anders Breivik killed nearly 80 people at a summer camp in Norway, 
it was largely an act of resistance against the multicultural and feminist agenda of the 
social democratic Labor Party and the first female Prime Minister.  
In assessing the utility of the research in this dissertation, further research would 
be useful in assessing what can be done to encourage conditions that lead to a shift away 
from nationalistic attitudes. This research has revealed that increasing globalization 
(including mobility), without forcing shifts in cultural emancipative values, coupled with 
improving socioeconomic status, can be key in these efforts. In addition, research could 
and should delve more deeply into individual regions, especially given the regional splits 
that were evidenced in some areas of research.   
In order to aide in shifting people’s attitudes away from nationalistic ones, we can 
encourage greater globalization, efforts that improve the socioeconomic status around the 
world, and combat fear politics by advancing agendas and electing officials who rely on 
and promote fact-based information and policies. Globalization can come in many forms, 
including fostering greater student mobility. With the COVID-19 health pandemic, 
student mobility is in jeopardy. However, globalization can still be encouraged through 
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other ways of introducing people to new ideas and cultures, such as through virtual 
conversations amongst peers at universities in different countries. Nothing replaces the 
experience of being fully immersed in a new place and culture, but exposure to that 
culture through other means can help facilitate the development of a global orientation.  
Globalization is on the rise, but nationalism is not overall. However, there are 
cases where nationalistic attitudes are decreasing significantly and other examples where 
it is on the rise. This research sought to understand the conditions that predict which 
outcome will occur. By better understanding those conditions, we can work toward 
promoting conditions that encourage a shift away from nationalistic attitudes, such as 





APPENDIX A  WORLD VALUES SURVEY QUESTIONS UTILIZED TO 
DETERMINE LEVEL OF NATIONALISM 
The questions that will be utilized from the World Values Survey to determine the level 
of nationalism or cosmopolitanism for each country are as follows (Wave 6 wording is 
utilized): 
From the Norris (2000) study: 
1. When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country 
over immigrants. (Agree, Neither, Disagree, Inappropriate, No answer, Don´t 
know) 
2. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the 
world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?  
a. I see myself as a world citizen  
b. I see myself as part of the [French]* nation 
(Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, Inappropriate, No 
answer, Don´t know) 
(In Waves 5 and 6, these are separate questions; in previous waves (including 
Wave 3) they are merged into one question in which respondents are selecting 
to which group they belong first, and second.) 
3. I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, 
quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?: 
a. The government (in your nation’s capital)  
 
346 
b. The United Nations 
Additional questions added by the researcher: 
1. On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that 
you would not like to have as neighbors?: Immigrants/Foreign workers  
(Mentioned, Not mentioned, Inappropriate) 
2. How proud are you to be [Nationality]*? (Very proud, Quite proud, Not very 
proud, Not at all proud, I am not [nationality], Inappropriate, No answer, 
Don´t know) 
3. I ‘d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could 
you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, 
somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another nationality (Trust 
completely, Trust somewhat, Do not trust very much, Do not trust at all, 
Inappropriate, Not applicable, No answer Don´t know) 
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APPENDIX B  CASES 













Chile Latin America 17,909.75 13,792.90 0.847 Nationalism Increasing 4% 52.05 
Mexico Latin America 127,540.42 8,208.60 0.762 Nationalism Decreasing 12% 51.72 
China Asia 1,378,665.00 8,123.20 0.738 Nationalism Decreasing 115% 54.23 
South 
Korea Asia 51,245.71 27,538.80 0.901 Nationalism Increasing 19% 53.93 
Germany West 82,487.84 42,161.30 0.926 
Nationalism Increasing 
(clear) 12% 85.49 
Romania West  19,699.31 9,522.80 0.802 
Nationalism Decreasing 
(clear) 92% 70.97 
USA West  323,127.51 57,638.20 0.92 Unclear 4% 78.82 
Turkey Middle East 79,512.43 10,862.60 0.767 Nationalism Decreasing 54% 68.22 
Jordan Middle East 9,455.80 4,087.90 0.741 Unclear 34% 54.72 
South 
Africa Africa 56,015.47 5,274.50 0.666 Unclear 16% 48.71 
Nigeria Africa 185,989.64 2,175.70 0.527 Unclear 21% 21.13 
 








9,000-20,000: 3 2000-5000: 2 .5-.6: 1 Increasing: 3 0-20%: 6 0-20: 0   
21,000-50000: 0 5100-10000: 4 .61-.7: 1 Decreasing: 4 21-40%: 2 21-40: 1  
51,000-100,000: 4 10001-20,000: 2 .71-.8: 4 Unclear: 4 41-60%: 1 41-60: 6 
101,000-150,000: 1 20001-40000: 1 .81-.9: 2  61-80%: 0 61-80: 3  
150,000-400,000: 2 41000-60000: 2 .91-1.0: 3  81-100%: 2 81-100: 1  
400,000 or more: 1      
    
Across the 24 
countries available in 
step 3, 14 are in the 0-
20% range. This 
represents 58%. With 
our cases here, we 
have 6 of 11 in the 0-
20% range, which is 
55% 
Across the 24 
countries available in 
step 3, 10 of 24 are in 
the 41-60 range. This 
is 42%. With our 
cases here, we have 6 
of 11, which is 55% 
    
    
    
*as of 2016;  in thousands; data from World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) 




APPENDIX C  POTENTIAL CONDITIONS 
Conditions Utilized 
Condition Theory  Measurement/ Source Notes 
1. Socio-Economic Status 
(and % change, relative to 
other countries) 
Factor is existential security; a 
decline in security can lead to 
increased nationalism 
(Inglehardt 2018, p. 185) 
 The following three 
conditions will be grouped 
into one condition. 
1a. GDP/capita (and 
percentage change, 
relative to other 
countries) 
Bekhuis et al speculated that 
more research is needed to 
determine how income and 
education levels impact the 
effect of globalization 
GDP per capita Higher income per capita 
creates more security and 
thus less nationalism as 
response to globalization 
1b. Employment rates 
(%change) 
“Ronald Inglehart predicts that 
in a situation of growing 
insecurities traditional societies 
may experience a resurgence in 
feelings of nationalism and 
identification with the nation-
state” (Norris 2000)  Inglehart 
(2018) – add employment levels 
as indicator (cultural evolution 
book, p. 183) 
UN data, World Bank 
data, current articles 
High unemployment 
creates insecurity and more 
nationalism. 
 
1c. Quality of Life Inglehardt (2018) includes this 
in his analysis of how “secure” 
a society may perceive itself to 
be. 
Life expectancy and 
Infant mortality (World 
Bank, UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, UN 
Demographic Yearbook) 
High quality of life leads to 
more security and, thus, 
less nationalism. 
2. Income Inequality Factor is existential security; a 
decline in security (increased 
inequality) can lead to increased 
nationalism (Inglehardt 2018) 
Gini Index  High income inequality 
leads to insecurity and, 
thus, more nationalism. 
3. Type and Rate of 
Immigration 
Based on current events 
(particularly around elections), 
there has been emphasis placed 
on the connection between 
immigration and nationalism. 
Threats to security (jobs, 
physical safety) are often 
attributed to immigrants. 
World Bank data, UN 
Office of Migration; 
examine if from similar 
cultural region, type of 
migration; record 
movement into and out 
of the country as that can 
impact the affect of 
globalization (Clifford 
1992). 
This would be a condition 
that is a particular form of 
cultural globalization. 
Increases in immigration, 
particularly from outside 
the same cultural region, 
may increase nationalism. 
4. Speed of Globalization Ronald Inglehart – growing 
insecurities may result in a turn 
toward national identity 
KOF data; Maastricht 
index 
Faster changes create more 
uncertainty and increases 
nationalism. 
5. Speed of Cultural 
Change 
Norris (2016); Florida (2017) 
speculate that the rise in 
populism can be attributed to a 
fear of cultural changes. 
Emancipative values 
(Welzel 2013) – shown 
to be reliable measure of 
cultural change 
Faster speed of cultural 










Conditions Initially Considered – Not Selected 
Level of 
education  
Norris (2000) found 
that higher levels of 
education were more 
highly associated with 
a sense of belonging 
to the EU; Bekhuis et 
al speculated that 
more research is 
needed to determine 
how income and 
education levels 
impact the effect of 
globalization 
Literacy rates; education levels (World Bank 
data); UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2017) 
and the United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook (2015) 
Higher educ may mean 
less nationalism because 
can benefit from 
globalization; however, it 
may not have that impact if 
existential security is more 
critical. 
 
If education level is found 
to be correlated with 
‘socio-economic status,’ 
then this may be combined 




Norris found that 
English-speakers 
shows higher levels of 
cosmopolitanism than 
those with a 
Confucian tradition 
Language of the country; responses in WVS Perhaps more willing to 
accept a ‘world citizen’ 
mentality if your native or 
learned language is the 
dominant one in that 
world. 
REMOVED because only 








societies would be 
less cosmopolitan in 
response to 
globalization  
World Bank data Norris argued that this 
applied to all societies and 
was not limited to 
traditional societies.  
REMOVED because 
correlation to some other 





Scheepers  (2003) 




News articles; government documents REMOVED because not 
practical to adequately 
assess within the scope of 
this research 
Overseas Aid 
Spending by the 
Government 
(and conversely 
amount of aid 





anticipated that this 
could be a factor in 
the level of nationalist 
attitudes 
DAC online OECD Statistics: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? 
DatasetCode=TABLE1 
REMOVED because not 
enough theoretical support 








Pager suggested that 
exporting national 
culture is a more 
effective means of 
protecting national 
culture.  
The Compendium of Cultural Policies and 
Trends in Europe (Council of 
Europe/ERICarts, 2011); National 
Performance Network (Bedoya, 2004); 
cultural import figures on books, films, 
videos, and CDs, as a percentage of country’s 
GDP, which can be derived from the 
UNCTADstat (2011) database 
Korea – exports cultural 
products; France does not.  
Exporting national culture 
may allow for more 
effective preserving of 
national pride or may make 
people feel less threatened. 
 
REMOVED – not practical 
to calibrate within the 
scope of this research 
Student mobility 
(both directions) 
Norris – youth are 
more likely to be 
more cosmopolitan   
% of students going abroad; % of students 
who are international students; IIE “A World 
on the Move”  
REMOVED – Influence on 
youth takes a generation to 
impact larger society. 
% of youth in 
population 
Norris – youth more 
likely to be less 
nationalistic; 
generational shift 
UN demographic data; World Bank data REMOVED – Influence on 
youth takes a generation to 





Norris (2009) noted 
that consistent 
patterns rarely emerge 
in the shifts in 
cosmopolitan 
identities; current 
events and activities 
may play a significant 
role 
News articles Will focus on 
events/activities that occur 
in the two years prior to 
when individuals in that 
country were surveyed 
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APPENDIX D - DETERMINING NATIONALISTIC ATTITUDES SCORE 
The researcher assigned a ‘nationalist attitudes’ score for each question where 0 
represent “not at all nationalistic” and 1.0 represents “fully nationalistic.” This is a 
similar approach to how Welzel determined the emancipative score for his research, 
which was also based on the World Values Survey.  Below, the researcher will dictate 
how she determined the score based on each question.  
A. Foreign Neighbors: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please 
mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?: Immigrants/Foreign workers  
(Mentioned, Not mentioned, Inappropriate) 
   
The results are broken into the percentage that mentioned foreigners as a type of 
neighbor they would not like to have and the percentage that did not mention 
them.  Mentioning them would be a 1 (fully nationalistic) on this scale; not 
mentioning them would be a 0 (not at all nationalistic). For example, in Rwanda, 
5.4% of respondents ‘mentioned’ foreigners, while 94.6% did ‘not mention’ them. 
5.4 participants would receive a 1, totaling 5.4.  94.6 participants would receive a 
0, totaling 0.  The total is 5.4, which results in an average of .054 when divided by 
100. 
B. Jobs Scare: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this 
country over immigrants. (Agree, Neither, Disagree, Inappropriate, No answer, Don´t 
know) 
The results are broken into the percentage that “agree,” indicate “neither agree nor 
disagree,” and that “disagree.” (A few other categories, such as ‘did not answer’ 
are included in the options, but are not useful here.) Agreeing would be a 1; 
Neither is .5; and Disagree is 0.  For example, in Rwanda, 52.8% agreed; 26.5% 
indicated neither; and 20.8% disagreed. To calculate the score, the researcher took 
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52.8 x 1 = 52.8;  26.5 x .5 = 13.25; and 20.8x0 = 0.  Then she added the totals 
(52.8+13.25+0 = 66.05). This resulted in a score of .6605 when divided by the 
total percentage represented in the agree, neither, and disagree responses.  
C. National Pride: How proud are you to be [Nationality]*? (Very proud, Quite proud, 
Not very proud, Not at all proud, I am not [nationality], Inappropriate, No answer, Don´t 
know) 
 
The results are broken into the following options, with the score assessment 
provided: 
  Very (1.0); Quite (.666); Not Very (.333); Not at all (0) 
  The same process as earlier noted was followed to determine the score. 
D. Identity: People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the 
world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each 
of the following statements about how you see yourself?  
a. I see myself as a world citizen  
b. I see myself as part of the [French]* nation 
(Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, Inappropriate, No 
answer, Don´t know) 
 
The ‘see self’ as questions changed in format from Wave 4 to Wave 5.  In W4 and 
prior, they asked two questions about what a person identifies with first and then a 
second question about what a person identifies with second and they provided 
options of local community, nation, region, or world. Starting with W5, they 
asked discrete questions for each level (local, national, regional, world) and to 
what extent a person sees themselves as ‘a world citizen’ (strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree).  This makes comparisons between Wave 3 and 
Wave 6 challenging.  
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For Wave 6, the researcher incorporated the results into the overall ‘nationalism’ 
score, with the following alignments: (World Citizen) Strongly Agree (0), Agree 
(.33), Disagree (.66), strongly disagree (1) and (Nation) Strongly Agree (1), Agree 
(.66), Disagree (.33), Strongly disagree (0).   
For Wave 3, the researcher incorporated the results into the overall ‘nationalism’ 
score by examining the percentage of people that noted that they identify first or 
second with the ‘world’ and first or second with their ‘nation,’ respectively. The 
following alignments will be utilized: 
World: 0-10% (1), 10.1 – 15% (.75), 15.1 – 20% (.5), 20.1 – 30% (.25), 30.1 -
100% (0) Nation: 0-30% (0), 30.1-60% (.25), 60.1-70% (.5), 70.1-80% (.75), 
80.1 -100% (1) 
Because of the vast differences in coding the Wave 3 and Wave 6 question types, 
the researcher decided to omit this question from the Descriptive Statistics 
analysis, but will include it in the qualitative comparative analysis.  
E. Confidence: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you 
tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a 
lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (United Nations, National 
Government) 
 
The researcher incorporated the results into the overall nationalism score with the 
following ratings:  
(UN) Great deal (0), Quite a lot (.33), Not very much (.66), None (1.0) and  





The researcher then combined the score for each question to determine an overall 
‘nationalist attitudes’ score for Wave 3 and for Wave 6. 
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APPENDIX E  EMANCIPATIVE VALUES (CULTURAL VALUES) SCORE 
Welzel’s (2013) emancipative values score is generated by combining four sub-
indexes, each containing four questions from the World Values Survey. The sub-indexes 
and questions are as follows: 
Autonomy Sub-Index: 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, 
if any, do you consider to be especially important? 
    Mentioned Not Mentioned 
Independence  1  0 
Imagination  1  0 
Obedience  0  1 
 
 
Equality Sub-Index:  
 
“Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following 
statements?  
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”  
 
Agree is coded 0, neither nor is coded as .5 and disagree is coded as 1. 
 
“For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly 
you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree?  
 
- A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.  
- On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.”  
 
‘Strongly agree’ is coded 0, ‘agree’ is coded .25, ‘disagree’ is coded .75, and 
‘strongly disagree’ is coded 1.  
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To create the equality sub-index, recoded scores are averaged over the three 
items. 
Choice Sub-Index:  
 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always 





Never Justifiable = 1 Always justifiable = 10 
Codes are rescaled from minimum 0 to maximum 1 for each of the three items. 
This is done by subtracting 1 from the respondent’s score and then dividing the 
resulting difference by 9 (given score minus minimum possible score divided by 
the difference between the maximum and minimum possible score). To create the 
choice sub-index, recoded scores are averaged over the three items. 
Voice Sub-Index: 
 
“People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the 
next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people 
would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, 
consider the most important? (…) And second most important?  
 
There are twelve aims in total, among them:  
 
- Giving people more say in important government decisions  
- Protecting freedom of speech  
- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in 




Responses are recoded into 0 when the item has not been chosen as important, .5 
when it has been chosen as second most important and 1 when it has been chosen 
as most important. To create the voice sub-index, the recoded scores are averaged 
over the three items. 
 
 
Creating the Overall Index of Emancipative Values  
The overall index of emancipative values is the average over the four sub-indices, 




APPENDIX F  CALIBRATION OF CONDITIONS AND OUTCOME WAVE 6 
Socioeconomic status – Wave 6 (2012) 











Chile 15432 6.7 78.8 7.2 0.75 
Mexico 9940 4.9 76.4 14.1 0.25 
China 6338 4.1 75.6 11.6 0.25 
South Korea 24359 3.2 80.8 3.3 0.75 
Germany 44065 5.4 80.5 3.3 0.75 
Romania 8535 6.8 74.4 9.4 0.25 
USA 51603 7.9 78.7 6.1 0.75 
Turkey 11720 8.1 74.7 14.3 0.25 
Jordan 3871 12.2 73.7 17 0.25 
South 
Africa 7478 24.7 58.5 36.1 0 
Nigeria 2746 3.8 51.7 75.7 0 


































More in than 
out (25,001-
58,510) 0.75 
More in than 
out (4.0 to 
4.9) 0.75 
More in than 
out (75 to 
80) 0.75 
More in than 






nor out (5) 0.5 
Neither in 
nor out (75) 0.5 
Neither in 







than in (5.1 
to 10) 0.25 
More out 
than in (60 
to 74.9) 0.25 
More out 
than in (10.1 
























Key   
Chile 47.4 0.25 1.00 Fully In (less than 35) 
Mexico 45.4 0.25 0.75 
More in than out (35-
45) 
China 42.2 0.75 0.50 Neither in nor out (45) 
South Korea 31.6 1 0.25 
More out than in (45.1-
50) 
Germany 30.8 1 0.00 
Fully out (more than 
50) 
Romania 36.5 0.75   
USA 40.8 0.75   
Turkey 40.2 0.75   
Jordan 33.7 1   
South 
Africa 63.2 0   
Nigeria 43 0.75   
Average 41.35    
 
Immigration  2015 




pop Calibration  
Calibration 
Key (High 
Immigration):   
Chile 3% 0.25  1.00 Fully in (10% or more) 
Mexico 1% 0.00  0.75 More in than out (5.1-10%) 
China 0% 0.00  0.50 Neither in nor out (5%) 
South Korea 3% 0.25  0.25 More out than in (1.1-4.9%) 
Germany 15% 1.00  0.00 Fully out (0-1%) 
Romania 1% 0.25    
USA 15% 1.00    
Turkey 4% 0.25    
Jordan 34% 1.00    
South 
Africa 6% 0.75    




Cultural Globalization (KOF Index) CuGI – Wave 6 (2012) 




Globalization   
Chile 68.35 0.75  1 Fully in (80 and above) 
Mexico 63.11 0.25  0.75 More in than out (66-79) 
China 53.20 0.25  0.5 Neither in nor out (65) 
South Korea 78.97 0.75  0.25 More out than in (50-64) 
Germany 88.83 1  0 Fully out (less than 50) 
Romania 74.83 0.75    
USA 85.34 1    
Turkey 63.46 0.25    
Jordan 59.17 0.25    
South Africa 59.19 0.25    
Nigeria 30.49 0    
Avg (w/o 
Nigeria) 69.45      
AVERAGE 65.90      
 









Values    
Chile 5 0.25   1 Fully in (7 and above) 
Mexico 5 0.25   0.75 More in than out (6) 
China 4 0.25   0.5 Neither in nor out (5.5) 
South 
Korea 5 0.25   0.25 
More out than in (4 
and 5) 
Germany 6 0.75   0 
Fully out (3 and 
below) 
Romania 5 0.25     
USA 6 0.75     
Turkey 4 0.25     
Jordan 3 0     
South 
Africa 5 0.25     




Nationalistic Attitudes  Wave 6 (2012) 
Country 
Nationalism 




Attitudes   
Chile 0.54 0.25  1.00 
Fully in (.7 and 
above) 
Mexico 0.54 0.25  0.75 
more in than 
out (.58 to .69) 
China 0.56 0.25  0.50 
neither in nor 
out (.57) 
South Korea 0.59 0.75  0.25 
More out than 
in (.51 to .56) 
Germany 0.50 0.00  0.00 
fully out (.5 and 
below) 
Romania 0.55 0.25    
USA 0.54 0.25    
Turkey 0.60 0.75    
Jordan* 0.71 1.00    
South 
Africa 0.58 0.75    
Nigeria 0.56 0.25    




APPENDIX G CALIBRATION OF CONDITIONS AND OUTCOME: CHANGES 
WAVE 3 (1996) TO WAVE 6 (PRESENT) 
















Chile 187% 0.75 14% 0 4% 0.75 -32% 0.25 0.4375 0.25 
Mexico 131% 0.25 -7% 1 4% 0.75 -49% 0.75 0.6875 0.75 
China 794% 1 37% 0 7% 1 -68% 1 0.75 0.75 
South 
Korea 85% 0 60% 0 9% 1 -60% 1 0.5 0.75 
Germany 44% 0 -39% 1 5% 0.75 -35% 0.25 0.5 0.25 
Romania 419% 1 1% 1 8% 1 -57% 0.75 0.6875 0.75 
USA 72% 0 44% 0 4% 0.75 -21% 0 0.1875 0.25 
Turkey 284% 0.75 23% 0 11% 1 -65% 1 0.6875 0.75 
Jordan 164% 0.75 -11% 1 4% 0.75 -34% 0.25 0.6875 0.75 
South 
Africa 117% 0.25 -1% 0 -3% 0 -25% 0 0.3125 0.25 
Nigeria 496% 1 -14% 1 13% 1 -38% 0.25 0.8125 0.75 
Clb = Calibration 
 Key: 





Improvements in Life 
Expectancy 














(more than 6%) 1 
Full Membership (60% or 
more) 
0.75 
More in than out 
(151-400%)    0.75 
More in than out 
(2-6% increase) 0.75 
More in than out (46-59% 
decline) 
0.5 
Neither in nor 




Neither in nor 
out (1% 
increase) 0.5 
Neither in nor out (45% 
decline) 
0.25 
More out than in 
(100 - 150%)    0.25 
More out than in 
(no change) 0.25 
More out than in (29-44% 
decline) 
0 
Fully out (less 





Fully Out (a 
decline in life 
expectency 0 






Inequality (GINI)  Wave 6 (2012) 
Country 
GINI 




Equity (GINI)*   
Chile -14% 1  1.00 
Fully in (more 
than 10% 
improvement) 
Mexico -6% 0.75  0.75 
More in than out 
(4-10% 
improvement) 
China 20% 0  0.50 




Korea n/a 0.25  0.25 
More out than in 
(1-3%) 
Germany 7% 0  0.00 
Fully out (no 
change or 
Decline) 
Romania 29% 0      
USA 0% 0  
* Improvement is 
represented by a 
decline   
Turkey -3% 0.25    
Jordan -7% 0.75    
South 
Africa 4% 0    
Nigeria -17% 1    
         
Average 1%      
 
Immigration Changes as a Percentage of Population (1995 to 2015) 
Country 
Immigration 
Change Calibration   
Calibration Key: Significant 
increase in immigration per 
population (95 to 2015) 
Chile 230% 1.00   1 Fully in (200% or more) 
Mexico 160% 0.25*   0.75 More in than out (101-199%) 
China 121% 0.25*   0.5 Neither in nor out (100%) 
South Korea 971% 0.75*   0.25 More out than in (50-99%) 
Germany 61% 0.75*   0 Fully out (less than 50%) 
Romania 68% 0.25     
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Immigration Changes as a Percentage of Population (1995 to 2015) (continued). 
USA 64% 0.75*     
Turkey 144% 0.75     
Jordan 102% 0.75     
South Africa 213% 1.00     
Nigeria 159% 0.25*     
          
AVERAGE 208%       
Manually adjusted calibration 




Change Calibration   
Calibration Key: Significant increase in 
cultural globalization (1996 to 2012 
CuGI) 
Chile 8% 0.25   1 Fully in (over 85) 
Mexico 9% 0.25   0.75 More in than out (25 to 85) 
China 127% 1.00   0.5 Neither in nor out (24) 
South 
Korea 15% 0.25   0.25 More out than in (1 to 24) 
Germany 3% 0.25   0 Fully out (no change or a decline) 
Romania 59% 0.75     
USA 20% 0.25     
Turkey 47% 0.75     
Jordan 12% 0.00     
South 
Africa 30% 0.25     
Nigeria 401% 1.00     
Avg (w/o 
Nigeria) 33%       
Average 67%       
 





Change Calibration    
Calibration Key: Significant 
increase in emancipative values 
Chile 21% 1   1 Fully in (more than 14%) 
Mexico 17% 1   0.75 More in than out (9.1-14%) 
China 5% 0.25   0.5 Neither in nor out (9%) 
South 
Korea 14% 0.75   0.25 More out than in (3-8.9%) 
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Cultural (Emancipative) Values Changes  Wave 3 (1996) to Wave 6 (2012) (continued). 
Germany -2% 0   0 Fully out (less than 3%) 
Romania -5% 0     
USA 10% 0.75     
Turkey -1% 0     
Jordan 9% 0.75     
South 
Africa 27% 1     
Nigeria 6% 0.25     
Average 9%      
 











Significant Decrease in  
Nationalism (W3 to W6) 
Chile -5% 1.00 0.25   1.00 
Fully In 
(Declined) 1.00 
Fully in (9% or 
more decline) 
Mexico 1% 1.00 0.75       0.75 
More in than out 
(5.1 to 8% decline) 
China -8% 1.00 0.75   0.50 
Neither in 
nor out (0% 
change) 0.50 
Neither in nor out 
(5% decline) 
South 
Korea -5% 1.00 0.75       0.25 
More out than in 
(1- 4.9% decline) 
Germany 14% 0.00 0   0.00 
Fully Out 
(Increased) 0.00 
Fully out (less than 
1% decline) 
Romania -12% 1.00 1       
USA 6% 0.00 0       
Turkey -6% 1.00 0.75       
Jordan 21% 0.00 0       
South 
Africa -12% 1.00 1       
Nigeria -9% 1.00 1       
Average -2%           
*manually changed because of additional factors indicating nationalistic attitudes, including election results 
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